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Abstract 
 
This thesis uses evidence from British and international archives to examine the events 
leading up to Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on 11 November 
1965 from the perspectives of Britain, the Old Commonwealth (Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand), and the United States.  Two underlying themes run throughout the thesis.  
First, it argues that although the problem of Rhodesian independence was highly 
complex, a UDI was by no means inevitable.  There were courses of action that were 
dismissed or remained under explored (especially in Britain, but also in the Old 
Commonwealth, and the United States), which could have been pursued further and may 
have prevented a UDI.  Second, the thesis argues there were structural weaknesses in the 
machinery of government of each of the major actors, but particularly in Britain.  This 
made the management of the Rhodesian Crisis more difficult, contributed to the 
likelihood of a UDI, and exacerbated tension in relations between Britain and its 
international partners.  In stressing these themes the thesis builds upon some of the earlier 
literature that was critical of the Labour Government’s foreign and Commonwealth 
policies.  Although this thesis is primarily an international history, it also makes use of 
theories from political science and international relations to frame certain aspects of the 
empirical research. 
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 1 
Introduction 
Past and Present Scholarship on the Rhodesian Crisis 
 
The Rhodesian Crisis: recent interest and scholarship 
 
During the 1960s the disintegration of the Central African Federation and the concomitant 
problems of granting independence to Southern Rhodesia attracted a significant amount 
of coverage in the British media and a high degree of interest among academics.1  The 
level of scrutiny intensified in the wake of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
(UDI) on 11 November 1965.  Many books were published that examined the events 
leading up to UDI and subsequent efforts to bring Rhodesia back to legality through 
diplomatic negotiations and economic sanctions.  As the armed confrontation between 
African nationalists and the UDI regime escalated, a number of books also appeared 
about the bush war.  After Rhodesia eventually became legally independent as Zimbabwe 
in 1980 a couple of studies of the Lancaster House negotiations emerged, and a few other 
books on Rhodesia’s independence were published, then interest generally subsided.2  In 
the last few years, however, a combination of media attention, academic research, 
publications, oral history projects, and conferences has revealed a renewed interest in the 
Rhodesian Crisis and the recent history of southern Africa. 
                                                 
1 After Northern Rhodesia became independent as the state of Zambia in October 1964, Southern Rhodesia 
was usually referred to simply as Rhodesia.  That pattern of nomenclature is used in this thesis. 
2 For a guide to the older literature see M. E. Doro, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe: A Bibliographic Guide to the 
Nationalist Period (Boston, MA: G. K. Hall, 1984); O. Pollack and K. Pollack, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe: An 
International Bibliography (Oxford: Clio Press, 1979); D. Potts, World Bibliographical Series, Volume 4: 
Zimbabwe (Oxford: Clio Press, rev. edn., 1993); and the online bibliography maintained by Richard Wood, 
available at http://www.jrtwood.com/rhodesia_zimbabwe_political.asp  
 2 
First, the British media has reported the troubles in Zimbabwe, which has prompted a 
renewed interest in Rhodesia’s history.  In a debate at the Oxford Union in October 2000, 
Ian Smith refused to apologise for atrocities committed while he held office.  He said he 
had no regrets about the estimated 30,000 Zimbabweans killed during the period of 
Rhodesian Front rule.3  Second, younger historians – searching for suitable topics on 
which to base their research – have taken advantage of the vast number of records 
released into the public domain in accordance with the Thirty Year Rule.4  Third, a 
number of notable books have emerged recently.  In terms of primary sources, historians 
have been well served by the British Documents on the End of Empire Project, which has 
made a good selection of documents on the Rhodesian Crisis available to scholars.5  In 
terms of autobiography and biography, historians have had the benefit of Ian Smith’s 
                                                 
3 The Observer, 29 October 2000. 
4 For example: Evan D. Fountain, ‘Purposes of economic sanctions: British objectives in the Rhodesian 
crisis, 1964-79’, Oxford D.Phil (2000); Richard Coggins, ‘Rhodesian UDI and the search for a settlement, 
1964-8: failure of decolonization’, Oxford D.Phil (2002); Alice Robinson, ‘Britain and the Rhodesian crisis, 
1964-5, with special reference to South Africa and the United States’, Ulster M.Phil (2003); Claire 
Waddingham, ‘Colonial misjudgement: a comparative study of British policy towards the Mau Mau 
emergency in Kenya, 1952–6, and the unilateral declaration of independence in Rhodesia, 1964–8’, Exeter 
M.Phil (in progress, 2005); Julian Francis, ‘The Seeds of UDI: an argument for and an examination of 
internal and external factors that shaped a Rhodesian national identity’, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 
London, Ph.D (in progress, 2006); Andrew Cohen, ‘Settler Power, African Nationalism and British Interests 
in the Central African Federation, 1957-63’, Sheffield Ph.D (in progress, 2006). 
5 S. R. Ashton and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), British Documents on the End of Empire, Series A, Volume 5, 
Part II: Europe, Rhodesia, Commonwealth (London: The Stationery Office, 2004); and Philip Murphy 
(ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire, Series B, Volume 9, Part II: Crisis and Dissolution, 1959-
1965 (London: The Stationery Office, 2005).  These volumes referred to hereafter as BDEEP. 
 3 
vituperative memoirs, published in 1997,6 and Alan Megahey’s study of the ‘beleaguered’ 
Governor of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, published in 1998.7  Richard 
Wood’s lengthy account of Rhodesia’s attempts to obtain independence, which is based 
on sole access to the hitherto closed papers of Ian Smith as well as British Government 
papers, was published only very recently.8  From the British perspective, John Young’s 
study of the Labour Government’s international policy, which also benefits from the use 
of recently released British Government files, has made an important contribution to the 
debate on Labour’s performance in office during the period 1964-70.9 
 
A fourth factor that has both reflected and stimulated interest in the Rhodesian Crisis is 
the number of projects that have captured the story of Rhodesia’s painful journey towards 
independence in the words of the people who lived it.  In 1999, David Dimbleby 
presented a three-part BBC documentary series entitled Rebellion, which featured 
interviews with many of the surviving protagonists including former British Labour 
Ministers Barbara Castle, Denis Healey, and George Thomson; Sir Oliver Wright, Private 
Secretary to Harold Wilson, 1964-66; Rhodesian Ministers Ian Smith, Jack Mussett, and 
P. K. Van Der Byl; and African nationalist leaders, including Robert Mugabe and Bishop 
Abel Muzorewa.  In September 2000, the Institute of Contemporary British History 
                                                 
6 Ian Douglas Smith, The Great Betrayal: The Memoirs of Ian Douglas Smith (London: Blake, 1997); and 
Bitter Harvest: The Great Betrayal and the Dreadful Aftermath (London: Blake, 2001). 
7 Alan Megahey, Humphrey Gibbs: Beleaguered Governor.  Southern Rhodesia, 1929-1969 (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1998). 
8 J. R. T. Wood, ‘So Far and No Further!’ Rhodesia’s Bid for Independence during the Retreat from 
Empire 1959-1965 (Victoria, B.C.: Trafford Publishing, 2005). 
9 John W. Young, The Labour Governments 1964-70, Volume 2: International Policy (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2003). 
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organised a Witness Seminar on ‘Rhodesian UDI’, held at the National Archives, Kew.  
Participants included: Sir Oliver Wright; George Cunningham, who served as an adviser 
in the Labour Party Overseas Department; Sir John Pestell, Comptroller to Humphrey 
Gibbs; and several Conservative and Labour Members of Parliament.10  Similarly, as part 
of its Southern Africa Initiative, the Cold War Studies Centre at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science (LSE) organised a further Witness Seminar on ‘Britain 
and Rhodesia: Road to Settlement’, again held at the National Archives, in July 2005.  
Participants included: Lord Carrington, Foreign Secretary, 1979-1982; Lord Steel, leader 
of the Liberal Party, 1976-88; and Peter Jay, British Ambassador to Washington, 1977-
79.11 
 
Finally, 11 November 2005 marked the fortieth anniversary of UDI, which occasioned 
two academic conferences.  In September 2005, the Centre for Research in the Arts, 
Social Sciences and Humanities, Cambridge, organised a conference entitled ‘UDI Forty 
Years On: Liberation, Confrontation and Co-operation’, opened by Kenneth Kaunda, 
President of Zambia at the time of UDI.12  In January 2006, a similar conference was held 
as part of the Southern Africa Initiative in the Cold War Studies Centre at the LSE, 
opened by Lord Owen, who was involved in the Rhodesian Crisis as Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State for the Navy, 1968-70, and as Foreign Secretary, 1977-79.13 
 
                                                 
10 See http://www.icbh.ac.uk/icbh/witness/rhodesia/  
11 See http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CWSC/events/pastEvents2005.htm#CWSCNationalArchiveWitnessSeminar  
12 See http://www.udi40.org  
13 See http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CWSC/events/rhodesia_jan_06.htm  
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This level of academic interest looks set to continue, especially under the auspices of the 
Southern Africa Initiative and the Struggles for Freedom in Southern Africa Collection 
(Aluka Project).  The Southern Africa Initiative has three major goals: first, to foster 
collaboration and coordination among established and emerging scholars, mainly through 
symposia and conferences (some of which are mentioned above); second, to bridge the 
gap between historians, archives and archivists, so that the full range of archival material 
available in the southern African region and internationally can be fully integrated into 
current research and scholarship; and third, to support and encourage research and 
scholarship by southern African graduates, as well as foreign researchers who wish to 
further their studies in Cold War issues in the southern African region.14  This promises 
some great practical benefits.  For example, among the projects currently under 
consideration is a new bibliography on the Rhodesian Crisis, and a register of current 
research on southern Africa in the Cold War.  In terms of the identification and collation 
of important archival sources, the Aluka Project (part of the wider Ithaka Project) is 
highly significant.  It aims to: ‘document the liberation struggles in southern Africa since 
the end of World War II through a carefully selected set of historical documents, 
periodicals, newspaper clippings, organizational records, personal papers of historical 
figures, oral histories, photographs, and other visual materials.’15  The first phase of the 
project covers five countries – Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and 
Zimbabwe – and at the time of writing the Zimbabwe Aluka Committee had recently 
produced its draft, ‘Report on the Architecture of the Zimbabwe Aluka Project’.16  This 
                                                 
14 See http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CWSC/SouthernAfricaInitiative/About_the_Southern_Africa_Initiative.htm  
15 See http://www.ithaka.org/aluka/content.htm  
16 Professor Terence Ranger distributed copies of this report to the delegates at the LSE Conference in 
January 2006. 
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project, once completed, will be extremely valuable for future scholars, particularly those 
interested in the Rhodesian Crisis from the perspective of the Liberation Movements. 
 
The thesis: scope, historiography, and arguments 
 
These multiple signs of proliferating interest in southern African studies are encouraging, 
but the history of Rhodesia’s UDI – especially the period leading up to UDI – remains 
relatively under researched, particularly the international context.17  This thesis is 
therefore intended partly to fill some of the gaps in existing knowledge, and in other 
respects to revise the contemporary interpretations of events (both of which are well-
established rationales for many doctoral theses).  Part One investigates the Rhodesian 
Crisis from a British perspective, challenging some of the extant academic studies and 
autobiographical accounts of the Wilson Government’s handling of the issue.  Part Two 
examines the Commonwealth dimension, especially the involvement of the Old 
Commonwealth, which has been a sorely neglected topic in studies of UDI.  Part Three 
documents the impact of the Rhodesian Crisis on the Anglo-American special 
relationship, and analyses the nature of policy formulation in the Lyndon B. Johnson 
administration, adding to the existing literature in those academic fields of enquiry.  It 
should be appreciated that due to the limitations of length imposed on this thesis, it is 
necessarily selective and limited to discussion of the British, Commonwealth, and United 
States dimensions of the Rhodesian Crisis.  This thesis is not intended to be a 
comprehensive international history: such a study would obviously have to take into 
account the involvement of the United Nations, and the Organisation of African Unity; 
                                                 
17 This is acknowledged, for example, in Coggins, ‘Rhodesian UDI and the search for a settlement’, p. 30. 
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and the role of regional actors, including South Africa and Portugal.18  This is first and 
foremost an empirical study, but it does make some limited use of international relations 
and political science theories where this helps to frame the research (especially in the 
third section of the thesis).  The remainder of this Introduction provides further details of 
the historiography that is relevant to the three parts of the thesis, the arguments advanced, 
the sources used, and a brief indication of the major conclusions reached. 
 
Part One: Britain and the Rhodesian Crisis 
 
Robert Good, the U.S. ambassador to Zambia at the time of UDI, suggested a few years 
later that the British Government’s Rhodesia policy had suffered from multiple 
weaknesses:  poor political judgment (especially the mistake of ruling out the use of force 
publicly); unrealistic aims (attempting to produce a ‘change of heart’ among white 
Rhodesians); and insufficient means (economic sanctions).19  Some early British accounts 
were also highly critical of the Wilson Government’s handling of the Rhodesian Crisis.  
Kenneth Young, the political adviser to Beaverbrook Newspapers, wrote an account that 
was highly sympathetic to the Rhodesian Front. Whilst this thesis is certainly not written 
from a perspective that shares Young’s political sympathies, it does agree with his 
conclusion that the Rhodesian Crisis ‘disclosed all too clearly the erratic nature of [the 
British] Government’s policy-making, before and more particularly after UDI … It 
certainly had a desperately ad hoc quality, never seeming on Monday to look further than 
                                                 
18 See Carl P. Watts, Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence: A Study in International Crisis 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming, 2008). 
19 Robert C. Good, UDI: The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1973), p. 293. 
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the following Friday.’20  In other cases, criticism of British policy was informed by a 
belief that both main political parties had demonstrated an inexcusable weakness in their 
dealings with the Rhodesian Government.  Elaine Windrich, a research assistant to the 
Parliamentary Labour Party during the 1960s, initially began writing her book as ‘a 
critique of the Labour party’s failure to implement its policy commitments on Rhodesia.’  
However, she recognised that the Conservatives had a comparable record and therefore 
extended her discussion of British policy up to the date of publication (1978).  Windrich 
observed that both parties ruled out the only effective means of resolving the Rhodesian 
Crisis (use of force) and became trapped in a fruitless search for an agreement between 
the Rhodesian Front and the African nationalists, neither of whom were prepared to 
compromise.21  There is much to be said in favour of Windrich’s argument, and in this 
thesis it is argued that the use of force was indeed the most efficacious means of 
producing a solution in Rhodesia.  Another participatory account came from Miles 
Hudson, who was head of Rhodesian affairs in the Conservative Research Department 
from 1965, Political Secretary to Alec Douglas-Home 1971-74, and closely involved with 
the settlement of the Rhodesian problem 1979-80.  Hudson recognised that ‘political 
leaders are constrained by circumstances in the decisions they come to’, but suggested 
that the response of politicians to the Rhodesian problem was ‘muddled and inconsistent’, 
and characterised by a ‘constant series of miscalculations ... often palpable and gross ... 
                                                 
20 Kenneth Young, Rhodesia and Independence (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1967), p. 504. 
21 Elaine Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence (London: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 7. 
Windrich also edited a collection of ‘documents’ on the Rhodesian problem.  These are mainly partial 
extracts from command papers and memoirs, and journal articles written in the 1960s.  Windrich (ed.), The 
Rhodesian Problem: A Documentary Record, 1923-1973 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975). 
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nearly all the result of wishful thinking.’22  This thesis puts forward a substantial body of 
documentary evidence that substantiates the view that there was considerable muddle and 
wishful thinking in the Labour Government’s handling of the Rhodesian Crisis. 
 
These examples of the critical literature on Labour’s Rhodesia policy fit into a broader 
historiographical orthodoxy in which politicians, journalists, and academics have 
lambasted the Labour Government, and Harold Wilson in particular, for its failures.  
Clive Ponting equated the poor record of the Labour Government with Wilson’s 
leadership and suggested that ‘the blame for the government’s overall failure has to rest 
largely with him.’23  A number of Wilson’s colleagues drew attention to his faults, 
including his scheming, indecision, excessive concern with detail, and absurd optimism.24  
Denis Healey commented that ‘His short-term opportunism, allied with a capacity for 
self-delusion which made Walter Mitty appear unimaginative, often plunged the 
government into chaos.’25  One early biographer argued that this ‘Walter Mitty’ side of 
Wilson’s character affected his foreign policy, because he deluded himself that he could 
end the Vietnam War and bring down the illegal Rhodesian regime.26  Writing in the late 
1980s, Kenneth Morgan observed that Wilson seemed ‘in acute danger of becoming a 
universal scapegoat … for all the misfortunes of British life between 1964 and 1976’, but 
                                                 
22 Miles Hudson, Triumph or Tragedy? Rhodesia to Zimbabwe (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1982), 
‘Introduction’. 
23 Clive Ponting, Breach of Promise: Labour in Power, 1964-70 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1989), p. 405.  
In Ch. 8, ‘The Shadow of the Past: Rhodesia’, Ponting is less critical of Wilson. 
24 Young, The Labour Governments 1964-70, Vol. 2, pp. 3-4.  
25 Denis Healey, The Time of My Life (London: Michael Joseph, 1989), p. 331. 
26 Andrew Roth, Harold Wilson: Yorkshire Walter Mitty (London: Macdonald, 1977), pp. 6 and 53.  Cited 
in Young, The Labour Governments 1964-70, Vol. 2, p. 4. 
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thought it probable that ‘historians will take a more charitable and compassionate view of 
his career and achievements’.27  This was a prescient comment, as subsequent biographies 
of Wilson portrayed him in a much more sympathetic light, observing the serious political 
and economic constraints under which he had to operate and acknowledging his success 
in maintaining party unity and winning elections.28  Revisionist historians have also 
challenged the disastrous reputation of the Labour Governments of the 1960s, both in 
domestic and foreign policy.29  Chris Wrigley has emphasised the essential continuity in 
foreign policy between the Conservatives and Labour, which is masked by the fact that 
‘Wilson’s actions were often remarkably volatile in the short term.’30  Certainly it can be 
argued that there was considerable continuity between the Conservatives and Labour in 
terms of their foreign policies. This is evident for, example, in the fact that Wilson 
continued the special relationship with the United States and submitted an application for 
EEC membership, and such policies tended to produce dissent on the Labour 
backbenches.31  Continuity was also clear in their Rhodesia policy, which Wilson himself 
                                                 
27 Kenneth O. Morgan, Labour People. Leaders and Lieutenants, Hardie to Kinnock (First published 1987; 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 246 and 247. 
28 Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson (London: HarperCollins, 1992); and Philip Ziegler, Wilson: The Authorised 
Life of Lord Wilson of Rievaulx (London: HarperCollins, 1993). 
29 Richard Coopey, Stephen Fielding and Nick Tiratsoo (eds.), The Wilson Governments 1964-1970 
(London: Pinter, 1993); and Young, The Labour Governments 1964-70, Vol. 2.  A forthcoming study, 
which also contributes to the revisionist literature on the domestic and foreign policy of the Labour 
Government, is Glen O’Hara and Helen Parr (eds.), The Wilson Governments 1964-70 Reconsidered 
(London: Routledge, 2006). 
30 Chris Wrigley, ‘Now you see it, now you don’t: Harold Wilson and Labour’s foreign policy 1964-70’, in 
Coopey, Fielding, and Tiratsoo (eds.), The Wilson Governments 1964-1970, p. 124. 
31 J. Richard Piper, ‘Backbench Rebellion, Party Government and Consensus Politics: the Case of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party, 1966-1970’, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 4 (1974), pp. 384-96. 
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was keen to emphasise in order to prevent the Conservatives from scoring any political 
points at Labour’s expense.32  Yet this hardly constitutes a revisionist assessment because 
it was acknowledged – indeed it was criticised – in the orthodox literature. 
 
As indicated above, this thesis lends additional weight to the orthodox view of the Labour 
Government’s Rhodesia policy.  Chapter One begins with a brief look at the policy of the 
Labour Party in Opposition.  It notes that during the 1950s Wilson demonstrated little 
interest in the Central African Federation, but when he became Party leader he expressed 
strong views publicly and privately that Southern Rhodesia should not be granted 
independence before African majority rule, which was increasingly at variance with the 
more cautious approach of some of his colleagues.  In office, however, Wilson 
immediately recognised that his previous views left little room for manoeuvre in 
negotiations with the Rhodesian Government, and he was prepared to compromise the 
principle of African majority rule in order to obtain a settlement.  The chapter observes 
the dominant role that Wilson played in the shaping of British policy and the conduct of 
negotiations with the Rhodesian Government, but suggests that the focus of the 
negotiations was misplaced.  They were therefore unlikely to produce an outcome 
satisfactory to the British Government, the Rhodesian Government, or the African 
nationalists in Rhodesia.  The chapter then uses a variety of public records to examine the 
contingency plans that the British Government formulated to deal with a UDI, and argues 
                                                 
32 Hence Barbara Castle’s comment that: ‘Harold Wilson was obsessed with the need to get a consensus 
with the Conservatives on Rhodesia if at all possible.’ The Castle Diaries, 1964-1970 (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1984), p. xv.   
 12 
that the planning process was compromised as a result of procrastination, bureaucratic 
conflict, and wishful thinking.33 
 
Chapter Two examines two alternative policies that the Labour Government could have 
pursued either to rid itself of the Rhodesian problem or to impose a settlement.  The 
chapter first considers the advantages and disadvantages of handing responsibility for 
Rhodesia to the United Nations.  The chapter argues that the British Government was 
afraid to do so because of the likelihood that it would have led to the application of 
sanctions against South Africa, which would have further undermined Britain’s already 
precarious economic position.  Second, the chapter uses correspondence from former 
members of the Rhodesian security services, recent oral testimony from British politicians 
and civil servants, and newly available documentary evidence from archives around the 
world, to re-examine the viability of British military intervention in Rhodesia during 1964 
and 1965.34  The chapter argues that the military and political obstacles to the use of force 
cited at the time and since have been grossly exaggerated.  These competing claims have 
never been properly assessed on the basis of the considerable documentary evidence 
                                                 
33 The chapter is based on a large number of public and private archives, but the main British Government 
records series used are: The National Archives [hereafter TNA]: Public Records Office, Kew [hereafter 
PRO], CAB 130, Cabinet: Miscellaneous Committees: Minutes and Papers (GEN, MISC and REF Series), 
1945-1976; CAB 148, Cabinet Office: Defence and Oversea Policy Committee and Sub-committees: 
Minutes and Papers (DO, DOP, and OPD Series), 1964-1970; DO 183, Central African Office and 
Commonwealth Relations Office [hereafter CRO]: Central Africa: Registered Files (CAO Series), 1962-
1966; and FO 371, Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence, 1906-1966. 
34 The British Government records dealing with military contingency planning are in: TNA: PRO, DEFE 
25, Ministry of Defence: Chief of Defence Staff: Registered Files (CDS, SCDS and ACDS (OPS) Series), 
1957-1980; and DEFE 32, Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Secretary’s Standard Files, 
1946-1983. 
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available in international archives and the one study of any consequence is now thirty 
years old.35  The chapter argues that with sufficient resolve, the Labour Government 
could have used force in an attempt to prevent or end UDI.  This might have offered a 
forthright solution to one of the most protracted and embarrassing international problems 
that confronted successive British governments during disengagement from Empire.  The 
discussion of military intervention is one of the most distinctive parts of the thesis and it 
has already been published.36 
 
Part Two: The Commonwealth and the Rhodesian Crisis 
 
Within a few years of the end of the Second World War the Commonwealth began to 
change. With the admission of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon it was no longer the British 
Commonwealth of Nations, bound by blood ties, but a multiracial Commonwealth, based 
on the principle of racial equality.37  The British Government presented this process as the 
                                                 
35 Douglas G. Anglin, ‘Britain and the Use of Force in Rhodesia’, in Michael G. Fry (ed.), Freedom and 
Change: essays in honour of Lester B. Pearson (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), pp. 43-75.  For a 
short analysis that does refer to British documentary sources concerning the use of force see Young, The 
Labour Governments 1964-70, Vol. 2, pp. 177-79.  See also Philip Murphy, ‘“An intricate and distasteful 
subject”: British planning for the use of force against European settlers of Central Africa, 1952-65’, English 
Historical Review (forthcoming, 2006). 
36 See Carl P. Watts, ‘Killing Kith and Kin: The Viability of British Military Intervention in Rhodesia, 
1964-5’, Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 16, No. 4 (December 2005), pp. 382-415. 
37 In 1948 Whitehall mandarins advised that ‘British’ should be omitted in front of ‘Commonwealth of 
Nations’. William David McIntrye, ‘The Commonwealth’, in Robin W. Winks (ed.), Oxford History of the 
British Empire Volume V: Historiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 558; and idem, 
‘Commonwealth Legacy’, in Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), Oxford History of the British 
Empire Volume IV: The Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 696. 
 14 
culmination of an imperial mission to prepare colonial peoples for self-government.38  
Some historians perpetuated this Whiggish interpretation.  Nicholas Mansergh, for 
example, suggested that when the Asian Dominions became part of the Commonwealth: 
‘The image of [the] Commonwealth was thereby embellished in the eyes both of Asian, 
African and other colonial nationalist leaders and also in those hitherto unenthusiastic or, 
more usually, sceptical left-wing progressives in Britain and the old dominions.’39  
Britain’s image within the Commonwealth was of course subsequently tarnished by the 
Suez debacle,40 but by 1961 the British Government had managed to restore some of its 
moral credibility with Commonwealth members through its espousal of the ‘wind of 
change’ in Africa.  This apparent moral and political unity resulted in South Africa’s 
departure from the Commonwealth in May 1961, and some commentators heralded a new 
era in which the Commonwealth would become a prominent international actor.41  Yet as 
Stephen Chan has acknowledged, at this time ‘the Commonwealth was far from an 
institution of triumphant virtue.’42  Difficult issues still remained unresolved, including 
relations with the apartheid regime in South Africa and the question of Rhodesian 
independence.  Harold Wilson was of course acutely conscious of the strength of 
Commonwealth feeling on the Rhodesian issue, later writing in his memoirs that the 
                                                 
38 Wm. Roger Louis, ‘The Dissolution of the British Empire’, in Brown and Louis (eds.), Oxford History of 
the British Empire Vol. IV, p. 329. 
39 Nicholas Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), p. 341. 
40 See Michael G. Fry, ‘Canada, the North Atlantic Triangle, and the United Nations’; Peter Lyon, ‘The 
Commonwealth and the Suez Crisis’, and Bruce Miller, ‘Australia and the Crisis’; in Wm. Roger Louis and 
Roger Owen (eds.), Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
41 Stephen Chan, The Commonwealth in World Politics. A Study of International Action 1965 to 1985 
(London: Lester Crook Academic Publishing, 1988), p. 4. 
42 Ibid., p. 5. 
 15 
Commonwealth was one of four ‘constituencies’ whose opinion he had to consider in 
attempting a settlement.43 
 
Yet despite the importance of the Commonwealth as a conditioning factor in British 
policy, the Commonwealth aspects of the Rhodesian Crisis have not attracted much 
scholarly attention and there has certainly been nothing published on this recently.44  This 
thesis therefore places a heavy emphasis on the Commonwealth dimension in order to 
                                                 
43 Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970: A Personal Record (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, and Michael Joseph, 1971), pp. 180-81.  The other three ‘constituencies’ were Rhodesian 
opinion, British opinion, and international opinion at the United Nations. 
44 Studies of domestic opinion and bilateral relations include: Robert Matthews and Cranford Pratt, 
‘Canadian Policy Towards Southern Africa’, in D. G. Anglin, T. Shaw, and C. Widstrand (eds.), Canada, 
Scandinavia and Southern Africa (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1978), pp. 164-178; 
Richard V. Hall, ‘Australia and Rhodesia: Black Interests and White Lies’, in Frank S. Stevens (ed.), 
Racism: The Australian Experience, Volume 3: Colonialism (New York: Taplinger, 1972), pp. 175-86; 
Glen St. J. Barclay, ‘Friends in Salisbury: Australia and the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence, 1965-72’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1983), pp. 38-49; 
Malcolm McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World Since 1935 (Auckland: 
Auckland University Press, 1993), pp. 235-38; M. P. K. Sorrenson, New Zealand and the Rhodesia Crisis: 
The Lessons of History (Auckland: Citizens Association for Racial Equality, 1968).  Two studies that 
discuss the Rhodesian problem in the context of the Commonwealth as a whole are: James Barber, ‘The 
Impact of the Rhodesian Crisis on the Commonwealth’, Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. 7, 
No. 2 (July 1969), pp. 83-95; and J. D. B. Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Expansion 
and Attrition 1953-1969 (London: Oxford University Press for The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
1974), Ch. 9 ‘Rhodesia (i): The Lost Dominion’, pp. 167-203; and Ch. 10 ‘Rhodesia (ii): The 
Commonwealth After UDI’, pp. 204-46. 
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correct the deficiencies in existing scholarship.45  Chapter Three discusses the attitudes of 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand towards the new, multiracial Commonwealth, and 
investigates their attitudes towards the problem of Rhodesia independence.  The chapter 
examines the strong undercurrent of racialism in Australia and New Zealand, and uses 
many new archival sources to demonstrate that there was significant sympathy for the 
European settlers in Rhodesia and an aversion to African nationalist demands for majority 
rule.  The chapter shows that Canada, on the other hand, adopted a much more positive 
attitude towards the multiracial Commonwealth and was sympathetic towards African 
aspirations in Rhodesia.  This chapter therefore exposes the fractures within the Old 
Commonwealth, which determined the extent to which Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand were prepared to become involved in the Rhodesian Crisis.46 
 
Chapter Four argues that despite the problems of racialism, the Commonwealth 
dimension of the Rhodesian Crisis should not be interpreted simply as an unwelcome 
complicating factor, because there were expectations in several quarters that the Old 
                                                 
45 See also Carl P. Watts, ‘The Old Commonwealth and the Problem of Rhodesian Independence, 1964-5’, 
Cold War History (forthcoming, 2007). 
46 The main records series used are: TNA: PRO, DO 183.  The National Archives of Canada, Ottawa 
[hereafter NAC]: RG 25, Department of External Affairs [hereafter DEA], Series A-3-c [most files relating 
to Southern Rhodesia are in Vols. 8985-8987, but these were only declassified in January 2006 and 
therefore could not be incorporated within the thesis, which was in an advanced state by that time]; MG 31-
E47, Records of Arnold Cantwell Smith, External Affairs Series.  National Archives of Australia, Canberra 
[hereafter NAA]: A1209, Prime Minister’s Department, Correspondence files, annual single number series 
(classified); A1838, Department of External Affairs, Central Office, Correspondence files, multiple number 
series; A5828, Eighth Menzies Administration – Cabinet Files (Folders of Decisions of Cabinet and Cabinet 
Committees).  Archives New Zealand/Te Rua Mahara o te Kāwanatanga, Head Office, Wellington 
[hereafter ANZ]: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade – Head Office, Series 950, Accession W4627. 
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Commonwealth could play a modest role in the management of the Rhodesian problem.  
Although Britain consistently reaffirmed its sole responsibility for bringing Rhodesia to 
independence, it nevertheless looked to its Old Commonwealth partners to make a 
constructive contribution in maintaining positive relations with the Rhodesian 
Government and the wider Commonwealth.  Harold Wilson followed the precedent 
established by his Conservative predecessors of consulting with the Old Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers about the handling of the Rhodesian problem.  Wilson ensured that they 
were kept informed of developments in the negotiations between Britain and Rhodesia, 
urged them to dissuade Ian Smith from a UDI, and looked to them for help in assuaging 
Afro-Asian criticism of British policy.  It was not only the British Government that 
entertained hopes and expectations that the Old Commonwealth could ward off a UDI.  
European moderates in Rhodesia approached the British Government and the Old 
Commonwealth to suggest that greater Commonwealth cooperation was needed in 
helping to find a solution to the Rhodesian problem.47  Some officials in the U.S. State 
Department also thought that the Old Commonwealth had a role to play and suggested 
that Rhodesia was most open to the influence of Australia and New Zealand.48  Similarly, 
some African governments and African nationalists in Rhodesia regarded Australia as the 
member of the Commonwealth that was potentially most influential.49  Yet it was the 
                                                 
47 ANZ: ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 9, Garfield Todd and Hardwicke Holderness to Keith Holyoake, 
9 June 1964, enclosing a copy of a letter from Todd and Holderness to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 15 May 
1964. 
48 NAA: A1838, 190/10/1, Part 3a, Australian Embassy, Washington, to Department of External Affairs, 
Canberra, Savingram 1284, 30 October 1964. 
49 TNA: PRO, DO 183/324, E. V. Vines, British High Commission, Dar Es Salaam, to D. F. B. Le Breton, 
UN and General Africa Department, CRO, London, Letter, 3 February 1964.  Vines reported a visit by 
Ralph Harry, Australian Department of External Affairs, to several African states including Tanganyika.  
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Canadian Government that was most active on the Rhodesian problem.  Canadian 
politicians and officials pursued several initiatives during 1964 and 1965 in the hope of 
inducing greater cooperation from the Rhodesian Government and preventing a UDI.  In 
Australia and New Zealand, however, the prevailing attitudes moderated the degree of 
support that they were prepared to give to Canadian initiatives.  The major conclusion of 
Chapter Four is that if Britain and the Old Commonwealth had acted in concert to a 
greater degree, especially in providing inducements to greater cooperation on the part of 
the Rhodesian Government, it might have been possible to avert a UDI. 
 
Chapter Five broadens the discussion of the Commonwealth dimension by firstly 
examining the reasons why the Rhodesian Government resisted Commonwealth 
interference in, or advice about, Rhodesian constitutional development.  The chapter 
argues that the attitudes of the Rhodesian Front towards the Commonwealth were similar 
to those of many Australian and New Zealand politicians and civil servants.  Yet despite 
the Rhodesian Government’s disdain for the principle of multiracialism, paradoxically it 
still claimed to be a member of the Commonwealth, and sought to obtain the support of 
the Old Commonwealth against the vociferous criticism articulated by the African 
member states against Rhodesia.  This contributed to Britain’s difficulties in trying to 
manage the Rhodesian Crisis, especially in the context of the 1964 and 1965 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meetings.  The chapter examines the growing 
restlessness of the African Commonwealth members in advance of these Meetings, and 
                                                                                                                                                  
Le Breton replied, ‘It is interesting to note how both Kambona [Tanganyikan Foreign Minister] and Sithole 
[Leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union] regard the Australians as the best channel for exerting 
influence on Field and his Government and also on ourselves.’ Le Breton, CRO, to P. A. Carter, British 
High Commission, Dar Es Salaam, Letter, 25 February 1964.   
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observes how Ghana in particular was relentless in drawing attention to the worsening 
situation in Rhodesia.  The major purpose of Chapter Five is to explain why 
contemporary fears that the Rhodesian Crisis would precipitate the dissolution of the 
Commonwealth did not come to pass. 
 
Part Three: The United States and the Rhodesian Crisis 
 
The prominence of the United States in British contingency planning to deal with UDI 
suggests that it was, in effect, a ‘fifth constituency’ in Wilson’s calculations.  Yet the 
Rhodesian Crisis has attracted only moderate interest among scholars of U.S. policy 
towards Africa, and academics in the field of Anglo-American relations have tended to 
focus on other aspects of the Wilson-Johnson period, particularly Vietnam.50  There is 
some merit in linking the Rhodesian problem with Vietnam, since American co-operation 
                                                 
50 Excellent studies within the bounds of U.S. archival sources include Andrew DeRoche, Black, White and 
Chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953–1998 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2001); and 
Thomas J. Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948–1968 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1985).  Some recent examples of the continuing significance of 
Vietnam in the historiography of Anglo-American relations during the Wilson-Johnson period are: Sylvia 
Ellis, Britain, America, and the Vietnam War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004); Kevin Boyle, ‘The Price of 
Peace: Vietnam, the Pound, and the Crisis of the American Empire’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 27, No. 1 
(January 2003), pp. 37-72; and Wm. Roger Louis, ‘The Dissolution of the British Empire in the Era of 
Vietnam’, American Historical Review, Vol. 107, No. 2 (February 2002), pp. 1-25.  Scholars have also 
recently paid more attention to Anglo-American defence relations during this period.  See, for example, 
Saki Dockrill, ‘Forging the Anglo-American Global Defence Partnership: Harold Wilson, Lyndon Johnson 
and the Washington Summit, December 1964’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 23, No. 4 (December 
2000), pp. 107-29; and Andrew J. Priest, ‘In American Hands: Britain, the United States and the Polaris 
Nuclear Project, 1962–1968’, Contemporary British History, Vol. 19, No. 3 (September 2005), pp. 353-76. 
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on the former partly explains why the British Government felt compelled to support 
American involvement in the latter.51  However, in Chapter Six it is argued that the 
Rhodesian Crisis deserves to be considered as a separate issue because it reveals a great 
deal about the nature of Anglo-American relations during the Wilson-Johnson era and 
therefore adds to the literature on the special relationship, which until recently 
marginalised the significance of this period.52  One weakness of the existing American 
literature on the Rhodesian Crisis (aside from being sparse) is that it has, on the whole, 
utilised only those archival sources most readily accessible in the United States, such as 
those in the National Archives, Washington, and the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Texas.53  
Whilst these sources give a good indication of views within the Johnson administration, 
they do not provide a comprehensive understanding of how misunderstandings surfaced 
in Anglo-American relations as a result of the Rhodesian Crisis.  Chapter Six therefore 
seeks to provide a fuller understanding by adopting a multi-archival approach, using 
sources from American archives in conjunction with sources from British and New 
Zealand archives.  The use of New Zealand archival sources in this context may seem 
                                                 
51 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p. 382. 
52 Limited regard for the significance of the Wilson-Johnson era is evident, for example, in J. Dickie, 
‘Special’ No More. Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Rivalry (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1994); D. Dimbleby and D. J. Reynolds, An Ocean Apart: The Relationship Between Britain and America 
in the Twentieth Century (London: BBC Books, 1988); and Wm. R. Louis and H. Bull (eds.) The ‘Special 
Relationship’: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).  Donald Cameron 
Watt went so far as to argue that: ‘Anglo-American relations in this period were characterised by their 
absence.’  Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain’s Place, 1900–1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), p. 146. 
53 One book informed by a multi-national, multi-archival approach is Gerald Horne, From the Barrel of a 
Gun: The United States and the War Against Zimbabwe, 1965–1980 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2001).   
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surprising, but as a result of regular briefings by officials in the State Department’s Office 
of Eastern and Southern African Affairs, the New Zealand Embassy in Washington was 
often better informed about developments in U.S. policy than the British diplomatic 
establishment.  The memoranda and cables from the New Zealand Embassy therefore 
provide a valuable insight into Anglo-American relations during 1964 and 1965.54   The 
chapter explores Anglo-American consultation in great detail, observing the considerable 
misperception and miscommunication between Washington and London, which caused 
disappointment and even suspicion at senior levels of government on both sides.  The 
chapter explains the misunderstandings and frustrations in Anglo-American relations by 
applying some important theoretical perspectives on alliance politics, which are usually 
neglected by historians.55  The chapter demonstrates that there were serious structural 
problems in the special relationship, which had not been corrected since the Suez and 
Skybolt crises.  Again, this makes a distinctive contribution to current scholarship.56 
 
                                                 
54 The utility of the New Zealand Archives for this part of the thesis was an accidental find during the 
course of research on the Commonwealth and the Rhodesian problem. 
55 None of the studies mentioned above employ a theoretical framework for analysing the significance of 
the Rhodesian problem in Anglo-American relations.  Theoretical approaches to Anglo-American relations 
can of course be found in international relations journals, for example: Raymond Dawson and Richard 
Rosecrance, ‘Theory and Reality in the Anglo-American Alliance’, World Politics, Vol. XIX, No. 1 
(October 1966), pp. 21-51; and John Baylis, ‘The Anglo-American Relationship and Alliance Theory’, 
International Relations, Vol. 8 (November 1985), pp. 368-79.  Richard Neustadt, Alliance Politics (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1970), was a seminal study and I have used Neustadt’s theories 
extensively in my analysis.  Neustadt’s theories are tested in Louise Richardson, When Allies Differ: Anglo-
American Relations During the Suez and Falklands Crises (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996). 
56 See Carl P. Watts. ‘The United States, Britain, and the Problem of Rhodesian Independence, 1964-1965’, 
Diplomatic History, Vol. 30, No. 3 (forthcoming, June 2006), pp. 439-70. 
 22 
Chapter Seven examines the making of U.S. policy on Rhodesia from the perspectives of 
bureaucratic politics and pluralism.  It argues that the U.S. position was conflicted 
because the desire to counter Communist subversion and infiltration in southern Africa 
(by tacitly supporting the so-called ‘white redoubt’) did not sit comfortably with the need 
to assuage U.S. domestic opinion on the sensitive matter of racial discrimination.  These 
incompatible objectives, combined with conflicting departmental interests, generated 
extended, well-documented bureaucratic contests.  The Rhodesian Crisis therefore 
illuminates the process of policymaking in the Johnson administration.  The chapter 
examines the policymaking process from the point of view of G. Mennen Williams, a 
former Governor of the State of Michigan with a strong record on civil rights, who was 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs between 1961 and 1966.57  The chapter 
demonstrates that Williams argued a strong case for greater U.S. involvement in the 
Rhodesian Crisis based on strategic and moral factors. However, Williams was ultimately 
unsuccessful due to implacable opposition from the highest levels of the Johnson 
administration.  Chapter Seven also explains the limited influence of pluralist pressures 
on U.S. policy towards Rhodesia.  It argues that although there was some connection 
between the domestic civil rights campaign and foreign policy issues like white minority 
rule in South Africa and Rhodesia, this never became fully and effectively developed. 
African-American interest groups lacked the knowledge and the political skills necessary 
to wield sufficient influence in Washington, and the White House was hostile to the 
development of a separate African-American voice in U.S. foreign policy.  The chapter 
                                                 
57 See Carl P. Watts, ‘G. Mennen Williams and Rhodesian Independence: A Case Study in Bureaucratic 
Politics’, Michigan Academician, Vol. XXXVI, No. 3 (2004), pp. 225-46; and Thomas J. Noer, Soapy: A 
Biography of G. Mennen Williams (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005).  Both studies are 
based on the under-utilised G. Mennen Williams papers deposited at the Bentley Historical Library, 
University of Michigan. 
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therefore contributes to the recent literature on the linkage between U.S. domestic and 
foreign policies in the 1960s.58 
 
Conclusions 
 
Two underlying themes run throughout this thesis.  First, it argues that although the 
problem of Rhodesian independence was highly complex, a UDI was by no means 
inevitable.  There were courses of action that were dismissed or remained under explored 
(especially in Britain, but also in the Old Commonwealth, and the United States), which 
could have been pursued further and may have prevented a UDI.  Second, the thesis 
argues there were obvious structural weaknesses in the machinery of government of each 
of the major actors, but particularly in Britain, which of course bore primary 
responsibility for Rhodesia.  This made the management of the Rhodesian Crisis more 
difficult, contributed to the likelihood of a UDI, and exacerbated tension in relations 
between Britain and its international partners.  In stressing these themes the thesis is 
therefore closer to some of the earlier critical literature on Wilson’s handling of the 
Rhodesian Crisis than it is to the more recent sympathetic revisionist literature. 
 
                                                 
58 See Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American race relations in the global 
arena (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race 
and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Michael L. 
Krenn, Black Diplomacy: African Americans and the State Department 1945-1969 (New York: M. E. 
Sharpe, 1999). 
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BRITAIN AND THE RHODESIAN CRISIS, 1964-65
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Chapter One 
The Labour Government and the Rhodesian Crisis 
 
Introduction 
 
Between the formation of the Central African Federation in 1953 and its dissolution ten 
years later, the Labour Party maintained a continuous record of opposition to white 
minority rule in the Federation as a whole and in Southern Rhodesia.  When the Labour 
Government took office in October 1964, it initially adopted a public position on the issue 
of Rhodesian independence that was consistent with the principles that the Party and 
Harold Wilson had articulated whilst in Opposition.  Privately, however, Wilson and his 
Government were prepared to compromise the principle of immediate African majority 
rule in Rhodesia, which reflected their belief that this was the only realistic way that a 
settlement might be achieved.  Negotiations with the Rhodesian Government ‘were 
essentially aimed at finding a formula which would enable Britain to grant independence 
on the basis of white minority rule but with some form of guarantee that at some future 
date black majority rule would be achieved.’1  Although the British Government 
remained publicly optimistic that a settlement was possible – and Wilson and his 
ministers expended tremendous effort in their negotiations with the Rhodesian Front – in 
private it was accepted that a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) was highly 
likely.  The British Government decided at a very early stage that it would not use force 
to prevent or terminate a UDI.  Ministers and their officials therefore became engaged in 
an enormously complex contingency planning operation to deal with the huge range of 
                                                 
1 Clive Ponting, Breach of Promise: Labour in Power, 1964-1970 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1989), p. 
140. 
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domestic and foreign consequences associated with a UDI.  The effectiveness of this 
operation was undermined by a range of factors: the number of different committees that 
were involved; a tendency to defer important decisions; and bureaucratic conflict between 
the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office, which reflected their 
differing interests and conceptions of how best to respond to a UDI.  This chapter 
therefore argues that although considerable time and effort went into the making of 
Labour’s Rhodesian policy, the end result was largely ineffective. 
 
Labour’s Rhodesian policy in Opposition 
 
Before examining the Rhodesian policy of the Labour Government elected in October 
1964 it is necessary to analyse the Party’s policy whilst in Opposition during the 
preceding thirteen years, which encompass the life and death of the Central African 
Federation.  In his study of the domestic consequences of decolonisation Miles Kahler has 
commented: 
 
The question of the Central African Federation, endorsed by the 
Conservative Government, brought to the fore the question of settler 
power and racial inequality that had aroused the Labour left during the 
Seretse Khama case.  More significantly, it unified the Labour Left and 
Right in opposition.2 
 
                                                 
2 Miles Kahler, Decolonization in Britain and France. The Domestic Consequences of International 
Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 244.  For details of the Seretse Khama case 
and the dissent that this caused in the Labour Party see ibid., pp. 238-41. 
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The following discussion suggests that this is an accurate assessment, but it must be 
qualified by observing that some Labour MPs and officials became more equivocal in 
their attitudes towards the Central African Federation and the future of Southern Rhodesia 
during the months preceding Labour’s return to office in October 1964.  Yet Harold 
Wilson, who quickly came to dominate Labour’s Rhodesian policy after he was elected 
Party leader in 1963, demonstrated that he was somewhat out of step with the 
increasingly cautious approach of some of his colleagues. 
 
In June 1951, the Attlee Government published a report on closer association between 
Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia, and Southern Rhodesia.  Under pressure from the Fabian 
Colonial Bureau, the Labour Party accepted that any arrangements for closer association 
should deliver not only economic advantages but also political advancement for the 
African majority in those territories.3  It was the absence of the latter that prompted the 
Labour Party to oppose the Conservative Government’s plans to establish the Central 
African Federation in 1953.  James Griffiths, Labour’s former Colonial Secretary, 
highlighted the undesirability of white minority power, which was assured by the 
adoption of the Southern Rhodesian franchise for the Federation as a whole.  Some right-
wing Labour MPs abstained in the vote, including Patrick Gordon Walker and George 
Brown, because they accepted the arguments that the Federation would bring economic 
benefits and forestall the growth of South African influence in the region.4  Harold 
Wilson voted with the majority of Labour MPs against the creation of the Federation, but 
                                                 
3 Ibid., p. 245. 
4 Ibid. 
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he did not raise the issue outside Parliament.5  Throughout the 1950s the Labour Party 
supported the African nationalists in their aspirations for greater democracy in the 
Federation, but ‘The party was slow to accept a right of secession by the African states 
[Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia] at the time of constitutional review, scheduled in 
1960.’6  In 1959, however, rioting broke out in Nyasaland and the Labour Party was very 
vocal in criticising the Federal authorities for brutally suppressing the rioting and 
arresting prominent African nationalists.  When the Conservatives established the 
Monckton Commission to investigate the future of the Federation the Labour leader, 
Hugh Gaitskell, sought to widen the Commission’s terms of reference to include the right 
of secession.  This was a clear indication that the Labour leader was prepared to stare-
down the white minority in the Federation, and there was little dissent over this position 
within the Party.7  Wilson, who was at that time Shadow Chancellor, continued to support 
the Party line but once again did not address the issue in his constituency.8 
 
The next key development was British affirmation of the 1961 Southern Rhodesian 
Constitution.  Wilson recalled in his memoirs that it was ‘passed by the British Parliament 
in a highly controversial atmosphere.  The Labour Party had voted solidly against it.’9  
The Labour Party believed that the 1961 Constitution did not contain adequate safeguards 
                                                 
5 Paul Foot, The Politics of Harold Wilson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), p. 258; and Robert C. Good, 
UDI: The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1973), p. 47. 
6 Kahler, Decolonization in Britain and France, p. 248. 
7 Ibid., pp. 248-49. 
8 Foot, The Politics of Harold Wilson, pp. 258-59. 
9 Harold Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-70 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, and Michael 
Joseph, 1971), p. 22. 
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for the African population in Southern Rhodesia.  James Callaghan warned with great 
prescience that the British Government was taking a major risk in passing its reserve 
powers to a territory that might elect a party that was representative of extremist white 
interests.10  In March 1963, shortly after Wilson became leader of the Labour Party, he 
gave a clear indication of the action that a future Labour Government would take: 
 
We have said that no constitution is defensible which fails to allow the 
people of those territories to control their own destinies.  We have bitterly 
attacked the Southern Rhodesian constitution for that, and a Labour 
Government would therefore alter it – let me make that very very plain.11 
 
Wilson reiterated this position during a speech on foreign affairs at the 1963 Labour Party 
Conference in Scarborough, in which he went even further in proposing how the future of 
Southern Rhodesia should be handled:  
 
You now face the ultimate decision in Southern Rhodesia.  We insist, as 
we have repeatedly insisted, that Britain cannot morally confer 
independence on a Southern Rhodesia which defies the most elemental 
claims of democracy by denying the vote to 99% of the Africans who 
outnumber the Europeans by 15 to 1.  We say, too, to the Government, 
your debts are too great, your moral reserves too low, the problem of 
                                                 
10 Callaghan recalled Keir Hardie’s speech against the South Africa Bill in 1909.  House of Commons 
Debates, Vol. 642, Col. 1808, 22 June 1961.  Cited in Elaine Windrich, Britain and the Politics of 
Rhodesian Independence (London: Croom Helm, 1978), pp. 43-44. 
11 Cited in Foot, The Politics of Harold Wilson, p. 259; Good, UDI, p. 47; and Windrich, Britain and the 
Politics of Rhodesian Independence, p. 30. 
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Central Africa can no longer be dealt with on a unilateralist basis, it must 
now be referred to the arbitration and good offices of a Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers’ conference.12 
 
These statements reflected not only the convictions of the Parliamentary Labour Party 
(PLP), but also the views of some Labour constituencies, which were worried by 
developments in Southern Rhodesia and anxious to secure a commitment by the Labour 
leadership to do something to prevent the white minority from further consolidating their 
dominant position.13  The National Executive Committee (NEC) fully supported the 
demand of the PLP that Southern Rhodesia should not be granted independence until 
‘genuine representative government’ was established.14 
 
The Labour Party was also highly critical of the Conservative Government’s handling of 
the dissolution of the Central African Federation.  At the Victoria Falls conference in 
June 1963 Winston Field and Ian Smith were unsuccessful in their bid to obtain a British 
commitment to confer independence on Southern Rhodesia, but they did manage to 
                                                 
12 Harold Wilson, Purpose in Politics. Selected Speeches by the Rt. Hon. Harold Wilson (London, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), p. 10.  The reference to Commonwealth involvement would have alarmed 
the Rhodesian Government because it was extremely resistant to Commonwealth interference in Rhodesian 
domestic affairs (which is discussed below, in Chs. 4 and 5). 
13 National Museum of Labour History, Manchester [hereafter NMLH]: Departmental Correspondence, 
Commonwealth Papers, Southern Rhodesia, Correspondence, 1961-1969 [hereafter Southern Rhodesia, 
Correspondence], Resolution of the General Management Committee of Hornchurch CLP, March 1963; 
Resolution of South Paddington Divisional Labour Party, April 1963. 
14 NMLH: Southern Rhodesia, Correspondence, David Ennals, Secretary, Overseas Department, National 
Executive Committee, to Councillor W. Dow, Hon. Secretary, South Paddington Divisional Labour Party, 
23 April 1963. 
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secure the bulk of the Federal military forces.  Robert Holland has acknowledged: ‘This is 
what really mattered to them, because it put the R[hodesian] F[ront] leadership in a 
position to threaten a unilateral declaration of independence.’15  Of course, if the 
Rhodesian Front leadership could see this, so could their opponents in Rhodesia, Africa, 
and Britain.  Labour’s NEC expressed its concern that the transfer of Federal military 
assets to Southern Rhodesia would inflame the already dangerous situation in central 
Africa, and Labour MPs also pointed out that the decision to transfer Federal forces to 
Southern Rhodesia put Britain in violation of a request by the UN General Assembly not 
to do so.16  Yet Labour’s public position masked some doubts about the issue.  George 
Cunningham, an adviser in the Labour Party Overseas Department, pointed out that there 
were a number of reasons why the Southern Rhodesian Government had a good claim to 
the Federal armed forces.  First, Southern Rhodesia had contributed the majority of the 
armed forces to the Federation and it was therefore logical that they should revert to 
Southern Rhodesia.  Second, only the Southern Rhodesians were competent to use the 
more sophisticated military equipment operated by the armed forces.  Third, as the troops 
and equipment were already in Southern Rhodesia, ‘it would be impossible for Britain to 
remove them or disband the troops without interfering in a major way in Southern 
Rhodesian affairs.’  Finally, the greater part of the cost of the forces had been borne by 
the Southern Rhodesian Government and not by the northern territories.  Cunningham 
concluded: ‘By every kind of logic, therefore, Southern Rhodesia has the prior claim and 
I cannot see the Conservative Government doing anything about this point and, quite 
                                                 
15 Robert F. Holland, European Decolonization 1918-1981: An Introductory Survey (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1985), p. 233. 
16 Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence, pp. 15-16.  See also NMLH: Southern 
Rhodesia, Documents, 1963-1966, NEC Statement on Southern Rhodesia, 23 October 1963. 
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frankly, I can’t see that we would be able to do anything different if we were in power.’17  
This kind of pragmatism became highly characteristic of the Labour Party’s Rhodesian 
policy once it was in power after October 1964, especially in relation to the question of 
using force to impose a settlement in Rhodesia. 
 
Indeed, there is some evidence that Labour MPs and Party officials became more cautious 
in dealing with the Rhodesian issue during the period leading up to the 1964 General 
Election.  In March 1964 the Africa Bureau discussed the possible action that a future 
Labour Government might take to solve the problem of Rhodesian independence.18  Some 
members of the Bureau argued that talk of a UDI had been stimulated by Rhodesian 
European fears that a Labour Government would not observe the convention of non-
intervention in Rhodesia’s internal affairs.  It was therefore suggested that the Labour 
Party should declare that its approach would not be different to that of the Conservative 
Government.  Lord Walston, who became Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, doubted the wisdom of this.  He said that if the Labour Party did form 
the next Government it would not wish to be ‘unnecessarily hampered’ by previous 
declarations.19  Similarly, in July 1964 George Cunningham advised the NEC: ‘it is 
important not to allow ourselves to be steramrollered into initiatives which do not solve 
                                                 
17 NMLH: Southern Rhodesia, Correspondence, George Cunningham to Arthur Bottomley, 13 September 
1963. 
18 The Africa Bureau was founded in 1952, ‘to advise and support Africans who wished to oppose by 
constitutional means political decisions affecting their lives and futures imposed by alien governments.’  P. 
M. Pugh, The Papers of the Africa Bureau (Oxford, 1980), p. 1. 
19 Rhodes House Library, Oxford [hereafter RHL]: Papers of the Africa Bureau, MSS Afr. s1681, Box 255, 
File 1, ‘Private Discussion on Southern Rhodesia: Notes on the discussion which took place at Chatham 
House on Monday 23rd March 1964’, pp. 3-4. 
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the problem and may react to our detriment.’20  Against this background of increasing 
caution it is difficult to comprehend why, just two weeks before the 1964 General 
Election, Harold Wilson entered into an explicit commitment to bring about African 
majority rule in Rhodesia.  When Dr E. Mutasa, a member of the Rhodesian Committee 
against European Independence, enquired about Labour’s Rhodesian policy, Wilson gave 
an unequivocal response: ‘The Labour Party is totally opposed to granting independence 
to Southern Rhodesia so long as the Government of the country remains under a white 
minority.’21  This comment was obviously compatible with Wilson’s previous statements 
on the Rhodesian issue, but it was at variance with the more reserved approach of others 
in the Labour Party during 1964.  It has been suggested that the Mutasa letter ‘was a vast 
hostage to fortune and, although in practice Wilson departed totally from this 
commitment, the existence of the letter, which was never formally repudiated, was to be a 
continuing strain in the relationship between Smith and Wilson.’22  The early 
correspondence between Smith and Wilson demonstrates that this is a fair comment.23  
From the very beginning the Rhodesian policy of the Labour Government was conflicted.  
Labour’s pre-existing commitment to granting independence to Rhodesia on the basis of 
African majority rule was incompatible with its public assurances that it had no pre-
conceived ideas about the formula for independence.  Wilson’s hope for a negotiated 
                                                 
20 NMLH: Southern Rhodesia, Documents, 1963-1966, George Cunningham, ‘Southern Rhodesia’, paper 
number OV/1963-64/29, 21 July 1964. 
21 Quoted in Foot, The Politics of Harold Wilson, p 259; Good, UDI, p. 47; and Windrich, p. 31. 
22 Miles Hudson, Triumph or Tragedy?  Rhodesia to Zimbabwe (London: Hamilton, 1982), p. 46. 
23 See the exchanges during November and December 1964 in Cmnd. 2807, Southern Rhodesia: documents 
relating to the negotiations between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian Governments November 
1963 – November 1965 (London: HMSO, 1965), pp. 47-51. 
 34 
 
 
settlement therefore never looked likely, despite the lengths to which he was prepared to 
go to try to achieve it. 
 
The Rhodesian policy of the Labour Government 
 
Cunningham feared that the possibility of a UDI before or during the general election 
‘would mean a Labour government would inherit a situation from which it would be 
almost impossible to emerge with credit.’24  Cunningham’s analysis was prescient in the 
long-term, but in the short-term his fears did not transpire.  When the Labour Government 
was elected in October it acted resolutely to thwart a possible UDI and in the process 
gained considerable credit.  In September Ian Smith visited London for talks with the 
Conservative Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, and the Commonwealth Secretary, 
Duncan Sandys.25  When Smith returned to Salisbury the Rhodesian Government 
‘sedulously fostered’ the impression that ‘a bargain was arrived at during Smith’s talks in 
London’.26  This was clearly at odds with the communiqué issued by the Conservative 
Government, in which it reserved its position on Smith’s claim that the majority of the 
                                                 
24 NMLH: Southern Rhodesia, Documents, 1963-1966, George Cunningham, ‘Southern Rhodesia’, paper 
number OV/1963-64/29, 21 July 1964. 
25 See Cmnd. 2807, pp. 21-38. 
26 The National Archives [hereafter TNA]: Public Records Office, Kew [hereafter PRO], PREM 13/85, J. B. 
Johnston, British High Commissioner, Salisbury, to Commonwealth Relations Office [hereafter CRO], 16 
October 1964.  Quoted in Alan Megahey, Humphrey Gibbs: Beleaguered Governor (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1998), p. 91.  Similarly, Group Captain H. G. Slade, RAF Liaison Officer in Salisbury, wrote 
that Rhodesians hailed the communiqué ‘as evidence of a resounding political victory by Mr Smith.’  Slade 
thought that the Rhodesians were, by this point, clearly delusional.  TNA: PRO, AIR 20/11189, Slade to Air 
Vice Marshal Peter Fletcher, 23 October 1964, p. 2 
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Rhodesian population supported his request for independence on the basis of the 1961 
Constitution.  The communiqué made it clear that: ‘the British Government must be 
satisfied that any basis on which it was proposed that independence should be granted 
was acceptable to the people of the country as a whole.’27  In an attempt to fulfil this 
criteria Smith proposed to stage an indaba of the African Chiefs (who were appointed by 
the Rhodesian Government) and a referendum of the white population.  On 15 October, 
general election day in Britain, Sandys advised Smith that his proposal for an indaba was 
inadequate, and rejected his invitation to send observers because this would be 
‘interpreted as implying a commitment on the part of the British Government to accepting 
your consultations as representing the opinion of the people as a whole.’28  On 19 October 
the new Commonwealth Secretary, Arthur Bottomley, wrote what Harold Wilson later 
described as ‘a stiff letter’ confirming that the Labour Government took the view that an 
indaba would be an insufficient demonstration of Rhodesian opinion as a whole.29  
Nevertheless, Ian Smith pressed ahead with his plans.  An indaba was held, beginning on 
22 October, and after a display by the Royal Rhodesian Air Force (which may be 
interpreted either as entertainment or as intimidation) the 622 African Chiefs voted ‘yes’ 
to the Government’s proposals for independence.30  A referendum of the white electorate 
was held on 5 November.  With only a 60 per cent turnout, 58,000 voted in favour of 
independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution and 6,000 against.31  Smith’s 
                                                 
27 ‘Joint Communiqué issued after the talks between the Prime Minister and Mr Ian Smith, Prime Minister 
of Southern Rhodesia’, Cmnd. 2807, pp. 38-39. 
28 Ian Smith to J. B. Johnston, British High Commissioner, Salisbury, 14 October 1964; and Johnston to 
Smith, 15 October 1964, Cmnd. 2807, pp. 39-41. 
29 Wilson, The Labour Government, p. 24.  Bottomley to Smith, 19 October 1964, Cmnd. 2807, pp. 41-42. 
30 Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence, pp. 25-26. 
31 Megahey, Humphrey Gibbs, p. 92. 
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determination to demonstrate – on his own terms – that the Rhodesian population wanted 
independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution alarmed the Labour Government, and 
forced it to take a strong public position at an early stage in its dealings with Rhodesia. 
 
In his second letter to Smith, Arthur Bottomley indicated his ‘serious concern’ about the 
Rhodesian Government’s intent to stage an indaba, and reiterated the British 
Government’s view that it could not regard this form of consultation as satisfactory.32  
Bottomley acknowledged that it was difficult for the new Labour Government 
‘immediately upon taking office to be confronted with a problem of this character.’  He 
proposed to discuss the situation with Smith by visiting Rhodesia after he attended 
Zambia’s independence celebrations, arriving in Salisbury on 26 October.  Bottomley 
also asked Smith to make arrangements for him to meet with the African nationalist 
leaders Joshua Nkomo and Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole.33  On 21 October, Bottomley 
presented a paper to a meeting of the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee (DOPC), 
which warned that the British Government was ‘on a collision course with the 
Government of Rhodesia’, and Bottomley advised ministers that ‘the only way of 
preventing rebellion in Southern Rhodesia was to warn Mr Smith in blunt terms of the 
                                                 
32 Bottomley to Smith, 19 October 1964, Cmnd. 2807, pp. 41-42. 
33 Ibid., p. 42.  Rhodesian liberation movements were deeply divided, which diminished their effectiveness 
in Rhodesia and undermined their support in the West.  In 1961 Joshua Nkomo organized the Zimbabwe 
African People’s Union (ZAPU) to replace the National Democratic Party, which had been banned by the 
Federal Government.  In 1962 ZAPU turned to violence and was also banned.  Some members of ZAPU – 
especially the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and Robert Mugabe – were critical of the amount of time that 
Nkomo spent abroad.  In August 1963 they formed the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), which 
sparked a violent confrontation between the rival groups.  Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian 
Independence, pp. 23-24. 
 37 
 
 
consequences’.34  Ministers discussed a draft statement for this purpose and agreed that if 
Smith did not consent to Bottomley’s condition that he should be allowed to see 
whomever he wished, the statement should be made public.35  Smith later wrote that he 
was incensed Bottomley wished to see Nkomo and Sithole at a time when they were in 
restriction because of their ‘criminal activities’, and was amazed ‘that there could be such 
a lack of sensitivity from a British minister’ at a time when ‘the nationalist thugs were 
intimidating and murdering innocent people.’36  Tension escalated further whilst 
Bottomley was in Lusaka because the British Government received reports that suggested 
a UDI was imminent.37  The Cabinet therefore agreed that the Prime Minister should 
invite Smith to London and, if Smith refused, he would be asked for a categorical 
assurance that the Rhodesian Government was not contemplating any unilateral action.  If 
Smith would not give such an assurance the British Government would send a statement 
to Salisbury warning of the consequences of a UDI and, if Smith did not respond, the 
British Government would then make the statement public on 27 October.38  This is 
                                                 
34 TNA: PRO, CAB 148/17, OPD (64) 2, ‘Memorandum by Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations’; and Minutes of OPD (64) 1st Meeting, 21 October 1964, p. 5. 
35 TNA: PRO, CAB 148/17, Minutes of OPD (64) 1st Meeting, 21 October 1964, pp. 5-6. 
36 Ian Douglas Smith, Bitter Harvest: The Great Betrayal and the Dreadful Aftermath (London: Blake, 
2001), p. 82. 
37 TNA: PRO, PREM 13/85, J. B. Johnston, British High Commissioner, Salisbury, to Sir Saville Garner or 
Sir Arthur Snelling, CRO, Cable No. 1397, 23 October 1964, in Philip Murphy (ed.), British Documents on 
the End of Empire Project [hereafter BDEEP] Series B, Volume 9, Central Africa, Part II: Crisis and 
Dissolution 1959-1965 (London: The Stationery Office, 2005), pp. 490-91. 
38 TNA: PRO, CAB 128/39, CC 2 (64) 2, 22 October 1964. 
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exactly how events unfolded.39  Smith declined the invitation to go to London because he 
was in the middle of his referendum campaign.  In his memoirs Smith recalled that he 
chose not to reply to the British Government’s ultimatum because: ‘This kind of 
behaviour was completely out of keeping with the accepted code of conduct between 
members of the Commonwealth and was entirely unprovoked on my part.’40  Smith may 
have found the ultimatum distasteful, but he ought to have recognised that the British 
Government was genuinely concerned about the prospect of a UDI and that failure to 
reply would exacerbate the tension in relations between London and Salisbury.  In the 
absence of a response from Smith the British Government’s warning statement ‘was 
issued from 10 Downing Street at 6 a.m. on the morning of the 27th, 8 a.m. in Rhodesia, 
where it would be heard on every car radio.’41  It observed that reports of a possible UDI 
had prompted the necessity of a statement warning of the consequences.  The statement 
made it clear that only the British Government could grant independence and would do so 
only when satisfied that this would be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. It 
warned that a UDI would have no legal effect, it would be an open act of rebellion and it 
would be treasonable to attempt to give effect to such a declaration.  The British 
Government would sever relations with the Rhodesian Government and Rhodesians 
would cease to be British subjects.  The economic effects on Rhodesia would be 
                                                 
39 An ad hoc committee, chaired by Wilson, finalised the warning statement.  TNA: PRO, CAB 130/206, 
Minutes of Meeting, 23 October 1964.  See also Wilson to Smith, 23 October 1964; Smith to Wilson, 24 
October 1964; and Wilson to Smith, 24 October 1964; Cmnd. 2807, pp. 42-43. 
40 Smith, Bitter Harvest, p. 83. 
41 Wilson, The Labour Government, p. 25.  Smith was due to debate a motion in the Rhodesian Legislative 
Assembly on 27 October, which the British Government feared could be the occasion of a UDI.  J. R. T. 
Wood, ‘So far and no further!’ Rhodesia’s bid for independence during the retreat from empire 1959-1965 
(Victoria, BC: Trafford, 2005), p. 245. 
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disastrous; all financial and trade relations with Britain would be frozen and Rhodesia’s 
trade with the rest of the world would be disrupted.  The statement also warned that 
Rhodesia would be isolated diplomatically.  Membership of the Commonwealth would be 
out of the question and, with one or two exceptions, foreign governments would not 
confer diplomatic recognition on the illegal regime, but might recognise a government-in-
exile if one were established.42 
 
How successful was the Labour Government’s early handling of the Salisbury regime?  In 
a study published two years after UDI, Kenneth Young wrote that the warning statement 
was unnecessary.  Young attributed it to the fact that Wilson’s position was precarious 
and he wanted ‘to make some emphatic, powerful gesture as a symbol of leadership’.43  
Smith suggested in his memoirs that the statement was an unsuccessful attempt to swing 
electoral support away from the Rhodesian Front in the forthcoming referendum, which 
constituted a breach in the constitutional convention of non-interference in Rhodesia’s 
domestic affairs.  He commented: ‘If I were searching for reasons to support a UDI they 
[British ministers] were making a positive contribution.’44  Similarly, in a recent analysis 
Richard Wood implied that the statement was futile: ‘If Wilson was hoping to cow Ian 
Smith, he had misjudged his man.’45  Yet the Labour Government’s warning was clearly 
very effective in several respects.  First, it drew grudging support from the Conservative 
Party.  During the debate on the Queen’s Speech, on 3 November 1964, Sir Alec 
                                                 
42 TNA: PRO, CAB 130/206, Minutes, 23 October 1964; Wilson, The Labour Government, p. 25; and 
Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence, pp. 32-33. 
43 Kenneth Young, Rhodesia and Independence: A Study in British Colonial Policy (London: Eyre and 
Spottiswoode, 1967) p. 168. 
44 Smith, Bitter Harvest, p. 83. 
45 Wood, ‘So far and no further!’, p. 245. 
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Douglas-Home described the language in the statement as ‘rough, but right.’46  This 
meant that Wilson had successfully established a bi-partisan approach on the Rhodesian 
issue at an early stage in his tenure of office, which made it more difficult for Home’s 
successor, Edward Heath, to deviate from supporting Wilson’s policy later on.  Shortly 
before UDI, Heath contested exactly what Home had said in the House of Commons 
almost a year before.47  Wilson wrote to Heath citing several written sources that 
confirmed Home had said the Labour Government’s warning statement had been ‘right’.  
Wilson stressed that this mattered because: 
 
[T]here is a feeling growing in the country – and abroad – that your Party 
may be re-thinking their attitude both about the points so strongly made by 
Sir Alec to Mr Smith in September 1964, and about the issue of the 
economic consequences that it was thought all of us agreed must follow an 
illegal and Unilateral Declaration of Independence.48 
 
A second reason why the statement may be regarded as successful is that ‘it heartened the 
African nationalists in Rhodesia, who regarded it as a portent of better things to come so 
far as they were concerned.’49  Third, the statement provided the British delegation at the 
United Nations with a document that it could present to the UN Special Committee on 
                                                 
46 Wilson, The Labour Government, p. 25.  
47 British Library of Political and Economic Science [hereafter BLPES]: Papers of George Edward Cecil 
Wigg [hereafter Wigg Papers], WIGG 4/13, ‘Rhodesia: Right and Rough Affair’. 
48 BLPES: Wigg Papers, WIGG 4/13, ‘Rhodesia: Right and Rough Affair’, Wilson to Heath, 26 October 
1965.  Wilson wrote from Government House, Salisbury, where he had gone for a further round of 
negotiations in a desperate attempt to prevent a UDI. 
49 Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence, p. 33. 
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Decolonisation, which in March 1964 had demanded the British Government: ‘warn the 
minority settler government against the consequences of a unilateral declaration of 
independence’.50  Fourth, the British statement gave the Commonwealth and the United 
States – whom the British Government regarded as essential partners in its efforts to avert 
a UDI – an early opportunity to express their support for the Labour Government’s 
policy.51  Finally, and most importantly, the statement left the Rhodesian Government in 
no doubt about the Labour Government’s attitude towards any illegal course of action that 
the Rhodesian Government might be contemplating.  Ian Smith told the Rhodesian 
Legislative Assembly that his Government was not considering a UDI, and on 29 October 
1964 the Assembly adopted the motion: ‘That the House takes note of the attitude of the 
British Government towards the independence issue and rejects any policy leading to a 
unilateral independence based on the result of the referendum of November the Fifth.’52  
On the same day Smith admitted in a television broadcast that he had abandoned his hope 
of independence by Christmas because the British Government’s actions had ‘upset 
everything’, and assured the Rhodesian public that a UDI would not be undertaken 
without careful deliberation, which would take some time.53  The Labour Government’s 
early handling of the Rhodesian Crisis was therefore extremely effective because it 
reduced the likelihood of a UDI and allowed more time in which to consider a solution of 
the problem.  From this point onwards, however, the Labour Government’s approach 
became less robust. 
 
                                                 
50 Ibid. 
51 Wood, ‘So far and no further!’, pp. 245 and 247.  For details of Old Commonwealth support see below, 
Ch. 4, pp. 223-24; and for U.S. support see Ch. 6, p. 312. 
52 Wood, ‘So far and no further!’, p. 247. 
53 Ibid., p. 248; and Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence, p. 33. 
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On the day that the British Government issued its warning statement, the former 
Rhodesian Prime Minister, Sir Edgar Whitehead, told the Rhodesian Legislative 
Assembly that the British Government did not use words like ‘rebellion’ and ‘treason’ 
unless it reserved its right to use force.54  Ironically, on 28 October 1964 an ad hoc 
Cabinet sub-committee – chaired by Wilson but attended by only four Cabinet ministers – 
agreed that: 
 
[T]here could be no question of military intervention in Rhodesia unless 
[the British Government was] asked to intervene by the Governor and 
could rely on the co-operation of the Rhodesian regular forces and on the 
availability of Salisbury airfield as a point of entry.55 
 
These conditions were considered unlikely, which meant that the use of force against 
Rhodesia in the event of a UDI had really been ruled out within two weeks of the Labour 
Government taking office.  The viability of military intervention is discussed at length in 
the next chapter, but for now it is important to note that Wilson and a handful of Cabinet 
ministers had imposed a significant constraint on the Government’s policy at a very early 
stage. 
 
                                                 
54  Rhodesian Legislative Assembly, Vol. 59, Col. 436.  Cited in Windrich, Britain and the Politics of 
Rhodesian Independence, p. 33. 
55 TNA: PRO, CAB 130/206, Minutes of Meeting, 28 October 1964.  This agreement reflected the advice in 
a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence, MISC 4/2, ‘UDI: Defence Implications’.  The 
Ministers who attended the meeting were Lord Gardiner, Lord Chancellor; Denis Healey, Secretary of State 
for Defence; Arthur Bottomley, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations; and Anthony Greenwood, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
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Anglo-Rhodesian negotiations during 1965 
 
With military intervention ruled out, the Labour Government pursued a Rhodesian policy 
that was much the same as that of its Conservative predecessor.56  In January 1965, 
Arthur Bottomley produced a paper for the DOPC outlining the Government’s 
approach.57  In the short term, the Government’s aim was to prevent a UDI, the prospect 
of which would be damaging to British interests in Africa and the United Nations.  A 
rebellion would have grave consequences for Britain’s relations with the African 
Commonwealth, which would regard economic action against Rhodesia as insufficient 
and would therefore call for the use of force.  As the British Government was not 
prepared to intervene militarily, it was ‘liable to be widely held to be condoning a white 
Rhodesian rebellion.’58  If, as seemed likely, an economic war broke out between 
Rhodesia and Zambia following a UDI, it would severely disrupt the production and 
export of Zambian copper, which would exacerbate Britain’s economic difficulties.59  The 
Government’s long-term aim was to secure conditions under which independence could 
be granted on a basis acceptable to the Rhodesian population as a whole.  If the 
Government appeared to retreat from this position, it ran ‘the risk of alienating African 
                                                 
56 On Conservative policy and attitudes see Philip Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonization. The 
Conservative Party and British Colonial Policy in Tropical Africa 1951-1964 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995).  For the factors that contributed to the continuity in policy see below, Conclusion, pp. 390-92. 
57 TNA: PRO, CAB 148/19, OPD (65) 10, ‘Southern Rhodesia: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations’, 19 January 1965.  For the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee discussions 
of this document see TNA: PRO, CAB 148/18, OPD (65) 3rd Meeting, 21 January 1965. 
58 TNA: PRO, CAB 148/19, OPD (65) 10, ‘Southern Rhodesia: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations’, 19 January 1965, para. 4 (a). 
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opinion in Rhodesia itself, the rest of the Commonwealth and the United Nations.’  If, on 
the other hand, the Government gave the white Rhodesians the impression that it was 
‘determined to push ahead too far and too fast’, it would defeat the short-term objective of 
preventing a UDI.  The Government’s problem was therefore: ‘to break through the 
political impasse without triggering off the explosion.’60 
 
Bottomley noted that Ian Smith had so far resisted the Government’s attempts to persuade 
him to come to London,61 but anticipated that in the event of Sir Winston Churchill’s 
death, Smith would visit for the funeral.  This would provide an opportunity for private 
discussions and the Government could prevail upon other Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers, especially Sir Robert Menzies, to exercise their influence on Smith.62  Smith 
did indeed attend Churchill’s funeral, and on 30 January had a somewhat clandestine 
meeting with Wilson.63  The British Prime Minister was well briefed for the meeting; his 
major objective was to prepare the ground for more substantive negotiations at a later 
                                                 
60 Ibid., para. 4 (b). 
61 For the exchanges between Wilson and Smith, November 1964 – January 1965, see Cmnd. 2807, pp. 45-
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62 TNA: PRO, CAB 148/19, OPD (65) 10, ‘Southern Rhodesia: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for 
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date.64  Smith was largely intransigent: he said that there could be no change in the 
Rhodesian Government’s position and that it was looking at ways to prolong European 
control for ‘60 or 70 years, or perhaps even longer.’65  Smith rejected Wilson’s proposals 
for any concessions to the African population in Rhodesia, but he did agree that the 
Commonwealth Secretary and Lord Chancellor should visit Rhodesia and that they 
should be allowed to see anyone who was not in prison.66  Wilson had not achieved 
much, but at least he had restored the momentum to talks about Rhodesia’s independence, 
which is one of the key factors affecting the dynamic of negotiations.67 
 
The Cabinet Secretary, Sir Burke Trend, had already expressed reservations about the 
wisdom of a ministerial visit to Rhodesia.  In a memorandum to the Prime Minister he 
questioned whether a visit would achieve much.68  Trend suggested that the British 
Government was in a ‘morally impregnable position’ because it had stated that it would 
be prepared to grant independence on any basis that was acceptable to the Rhodesian 
people as a whole.  Trend advised that if the British Government proposed amendments 
to the 1961 Constitution – and Smith refused to make them, or the African nationalists 
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rejected them as inadequate – this would expose the British Government to attack, 
‘because we have indicated that we regard it as our duty (rather than Mr Smith’s) to take 
the initiative in attempting to solve the problem and are therefore blameable to the extent 
to which we fail to solve it.’69  However, the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) did 
not have in mind that the aim of the ministerial visit should be to produce a solution to the 
problem, but rather: ‘to re-establish a dialogue with the [Rhodesian] Government; to 
correct false ideas of British policies; to combat the move to a unilateral declaration of 
independence; and to assess public opinion.’70  It was in pursuit of these limited 
objectives that Arthur Bottomley and Lord Gardiner visited Rhodesia between 21 
February and 3 March 1965.  They had meetings with a wide cross-section of Rhodesian 
opinion, including: Ian Smith and Rhodesian ministers; the Opposition; the Chiefs and 
Headsmen; African nationalists; representatives of business, farming, and industrial 
interests; and educational, cultural, and religious leaders.71  From the outset some 
elements of the British press were sceptical that the visit would achieve anything.72 
Towards the end of the visit, one report in The Times suggested that the ministerial tour 
had proved the intractability of the various factions in Rhodesia and commented that it 
had been a ‘justification exercise’: the Rhodesian Government could point to their 
invitation as evidence of good faith in an attempt to negotiate their independence, and the 
                                                 
69 Ibid. 
70 TNA: PRO, FO 371/181877, ‘Rhodesia: Visit by the Secretary of State and the Lord Chancellor’, J. B. 
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British could report to the forthcoming Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference that 
the UK was doing all it could to find a solution.73  One of Wilson’s biographers has 
followed this line, suggesting that ‘The ministerial visit proved fruitless.’74 
 
It may certainly be argued that the visit was unsuccessful if it is assessed merely on the 
basis that it produced no tangible agreement between the British and Rhodesian 
Governments.  On the other hand, the British High Commissioner in Rhodesia, J. B. 
(Jack) Johnston, reported that although the ‘realistic picture remains one of irreconcilable 
positions and immovable views’, the visit had achieved its intended objectives ‘in great 
measure’.75  First, the Rhodesian Government had been left in no doubt of the severe 
consequences of a UDI, which had ‘produced an increased disposition to look at any 
other way out of the impasse’.76  Second, a dialogue had been re-established, albeit within 
narrow limits.77 Third, and most notably, ‘the sedulously fostered myths and 
misconceptions about the British Government’s policy and purpose’ had been dispelled 
effectively, which had produced a ‘tangible lessening of the previous tension.’78  Finally, 
‘a balanced assessment of the state of Rhodesian opinion, and of the possibilities of 
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compromise, was amply achieved.’79  At the conclusion of their visit Bottomley and 
Gardiner told the press that their main impression was ‘of a hardening of attitudes in 
recent months amongst both Europeans and Africans’, but they remained conscious of the 
hopes of all Rhodesians that ‘some way forward can be found which will reassure both 
those Africans who at present feel themselves denied full political and human rights and 
those Europeans who fear losing what they have earned and won.’80 
 
Did Bottomley and Gardiner really feel that there was a way forward, or was their public 
statement merely part of the ‘justification exercise’ perceived by The Times?81  British 
Cabinet sub-committee minutes suggest that during an informal meeting with Smith on 3 
March, Bottomley and Gardiner had discussed the possibility of granting independence in 
return for a combination of changes in the Rhodesian franchise and alteration of 
legislative provisions governing land distribution.  The specific proposals were that: 
election to the ‘B’ Roll would be on the basis of ‘one man, one vote’; the number of ‘B’ 
Roll seats would be increased from 15 to 26, providing a blocking minority of one-third 
plus one, to guarantee against retrogressive changes in the Constitution; the process by 
which Africans qualified for the ‘A’ Roll would be speeded up, to hold out the prospect 
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of majority rule in a measurable time; and the Land Apportionment Act would be 
liberalised.82  British ministers took note that: 
 
There could be no certainty that Mr Smith would accept an agreement on 
these lines, or that, even if he himself did so, he could carry his 
Government and the white population of Southern Rhodesia with him.  
The danger of embarking on negotiations with Mr Smith was that, if they 
were to become public, they would be denounced by the other African 
Governments, including the Commonwealth in Africa, as a betrayal of the 
Africans in Southern Rhodesia.  If the opposition were such that the 
United Kingdom Government then had to draw back Mr Smith would be 
almost certain to make a UDI and would probably publish any 
correspondence with the United Kingdom Government.83 
 
Bottomley and Gardiner were convinced that Smith genuinely wanted to reach an 
agreement and that his dominant position in Rhodesian politics held out the prospect that 
                                                 
82 TNA: PRO, CAB 21/5513, MISC51/1, Minutes of Meeting, 25 March 1965, in Murphy (ed.), BDEEP 
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he might be able to secure it.84  Over the next few weeks the British High Commissioner, 
Jack Johnston, discussed privately with Smith the formula that the British Government 
hoped might provide a way forward for a formal agreement.85  However, these 
discussions took place against a background of increasing tension, because on 30 March 
the Governor suddenly and unexpectedly announced that a general election would take 
place in Rhodesia on 7 May.86  In his memoirs Smith explained that the election served 
two purposes: first, it was a means by which to demonstrate to the British Government 
that there was no possibility of replacing the Rhodesian Front ‘with more malleable left-
wingers’; and second, it was an opportunity to obtain a two-thirds majority so that the 
Rhodesian Government could pass constitutional amendments in the Legislative 
Assembly.87 
 
Against this background Johnston reported that he was unable to secure any private 
commitments from Smith, especially regarding the proposal for a blocking third in the 
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85 Wood, ‘So far and no further!’, pp. 293-96. 
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Legislative Assembly, and he was unlikely to be able to pin Smith down during the 
election campaign because he was wary of his position in his own Cabinet and with the 
electorate.  Johnston suspected that Smith was attempting to manoeuvre the British 
Government into a public statement of its proposals for independence.  This, Johnston 
recognised, could provoke adverse African reactions and he therefore suggested that the 
British Government might consider a statement of principles rather than specific terms.88  
It was at this juncture that the CRO formulated the Five Principles:89 
 
(i) The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already 
enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and 
guaranteed. 
(ii) There would have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the 
Constitution. 
(iii) There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the 
African population. 
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(iv) There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination. 
(v) The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for 
independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.90 
 
In theoretical terms it may be argued that these principles were helpful because they 
provided a means to facilitate the incremental process by which polarised parties narrow 
their differences in negotiations.91  On the other hand, Martin Le Quesne, reflecting on 
the end of his four-year term as Head of the Foreign Office West and Central Africa 
Department in 1968, suggested that in practice these principles had operated as more of a 
constraint.  Le Quesne acknowledged that the articulation of the principles had been 
necessary to clarify British thinking, but thought that making them public was a mistake 
because it diverted Anglo-Rhodesian negotiations into a ‘sterile channel’, in which a 
political settlement could only be achieved if it conformed in every respect with the 
principles.92  In a recent study John Young concurred with Le Quesne’s contemporary 
assessment, arguing that the principles ‘tied Britain’s hands in future talks and in a sense 
made agreement less likely, because they went beyond what the Rhodesia Front would 
accept.’93  In another recent analysis, which is sympathetic to the Rhodesian Front, 
Richard Wood has gone so far as to suggest that the principles not only impeded any 
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solution short of majority rule but also resulted in ‘the return of Robert Mugabe in 1980 
and all the consequences which flowed.’94  This is excessively reductionist, but it does 
demonstrate that there has been consistent criticism of the Five Principles since they were 
first formulated up to the present day. 
 
The British Government was anxious to avoid a situation in which Smith could turn the 
Rhodesian general election into a referendum on the principles, and Johnston therefore 
did not reveal them to Smith until 27 May.95  Smith apparently ‘gave no immediate 
reaction either favourable or unfavourable’ to the British High Commissioner.96  In the 
meantime, two related developments appeared to suggest that the Rhodesian Government 
might be moving nearer to a UDI.  First, on 26 April, the Rhodesian Government 
published a White Paper entitled ‘Economic Aspects of a Declaration of Independence’, 
which suggested that the economic consequences of a UDI would not be as serious as the 
British Government had warned in its statement of October 1964.  In particular, it claimed 
that Rhodesia’s exports of tobacco could be marketed in countries other than Britain 
(which was Rhodesia’s biggest customer), and that Rhodesia would be able to secure 
investment from friendly countries.  The White Paper alarmed some Europeans in 
Rhodesia.  The Rhodesia Herald dismissed it as ‘an insult to the electorate’, and the 
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Institute of Directors published their own assessment, prepared the previous November, 
that a UDI would have ‘disastrous financial and economic consequences.’97  In a 
statement to the House of Commons on 29 April, Harold Wilson explained that although 
his Government did not seek to influence the Rhodesian electorate, he must reiterate his 
previous warning that a UDI would have a disastrous effect upon the Rhodesian economy 
and would damage its relations with the Commonwealth.98  Thereafter, criticism of the 
White Paper by Rhodesian commercial and industrial interests became even more vocal, 
though this apparently had little effect on the Rhodesian Government.  Even the Leader of 
the Opposition, David Butler, said: ‘It is wrong for Britain to go on threatening Rhodesia 
without putting forward an alternative for settling our future.’99 
 
The second development that pointed towards a possible UDI was the Rhodesian Front’s 
overwhelming electoral victory.  It won all fifty of the ‘A’ Roll seats, and in the 28 
contested constituencies the Rhodesian Front polled 28,165 votes to the Rhodesia Party’s 
6,377.  The Opposition consisted of ten Africans of the new, United Peoples’ Party 
elected on the ‘B’ Roll, four African independents and one white (Dr Ahrn Palley).  The 
election totally destroyed the Rhodesia Party and thereby eradicated the remaining 
political influence of the old liberal establishment in Rhodesia.100  Alan Megahey has 
observed that the election also contributed to the isolation of another moderating 
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influence, the Governor, Humphrey Gibbs: ‘In a sense, on the political scene, the 
Governor was on his own, whereas in the past, friends, colleagues and old acquaintances 
– the establishment – had been part of the political and social milieu in which he 
moved.’101  The outcome of the election obviously had significant constitutional and 
political implications, but it did not unduly alarm the British Government, for three 
reasons.  First, the DOPC had already anticipated that in the event of a general election 
the Rhodesian Front would win a two-thirds majority in the Legislative Assembly, so the 
result did not come as an unexpected shock.102  Second, the Rhodesian Government 
immediately and publicly denied that it regarded the election as a mandate for a UDI.103  
Third, shortly after the election the British High Commissioner advised the DOPC that 
Smith was ‘now much more relaxed’, and that he ‘genuinely wanted to negotiate and to 
avoid a UDI if possible.’104   Smith had told Johnston that ‘the extremists in the 
Rhodesian Front did not represent the views of the majority in the party or his own 
views.’  Smith had committed himself publicly to exhausting all possibilities of 
negotiation before he made a UDI and he had told Johnston that if talks did break down, 
‘then he would have to make a clear assessment of where Rhodesia’s interests lay before 
taking any action’.  The DOPC therefore interpreted this as a disposition to postpone the 
issue, and concluded: ‘Though the gap to be bridged in negotiation with Mr Smith was 
wide, and the scope for compromise limited, there seemed now less cause for anxiety in 
the immediate future.’105  One month later, Arthur Bottomley was still optimistic that a 
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UDI might be avoided, and advised the DOPC that Smith seemed to be pursuing a more 
moderate policy.106 
 
Harold Wilson’s main concern in June 1965 was to make it through the Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers’ Meeting without either precipitating the disintegration of the 
Commonwealth over the Rhodesian problem, or destroying the chances of a negotiated 
settlement by entering into untenable commitments forced upon him by African 
Commonwealth leaders.  He was remarkably successful in both respects.107  He then 
wrote immediately to Smith: ‘I am sure you will understand that throughout the meeting I 
have been seeking to keep the way open to pursue the negotiations with you.  It remains 
our policy and indeed our earnest wish to bring them to a successful conclusion within the 
broad framework which our High Commissioner has explained to you.’108  The ‘broad 
framework’ to which Wilson referred was the set of principles that Smith accepted at the 
end of May.  Even though the British Government had no further specific proposals to put 
forward, ministers recognised that they should be seen to be negotiating, and to this end it 
was suggested that Cledwyn Hughes, Minister of State at the CRO, should visit 
Rhodesia.109  Bottomley advised Smith that he was sending Hughes on his behalf because 
of his own parliamentary commitments and his forthcoming visit to West Africa, which 
was a long-standing engagement.110 
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In his account of the negotiations historian Kenneth Young suggested that at this juncture 
Smith was optimistic about the prospects for a settlement, because: ‘He believed – 
wrongly – that through his talks with the High Commissioner he had somehow converted 
the British Government to his point of view and that this was proved by their willingness 
to send out the Minister of State to talk to him.’111  However, Smith soon recognised that 
Hughes, ‘did not have the power to make decisions, and was simply putting out feelers in 
the hope that he could take something back with him.’112  The main objectives of the visit 
were to see how far Smith was prepared to go along the lines suggested by Bottomley in 
March, and to determine whether a negotiated settlement was possible on the basis of the 
Five Principles.  To this end Hughes was instructed to discuss with Smith the idea of a 
senate, which might accommodate three of the principles.  By giving the Africans a more 
effective political voice it would satisfy the second principle of immediate political 
improvement for Africans.  By giving it a power of veto over changes to the Constitution 
it would satisfy the second principle of no retrogressive constitutional amendments.  By 
taking over the role of the Constitutional Council it would meet the requirements of the 
fourth principle, to eliminate racial discrimination.113  Although Smith was prepared to 
consider a senate that represented African opinion, he was unwilling to allow an African 
majority, rejected the safeguard of a veto over constitutional changes, and was reluctant 
to concede to the senate more than a nominal legislative role.  Hughes also found that 
Smith would not accept a blocking third in the Legislative Assembly, but might consider 
the possibility of a blocking quarter on some constitutional matters.  Smith suggested that 
an extension of the franchise on the ‘B’ Roll would be possible, but the number of ‘B’ 
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Roll seats would only be increased in proportion with an increase in ‘A’ Roll seats (which 
would nullify the increase in African representation).  Smith also agreed to look at 
possible changes to the Land Apportionment Act as a means to reduce racial 
discrimination.114  On his return to London, Hughes advised the British Government that 
there was no immediate danger of a UDI, and confirmed earlier impressions that Smith 
was anxious to negotiate a settlement.  Ministers concluded: ‘The situation as a whole 
was fluid.’115  The British Government had, once again, detected no obvious way through 
the impasse but had at least sustained the dialogue and held the door open for further 
negotiations, which may be considered an achievement in itself. 
 
However, there were signs that the Rhodesian Government was becoming increasingly 
impatient with the lack of substantive progress in negotiations.  At the conclusion of 
Hughes’ visit the Rhodesian Government announced that the former Minister of 
Information and Tourism, Harry Reedman, would be appointed as Rhodesia’s ‘accredited 
diplomatic representative’ in Lisbon.  Rhodesia already had a diplomatic representative in 
South Africa, so it was obvious that Rhodesia was strengthening its links with the 
countries from which it expected support in the event of a UDI.  The British Government 
publicly played down the issue, suggesting that Reedman would not have the status of 
‘accredited diplomatic representative’, but rather would be attached to the British 
Embassy in Lisbon in the same manner that Rhodesian representatives served in other 
British embassies.116  Privately, however, the British Government treated the matter with 
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grave concern, and it generated considerable friction with the Rhodesian Government.117  
It was in this context that a rapid exchange of correspondence took place between Smith 
and Bottomley.  The Commonwealth Secretary proposed to visit Salisbury after the 
Labour Party Conference and before Parliament resumed on 26 October.118  Smith was 
clearly frustrated by the delay and advised Bottomley: ‘the impression is gaining ground 
that your Government has no intention of granting independence to Rhodesia.’  Smith 
stressed that his Government regarded the matter of Rhodesia’s independence as ‘one of 
extreme urgency’ and requested a ‘definite reply’ to the proposals that had been put 
forward during Hughes’ visit.119  Bottomley replied that there had been no concrete 
proposals, expressed his concern over the ‘apparent hardening’ of Smith’s views, and 
emphasised the importance of further negotiations.120  Smith pointed out that the ‘the 
concept of a senate was raised and quite definite views were put forward’, and rejected as 
unsatisfactory the British Government’s unwillingness to discuss further proposals until 
Bottomley arrived in Salisbury for further discussions, which, Smith warned: ‘must reach 
final decisions’.  With regard to Bottomley’s observations Smith advised: ‘The hardening 
of our views here in Rhodesia is not merely apparent; it is very real and serious.  So long 
as the delay in reaching a decision persists the gap between our respective Governments 
will continue to widen.’  Smith observed that the Rhodesian planting season was about to 
begin and commented: ‘our farmers expect and are entitled to a decision on our 
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independence.’  He therefore urged Bottomley to advance the date of his visit.121  
Bottomley could not accede to Smith’s request, but in an attempt to maintain the 
momentum of negotiations he reverted to discussion of the Five Principles, on which the 
British Government would have to be satisfied before it could grant independence.122  At 
this point Smith’s patience was exhausted and he proposed to visit London for talks in 
early October.123 
 
The British Government anticipated that talks with Smith would fall into two phases: 
first, reasoned argument; second, warning and intimidation.  Sir Burke Trend noted that 
the success of the second phase would depend upon the Government’s ‘determination to 
introduce, if there is a u.d.i., the various economic measures which Ministers have 
considered many times but have not yet formally approved.’124  Trend recognised one of 
the fundamental weaknesses associated with the British Government’s position – that it 
had failed to establish exactly what it intended to do in the event of a UDI – which is 
discussed in greater detail below.  Before the talks began, Bottomley told the DOPC that 
the discussions were not expected to produce any results and the most that could be hoped 
for was to reiterate the consequences of a UDI.  Wilson noted that Smith had retreated 
from his earlier readiness to negotiate on the basis of the Five Principles, perhaps because 
of pressure in his own party.  Jack Johnston explained that Smith’s earlier willingness to 
negotiate was based on the assumption that the British Government was seeking only 
minor concessions, which would not affect the dominant position of the Europeans in 
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Rhodesia, but it was now clear to Smith that the British Government would only grant 
independence on the basis of the Five Principles, which were unacceptable to him and his 
party.125 
 
According to Bottomley, when the talks began on 5 October, Smith accepted that the 
discussions should be based on the Five Principles but subsequently rejected all of them, 
so no progress was made: 
 
His only positive proposal had been the suggestion of a Second Chamber 
to consist of six Chiefs, one Asian representative, one African 
representative and four representatives of industry, commerce, the 
professions, etc., all nominated by the Southern Rhodesian Government.  
A two-thirds majority of both Houses voting together would be required 
for the amendment of the specially entrenched clauses of the 
Constitution.126 
 
Smith would not agree to repeal the Land Apportionment Act as a means to diminish 
racial discrimination.  He argued that the 1961 Constitution had been negotiated with the 
intention that Rhodesia should subsequently obtain independence on this basis, and 
sought to press the British Government for a statement that it rejected the Constitution.  
Smith also argued that the fifth principle – that a settlement must be acceptable to the 
people of Rhodesia as a whole – superseded the first four principles.  Bottomley 
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concluded: ‘It appeared that there was unanimity between Smith and his colleagues and 
that the talks were heading for a breakdown.’127  It was at this critical juncture that 
Wilson took over the negotiations.  It was made clear that the British Government was 
prepared to grant independence before African majority rule, but despite this major 
concession and extensive discussions, no agreement was reached on the implementation 
of independence on the basis of the Five Principles.128  The joint communiqué stated that 
frank and thorough discussions had failed to reconcile the two Governments’ opposing 
views and no further meeting was planned.129  Smith later wrote that ‘this was a blunder, 
because it established the fact that there was only one way out for us.’130  Smith and 
Wilson had discussions independently with the Conservative Party leadership over the 
course of the weekend.  Edward Heath and Selwyn Lloyd suggested that an alternative 
way to provide constitutional safeguards for the Africans might be to sign a treaty, 
perhaps registered with the United Nations, guaranteeing that there would be no 
regression in the constitutional status of Africans after independence.131  Before Smith 
departed London he had one further meeting to discuss this idea with Wilson.132   The 
British Prime Minister observed that the only precedent for such a treaty of guarantee was 
Cyprus, and it was ‘not entirely a happy one’, but conceded that the idea might merit 
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Smith, Bitter Harvest, pp. 91-92; Wilson, The Labour Government, pp. 146-49; Wood, ‘So far and no 
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further discussion.133  Smith pointed out that it would still offer a possible way forward 
on only one of the Five Principles; the difficulties in respect of the other four would 
remain.  Wilson accepted this, but suggested that it still offered the possibility that some 
progress might be made.134  Wilson had, once again, tried to leave the door open to 
further negotiations even though it was obvious to both sides that there was little, if any, 
room for agreement. 
 
After Smith departed London, Wilson appeared on television.  As Smith later observed: 
‘Very adroitly, he changed course from the irreconcilability expressed in the communiqué 
of [the previous] Friday.’135  Wilson explained that he had followed the principles of 
successive British Governments, and was not giving up because too much was at stake.  
He revealed a new initiative, for a Commonwealth mission, and concluded with a 
dramatic appeal: ‘I know I speak for everyone in these islands, all parties, all people, 
when I say to Mr Smith: “Prime Minister, think again”.’136  Wilson then wrote to Smith: 
‘it is important that everything that is humanly possible should be done to devise a 
peaceful solution of the Rhodesian problem.’  He urged Smith to accept a Commonwealth 
mission of senior statesmen, headed by Sir Robert Menzies of Australia, which was 
‘genuinely meant as an attempt to open up new avenues of negotiation.’137  Smith replied 
that Menzies had a standing invitation to visit Rhodesia, but the Rhodesian Government 
                                                 
133 Ibid., p. 93. 
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135 Smith, Bitter Harvest, p. 94. 
136 Wilson, The Labour Government, pp. 149-50. 
137 Wilson to Smith, 12 October 1965, Cmnd. 2807, p. 95.  For further details of the proposed 
Commonwealth mission see below, Ch. 4, pp. 219-20. 
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was not disposed to accept the proposed Commonwealth mission.138  Smith was aware 
that ‘Wilson was manoeuvring for tactical advantage, and trying to ensure that he did not 
place himself in a position where he appeared to be responsible for any breakdown of 
negotiations.’139  They continued to exchange correspondence and Wilson put forward a 
proposal to visit Salisbury, which Smith accepted.140  Smith could not really have done 
otherwise, for he was obviously as conscious as Wilson of the need to avoid the public 
impression that he was responsible for the final breakdown of talks between the British 
and Rhodesian Governments.  From this perspective it may be argued that Wilson’s move 
was astute because it locked his opponent into a further round of negotiations, with the 
prospect of indefinite delay.  This clearly suited the British Government, but not the 
Rhodesian Government, which was convinced that it must resolve the uncertainty 
surrounding Rhodesia’s future.  On the other hand, according to Richard Crossman there 
were serious reservations in the British Cabinet about the wisdom of Wilson’s tactical 
manoeuvre.  Crossman thought that ‘Burke Trend was the decisive influence’, and 
compared the initiative to Neville Chamberlain’s flight to Munich.141  Arthur Bottomley 
later wrote that it was ‘most unwise’, because: ‘Nothing would be gained by such a visit 
and our Asian, West Indian and African Commonwealth partners would not be 
enthusiastic about the proposal.’142 
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142 Bottomley, Commonwealth, Comrades and Friends, p. 149. 
 65 
 
 
Oliver Wright, Wilson’s Foreign Office Private Secretary, defined the objective of the 
visit as an attempt to discover, ‘by personal contact and discussion with all shades of 
Rhodesian opinion whether there exists a general desire to find a way out of the present 
deadlock’, and ‘if there is such a desire, to try to crystallize and focus it; and to float a 
proposition.’143  The particular target of the visit was to obtain a year’s moratorium on the 
independence issue.  Wright envisaged that this could be achieved if: (i) the Rhodesian 
Government withdrew of the threat of UDI; (ii) the British Government withdrew the 
threat of sanctions; (iii) the African nationalists agreed to set aside their differences, work 
the Constitution, and adopt legal political methods; (iv) the Rhodesian Government lifted 
the restrictions on African nationalists in return for their assurance of legal methods; (v) 
all parties agreed to take stock at the end of one year, perhaps at a constitutional 
conference in London; and (vi) the British Government sweetened the package through a 
combination of education and training for Africans, government-to-government loans, 
and encouragement of private capital investment directed towards Europeans.144  
Tactically, the British would try to hold Smith in the centre through discussions, whilst 
‘outflanking him to left and right by taking soundings of moderate opinion among 
Nationalist leaders, ex-Prime Ministers, business and farming interests etc. to discover 
whether there is scope for a fresh approach to Rhodesian independence.’145  All of this 
was sound in theory, but what the British Government did not know is that from the very 
beginning there was no likelihood that Wilson’s visit would succeed, because on 19 
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144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid., p. 206. 
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October the Rhodesian Security Council had taken the decision to proceed with UDI ‘at 
the first favourable opportunity.’146 
 
At the commencement of negotiations between the two Governments on 26 October, 
Smith observed that although the position was generally unchanged, there was a ‘ray of 
light’.  He understood that there were signs of a more reasonable attitude on the part of 
the African nationalists and the Opposition, who realised that a settlement short of 
majority rule might be preferable to ‘something worse than the 1961 Constitution’ (by 
which he meant a UDI).  No progress was made on the suggestion of a post-independence 
treaty of guarantee because the two sides could not agree exactly what constitutional 
safeguards the treaty would offer, and the Rhodesian Government would not concede 
sufficient ground on the issue of African political advancement to make it possible for the 
British Government to agree to independence before majority rule.147  Wilson then had 
meetings with the African nationalists, which Elaine Windrich has observed: ‘were an 
essential preparation for negotiations with the Europeans.  If he could be seen to be taking 
a tough line with them, his chances of getting an agreement with the Europeans would be 
immeasurably improved.’148  However, Wilson found that despite Smith’s optimistic 
remarks earlier in the day, the African nationalists remained obdurate: they would not 
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agree to co-operate with each other, to withdraw their demands for immediate majority 
rule, or to work legally under the 1961 Constitution.149  The need to engineer a more 
reasonable attitude on the part of Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole may well 
explain Wilson’s otherwise incomprehensible decision to rule out explicitly the use of 
force against Rhodesia in the event of a UDI.150  However, even this did not assist his 
dealings with the Rhodesian Government, which were soured by mutual contempt.  One 
of Wilson’s biographers commented: ‘the ultra-reactionary Rhodesian Cabinet regarded 
the British premier with macho scorn, while he treated them with headmasterly 
distaste.’151 
 
At their morning meeting on 29 October, Wilson told Smith that he had made it clear to 
the African nationalist leaders that there would be no British military intervention in the 
event of a UDI, that the African nationalists could not expect majority rule in the 
immediate future, and that there could be no fixed timetable for transition to majority 
rule.  Wilson then put forward two proposals: the first was a referendum of all Rhodesian 
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taxpayers to test the Rhodesian Government’s assertion that the majority of the Rhodesian 
people were in favour of independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution; and the 
second was a Royal Commission, under the chairmanship of the Rhodesian Chief Justice, 
Hugh Beadle, ‘to recommend the constitutional arrangements on the basis of which 
Rhodesia might proceed to independence as rapidly as possible in a manner acceptable to 
the people of the country as a whole.’152  Smith rejected the first proposal but agreed that 
his Cabinet should give careful consideration to the second.  At a final meeting, Smith 
made a counter-proposal to Wilson that the Royal Commission should receive from the 
British and Rhodesian Governments an agreed independence constitution, which it would 
then put to the Rhodesian people to ascertain its acceptability.  This, of course, raised two 
important questions: the nature of the independence constitution and the means by which 
its acceptability would be tested.  Agreement on these points could obviously not be 
reached instantly, and Wilson said that he would have to consult his Cabinet on the matter 
(much to the annoyance of the Rhodesian ministers, who believed that this was simply 
another delaying tactic).  Wilson was also scheduled to embark on consultations with 
Commonwealth leaders in Zambia, Nigeria, and Ghana before returning to London, so he 
left behind the Commonwealth Secretary and Attorney General to continue the 
discussions in Salisbury.153  However, they were not able to resolve the points of 
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difference regarding the proposed constitution.154  Smith advised Wilson that the Royal 
Commission was a non-starter unless the British Government agreed that the 
independence constitution should be acceptable to the Rhodesian Government.  Smith 
also reasserted his claim that he had an agreement with the previous British Government 
that Rhodesia should be granted independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution.155 
 
At Cabinet meetings on 1 and 2 November, British ministers debated four choices: (i) 
accept Smith’s document for submission to the Royal Commission to see if the Rhodesian 
people wanted it; (ii) submit Smith’s draft to the Commission while publicly dissociating 
the British Government from it; (iii) put both drafts before the Commission; or (iv) insist 
that only the British Government’s draft be submitted.  It was thought that that the first 
two options would buy some time, whereas the third and fourth options were likely to 
provoke a UDI.156  The Cabinet agreed to support the second option, provided that the 
Royal Commission’s report was unanimous and there was unanimous agreement on the 
mechanism for consulting the Rhodesian people.157  Wilson put these terms to Smith, but 
he replied that they were so hedged with restrictions ‘that the only conclusion to be 
derived from your letter is that it is tantamount to, and can only be interpreted as, a 
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rejection of the proposals agreed with you in Salisbury.’  He concluded: ‘the impression 
you left us with of a determined effort to resolve our constitutional problems has been 
utterly dissipated.  It would seem that you have now finally closed the door which you 
claimed publicly to have opened.’158  Meanwhile, on 5 November, a state of emergency 
was declared in Rhodesia, which was an obvious prelude to a UDI, even though the 
Rhodesian Government denied that this was the case.159  There were further, desperate, 
efforts to prevent a UDI.  At Wilson’s invitation Sir Hugh Beadle flew to London to 
discuss how the Royal Commission would work under the circumstances of a state of 
emergency, but Smith declared that Beadle was travelling ‘entirely on his own 
initiative.’160  Wilson also offered to meet Smith again, this time in Malta, but Smith 
merely replied that no agreement was possible on the Royal Commission.161  On 10 
November Wilson sent another lengthy message to Smith, reporting his discussions with 
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Beadle, explaining the British Government’s position on the Royal Commission, and 
once again suggesting a further meeting.162  Clive Ponting has commented: 
 
By now the British government was essentially shadow-boxing to establish 
their position after UDI.  Their aim was to show how hard they had tried to 
avoid it.  But this was important politically because Wilson, who had 
carefully been keeping Heath in the picture, had obtained an undertaking 
that if he went to the absolute limit of concessions on the Royal 
Commission then the Conservatives would not support UDI.163 
 
On the night of 10 November Wilson received intelligence that a UDI would take place 
the next day.  He telephoned Smith early the following morning, but it was too late to 
avert the course of action to which Smith was committed.164  The Rhodesian Government 
unilaterally and illegally declared its independence at 11 a.m. that morning.165 
 
A critical analysis of the Anglo-Rhodesian negotiations 
 
Was there ever any possibility of a negotiated settlement that would have averted a UDI?  
Robert Holland has contended that: ‘Anglo-Rhodesian talks were really concerned with 
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the cultivation of images for media presentation, since the two sides were too far apart for 
a real agreement to be practicable.’166  There is much to be said in favour of this 
argument, as the foregoing discussion has suggested.  Although the British and Rhodesian 
Governments agreed that there could and should be no immediate transition to African 
majority rule, the Rhodesian Government made it clear in each round of substantive 
negotiations that it was not prepared to countenance transitional arrangements that would 
have produced majority rule within a timeframe acceptable to the British Government, 
international opinion, or Rhodesian African nationalists (for whom immediate majority 
rule was the only acceptable outcome).167  The unwillingness of the Rhodesian 
Government to accept that the problem had international dimensions that conditioned the 
scope of any bilateral agreement was a serious handicap to the negotiations. 
 
A further complication from the British perspective was that they were never really sure 
what to make of Smith.168  In September 1964 British officials described Smith to Sir 
Alec Douglas-Home: 
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He is a simple-minded, politically naïve, and uncomprehending character.  
His political approach has been described as ‘schoolboy’.  He possesses a 
strong vein of schoolboy obstinacy and there is a mixture of schoolboy 
stubbornness, cunning and imperception about his speeches.  Likewise 
there is a Boys Own Paper ring about his patriotic utterances.  
Nevertheless his pedestrian and humourless manner often conceals a 
shrewder assessment of a particular situation than at first appears on the 
surface and he should not be under-rated.169 
 
Wilson’s initial impression of Smith was that he was ‘very far round the bend’ and ‘a nut 
case’, but by October 1965 he no longer believed that Smith was ‘neurotic and 
temperamental’.170  The British Government clearly came to believe that Smith wanted an 
agreement,171 and thought that Smith was different from the extremists in the Rhodesian 
Front.172  Yet even if the British Government were correct in its calculations that Smith 
was a moderate, it would have been difficult for Smith to sell an agreement to the 
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Rhodesian Front, as the British Government recognised.173  This became obvious during 
Cledwyn Hughes’ visit to Rhodesia in July 1965, when Smith had to give assurances to 
the Rhodesian Front Chairman, Lieutenant-Colonel William Knox, that ‘the Government 
is not contemplating any action which could be construed as contravening the principles 
and policies of the Rhodesian Front’ and that independence, whether negotiated or not, 
would be ‘without strings’.174 
 
Given the difficulties of reaching a negotiated settlement of the independence issue, the 
British Government really ought to have considered negotiating for an alternative 
objective that it stood a much better chance of obtaining: a moratorium.  For the 
Rhodesian Government, a moratorium may have been hard to contemplate.  Southern 
Rhodesia had been a self-governing Colony since 1923, and the fact that it had not been 
granted full independence at the same time as Malawi and Zambia injured the pride of the 
Rhodesian Europeans.  More importantly, the Rhodesian Government was explicit on 
many occasions that the state of the Rhodesian economy was the main reason why it must 
gain independence.  Rhodesian ministers argued that only independence would create 
conditions of certainty that would attract investment, which Rhodesia desperately 
needed.175  When Labour ministers suggested that there was only limited investment in 
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Rhodesia because of the threat of a UDI, Smith asserted: ‘the facts were that since his 
Party came to power three years before and began to campaign for independence, 
investment had substantially increased, even though it was still insufficient.’176  In May 
1965, Smith had publicly dismissed as impractical the Rhodesia Party’s idea of 
maintaining the status quo because it was economically and politically dangerous.177  Yet 
this position was taken in the context of a general election campaign, when Smith was 
trying to distinguish the Rhodesian Front’s policy from those of its political rivals.  It is 
interesting to note that in October 1965, Smith privately asked whether the Labour 
Government believed ‘that an alternative lay in the maintenance of the status quo’, and 
that Wilson rejected this.178  This was surely a mistake.  A moratorium on the 
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independence issue would have suited the British Government because in the short term it 
would have allowed it to focus on a plethora of other domestic and foreign policy 
problems.  It would also have removed the threat of a UDI, given time to implement 
confidence-building measures among the Europeans in Rhodesia, and to prepare the 
Africans for majority rule.  This was in fact suggested by Oliver Wright in advance of the 
final round of negotiations in Salisbury.179  It should have been a British objective from a 
much earlier stage, for it was blindingly obvious that the economic situation in Rhodesia 
presented an opportunity that the Labour Government could have exploited to its 
advantage. 
 
In July 1964 the Rhodesian Government requested financial assistance from the South 
African Government in the form of a public loan of £2.5 million and a government-to-
government loan for a further £2.5 million.  The South African Government stipulated 
that the second loan should be used for non-military purposes, such as irrigation projects, 
railway and canal construction, expansion of hydroelectric power, and the building of an 
airport at Chiredzi.  This stipulation masked the real purpose of the loan, as Sue Onslow 
has recently commented: 
 
The clandestine agreement behind this apparently anodyne financial 
arrangement was that the money thus saved by the Southern Rhodesian 
exchequer could then be diverted into national defence, offsetting the 
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anticipated shortfall in tax revenue caused by falling investment and 
obviating the need for tax increases in an acutely sensitive political 
environment.180 
 
This demonstrates that the Rhodesian Government was short of money: it could not 
afford the burden of increasing defence expenditure and the financing of major 
infrastructure projects simultaneously.  At the same time that Ian Smith was negotiating 
the loans from the South African Government he told the Canadian ambassador in South 
Africa that the level of British aid to Rhodesia was almost negligible.  Further, Smith said 
that British aid was directed towards the Africans in Rhodesia, whereas private capital 
was flowing towards the Europeans, so he was unconcerned that the British Government 
might discontinue its aid because it would hurt the Africans rather than Europeans.181  In 
October 1965 a delegation from the Confederation of British Industry told Wilson that in 
a recent visit they had noticed: ‘Much play had been made in Rhodesia that whereas 
Britain gave a vast quantity of aid to other African countries, she has given nothing to 
Rhodesia over the last few years.’182  It was untrue that Britain had given nothing, but 
British aid to Rhodesia was limited, and the aid issue generated tension rather than 
goodwill.  The Rhodesian Government had been promised £4 million following the 
dissolution of the Central African Federation, and had received £2 million by the time 
that the Labour Government came into office.  The remaining £2 million was due to be 
                                                 
180 Sue Onslow, ‘A Question of Timing: South Africa and Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence, 1964-65’, Cold War History, Vol. 5, No. 2 (May 2005), p. 136. 
181 NAC: RG 25, Vol. 10071, 20-1-2-SR, Part 1.1, Ralph Collins, Canadian Ambassador to Pretoria, to 
DEA, Ottawa, Cable No. 85, 3 July 1964, Part 3, ‘The economic situation’. 
182 ‘Record of a Meeting between Mr Wilson and a delegation from the Confederation of British Industry’, 
19 October 1965, Murphy (ed.) BDEEP Series B, Vol. 9, Part II, p. 554. 
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paid in April 1965, but the Labour Government indicated that it had reservations about 
releasing this money whilst the Rhodesian Government contemplated a UDI.  The 
Rhodesian Government interpreted this as ‘financial blackmail’ and accused the British 
Government of ‘immoral behaviour’.183  When Wilson met with Smith in January 1965, 
he said that the British Government was prepared to enter into negotiations about 
financial aid and whilst it was ‘not taking the line that these should be suspended because 
there had been talk of a unilateral declaration of independence … the signing of a cheque 
must depend on the state of relations between the two Governments at the time.’184  
Wilson subsequently confirmed that the British Government would pay the remaining £2 
million in April (unless there was a UDI), and pointed out that his Government had also 
provided other forms of financial assistance, including a guarantee for a World Bank loan 
of £2.75 million to the Kariba Dam authority, and a loan of £1.5 million from the 
Commonwealth Development Corporation (a British Government agency) to Central 
African Airways.  Although Smith was not unappreciative of these various forms of 
assistance, he asserted that the British Government’s warning statement of 27 October 
1964 ‘had definitely [had] an inhibiting effect upon the attitude of both British and 
foreign investment in Rhodesia.’185 
 
                                                 
183 Smith to Wilson, 13 January 1965, Cmnd. 2807, pp. 53-55.  TNA: PRO, CAB 148/18, Minutes of OPD 
(65) 3rd Meeting, 21 January 1965, p. 3; CAB 148/19, OPD (65) 10, ‘Southern Rhodesia’, Memorandum 
by Arthur Bottomley, 19 January 1965, para. 1. 
184 TNA: PRO, PREM 13/534, ff 86-95, ‘Record of a meeting between Mr Wilson and Mr Smith’, by Derek 
J. Mitchell, Prime Minister’s Principal Private Secretary, 30 January 1965, para. 5, in Ashton and Louis 
(eds.), BDEEP Series A, Vol. 5, Part II, pp. 184-85. 
185 Wilson to Smith, 29 March 1965; and Smith to Wilson, 23 April 1965, Cmnd. 2807, pp. 59-61.  See also 
Smith, Bitter Harvest, pp. 84-85. 
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It may certainly be argued that Wilson’s position was not unreasonable, but perhaps a 
bolder financial approach would have yielded better political results.  What the British 
could have done at this juncture was to offer a much bigger incentive: in other words, to 
buy off the Rhodesian Government.  In November 1964 Arthur Bottomley and Barbara 
Castle suggested that the British Government should offer ‘considerable’ financial and 
technical assistance, and send an economic mission to Rhodesia, but ‘not before there has 
been progress in the political talks, since otherwise Mr Smith will use it against us by 
saying that we are trying to bribe his Government to abandon their objectives.’186  Given 
the state of the Rhodesian Government’s finances this is debatable, but it is of course 
necessary to consider what level of financial aid might have been sufficient to induce a 
more cooperative attitude on the part of the Rhodesian Government, and whether Britain 
could afford the sums of money required.  In May 1964 the former Rhodesian Prime 
Minster, Garfield Todd, wrote to Sir Alec Douglas-Home suggesting that the British 
Government should be prepared to offer substantial assistance of £10 million per year for 
ten years in order to facilitate a political agreement.187  Of course, the political situation in 
Rhodesia made financial bargaining a very difficult issue, and it is by no means certain 
that the Rhodesian Government would have been prepared to concede a specific timetable 
for African majority rule.  It may, however, have been prepared to stop talking about the 
need for a UDI, which would have reduced the tension in Anglo-Rhodesian relations.  It 
might also have been more reasonable about arrangements for an accelerated educational 
                                                 
186 TNA: PRO, PREM 13/87, ‘Southern Rhodesia – policy and tactics’, Minute by Sir Burke Trend to 
Harold Wilson, 24 November 1964, in Murphy (ed.) BDEEP Series B, Vol. 9, Part II, pp. 498-99. 
187 ANZ: ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 9, Garfield Todd and Hardwicke Holderness to Sir Alec 
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programme for Africans, land reform, and a gradual extension of the franchise, if the 
Europeans in Rhodesia stood to benefit substantially from British aid. 
 
Could Britain afford an agreement of this kind, both politically and economically?  £100 
million over ten years was indeed a substantial sum, though major levels of transitional 
aid for newly independent countries were not unprecedented.188  From a political point of 
view, if the aid package were not tied explicitly to a timetable for independence then it 
would no doubt have been difficult for the British Government to ‘sell’ it to the Labour 
Party, the British public, and African nationalists.  From an economic perspective, the 
British Government would have found it difficult to increase its level of aid to the figures 
suggested by Todd, since this would have taken a disproportionate share (one-sixth) of 
Britain’s annual African aid budget.  With the benefit of hindsight it is also obvious that 
massive aid would have become more difficult in the context of the Wilson Government’s 
subsequent economic retrenchment, which cut deep into total overseas development 
funds.189  On the other hand, in June 1965 the Board of Trade warned that the annual 
balance of payments costs to Britain of economic sanctions against Rhodesia in the event 
                                                 
188 When Malta became independent in September 1964 Britain signed a defence agreement and a financial 
agreement that were designed to ease Malta’s loss of service expenditure.  Britain paid £5 million annually 
to station troops in Malta and to use air and naval facilities, and contributed £29.5 million (75 per cent loan 
and 25 per cent grant) over five years to develop new industry and tourism.  Ashton and Louis (eds.), 
BDEEP Series A, Vol. 5, Part III, p. 99, editor’s note. 
189 In 1966 Britain provided £63 million to African countries, of which £60 million was allocated to 
Commonwealth countries.  The sterling crisis of 1965 generated cuts in the overall aid budget from £250 
million to £225 million and as a result of the 1966 sterling crisis a further £20 million was pruned from the 
aid programme for 1967-68.  Ashton and Louis (eds.), BDEEP Series A, Vol. 5, Part I, pp. cvii and cxvi-
cxvii.  See also Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, Ch. 12 ‘The Sterling Area, Trade, and Aid’, 
especially pp. 296-306. 
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of a UDI could be anywhere between £50 and £200 million.190  On that basis the British 
Government might have calculated that aid of £100 million over ten years represented 
excellent value if it could be tied to a Rhodesian pledge of good behaviour.  If the aid 
package could have been used to secure an agreement for a specific transition to African 
majority rule rather than a moratorium on the independence issue then so much the better.  
In the absence of a firm plan to obtain either, the British Government needed to ensure 
that its contingency plans to meet the eventuality of a UDI were sound.  However, it was 
in this crucial respect that the formulation of Labour’s policy was weakest.  
 
British contingency planning for a UDI 
 
Historian John Young has observed that from Wilson’s viewpoint, ‘it was a success to 
defer UDI as long as possible, delaying a crisis in which unpleasant, and economically 
costly, decisions would have to be made.’191  However, although the British Government 
sought to defer a UDI for as long as possible it was simultaneously engaged in an 
enormously complex contingency planning operation, which was weakened by some 
major deficiencies.  First, there was a plethora of committees involved in the process, 
which meant that few officials or ministers had a clear view of the overall situation.  This 
suited Wilson because it augmented his control over the Government’s Rhodesian policy, 
especially the decision to implement economic sanctions against Rhodesia despite the fact 
that officials and ministers harboured many doubts about this.  Second, the Government’s 
                                                 
190 TNA: PRO, FO 371/181877, ‘Implications of economic pressure against Rhodesia’, Paper by the 
Commercial Relations and Export Department of the Board of Trade, 12 May 1965, in Ashton and Louis 
(eds.), BDEEP Series A, Vol. 5, Part II, pp. 188-90. 
191 Young, The Labour Governments 1964-70, Vol. 2, p. 171. 
 82 
 
 
contingency planning lacked sufficient momentum.  Crucial decisions were often deferred 
pending an assessment of the circumstances that prevailed at the time of a UDI, which 
hindered coordination with the Old Commonwealth and the United States,192 and 
inhibited the initial response to UDI.  Third, contingency planning involved many 
departments and it generated bureaucratic conflict over key issues.  Rhodesia was chiefly 
within the remit of the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), but the Cabinet Office, 
Foreign Office (FO), Ministry of Defence, Treasury, Board of Trade, Department for 
Economic Affairs, Ministry of Power, and the Home Office were all concerned with 
various aspects of the Rhodesian Crisis.  One scholar has suggested: ‘it is not clear that 
any interdepartmental rivalry reflected actual differences of opinion on how to resolve the 
Rhodesian Crisis.’193  Yet as the following discussion demonstrates, this is clearly at 
variance with the considerable weight of evidence in The National Archives, which 
indicates concern in the FO about complacency and inefficiency in the CRO.194 
 
Peter Hennessy has observed that: ‘Wilson bids fair to be the untidiest of all the postwar 
premiers in administrative terms despite his pride in his housetraining.’195  This refers to 
                                                 
192 This is discussed at length below, in Chs. 4 and 6. 
193 Richard Coggins, ‘The British Government and Rhodesian UDI’, paper presented in ‘Rhodesian UDI’, 
Institute of Contemporary British History Witness Seminar, Public Records Office, Kew, 6 September 
2000.  Available at: http://www.icbh.ac.uk/witness/rhodesia  
194 See also Joe Garner, The Commonwealth Office 1925-1968 (London: Heinemann, 1978), Ch. 2, ‘The 
Office’.  Garner, who was the CRO Permanent Under Secretary at the time of UDI, acknowledges the 
conflict with other departments, as well as criticism of the CRO in Parliament and the press. 
195 Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister. The Office and Its Holders since 1945 (New York: St. Martin’s, 
2001), p. 310.  The term ‘housetraining’ refers to the fact that Wilson was one of only three Labour 
Ministers to have served in the Cabinet before. 
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Wilson’s practice of creating numerous miscellaneous committees to handle various 
aspects of government business.  This was especially pronounced on the Rhodesian 
question, which reflected ‘the sheer scale of the problem and the breadth of its 
institutional impact’.196  British contingency planning took place largely outside the full 
Cabinet, in various ad hoc Cabinet sub-committees on Rhodesia,197 the Defence and 
Oversea Policy Committee,198 the Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee,199 
and the Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Working Party on Southern Rhodesia.200  
The number of committees proliferated even further after UDI.201  On the surface this 
appears inefficient, but there was obviously a method in Wilson’s administrative 
                                                 
196 Young, The Labour Governments 1964-70, Vol. 2, p. 16.  See also Hennessy, The Prime Minister, pp. 
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201 TNA: PRO, CAB 134/3150-3168, ‘Rhodesia and Related Matters’, May 1966-December 1969. 
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madness.  As noted above, the decision to rule out the use of force was taken by a Cabinet 
sub-committee, which was much more limited in its composition than the DOPC – let 
alone the full Cabinet – and this made it easier for Wilson to impose himself on important 
policy issues.202  John Young has noted that: ‘Official committees often failed to resolve 
differences or produce compromise positions and appeal was possible from ministerial 
committees to the full Cabinet, though Wilson tried to restrict the frequency of this.’203  
Barbara Castle, the most radical minister in the Labour Government, later commented: 
‘Few members of the Cabinet were privy to the crucial discussions that were going on 
behind the scenes’, and Richard Crossman similarly observed: ‘there is nothing decided at 
Cabinet unless the P.M. specifically wants to have it discussed there.’204  Castle 
complained bitterly in her diary that Wilson did his best to keep key foreign policy issues 
– including South Africa, Rhodesia, and Vietnam – off the Cabinet agenda, and Crossman 
confirmed that half the Cabinet was excluded from the ‘defence and foreign policy 
group’.205  When crucial matters did reach the Cabinet they usually resulted in lengthy 
discussion, as Castle commented in early 1965: ‘I am afraid Harold is not a strong enough 
chairman and the discussions drag on endlessly.’206  George Brown apparently confirmed 
                                                 
202 See above, p. 42. 
203 Young, The Labour Governments 1964-70, Vol. 2, p. 16.   
204 Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-1970, p. xiv; and Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, 
p. 201, entry for Sunday 18 April 1965. 
205 Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-1970, pp. 19-20, entries for Tuesday 16 March and Thursday 18 March 
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206 Ibid., p. 5, entry for Friday 5 February 1965. 
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these impressions specifically in relation to Rhodesia, when he told one newspaper editor 
shortly before UDI: 
 
Wilson has no idea no idea how to conduct Cabinet business.  Rhodesia 
was referred to a Cabinet committee of six.  Its report was submitted to 
Cabinet supposedly for adoption …  [but] the whole thing was debated 
afresh – Dick Crossman, Frank Cousins and Barbara Castle very much to 
the fore.  After hours of discussion … the whole matter was referred to a 
fresh committee!207  
 
Yet these assessments by Castle and Brown do not convey the more relevant observation 
that Wilson deliberately adopted these Cabinet management methods, as Peter Hennessy 
has observed: ‘Wilson used prolixity as a weapon, allowing the Cabinet to talk itself 
out.’208  By the time that everyone in the Cabinet had expressed their views they were 
either bored or exhausted, at which point Wilson would sum up the discussion in favour 
of the policy that he wished to adopt.  Wilson’s dominance over his Cabinet was also 
reinforced by the fact that he ‘knew more about the nitty-gritty of foreign affairs than the 
rest of the Government put together’,209 and also because most ministers were absorbed 
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with the work of their departments, which Wilson encouraged.210  All this may have been 
politically convenient for the Prime Minister, but it reduced the collegiality of decision-
making and in the case of the Rhodesian Crisis it resulted in the adoption of Wilson’s 
preferred policy of economic sanctions, which was never considered likely to achieve the 
collapse of the Rhodesian economy.211 
 
The second weakness of the Government’s contingency planning was its lack of 
momentum.  As soon as the Labour Government was elected it began to consider what it 
would do in the event of a UDI.  The Government was able to give some general 
indications of its intended actions in its warning statement of 27 October 1964, but the 
major decisions were consistently deferred.  Following the visit of Bottomley and 
Gardiner to Rhodesia in February-March 1965, the DOPC decided that the Government’s 
contingency plans – such as they were – should be re-examined.212  By May, officials had 
identified many relevant issues.  The Government had agreed ‘first action’ measures to be 
taken in the event of a UDI, such as termination of diplomatic representation in London 
and Salisbury, and application of an arms embargo, but officials suggested that many 
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further decisions could only be made in the light of the circumstances that prevailed at the 
time of a UDI.213  The DOPC therefore determined that no decisions should be taken in 
advance concerning crucial matters, including the introduction of an Enabling Bill, 
application of a comprehensive trade embargo, exclusion of Rhodesia from Her Majesty’s 
Dominions, and denial of British citizenship to Rhodesians (although the DOPC directed 
that preparations should be made to facilitate these).214  Shortly thereafter the Cabinet 
Secretary informed the Prime Minister: ‘In terms of our own domestic action – draft Bills, 
Orders in Council, Regulations, etc. – we are now reasonably ready.’215  However, this 
simply did not accord with the reality of the situation, as the Cabinet Secretary himself 
acknowledged at the beginning of October.  He pointed out a whole range of outstanding 
issues in the UDI ‘war book’, including: the Government’s public statement to be issued 
in the event of a UDI; the contents of the Enabling Bill; and the nature of the economic 
sanctions that the Government intended to implement.216  It was not until Wilson began 
the penultimate round of negotiations with the Rhodesian Government that discussions in 
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the DOPC gained sufficient momentum to seriously address many of the outstanding 
issues associated with the British Government’s likely response to UDI.217 
 
Nevertheless, in some respects UDI still caught the British Government unprepared, 
which may be illustrated by two examples.  When Cecil King, the Chairman of 
International Publishing Corporation – which owned the Daily Mirror and the Sun 
newspapers – enquired whether Rhodesian funds in the UK would be frozen, he was told 
that no decision had been taken.  This prompted him to write in his diary that a UDI ‘has 
been on the cards for four years, so surely the appropriate moves could have been decided 
before this.’218  Similarly, when the British High Commission in Lagos asked what 
statement it should issue to indicate to the people of Africa what action the British 
Government would take against Rhodesia, it found that there were no standing 
instructions.  Consequently, the First Secretary had to concoct a statement based on what 
he thought the British Government might be considering.  The press release, entitled 
‘Britain Vows to Bring Down Smith’, stated that the British Government would 
implement economic sanctions, institute an arms embargo, and apply foreign exchange 
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and travel restrictions.  The press release was well received in Nigeria and – unlike 
elsewhere in Africa – no British diplomatic or cultural premises were subject to 
demonstration or damage.219  These examples justify the comments of Paul Gore-Booth, 
Head of the Diplomatic Service from 1965, who recalled in his memoirs: 
 
One of the great difficulties was the idea prevalent in the summer of 1965 
that, if the British Government were too obviously working on what would 
happen should Mr Ian Smith unilaterally declare independence, this might 
incite him to do so.  This doctrine tended to be quoted when we in the 
Foreign Office worried about inadequate information and so we had to 
suspend worrying.  But he declared it anyway, and the necessary 
information was not there.220 
 
The third problem associated with the Government’s contingency planning was 
bureaucratic conflict between the FO and CRO, which can be illustrated in two ways.  
First, FO officials were worried about the poor state of liaison between the British and 
U.S. Governments.  A sound understanding between the United Kingdom and the United 
States at the political and official levels was essential to ensure effective joint 
contingency planning to support the Zambian economy in the event of a UDI, which was 
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a fundamental Anglo-American concern.221  Second, the FO and the CRO diverged on the 
objectives of British policy, and the most efficacious means of achieving those objectives.  
FO officials felt that the CRO had given little consideration to the pressures that the 
British Government was likely to face as a result of the international reaction to a UDI, 
particularly in the United Nations, where responsibility for defending British policy and 
interests rested with the FO, not the CRO.  In May 1965, Derrick March, an official in the 
FO West and Central Africa Department wrote: 
 
I am afraid it is clear that the CRO have not done any thinking on this 
question.  It is one of the great faults of the Sub-Committee on Rhodesia 
that although many papers have been prepared on detailed aspects of a 
unilateral declaration of independence nothing has been written about the 
reactions of Afro-Asian Governments, the OAU and the United Nations, 
and the effect on our international position if [Her Majesty’s Government] 
did nothing to put an effective end to the rebellion.222 
 
March argued that if economic warfare broke out between Rhodesia and Zambia, and the 
UN passed a resolution in Chapter VII terms, the British Government would have to 
demonstrate that it was willing to support African and UN forces to overthrow the rebel 
government.223   March observed that if this situation was reached, the British 
                                                 
221 See below, Ch. 6, for an extensive discussion of the problems that this caused in Anglo-American 
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Government would have to consider the use of British troops to end the rebellion which 
would, in any case, be very much cheaper than the threat posed by economic sanctions to 
the whole Sterling area envisaged by the Board of Trade. March argued that the British 
Government should not allow a minority of 217,000 Europeans, of whom 75 per cent 
were women and children, ‘to hold our whole international policy to ransom.’  He 
suggested that the Rhodesian Government would not contemplate a UDI if the British 
Government demonstrated sufficient resolve, but acknowledged that the situation might 
deteriorate ‘if the Rhodesian Government proceeds on the assumption that troops would 
never be used in any circumstances.’224 
 
There was not much sympathy in the FO towards suggestions that force might have to be 
used.225 However, senior officials certainly emphasised the need satisfy, so far as 
possible, public opinion in Britain, in Africa, and in the United Nations, without running 
Britain into bankruptcy in the process.226  The FO therefore favoured measures with 
presentational value that could be implemented at little economic cost to Britain, such as 
                                                                                                                                                  
take action against the state responsible for the existence of a dispute.  The Foreign Office was concerned 
that the CRO did not understand the difficulties that the British Government was likely to face as a result.  
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224 TNA: PRO, FO 371/181877, Minute by Derrick March, 24 May 1965.  Emphasis in the original.  
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the exclusion of Rhodesia from Her Majesty’s Dominions.  The CRO, on the other hand, 
believed that stringent economic measures would work if given sufficient time and there 
was therefore no need to consider exclusion.  In July 1965, Arthur Bottomley wrote to the 
Prime Minister: ‘Such a Bill will not be required until some time after any unilateral 
declaration of independence, and only then if we have decided, in the light of 
developments, to accept the success of the declaration, which we hope will not 
happen.’227  FO officials were unhappy with Bottomley’s proposal that no further action 
should be taken, and Martin Le Quesne therefore prepared a draft minute of opposition 
for consideration by the Foreign Secretary.  Meanwhile the Prime Minister took advice 
from Sir Burke Trend and the FO was advised that Wilson concurred with Bottomley’s 
proposal.  Michael Stewart then wrote to the Prime Minister: 
 
I think that we are all agreed that if a UDI takes place there will be a 
period during which we hope that the various forms of economic and 
political pressure open to us will serve to bring public opinion in Rhodesia 
to its senses and so bring about a return to legality.  It seems to me, 
however, that we must, at any rate in our planning, admit the possibility 
that these measures will not succeed in their object and that we shall at 
some stage be faced with the necessity of taking the serious step of 
declaring that Rhodesia is no longer one of Her Majesty’s Dominions.228 
 
Stewart accepted that the problems involved were complex, but argued that these would 
not become any easier to resolve after a UDI had taken place.  He suggested that Africans 
                                                 
227 TNA: PRO, FO 371/181878, Bottomley to Wilson, 12 July 1965. 
228 TNA: PRO, FO 371/181878, Stewart to Wilson, 20 July 1965. 
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would want the British Government to take action quickly and it would be embarrassing 
if the Government eventually decided to take the step and then had to wait for an official 
study to be prepared.  Stewart therefore recommended that the problem should be 
considered immediately in order to identify and define the issues involved.229 
 
Bottomley responded: ‘The Bill would legally end the Rhodesian rebellion by admitting 
its success.  It would terminate all responsibility of Britain for Rhodesia and make her a 
foreign country.  It would put the world on notice that we washed our hands of the 
Rhodesian problem.’  With regard to the point raised by Stewart concerning the likely 
reaction of Africans, Bottomley contended: ‘I take the opposite view and believe that 
Africans would criticise us strongly and accuse us of connivance if we passed the ultimate 
legislation with indecent haste.’  Bottomley averred that it was not difficult to identify 
and define the issues with which the legislation would be concerned: some sixty Acts of 
Parliament applying to Rhodesia would have to be examined.  Further, the experience of 
South Africa leaving the Commonwealth had indicated what issues would be involved if 
Rhodesia were to be excluded.  Bottomley therefore concluded that he did not wish to 
amend his original recommendation to which the Prime Minister had agreed.230 
 
Le Quesne remained unhappy and discussed the matter further with officials in the 
CRO.231  Although they were agreed that there would be a period after UDI during which 
the British Government would try to bring Rhodesia back to legality, they differed on the 
time scale involved.  The CRO believed that this period might be as long as five years, 
                                                 
229 Ibid. 
230 TNA: PRO, FO 371/181878, Bottomley to Wilson, 27 July 1965. 
231 TNA: PRO, FO 371/181878, Minute by Le Quesne, 13 August 1965. 
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which the FO thought quite unrealistic; Le Quesne suggested six months was more likely.  
He refuted Bottomley’s view that Rhodesia’s expulsion from the Commonwealth was 
likely to be interpreted as evidence of collusion between the British and Rhodesian 
Governments.  On the contrary, if the British Government failed to act quickly then 
Britain would be accused of acquiescence and collusion.  Le Quesne commented: ‘It is 
true that it would also constitute an admission of our inability forcibly to impose our will 
on Rhodesia.  But this is a fact which we at any rate accept and which, in the 
circumstances envisaged, will in any case have become apparent to all.’232 Le Quesne 
observed that as the Prime Minister had already endorsed Bottomley’s proposal, there 
was no point in challenging the accepted view.  However, he suggested that a draft 
minute should be prepared for the Foreign Secretary in order to make the Prime Minister 
aware of the difference of view between the FO and CRO.  The minute was sent on 31 
August 1965, and recommended that the issue should be given further consideration in 
the official Rhodesia sub-committee.233  In September the DOPC began to lean towards 
the Foreign Office position and encouraged a meeting between FO and CRO officials to 
revise the Government’s contingency plans.234  When the meeting took place, CRO 
officials continued to profess their belief that if the British Government expelled 
Rhodesia from the Commonwealth it would be seen as connivance and would lead to the 
disintegration of the Commonwealth.235  They did agree, however, that it was unrealistic 
                                                 
232 Ibid. 
233 TNA: PRO, FO 371/181878, Stewart to Wilson, 31 August 1965. 
234 TNA: PRO, CAB 148/18, Minutes of OPD (65) 40th Meeting, Item 4, 22 September 1965.  The 
Committee invited the FO and CRO to arrange for OPD (65) 132 Annex II to be amended to reflect the 
possibility that further measures to those proposed by the CRO might be necessary in the context of the 
likely response at the UN. 
235 TNA: PRO, FO 371/181878, Minute by Le Quesne, 1 October 1965. 
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to think in terms of the British Government holding its position at the UN for up to five 
years, but CRO officials apparently told their FO colleagues that Bottomley refused to 
admit the possibility that the British Government’s contingency measures would fail.236  
This was at variance with the views of the FO, and the difference of opinion was never 
resolved.  Shortly before UDI, Le Quesne wrote to his counterpart in the CRO, Derrick 
Watson: ‘I am sorry to keep reverting to this point, but we would be extremely grateful if 
you could let us have a reasoned statement of the grounds on which we believe that the 
measures which we propose to take against Rhodesia in the event of a UDI will be 
successful.’237  The absence of such a ‘reasoned statement’ can only be explained by the 
fact that there were no reasonable grounds on which to base the assumption that British 
objectives could be achieved by the measures that the Government proposed to take in the 
event of a UDI.  This makes an even bigger nonsense of Wilson’s remark at Lagos in 
January 1966 that ‘the cumulative effects of the economic and financial sanctions might 
well bring the rebellion to an end within a matter of weeks rather than months.’238 
 
Conclusion 
 
In his biography of Wilson Philip Ziegler observed that if the Labour Government’s 
foreign policy problems are considered in isolation it risks ‘misrepresenting the 
atmosphere in which such problems were considered and decisions made’, because 
Wilson had to grapple with so many interrelated problems simultaneously.  ‘To give the 
Rhodesian negotiations the calm and concentrated attention which they deserved against 
                                                 
236 Ibid. 
237 TNA: PRO, FO 371/181880, Le Quesne to Watson, 21 October 1965. 
238 Quoted in Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p. 377. 
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such a tempestuous background was beyond the powers of any except the 
superhuman.’239  It is right to acknowledge the multiple difficulties that Wilson faced 
from his very first moments in office, and indeed Wilson drew attention to these in his 
memoirs.240  However, it is important not to overstate the problems that were not of 
Wilson’s making to the extent that they obscure the difficulties that he created for 
himself.  During the 1964 general election Wilson need not have entered into an explicit 
commitment to bring about African majority rule in Rhodesia, especially as this was not 
even an issue in that election.241  This commitment was at variance with his Party’s 
cautious approach to the Rhodesian problem in 1964, and it complicated the dialogue 
with the Rhodesian Government once Labour was in power.  The Labour Government’s 
initial response to the possibility of a UDI was robust and effective, but the deterrent 
effect of Labour’s early posture wore off over the next few months because the Rhodesian 
Government was able to determine how it could circumvent the likely economic 
consequences of a UDI.  The fact that the Labour Government was able to lock the 
Rhodesian Government into four rounds of substantive negotiations during 1965, and to 
stave off a UDI for so many months, was an achievement in itself.  However, it made 
little sense to expend so much effort seeking a negotiated solution; it would have been 
more realistic to try to maintain the status quo.  As Ben Pimlott has commented: ‘The 
most puzzling aspect is that the Rhodesian Government bothered to declare UDI at all.  It 
puzzled Wilson at the time.  At best illegal independence was bound to be risky and 
lonely, at worst disastrous.  A rational course would have been to retain the stable limbo 
                                                 
239 Philip Ziegler, Wilson: The Authorised Life of Lord Wilson of Rievaulx (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 
p. 218. 
240 Wilson, The Labour Government, pp. 2-3. 
241 D. Butler and A. King, The British General Election of 1964 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1965), p. 121.  
Cited in Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence, p. 29. 
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of minority rule under the technical suzerainty of the British Crown.’242  This might have 
been achieved if the British Government had been prepared to engage the key concern of 
the Rhodesian Government – economic uncertainty – through a massive programme of 
aid and technical assistance.  Instead, the British Government created economic 
uncertainty of its own with its preparations to implement economic sanctions against 
Rhodesia in the event of a UDI.  The contingency planning operation suffered from 
multiple weaknesses – a complicated decision structure, ministerial procrastination, and 
bureaucratic conflict – which adversely affected the preparations to deal with a UDI.  To 
return to the point raised by Ziegler, it was all but impossible for Wilson and the Labour 
Government to grapple effectively with the Rhodesian Crisis when there were so many 
other problems to deal with at home and abroad.  Yet there were alternative policies to 
which the Government might have given greater consideration, especially the use of 
force, which is discussed in the next chapter. 
                                                 
242 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p. 372. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Alternatives: The United Nations, and the Use of Force 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Labour Government’s Rhodesia policy – negotiating to prevent a UDI and 
simultaneously preparing to deal with it when it came – was not the only viable course of 
action that the Government could have pursued.  There were alternatives, which could 
either have rid Britain of responsibility for Rhodesia, or produced a direct solution that 
negated the intransigence of the extremist Europeans and African nationalists in 
Rhodesia.  In other words, the Government could either have handed over the problem to 
the United Nations, or used force to impose a settlement.  The fact that these options were 
dismissed with little discussion requires some explanation.  The Government’s reluctance 
to hand over the problem to the United Nations is worth examining, because it saddled 
Britain with primary responsibility for Rhodesia until it obtained its legal independence as 
Zimbabwe in 1980.  This chapter will argue that the most significant reason why the 
British Government sought to maintain control of the Rhodesian problem at the United 
Nations is that it was desperate to avoid creating a precedent for UN sanctions against 
South Africa, which would be highly damaging to the British economy.  Another key 
issue at the time, which has remained controversial ever since, is whether the Wilson 
Government could, or should, have used force against Ian Smith’s regime in order to 
prevent UDI or, after it had occurred, to compel Rhodesia to walk a legal path to 
independence.  Michael Stewart, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1965-1966) wrote 
in his memoirs that military intervention would have been too risky: ‘All the evidence 
before us was to the effect that [Rhodesia’s] forces were well-armed and well-trained; and 
that they would fight.  This would not be a colonial expedition but a medium-sized war of 
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uncertain duration.’1  On the other hand, James Callaghan, Chancellor of the Exchequer 
(1964-1967), recognised in retrospect that a more coercive strategy might have yielded 
beneficial results: ‘I do not disguise my regret nor my belief that more forceful action by 
us at the time might have saved Britain from many uncomfortable moments in later 
years.’2  This chapter demonstrates that the British Government rejected the option of 
using force because it was engaged in a desperate struggle to limit its military liabilities 
for economic reasons.  Further, the Government was profoundly averse to taking any 
action that might have jeopardised its parliamentary majority or its prospects of winning 
another general election.  These were the chief concerns guiding the Government’s 
calculations, but publicly it was prudent to argue that the use of force was neither 
militarily feasible, nor desirable because of popular sympathy for Rhodesian ‘kith and 
kin’.  However, it will be argued below that even though the circumstances were not 
particularly favourable to military intervention, the ‘more forceful action’ advocated by 
Callaghan was practicable and likely to have succeeded. 
 
                                                 
1 Michael Stewart, Life and Labour (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1980), p. 169.  Stewart’s emphatic 
rejection of the possibility that military force might have been used is actually at variance with his actions 
in October 1965, when on his own initiative he discussed military options with U.S. Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk and Australian representatives at the United Nations.  National Archives of Australia [hereafter 
NAA]: A1838, 190/10/1, Part 5, James Plimsoll, Australian Mission to United Nations [hereafter AMUN], 
New York, to Department of External Affairs [hereafter DEA], Canberra, Cable No. UN1468, 9 October 
1965. 
2 James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Collins, 1987), p. 145. 
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The UN option 
 
In November 1964, a British Cabinet sub-committee considered a list of proposals for the 
solution of the Rhodesian problem, which Arthur Bottomley presented ‘roughly in 
ascending order of acceptability to Mr Smith’:3 
 
1. Hand over to the UN, admitting that the UK has no solution to the 
problem (similar to Palestine).   
2. Suspend the Rhodesian Constitution and impose direct rule by force. 
3. Amend the current Constitution to enfranchise the Africans. 
4. Summon an immediate Constitutional conference in London or 
Salisbury. 
5. Allow independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution, provided 
that the Africans are enfranchised beforehand. 
6. Persuade Smith to accept a Commonwealth Commission to try to 
devise a solution to the problem. 
7. [Her Majesty’s Government] to devise a new Constitution with a 
bicameral legislature, the second chamber of which would contain an 
African majority. 
8. Ask Smith to provide greater evidence of Rhodesian support for 
independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution. 
                                                 
3 The National Archives [hereafter TNA]: Public Records Office, Kew [hereafter PRO], CAB 130/206, 
MISC 4/5, ‘Cabinet: Southern Rhodesia. Policy and Tactics’, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations, 20 November 1964.  Wilson chaired the meeting, attended by six Cabinet 
ministers: Bottomley, Castle, Gardiner, Greenwood, Healey, and Soskice. 
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9. Suggest a national meeting similar to the ‘National Convention’ held 
under the governorship of Sir J. Kennedy in 1960. 
10. Suggest a political moratorium on the independence issue, with the UK 
or Commonwealth intervening to dissuade the African Nationalists 
from unconstitutional action. 
11. Persuade Smith to make a concession to the African Nationalists by 
incorporating a few of them into his Government. 
12. Propose that the convention of non-intervention in Rhodesian affairs 
by the British Parliament be formalised, but with [Her Majesty’s 
Government] retaining responsibility for external affairs. 
13. Grant immediate independence with safeguards against repeal of the 
entrenched clauses of the Constitution. 
14. Grant unconditional independence. 
 
As the previous chapter demonstrated, the Labour Government discussed many of the 
‘middle’ options with the Rhodesian Government during the course of 1965, and even 
went so far as to explore the possibility of granting independence with safeguards against 
repeal of the entrenched clauses of the 1961 Constitution.  Yet despite these concessions 
– which represented a reversal of its previous commitment to grant independence only on 
the basis of majority rule – the Labour Government was unable to agree a formula for 
Rhodesian independence.  When Wilson met Smith in January 1965 and learned that the 
Rhodesian Front was examining ways to prolong European rule in Rhodesia by up to 70 
years, it would not have been unreasonable for Wilson to concede that the British 
Government had no solution to the problem and was therefore going to hand the matter 
over to the United Nations.  Officials in the Foreign Office West and Central Africa 
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Department later suggested: ‘This is a threat to which precisely the most reactionary and 
stubborn Rhodesians would be likely to be most susceptible.’4  It was argued that handing 
over the problem to the United Nations would have several advantages: it would accept 
the facts of the situation (namely that the British Government had no ability to control the 
situation in Rhodesia); it would obviate the need for a general trade embargo; and it 
would demonstrate that British policy was not motivated by favouritism towards the 
white minority in Rhodesia.5  It also became apparent shortly before UDI that a majority 
of the British public (some 63 per cent) was in favour of handing responsibility for 
Rhodesia to the United Nations.6 
 
Why, then, did Wilson not threaten to turn the matter over to the United Nations, and why 
did he press on with apparently hopeless negotiations rather than rid the British 
Government of the problem?  Several reasons may be suggested.  First, it is questionable 
whether the Rhodesian Government would have paused, reconsidered its position, and 
adopted a more reasonable posture in its negotiations with Britain.  There is evidence that 
the Rhodesian Government would probably have justified a UDI on the basis that Britain 
intended to absolve itself of responsibility, and was no longer capable of defending 
Rhodesia against external interference in its constitutional affairs.7  Second, until his 
                                                 
4 TNA: PRO, FO 371/181879, West and Central Africa Department [hereafter WCAD] brief for Secretary 
of State’s attendance at OPD (65) 40th Meeting, 22 September 1965, para. 8. 
5 Ibid., para 10. 
6 National Opinion Poll Bulletin, Special Supplement 1, Rhodesia (October 1965).  Cited by E. Silver, ‘Mr 
Wilson, the Public and Rhodesia’, Venture, Vol. 18 (February 1966), p. 4. 
7 On 27 October 1964, Smith told the Rhodesian Legislative Assembly that a UDI would become 
imperative if Britain broke the convention of non-interference in Rhodesia’s domestic affairs, or ceased to 
support Rhodesia at the United Nations.  J. R. T. Wood, ‘So far and no further!’ Rhodesia’s bid for 
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desperate mission to Rhodesia in October 1965, Wilson clearly did not feel that he had 
fully explored the possibility of a negotiated settlement.  A related point is that Wilson 
recognised that his Government would have been subjected to a great deal of domestic 
and international criticism if it had handed responsibility for Rhodesia to the United 
Nations prematurely.  Following a meeting with Wilson in October 1965, the editor of the 
Guardian wrote in his private record: ‘Wilson said he thought Heath was looking for a 
way in which to hit the British Government – to say that they had mishandled the 
negotiations with Smith’, but Heath’s options were narrow because he could not condemn 
the Government for handing the matter over to the United Nations, or accuse it of a lack 
of clarity in its dealings with Smith.8  Third, in early 1965 British contingency planning 
was only in its infancy, especially in relation to the potential ramifications of economic 
warfare between Rhodesia and Zambia.  Even if the Labour Government no longer 
claimed primary responsibility for Rhodesia and managed to avoid a general trade 
embargo, it would still have wished to support Zambia, and would therefore have been 
plunged into a situation with which it was ill prepared to cope.  The Foreign Office 
highlighted the necessity of protecting Zambian copper production as a key reason why 
the British Government should seek to maintain formal responsibility for Rhodesia at the 
                                                                                                                                                  
independence during the retreat from empire 1959-1965 (Victoria, BC: Trafford, 2005), p. 247.  Similarly, 
Oliver Bennett told the Canadians that if Britain failed to protect Rhodesia at the United Nations it would 
provoke a UDI.  National Archives of Canada, Ottawa [hereafter NAC]: RG 25, Vol. 10071, 20-1-2-SR, 
Part 1.1, ‘Visit to Ottawa of Mr. O. B. Bennett, Rhodesian Minister in Washington, 18 January 1965’, 
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Canadian Trade Commission, Salisbury, Cable No. ME1, 
26 January 1965. 
8 British Library of Political and Economic Science [hereafter BLPES]: Papers of Alastair Hetherington 
[hereafter Hetherington Papers], Hetherington/10/3, ‘Note of a Meeting with the Prime Minister’, 11 
October 1965, Item 2, ‘Rhodesia – Heath’. 
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United Nations in the event of a UDI.9  Two further reasons must also be considered: 
Wilson’s personal fear that the United Nations might authorise the use of force, which 
could create a general conflagration in southern Africa that the Communists would 
exploit to their advantage; and the British Government’s concern that an admission of UN 
competence to deal with the situation in Rhodesia would embolden the Afro-Asian bloc 
to press for UN action against South Africa, which would gravely prejudice Britain’s 
economic interests (South Africa was Britain’s fourth largest export market, worth £300 
million annually).10  Of all these reasons, the last was by far the most significant. 
 
In his memoirs Wilson wrote that at the United Nations the Soviet bloc was ‘busy in 
seeking to win clients among African countries’, and recalled that after UDI he was 
troubled ‘when two Zambian ministers were despatched to Moscow to discuss copper 
sales.’11  One month before UDI Wilson also privately expressed to the editor of the 
Guardian his fears about Soviet intentions in central Africa.12  During his negotiations 
with Smith, Wilson warned that regardless of Rhodesian feelings about the United 
Nations they ought to recognise that Britain might lose control of the issue there, and in 
such circumstances the use of force by the United Nations could not be ruled out.13  
                                                 
9 TNA: PRO, CAB 148/22, OPD (65) 132, Annex II, ‘Immediate Action in the UN: Note by the Foreign 
Office’, 21 September 1965, para. 3 (iii). 
10 See John W. Young, ‘The Wilson government and the debate over arms to South Africa’, Contemporary 
British History, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1998), pp. 62-86. 
11 Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, and Michael 
Joseph), pp. 181 and 183. 
12 BLPES: Hetherington Papers, Hetherington/10/3, ‘Note of a Meeting with the Prime Minister’, 11 
October 1965, Item 4, ‘Rhodesia – Military Action’. 
13 ‘Record of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street’, 8 October 1965, Cmnd. 2807, p. 83. 
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Referring to the Congo, Wilson said that ‘at least the United Nations had been able to 
prevent the country from becoming a cockpit for the major Powers’, but wondered 
whether this would be true in Rhodesia in the event of a UDI. Wilson observed that ‘a 
great struggle was in progress between the Soviet Union and China for influence in 
Africa.  Both these countries would be under strong temptation to intervene in Rhodesia 
with incalculable consequences.’  Wilson therefore saw a danger, if not the probability, of 
‘terrible conflict and bloodshed.’14  Yet this cannot be taken at face value because Wilson 
was attempting to persuade Smith to adopt a more reasonable position in order to reach 
some sort of compromise agreement.  On the same day that he warned Smith of the dire 
consequences of Communist involvement in the Rhodesian Crisis, Wilson advised his 
Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, that it was not thought the Soviet Union would wish 
to attempt to intervene in Rhodesia except possibly in support of a UN initiative.  Even in 
those circumstances it was doubtful that the Soviet Union would wish to become involved 
militarily, as the logistical difficulties would be too great.  For this reason, Wilson 
advised, the Soviet Union and China preferred to restrict their assistance to the training of 
subversive forces.15  It is therefore clear that Wilson deliberately exaggerated the danger 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
15 TNA: PRO, FO 371/181893, Wilson to Stewart (in Washington), Cable No. 7870, 8 October 1965.  
Whilst Stewart was at the UN he sought an assessment of what might happen if, in the worst analysis, there 
was a UDI followed by a UN General Assembly or Security Council Resolution providing for direct action 
against the Rhodesian Government.  TNA: PRO, FO 371/181893, Stewart to Wilson, New York Cable No. 
2383, 7 October 1965.  Wilson’s reply was based on the advice of the Joint Intelligence Committee, 
contained in JIC (65) 69, 1 October 1965. 
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of intervention in Rhodesia by a ‘Red Army in blue berets’.16  He did this first, in order to 
apply pressure on Smith;17 and second, to justify keeping the issue out of the hands of the 
United Nations for as long as possible.  As the following discussion demonstrates, the real 
reason why the British Government feared UN involvement in the Rhodesian Crisis is 
that it could have created a precedent for UN action against South Africa, which would 
have had far graver consequences than UN action against Rhodesia. 
 
In May 1965 the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee (DOPC) determined that in the 
event of a UDI the British Government should take the initiative in bringing the 
Rhodesian Crisis before the United Nations.18  Ministers gave no further consideration to 
this for some months, but as the likelihood of a UDI increased, Foreign Office officials 
became increasingly worried about the potential linkage at the United Nations between 
the Rhodesian Crisis and apartheid in South Africa.  In September 1965, the West and 
Central Africa Department sought advice about whether the imposition of economic 
sanctions by the British Government against Rhodesia would constitute a ‘damaging 
precedent’ that could be used against the British Government in the United Nations by 
those who advocated the imposition of sanctions against South Africa in the context of 
                                                 
16 Wilson used the phrase in the House of Commons on 12 November 1965.  Cited in J. D. B. Miller, 
Survey of Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Expansion and Attrition, 1953-1969 (London: Oxford 
University Press for The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1974), p. 211. 
17 This did not impress Smith, who was convinced that the Rhodesian Government was a bastion against the 
spread of Communism in southern Africa.  For a brief discussion of Smith’s anti-Communism and how this 
conditioned his attitude towards the Commonwealth see below, Ch. 5, pp. 268-69. 
18 TNA: PRO, CAB 148/18, Minutes of OPD (65) 24th Meeting, 5 May 1965, para. 6. 
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apartheid.19  Legal advice suggested that it depended on whether the issue was brought 
before the Security Council in Chapter VI or Chapter VII terms.  If it became a Chapter 
VII matter then it would establish a precedent that could be used against the British 
Government in the context of South Africa.20  Foreign Office officials therefore advised 
ministers that Britain could not bring the situation before the Security Council under 
Chapter VII because the British Government would then have to admit that the internal 
situation in the territory of a member state, which had international repercussions, could 
constitute a threat to the peace.  They pointed out that this would be contrary to the line 
that the British Government had consistently adopted in relation to apartheid in South 
Africa, and warned that if the UN extended economic sanctions to cover South Africa it 
could have ‘exceedingly damaging’ consequences for Britain.21  Even if the British 
Government took the matter before the UN of its own volition – whether or not it required 
action by other member states – the British Government would have conceded that the 
UN had some competence in the matter.  It would therefore be difficult to argue that the 
British Government retained ‘sole responsibility in any subsequent constitutional 
negotiations.’22 The fact that the Foreign Office highlighted these concerns over a range 
of other considerations associated with the UN dimension of the Rhodesian Crisis clearly 
explains why the British Government did not consider a solution by handing the matter 
over to the United Nations.  Yet this was not the only alternative that the British 
                                                 
19 TNA: PRO, FO 371/181879, C. M. Le Quesne, WCAD, to Joyce Gutteridge, Legal Department, 15 
September 1965. 
20 TNA: PRO, FO 371/181879, Joyce Gutteridge, Legal Department, to C. M. Le Quesne, WCAD, 17 
September 1965. 
21 TNA: PRO, CAB 148/22, OPD (65) 132, Annex II, ‘Immediate Action in the UN: Note by the Foreign 
Office’, 21 September 1965, para. 2. 
22 Ibid., para. 3 (ii). 
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Government could have considered.  The second option on Bottomley’s list was the use 
of force, but this was given very short shrift across all Government departments. 
 
Killing kith and kin: the viability of British military intervention in Rhodesia 
 
In the previous chapter it was noted that very soon after the Labour Government was 
elected a small group of ministers agreed that ‘there could be no question of military 
intervention in Rhodesia unless we were asked to intervene by the Governor and could 
rely on the co-operation of the Rhodesian regular forces and on the availability of 
Salisbury airfield as a point of entry.’23  The British Government was advised that such 
conditions were unlikely, which meant that the use of force against Rhodesia in the event 
of a UDI had effectively been ruled out within two weeks of the Labour Government 
taking office.  This partly reflected the continuity in advice from the Chiefs of Staff, who 
had concluded three years earlier that military intervention, in what was then the Central 
African Federation, was not viable in the face of opposition from Federal forces.24  In 
                                                 
23 This agreement reflected the advice of the Secretary of State for Defence.  TNA: PRO, CAB 130/206, 
MISC 4/2 ‘UDI: Defence Implications’, 27 October 1964.  This view was repeated like a mantra throughout 
meetings of the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee during 1965.  TNA: PRO, CAB 148/18, passim. 
24 The Prime Minister of the Central African Federation, Sir Roy Welensky, was at this stage struggling to 
preserve the Federation by pressuring London not to concede to the demands of African nationalists for 
Northern Rhodesian independence.  Welensky hinted that if independence were conceded, it would result in 
a coup by Federal forces and a UDI by the Federation.  The Joint Planning Staff advised in June 1961 that 
‘We see no military solution of the dispute between Sir Roy Welensky and H[er] M[ajesty’s] Government 
short of war with the Federation.’ TNA: PRO, DEFE 32/17, JP (61) Note 19, para. 12, 14 June 1961.  This 
advice was based on an earlier report, JP (61) 23 (Final), ‘Outline Plan for Deployment in Northern 
Rhodesia’ (Operation Fume), 2 March 1961.  These planning papers were withdrawn, which is an 
indication of the sensitivity of the issue.  For a discussion of the antecedents of British military planning see 
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January 1962, officials in the Ministry of Defence raised a query concerning British plans 
for meeting internal security problems in Northern Rhodesia.  The Deputy Chief of the 
Defence Staff, Major-General D. S. S. O’Connor, advised officials that there was no plan 
for that contingency.  There was only one plan, Operation Mattock, which had been 
designed to provide assistance to the Federation in the event of external aggression.25  In 
the final paragraph of his paper O’Connor warned: 
 
If there is any thought of operations in Northern Rhodesia in the face of 
active opposition from the Federal Forces, you need no reminder of the 
results of our anguished examinations last February when it became clear 
that we would have to resort to war if H[er] M[ajesty’s] G[overnment]’s 
decisions were to be enforced.26 
 
The Chief of the Defence Staff, Lord Mountbatten, also echoed these warnings, and the 
Conservative Government was left in no doubt that British military intervention depended 
upon Federal co-operation and there was no workable plan in the event of opposition 
from Federal forces.27  This advice informed the position of the Macmillan Government 
when the Americans asked what the British response would be in the event of a UDI by 
Southern Rhodesia.  When Adlai Stevenson visited London in March 1963, the former 
                                                                                                                                                  
also Philip Murphy, ‘“An intricate and distasteful subject”: British planning for the use of force against the 
European settlers of Central Africa, 1952-1965’, English Historical Review (forthcoming, 2006). 
25 TNA: PRO, DEFE 25/22 COS (61) 476 [n.d.] 
26 TNA: PRO, DEFE 25/22, Major-General D. S. S. O’Connor to Mr C. W. Wright, MOD Division 5, 9 
February 1962. 
27 TNA: PRO, DEFE 25/22, Lord Mountbatten to Harold Watkinson, 6 February 1962.  The Secretary of 
State for War reported Mountbatten’s comments to the Cabinet on 26 February 1962. 
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Colonial Secretary, Iain Macleod, told him that British military intervention was 
‘inconceivable’ due to the strength of the armed forces at the disposal of the Federation.28  
As noted below, Conservative and Labour politicians advanced this argument against 
British military intervention consistently before and after UDI. 
 
Shortly before the Labour Government was elected, the Defence Planning Staff (DPS) 
prepared a report ‘To set out an outline plan for, and to examine the implications of, the 
introduction of British forces into Southern Rhodesia at the request of the Governor in 
circumstances when the Southern Rhodesian Government declared independence.’29  The 
DPS assumed that the Governor would be assured of the support of the Rhodesian Chiefs 
of Staff and the bulk of the armed forces, that the loyalty of the Territorial Force and the 
Police could not be guaranteed, and that inter-racial disorder might occur.30  It was argued 
in the report that a military operation in these circumstances ‘would place a severe strain 
on the loyalties and morale of British troops’ and warned that intervention in less 
favourable circumstances would be impracticable.31  The report concluded that military 
intervention was likely to lead to action against both whites and blacks, which might have 
repercussions in other African and Asian countries; it would place a burden on the armed 
forces, which were already overstretched; and it would represent a volte face from recent 
policy statements which could lead to severe international criticism, despite the legality of 
                                                 
28 TNA: PRO, FO 1109/535, I. Macleod to R. A. Butler, 1 April 1963.   Cited in L. J. Butler, ‘Britain, the 
United States, and the Demise of the Central African Federation, 1959-63’, The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, Vol. 28, No. 3 (September 2000), p. 145. 
29 TNA: PRO DEFE 32/17, DP 83/64 (Final) ‘Operations in Central Africa’, para. 4, 19 June 1964. 
30 Ibid., para. 5. 
31 Ibid., paras. 7 and 34. 
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the intervention.32  Given this excessively pessimistic advice, it is perhaps not surprising 
that the Labour Government ruled out the use of force at such an early stage after taking 
office.  Whether this advice was infallible is another matter entirely. 
 
The practicalities of British military intervention 
 
Douglas Anglin has observed that debate about the feasibility of British military 
intervention revolved around five factors: availability of sufficient forces; logistical 
support; the likely extent of Rhodesian resistance; the danger of South African 
intervention; and the willingness of British soldiers to fight against their ‘kith and kin’.33  
These various considerations can be assessed with reference to a variety of evidence that 
has only become available during the last few years. 
 
(i) Availability of forces 
 
Estimates of the size of the force required occupy Rhodesia varied considerably.  A 
limited deployment in a coup de main operation would have required a single battalion of 
paratroops, which could have been dropped into Rhodesia to bolster the authority of the 
Governor in Salisbury.  However, as Robert Good has pointed out, this type of scenario 
ignored a fundamental consideration: ‘No responsible commander would have embarked 
upon such a risky venture without a substantial reserve force at the ready.’34  Certainly, 
                                                 
32 Ibid., para. 35. 
33 Douglas G. Anglin, ‘Britain and the Use of Force in Rhodesia’, in Michael G. Fry (ed.), Freedom and 
Change: essays in honour of Lester B. Pearson (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), pp. 68-69. 
34 Robert C. Good, UDI: The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1973), p. 58.  Sir Oliver Wright, Private Secretary to Harold Wilson, has commented: ‘I 
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there is no evidence in surviving British documents that such an operation was given any 
consideration by the DPS, whose plans were always formulated on the assumption that at 
least one Brigade Group would be required.  Operation Mattock, which had been 
conceived to defend Rhodesia against external aggression, provided for the insertion of 
one Brigade Group with artillery on call and an armoured car squadron, such forces to be 
drawn from any or all of Middle East Command, Royal Marine Commandos overseas, 
and the UK Strategic Reserve.35  Operation Fume, which was designed to deal with a 
Congo-type situation in Northern Rhodesia, required large air, naval and military forces 
of up to three Brigade Groups including 3 Commando Brigade (consisting of 42 Royal 
Marine Commando and 45 Royal Marine Commando, from Aden; and 40 Royal Marine 
Commando, from Malta) 3 Parachute Battalion Group, 51 Infantry Brigade Headquarters 
and an armoured car squadron.36  Similarly, when the DPS prepared its 1964 plans it 
estimated force requirements at one Brigade Group at light scales, with a further Brigade 
Group at readiness and an armoured car squadron.37  It has also been suggested that if 
serious resistance were encountered (which was discounted in British plans because 
military intervention was ruled out altogether in such circumstances) Britain might have 
                                                                                                                                                  
simply don’t believe that any politician would take the responsibility, or any Chief of Defence Staff would 
fail to put in a bid for anything less than overwhelming force.’  Wright in ‘Rhodesian UDI’, Institute of 
Contemporary British History [hereafter cited as ICBH] Witness Seminar, 6 September 2000, Session Two 
Transcript, p. 55.  http://www.icbh.ac.uk/icbh/witness/rhodesia 
35 TNA: PRO, DEFE 25/22, COS (61) 476 [n.d.] 
36 TNA: PRO, DEFE 32/17, JP (61) 23 (Final), ‘Outline Plan for Deployment in Northern Rhodesia’ 
(Operation Fume), 2 March 1961.  Planned naval forces included HMS Victorious, HMS Hermes, HMS 
Bulwark and HMS Dieppe.  Three squadrons of Canberra bombers and two squadrons of Hunter fighters 
would have provided RAF strike capabilities. 
37 TNA: PRO, DEFE 32/17, DP 83/64 (Final), ‘Operations in Central Africa’, para. 17, 19 June 1964. 
 113 
 
needed to deploy up to two divisions.38  Dean Rusk, with more than a nod to the concept 
of overwhelming force, suggested between six and eight divisions might be required.39 
 
Clearly, then, substantial numbers of troops would have been required if the British 
decided to intervene in Rhodesia with any degree of assurance that they could deal with 
all eventualities.  Douglas Anglin acknowledged: ‘The larger the British expeditionary 
force, the less resistance there would likely have been, the shorter the campaign, the 
fewer the casualties, and the less explosive the domestic political repercussions.’40  
However, the problem was that by 1964 Britain’s armed forces were seriously stretched 
by multiple commitments around the world.  In particular, by the time that Harold Wilson 
entered office, Konfrontasi (the protection of Malaysia against Indonesian subversion) 
was absorbing a substantial proportion of Britain’s military resources, including over 
50,000 troops and more than a third of the Royal Navy’s surface fleet.41  This meant that 
many of the units that had been earmarked in earlier plans for deployment to Rhodesia 
were no longer available.  Robert Good suggested that any shortage of troops might have 
been overcome by detaching some units from the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR).  
There was a precedent for this, as the French had ‘borrowed’ some of their NATO forces 
for their operations in Algeria.42  In fact, British commanders did not consider BAOR 
units to be suitable for operations in Rhodesia, but the DPS had suggested that any 
                                                 
38 Anglin, ‘Britain and the Use of Force in Rhodesia’, p. 69; Good, UDI, p. 58. 
39 NAA: A1838, 190/10/1, Part 5, Plimsoll, AMUN, New York, to DEA, Canberra, Cable No. UN1468, 9 
October 1965. 
40 Anglin, ‘Britain and the Use of Force in Rhodesia’, p. 69. 
41 Ibid.; and Eric J. Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy Since World War Two (London: 
Bodley Head, 1987), pp. 265-67. 
42 Good, UDI, p. 59. 
 114 
 
shortage of troops might be met by using the UK Strategic Reserve, which was 
maintained to meet emergency situations.43  It can therefore be argued that lack of 
adequate forces was not a convincing reason for non-intervention in Rhodesia. 
 
(ii) Logistical Support 
 
The logistical situation was considered to be an insurmountable obstacle to military 
intervention in Rhodesia.  Denis Healey observed that Aden was the nearest British base 
and that was as far away from Rhodesia as Cairo is from London.44  Similarly, Colonel 
George Wigg, Harold Wilson’s self-styled security expert, advised the Prime Minister: ‘It 
is obvious when looking at the land locked nature of Southern Rhodesia and geographical 
dispersal of its airfields that military intervention by our Armed Forces is out of the 
question.’45  Certainly, the initial deployment of British forces would have been difficult 
because the numbers of troops required was relatively large, lines of communication were 
very long and Rhodesia enjoyed a favourable strategic location, with South Africa and the 
Portuguese colony of Mozambique protecting its southern and eastern flanks.  The only 
land route into Rhodesia was through Zambia, and although President Kaunda was very 
willing to allow British forces to use Zambian facilities, there were some complicating 
factors involved in establishing a large intervention force there. 
 
                                                 
43 TNA: PRO, DEFE 32/17, DP 83/64 (Final), ‘Operations in Central Africa’, para. 20, 19 June 1964. 
44 Denis Healey, The Time of My Life (London: Michael Joseph, 1989), p. 331. 
45 BLPES: Papers of George Edward Cecil Wigg [hereafter Wigg Papers], WIGG 4/68, ‘Military Situation - 
Southern Rhodesia’, 4 November 1965. 
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To begin with, the movement of British troops to Zambia and their subsequent supply 
would have absorbed the total capacity of RAF Transport Command.  Its 56 Argosy 
aircraft were capable of carrying around 70 men or 15 tons of stores each, and to move a 
single Brigade Group to Lusaka via a staging post in Dar Es Salaam would have taken 
between a week and ten days.46  If a larger British force was required it would have been 
necessary to supplement the transport capacity of the RAF by commandeering civilian 
aircraft, or requesting assistance from the United States Government, which would 
probably have been forthcoming.47  American help would certainly have been desirable 
given the complications that would have been inherent in maintaining British forces in 
southern Africa.  When the DPS drew up its plans for Operation Mattock, it emphasized 
that British forces would be reliant upon the co-operation of the Federation for the supply 
of engineer plant and stores; fresh rations; petrol, oil and lubricants; a limited number of 
civilian vehicles; accommodation; use of railways; and limited aircraft handling facilities 
and servicing systems. It suggested that protracted operations would require a surface line 
of communication and it would therefore be necessary to arrange this with either the 
                                                 
46 Neville Brown, ‘Military Sanctions Against Rhodesia’, Venture, Vol. 17, No. 12 (January 1966), p. 12; 
William Gutteridge, ‘Rhodesia: the use of military force’, The World Today, Vol. 21 (December 1965), p. 
499; and Good, UDI, p. 59. 
47 Thomas Mann, the U.S. Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, advised President Johnson that 
any British request for American troops in Rhodesia should be refused but a request for an airlift to move 
and support British troops should be treated sympathetically.  Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Texas 
[hereafter LBJL]: White House Confidential File, Mann to the President, 22 December 1965.  The Joint 
Chiefs had by this time ordered a military study of Rhodesian military capabilities and an estimate of 
whether the United States could meet a British request for up to three squadrons of transport aircraft.  
LBJL: National Security File [hereafter NSF], Rhodesia Country File, Box 97, ‘Cables, 12/63-1/66’, JCS to 
U.S. C-in-C Middle East, Cable No. 071558z, 7 December 1965.  This document was declassified in 
September 2005 pursuant to a Mandatory Review request. 
 116 
 
South African or Portuguese authorities.  The plan relied on over-flying Tanzania, or 
Mozambique, in which case it would be necessary to obtain authorisation from the 
relevant authorities.48  However, if British forces had been deployed to prevent or end a 
UDI they could not have expected a great deal of co-operation, in which case military 
intervention would have been much more difficult.  In 1961 British planners estimated the 
supply requirements for a force consisting of three brigades at between 60 and 90 tons per 
day,49 and in the event of a UDI this would have to be airlifted into Zambia, which would 
have been no small undertaking.  A further logistical problem that would have been 
involved in British operations out of Zambia concerned the movement of troops into 
Rhodesia.  The Zambezi formed a natural barrier and it was only bridged at three points.  
This meant that British offensive operations would have been dependent upon helicopters, 
but these were in short supply because of British operations in Malaysia.50 
 
The logistical problem would also have been exacerbated by the need to maintain the 
Zambian economy against Rhodesian retaliatory action.51  A major concern for the British 
and Americans was the security of the Kariba dam and power station, which supplied 
Zambia with the electricity that was essential to keep its copper mines functioning.52  
                                                 
48 TNA: PRO, DEFE 25/22, COS (61) 476 [n.d.] 
49 TNA: PRO, DEFE 32/17, ‘Internal Security Reinforcement of Northern Rhodesia’, para. 11, 9 February 
1961. 
50 Brown, ‘Military Sanctions Against Rhodesia’, p. 12; and Good, UDI, p. 59. 
51 This problem was discussed at both the official and political levels in London and Washington from late 
1964 throughout 1965, and created considerable strains in Anglo-American relations.  See below, Ch. 6, pp. 
316 ff. 
52 A few weeks after UDI the U.S. Consul General in Salisbury warned that Kariba remained the ‘Most 
immediate Sword of Damocles’ despite the fact that Ian Smith had rejected press speculation that 
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However, Kariba lay on the Rhodesian side of the Zambesi and when the DPS considered 
the possibility of a British deployment to seize control of the installation they recognized 
a large number of factors inhibited such an operation, not least their lack of confidence 
that surprise could be maintained.53  Harold Wilson was prepared to deploy British troops 
along the north bank of the Zambesi in a purely defensive capacity, but the proposal 
foundered when Kenneth Kaunda insisted that they should seize control of Kariba.54  
Next, Wilson suggested that a Commonwealth force might be used to protect Kariba, but 
this generated no enthusiasm in Australia.55  In the event Kariba remained safe, probably 
because the Rhodesians recognized that any action taken against the installation might 
have provoked British military intervention.56  However, once economic sanctions against 
Rhodesia escalated the British and American Governments were compelled to mount a 
massive airlift to maintain the Zambian economy, which would otherwise have been 
crippled by Rhodesian economic retaliation.57 
                                                                                                                                                  
Rhodesian forces might take action against the installation.  LBJL: NSF, Rhodesia Country File, Box 97, 
‘Cables, 12/63-1/66’, McClelland to State Department, Cable No. 480, 4 December 1965. 
53 TNA: PRO, DEFE 32/17, DP 17/65 (Final), ‘The Kariba Dam.  Note by the Directors of Defence Plans’, 
22 February 1965.  These contingency plans were drawn up following State Department enquiries in early 
February.  TNA: PRO, DO 183/619, N. C. C. Trench, British Embassy, Washington, to Mr. C. M. 
LeQuesne, WCAD, Foreign Office, 5 February 1965; and John Wilson, WCAD, to Trench, 12 February 
1965. 
54 Anglin, ‘Britain and the Use of Force in Rhodesia’, p. 63; Wilson, The Labour Government, p. 182. 
55 NAA: A1838, 190/11/1, Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee Decision No. 1445 (FAD), 7 December 
1965; and Sir Robert Menzies to Harold Wilson, 9 December 1965. 
56 It has been suggested that British intelligence conveyed a warning to the Rhodesian Government that any 
Rhodesian action would be met by unspecified reprisals. See D. Leigh, The Wilson Plot: The Intelligence 
Services and the Discrediting of a Prime Minister (London: Heinemann, 1988), p. 106. 
57 See below, Ch. 6, p. 326, n. 48. 
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It may be argued that the complexities of the logistical situation militated against British 
military intervention but they were not insurmountable (as the Anglo-American airlift 
proved).  Indeed, the logistical obstacles should not have been insurmountable, as the 
Labour Party’s Commonwealth Officer, George Cunningham, pointed out: ‘If we do not 
have the power [to use troops] we have no right to have colonies in our charge and our 
military planners deserve hanging for spending $2,000 million a year without being able 
to compel a population the size of that of Harrow to stick to the law.’58 
 
(iii) The likely extent of Rhodesian resistance 
 
In 1965 there were all sorts of dire predictions about the likely scale of the fighting that 
would result from British military intervention in Rhodesia.  Shortly before UDI, for 
example, Harold Wilson told President Kaunda that Britain could not send troops into 
Rhodesia because the Rhodesians would ‘resist bitterly any British forces and would 
fanatically try like Hitler to defend their “standards”.’59   No doubt there was an element 
of hyperbole in Wilson’s remarks, as he was trying to dissuade Kaunda from pressing for 
military intervention, but there was – and still is – a deep conviction in Britain that the 
Rhodesian armed forces would not have hesitated to resist British military intervention.  
Sir John Pestell, Controller and Secretary to the British Governor in Rhodesia at the time 
of UDI, was adamant on this point: ‘I knew lots of army and air force … I don’t believe 
that when the balloon went up the Rhodesian forces would not have opposed 
                                                 
58 G. Cunningham, ‘Rhodesia – An Indictment’, Venture, Vol. 17, No. 11 (December 1965), p. 3. 
59 TNA: PRO, FO 371/181881, Sir L. Monson, British Embassy, Lusaka, to Commonwealth Relations 
Office, Cable No. 1659, 31 October 1965. 
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vehemently.’60  Yet until now there has never been any research published on the 
question of whether Rhodesian forces would have resisted British troops.  It appears that 
the picture is rather more nuanced than politicians, civil servants or the military admitted 
at the time or since.61  Similarly, there has never been any informed assessment of 
whether Rhodesian forces were properly equipped to fight against Britain, which is surely 
a critical factor in any discussion of the viability of British military intervention. 
 
(a) Rhodesian attitudes 
 
The attitude of the Rhodesian Service Chiefs can be assessed on the basis of the reports of 
the British Defence Liaison Staff (RAF Element) in Salisbury.62  In his report for the 
period from June to August 1964, Group Captain Slade advised that members of the 
Rhodesian Front Party, including Ministers, had been meeting officers and airmen 
informally and socially to casually enquire if the Rhodesian Government could rely upon 
                                                 
60 Sir John Pestell in ‘Rhodesian UDI’, ICBH Witness Seminar, 6 September 2000, Session Two Transcript, 
p. 56.  http://www.icbh.ac.uk/icbh/witness/rhodesia  
61 Bottomley wrote in his memoirs: ‘Smith possessed a well-trained army and police force, which were 
completely loyal to him.’ Commonwealth, Comrades and Friends (Bombay: Somaiya Publications, 1985), 
p. 141.  Yet not everyone who examined the issue at the time was convinced of the loyalty of the Rhodesian 
armed forces to the Rhodesian Front.  Shortly before the Labour Government was elected George 
Cunningham advised the National Executive Committee: ‘The loyalty of the armed forces must be in doubt 
and must be Mr. Smith’s biggest worry.’   National Museum of Labour History, Manchester: 
Commonwealth Papers, Southern Rhodesia Documents, 1963-1966, Paper No. OV/1963-64/29, 21 July 
1964. 
62 TNA: PRO, AIR 20/11189.  Group Captain H. G. Slade was the RAF Liaison Officer and Air Adviser to 
the British High Commissioner in Salisbury from 1962 until November 1964.  Group Captain G. B. Johns 
then succeeded Slade. 
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them in the event of a UDI.  Slade reported that the Chief of the Air Staff in Rhodesia, 
Air Vice Marshal Bentley, had ‘taken great exception to this being done’ and had made 
this clear to Ian Smith ‘in no uncertain terms.’63  Just before the end of his tour, Slade 
wrote to Air Vice Marshal Sir Peter Fletcher, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Policy), in 
London, commenting on the likely reaction of the Rhodesian Chiefs of Staff in the event 
of a UDI:  ‘I have never found it difficult to state where the Armed Forces would stand.  
As you know I have never had any doubts whatsoever about Bentley’s position or 
reactions; similarly my Army colleague has had no doubts about the Army.’64  However, 
Slade suspected that Bentley would be removed before his official retirement in July 
1965.  On the following day, the General Officer Commanding Rhodesia, Major General 
John Anderson, was ‘retired’ on the grounds of age (at 51).  Anderson, who was known to 
oppose a UDI, was reported to have said: ‘I have been represented politically as being the 
only stumbling block.  But I do not believe that this is so.  I think I have the support of 
some members of the other services and Security Forces in my attitude.’65 
 
There was some questioning in the British Cabinet about the loyalty of the Rhodesian 
armed forces.  Healey was tasked with improving intelligence on this issue, but there does 
not appear to be any evidence that the matter was discussed further, either in the Cabinet 
                                                 
63 TNA: PRO, AIR 20/11189, Slade to MOD (Air Department), 31 August 1964.  George Ivan Smith, the 
personal representative in southern Africa of UN Secretary General, U. Thant, also reported that he had 
heard of these Rhodesian Front enquiries.  Centre for Southern African Studies, Borthwick Institute of 
Historical Research, York: SMI 9, Smith to Thant, 17 April 1964. 
64 TNA: PRO, AIR 20/11189, Slade to Fletcher, 23 October 1964.  The Army Historical Branch, Ministry 
of Defence, confirms that the records of the BDLS (Army Element) have not survived (in common with 
many other overseas records).  Mr I. Goode to author, 8 March 1999. 
65 Rhodesia Herald, 24 October 1964.  Slade included a cutting of the front page in his letter to Fletcher. 
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or the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee.66  However, it is now clear that 
Anderson’s replacement, Major-General Rodney Putterill, held similar views to those of 
his predecessor.67  Air Vice Marshal Bentley was retired slightly early in April 1965, as 
Group Captain Slade had predicted.  Air Vice Marshal Harold Hawkins replaced Bentley, 
who quickly assured Slade’s successor, Group Captain Johns, the relationship between 
the Royal Air Force and its Rhodesian counterpart would not change.68  In his report for 
the period from April to August 1965, Johns commented: ‘On the surface the attitude of 
the Rhodesian Defence Forces has not changed.  They continue to be friendly and co-
operative.’69  In November 1965, Hawkins actually advised Johns that UDI was imminent 
and, further, ‘he had told his stations that he would not issue any illegal orders i.e. orders 
would be confined to those necessary for the country’s security.’70  This might be 
                                                 
66 TNA: PRO, CAB 130/206, Minutes of Meeting, 28 October 1964.  In fact, British intelligence on 
Rhodesia was extremely weak; the Joint Intelligence Committee did not even task MI6 with obtaining 
intelligence on Rhodesia.  See Stephen Dorril, MI6. Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Secret 
Intelligence Service (New York: Touchstone, 2002), p. 725; Leigh, The Wilson Plot, p. 106; and John 
Young, The Labour Governments 1964-70 Volume 2: International Policy (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2003), p. 179. 
67 Putterill told the Chief of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation that he would support the 
Governor if so requested.  Ken Flower, Serving Secretly. An Intelligence Chief on Record: Rhodesia into 
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racial Centre Party in protest against the Rhodesian Front’s racial Constitution of 1969; he also opposed the 
regime’s efforts to make Rhodesia a republic.  See Elaine Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian 
Independence (London: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 28; and Good, UDI, p. 57. 
68 TNA: PRO, AIR 20/11189, Johns to MOD (Air Department), 1 April 1965. 
69 TNA: PRO, AIR 20/11189, Johns to MOD (Air Department), 4 September 1965. 
70 TNA: PRO, AIR 20/11189, Johns to Commonwealth Relations Office, Emergency Cable, 9 November 
1965. 
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considered slightly ambiguous, but Hawkins also referred to the hard-liners in the 
Rhodesian Front as ‘madmen’, which is a reasonable indication of his hostility to UDI.71  
The attitude of the Rhodesian Service Chiefs, even after the purge of Anderson and 
Bentley, might therefore have helped to prevent a full-scale confrontation between British 
and Rhodesian forces. 
 
Attitudes among senior Rhodesian Army officers were not sympathetic to the Rhodesian 
Front regime.  On the morning of UDI the Governor in Salisbury, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, 
received a visit from four Army officers who arrived armed at Government House.  They 
informed Gibbs that if he provided them with a warrant for the arrest of Smith as a rebel 
against the Queen, they would do their duty.  The Governor refused, and the soldiers left.  
In Gibbs’ obituary Patrick Keatley commented that ‘This was the fatal moment of 
hesitation.’72  The Governor had in fact considered the possibility of resisting UDI.  He 
consulted Ken Flower, Chief of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), to 
ascertain his views.  Flower recalled in his memoirs: 
 
Although I considered that the loyalty of the Chiefs of Staff, Putterill and 
Hawkins, was not in doubt and that many of their senior officers would 
follow their lead, I advised Gibbs that an appeal for their support would 
                                                 
71 Hawkins’s comment referred, in particular, to the Minister of Law and Order, Desmond Lardner-Burke, 
and Commissioner of Police Barfoot.  Hawkins also told Flower that he was fully in support of the 
Governor. Serving Secretly, p. 56. 
72 Patrick Keatley, Obituary of Sir Humphrey Gibbs, Guardian Weekly, 18 November 1990.  Quoted in 
Alan Megahey, Sir Humphrey Gibbs: Beleaguered Governor (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 110-11.  
In his autobiography Wilson’s security adviser, George Wigg, suggests that he was in favour of demanding 
Ian Smith’s arrest. George Wigg (London: Michael Joseph, 1972), p. 326. 
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put them in an almost impossible position, between the government that 
paid them and an overseas Queen to whom they owed their allegiance.73 
 
Flower also advised that the possibility of bloodshed could not be discounted because the 
attitude among middle and junior ranks was more belligerent, especially in the Rhodesian 
Light Infantry (RLI), which Flower said ‘would willingly “jump into the Makabusi (a 
muddy river on the outskirts of the city [Salisbury]) for Smith, even if this meant going 
against their seniors.’74  Some former RLI troops have since expressed a view that they 
would, without question, have fought against British troops or any other invading force.75  
Victor Lee Walker, a Captain in 1RLI who at the time of UDI was seconded to the 
Military Intelligence Section of the CIO, has commented: 
 
                                                 
73 Flower, Serving Secretly, p. 55.  Lieutenant General Peter Walls, who commanded the RLI in 1965, has 
suggested to one historian that his orders were to resist any invading force.  Walls said it would have been a 
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resistance and loyalist rebellion in the Empire’, in Keith Jeffery (ed.), ‘An Irish Empire’?  Aspects of 
Ireland and the British Empire (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 213, n. 69. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Dennis Croukamp, 13 Troop, 3 Commando RLI (1965-1980) to author, 28 September 1999; Peter 
Eldridge, RLI Support Group (1961-1975), then 2 Rhodesian African Rifles (commissioned, 1975), to 
author, 23 November 2004; Leopold James Bergoff, RLI, to author, 14 and 15 April 2005.   Jim Bergoff 
joined the RLI as a recruit in 1960, rose through the ranks to become a WO1, and was later commissioned 
in the Rhodesian Army Medical Corps, retiring as an acting Captain in October 1981.  He commented: ‘I 
consider that I was a well disciplined soldier – and loved my country – I believe that many of us would 
have died for “Rhodesia”.’ 
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The general feeling within the RLI, and other Rhodesian Defence 
organisations was one of intense loyalty to the country and its government 
and all members were prepared to fight for Rhodesia (this was later proved 
during the terrorist campaign).  I was prepared to resist any intervention in 
our country’s affairs as were all my fellow officers who were still serving 
in 1RLI.76 
 
The Rhodesian Front could also have counted on the support of the Territorial Force and 
reservists, who reflected the political mood of the European population in Rhodesia and 
were therefore likely to offer some resistance to British military intervention.77  Yet in 
other units the mood was not quite so clear-cut, as one commentator pointed out: 
 
It should not be forgotten, however, that there is a regular African 
battalion, whose reputation is not particularly high and whose conduct 
would be unpredictable in the event of a serious African rising.  It has 
European officers but is otherwise largely a mixed Matabele and Mashona 
unit.  In some circumstances a mutiny presumably could not be ruled out, 
but equally it can be assumed that the Rhodesians are alert to the 
possibility if it exists.78 
                                                 
76 Victor Lee Walker, RLI, to author, 26 November 2004.  Walker served in the Rhodesian armed forces 
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The Rhodesian Front was certainly alert to the possibility, which explains why some 
African units were disbanded.79  On the other hand, it has also been suggested that 
African troops were in fact loyal to the Rhodesian Government.80  Beyond the Rhodesian 
Army, the paramilitary British South Africa Police (BSAP) also played a major role in 
Rhodesian security.81  There is certainly evidence of militant opinion among the 
substantial European element of this force.  One former BSAP officer said that he would 
have fought against the British, even though he later went on to join the British Army, 
serving as an officer in the Gurkhas!82  Other former officers have indicated a strong 
belief that they were engaged in a struggle against communist insurrection.83  This is 
perhaps not surprising when one considers that ‘A tremendous propaganda exercise was 
mounted by the Rhodesian Government for many months prior to UDI and this of course 
continued well after the event, if fact right up to the demise of Rhodesia in 1979/80.’84  
However, this propaganda exercise was necessary because the vast majority of BSAP 
recruits were black Africans, and the white recruits were mainly drawn from outside 
                                                 
79 Good, UDI, p. 57. 
80 Vic Walker contended ‘Our Black troops were also behind the Rhodesian Government, in particular the 
1st Battalion The Rhodesian African Rifles.’  Walker, RLI, to author, 26 November 2004. 
81 The misleading name originated from the period when Cecil Rhodes’ British South Africa Company 
administered Rhodesia.  In a survey of former BSAP officers conducted in 1999, I invited respondents to 
‘consider whether you would personally have resisted a British intervention force.’ The survey yielded 
nineteen responses: eight confirmed that they would definitely have resisted a British force, three said that 
they would not, and eight were equivocal. 
82 Derek Jewson, BSAP 6680, to author, 19 September 1999. 
83 Gerry de Bruin, BSAP 7228, to author, 13 September 1999; Michael Horner, BSAP 6125, to author, 16 
September 1999; Dan Hughes, BSAP 6308, to author, 14 September 1999. 
84 BSAP Senior Assistant Commissioner Alan Rich, to author, 28 September 1999.  Rich advised that the 
views of white officers should be treated with caution because of this propaganda exercise.   
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Rhodesia, many from the UK.85  It therefore hardly seems likely that the entire BSAP 
could have been relied upon to oppose intervention by British troops.  In fact, after UDI 
there was a wave of desertions by recruits from the UK.86  An important element to 
consider in relation to the mood of the BSAP, and the Rhodesian security forces 
generally, is the fact that many Rhodesians felt conflicted by the oath they had sworn to 
the British Crown, as one former BSAP officer has commented: 
 
You should note that I was seriously concerned that, at the time I attested 
into the Force, I signed an Oath of Allegiance to the Queen.  At no time 
subsequent to the UDI did I either renounce that original Oath or sign 
another Oath of Allegiance. Many of my associates felt exactly the same 
way.  It may sound old fashioned to be concerned about such matters as 
Oaths of Allegiance but back in 1965 Oaths had value and meant 
something!87 
 
                                                 
85 Rich to author, 28 September 1999; Ivan Smith, BSAP 7357, to author, 14 September 1999; and Gordon 
Johnston, BSAP 7354, to author, 21 and 28 December 1999.  Smith (a Rhodesian) wrote that in his squad of 
about 30 only 3 were Rhodesian.  Similarly, Johnston (a New Zealander) recalled that in his squad of 16 
just 3 were Rhodesian.  As far as propaganda was concerned, Smith and Johnston both recall that at parade 
on 11 November 1965 they were told that the BSAP flag was the only one to which they owed their loyalty. 
86 cf. de Bruin, to author, 13 September 1999; Johnston, to author, 28 December 1999; Smith, to author, 14 
September 1999.  On the other hand, it has been suggested that the British listed only 14 deserters, which 
was ‘hardly a wave’.  J. R. T. Wood to author, 18 January 2006. 
87 Adrian Staines, BSAP 6633, to author, 14 September 1999.  Alan Rich also commented: ‘What must be 
remembered [is that] we had all sworn allegiance to the Monarch and the Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs’.  
Rich, to author, 28 September 1999. 
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Recent evidence of attitudes in the Rhodesian security forces during 1965 suggests that 
although there were pockets of belligerence, there was not uniform hostility to Britain.  
The evidence certainly does not substantiate Denis Healey’s unqualified assertion that the 
British Government ‘had no reason to believe they would not fight us if we attempted to 
intervene.’88  The Government could have found indicators that British military 
intervention would not have met with widespread resistance, but the Government did not 
carry out any detailed analysis of the situation, probably because it was generally 
disposed against the use of force from the beginning.  Further, it may be argued that those 
elements of the Rhodesian security forces that may have resisted British military 
intervention – the Rhodesian Light Infantry, the Territorial Force, and some sections of 
the BSAP – lacked sufficient capabilities to do so effectively. 
 
(b) Rhodesian capabilities 
 
During negotiations for the dissolution of the Central African Federation the Conservative 
Government proposed to transfer the bulk of Federal military assets to Southern 
Rhodesia, which generated an outcry at the United Nations.  African states were 
concerned that the Rhodesian Government would use its armed forces to suppress African 
nationalists and therefore brought forward resolutions in the Security Council and 
General Assembly that called upon Britain not to permit the transfer, but British 
representatives vetoed the resolutions.89  As it was a Conservative Government that had 
                                                 
88 Healey, Time of My Life, p. 332.  There is some evidence that suggested the Rhodesian armed forces were 
at least trying to create uncertainty about their intentions.  A few weeks before UDI, the MOD received a 
request for ammunition supplies that was well above normal requirements.  TNA: PRO, CAB 130/244, 
OPD (O) (SR) Minutes of Meeting, Item 7, 4 October 1965. 
89 Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence, pp. 15-16. 
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negotiated the handover of Federal forces to Southern Rhodesia, Michael Stewart no 
doubt felt justified in his later claim that the strength of Southern Rhodesia’s armed forces 
was a deterrent to British military intervention under the Labour Government.90  This 
was, however, disingenuous, for although Rhodesian capabilities were formidable by 
comparison with those of other African states, they were much less impressive when 
compared to those of Britain. 
 
Rhodesian capabilities were well known to the Ministry of Defence and to George 
Wigg.91  The Royal Rhodesian Air Force (RRAF) in particular gave British politicians 
pause for thought and was never far from the minds of the DPS.  The RRAF was 
equipped with around 70 aircraft, including Hunter and Vampire fighters, Canberra light 
bombers, and a squadron of Alouette helicopters.  This was a potent force, but it would 
not have been a match for the more modern aircraft flown by the Royal Air Force, and 
there were in fact specific contingencies to deal with the threat from the RRAF.  A few 
days after UDI, the Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Air Vice Marshal J. H. 
Lapsley, submitted a report that concluded 12 RAF or Royal Navy fighters stationed in 
Zambia would be an effective deterrent or strike force against the RRAF.92  Shortly 
thereafter the RAF deployed a squadron of Javelins to Zambia together with radar 
defence and a detachment of the RAF Regiment.  This deployment helped to ease tension 
with Rhodesia and provided protection for the Anglo-American airlift, but it did not 
satisfy Kenneth Kaunda’s demands for offensive British action and by August 1966 the 
                                                 
90 Stewart, Life and Labour, p. 169. 
91 TNA: PRO, DEFE 32/17, DP 83/64 (Final), ‘Operations in Central Africa’, paras. 8-13, 19 June 1964; 
and BLPES: Wigg Papers, WIGG 4/68, ‘Southern Rhodesia – Military Situation’, passim. 
92 TNA: PRO, DEFE 32/17, ‘An Examination of the Possible Provision of Some Air Defence for Zambia’, 
15 November 1965. 
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RAF presence was withdrawn.93  These defensive arrangements demonstrate that the 
RAF had the means to protect Zambia, but if British forces had invaded Rhodesia it 
would have been necessary to neutralise the RRAF threat by bombing its bases.  In late 
November 1965 the Chiefs of Staff submitted a report that outlined the possible uses of 
Vulcan, Canberra, Buccaneer, Sea Vixen and Scimitar aircraft in such an offensive role.94  
However, Harold Wilson was apparently tormented by the fact that RRAF bases at New 
Sarum and Thornhill were near to civilian housing, which meant that there was a good 
chance of inflicting civilian casualties in any bombing campaign.95  Yet there was, 
perhaps, an alternative, as the head of Rhodesian intelligence recalled in his memoirs: 
 
I remember Air Vice-Marshal Bentley, Rhodesia’s Diplomatic 
Representative in Washington, saying during consultations in October that 
… the Royal Air Force could neutralise the Rhodesian Air Force without a 
shot being fired in anger.  One way of doing this would have been for the 
Royal Air Force to have their Vulcan bombers (then based in Nairobi, but 
which could be moved to Lusaka) keeping a permanent watch in the skies 
over New Sarum and Thornhill … with the threat issued in advance that if 
any Rhodesian aeroplane tried to get airborne the runways and the planes 
on the ground would be bombed.96 
                                                 
93 Anglin, ‘Britain and the Use of Force in Rhodesia’, pp. 63-64; Wilson, The Labour Government, p. 182. 
94 TNA: PRO, DEFE 32/17, JP (61) 23 (Final), ‘Outline Plan for Deployment in Northern Rhodesia’ 
(Operation Fume), 2 March 1961; PRO, DEFE 32/17, DP 17/65 (Final), ‘The Kariba Dam.  Note by the 
Directors of Defence Plans’, 22 February 1965; PRO, DEFE 32/17, COS 2634, ‘Strike Plan for Use Against 
the RRAF’, 27 November 1965. 
95 David Owen, The Politics of Defence (London: Jonathan Cape, 1972), p. 115. 
96 Flower, Serving Secretly, p. 52. 
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The evidence suggests that the RRAF did not constitute an effective deterrent to British 
military action.  It could have been destroyed (although the political problems that would 
have resulted from this were considered to be unacceptable) or simply suppressed by 
combat air patrols.  
 
The Rhodesian Regular Army consisted of less than 2,500 men, and over 1,000 of its 
regular troops were Africans officered by Europeans.  In his assessment of Rhodesian 
capabilities Wigg noted that ‘The two European teeth-arm units, 1st Battalion Rhodesian 
Light Infantry and Special Air Service Squadron, have deficiencies in manpower and this 
is also reflected in the supporting arms and services.’97  A Territorial Force of about 6,000 
men, the vast majority of whom were Europeans, supported the Regular Army, and Wigg 
suggested that this was ‘the main source of strength’, as there was ‘provision for rapid 
mobilisation and expansion in times of emergency’.98  However, it has been suggested 
that the Territorial Force was not terribly effective and its main function was to provide 
internal security, thereby releasing the Regular Army for combat duties.99  The main 
weakness of the Rhodesian Army and Territorial Force was lack of firepower.  In terms of 
small arms Regular infantry units were well equipped with the 7.62 mm Self Loading 
Rifle, the General Purpose Machine Gun, and 81 mm mortars.  Active TF battalions also 
used the SLR, the Bren Light Machine Gun, Vickers Medium Machine Gun, and 3 inch 
mortars.  However, these infantry units were supported by only a handful of Ferret Scout 
Cars and two eight gun batteries equipped with 25 pounder field guns.100  This shortage 
                                                 
97 BLPES: Wigg Papers, WIGG 4/68, ‘Southern Rhodesia – Military Situation’, para. 7. 
98 Ibid., para. 8. 
99 Croukamp, RLI, to author, 28 September 1999. 
100 BLPES: Wigg Papers, WIGG 4/68, ‘Southern Rhodesia – Military Situation’, para. 3. 
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of armour and artillery would have been a serious handicap to Rhodesian attempts to 
resist a British invasion.  One former Rhodesian Light Infantryman has commented: ‘I 
have no doubt that a British intervention force would not have taken long in stopping any 
resistance from the then very small and inexperienced army.’101  On the other hand, some 
former Rhodesian servicemen have suggested that the Rhodesian Army would have 
fought a bush war similar to the operations they later conducted against African 
nationalist forces.  In these circumstances a British military intervention might have been 
much more protracted.102 
 
As noted above, the Rhodesian Army was supported by the BSAP, whose regular strength 
was around 6,000 men, two-thirds of whom were Africans. For George Wigg, the BSAP 
was the joker in the pack because it could ostensibly mobilise as many as 33,000 men in 
the event of an emergency.103  This seems very impressive on paper, but most of the 
BSAP Reserve had a minimal level of training and the capabilities of the BSAP were 
extremely limited, as one former officer has commented: 
 
I must point out that despite training in the use of various weapons the 
BSAP members [were only issued with] antiquated .303s (for parade 
purposes mainly) and boasted being the only Police Force in Africa not to 
be armed in the normal course of duty … Our weapons and training would 
have been of little avail against even a modest British air/land assault …104 
                                                 
101 Croukamp, RLI, to author, 28 September 1999. 
102 Eldridge, RLI, to author, 23 November 2004; Walker, RLI, to author, 26 November 2004. 
103 BLPES: Wigg Papers, WIGG 4/68, ‘Southern Rhodesia – Military Situation’, para. 15. 
104 Gordon Johnston, BSAP 7354, to author, 28 December 1999. 
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It may therefore be argued that even though some elements of the Rhodesian security 
forces may have been inclined to resist British military intervention, on the whole they 
lacked sufficient capability to fight effectively against better-equipped opposition. 
 
(iv) The danger of South African intervention 
 
A further constraint on British military intervention was the fear that Rhodesian resistance 
might have been augmented by South African support.  A British parliamentarian visiting 
South Africa was told that in the event of an invasion of Rhodesia, ‘there would only be 
generals left in South Africa because everyone else would have gone over the border in 
plain clothes.’105  There was perhaps some danger that South African volunteers might 
take up arms against British military intervention in Rhodesia, but whether the South 
African Government would have given any official sanction to this is highly debatable.  
The British Ambassador in South Africa suggested that in the event of a UDI, ‘Dr 
Verwoerd would probably consider it in his interest to permit some measure of help, short 
of military involvement, to be given for the sake of preserving a White Government on 
his northern border.’106  The qualification ‘short of military involvement’ is obviously 
crucial.  The South African Government recognised that it was in a delicate position.  On 
the one hand it was in the interests of the South African Government that white rule 
should be maintained in Southern Rhodesia, but on the other hand the South African 
                                                 
105 Quoted in Good, UDI, p. 58. 
106 TNA: PRO, PREM 13/86, ‘South African/Southern Rhodesian relations’, Despatch No. 61, Sir H. 
Stephenson, British Embassy, Pretoria, to Patrick Gordon Walker, Foreign Secretary, 21 October 1964, 
para. 8, in Philip Murphy (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire, Series B, Volume 9, Central 
Africa, Part II: Crisis and Dissolution 1959-1965 (London: The Stationery Office, 2005), p. 490. 
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Government had always remained committed to legality in international affairs and the 
principle of non-interference in domestic politics.107  The problem of the mandated 
territory of Southwest Africa was also entering a crucial phase at the United Nations and 
a negative reaction against South Africa could have resulted on this issue if its 
Government intervened in support of Rhodesia.108  A further point of concern was that if 
the United Nations applied sanctions against Rhodesia in the event of a UDI, they might 
next be applied against South Africa.109  Ian Smith suggested in his memoirs that this 
actually worked in Rhodesia’s favour, because the South Africans made it clear to the 
British Government: ‘South Africa would not abandon Rhodesia, not only for moral 
reasons and because of our strong mutual ties, but because there was much evidence to 
indicate that if sanctions succeeded against Rhodesia, South Africa would be next on the 
list.’110  Sue Onslow has established that South Africa gave several forms of ‘covert and 
tacit’ support to Rhodesia during the period 1964-65.111  This included loans to the 
Rhodesian Government (which it used for military purposes), building of strategically 
important railway lines, training of helicopter pilots, and discussion of intelligence and 
security matters.112  In August 1967, almost two years after UDI, the South African 
                                                 
107 Sue Onslow, ‘A Question of Timing: South Africa and Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence, 1964-65’, Cold War History, Vol. 5, No. 2 (May 2005), pp. 129-59. 
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Government went even further, sending police units to assist Rhodesia against African 
nationalist incursions, but it is notable that South Africa lacked sufficient regular army 
units to offer greater support.113  No doubt the South African Government was alarmed by 
the increasing instability on its northern border.  Douglas Anglin has argued that a 
settlement of the Rhodesian issue was therefore in South Africa’s interests, which would 
have conditioned its attitude to British military intervention: ‘British military objectives 
were clearly limited in scope, and moreover, direct British rule might have been 
positively welcomed in so far as it strengthened Rhodesia as a buffer against “terrorist” 
infiltration.’114  It therefore seems unlikely that there would have been much danger of an 
official South African retaliation against British military intervention. 
 
(v) The British armed forces and the ‘kith and kin’ factor 
 
Healey alleged in his memoirs that the British armed forces could not be trusted to 
execute orders for a military intervention against their Rhodesian ‘kith and kin’.  Healey 
recalled that he reprimanded the Chief of the General Staff, Sir James Cassels, over 
‘mutinous muttering among senior army officers.’115  There is no doubt that the Defence 
Secretary was made aware of the reservations of the military on several occasions.  The 
                                                 
113 J. R. T. Wood to author, 18 January 2006. 
114 Anglin, ‘Britain and the Use of Force in Rhodesia’, p. 71. 
115 Healey, Time of My Life, p. 332.  This allegation was repeated on British television in 1999: ‘I remember 
Jim Cassels did warn me ... that there would be real difficulty ...  I said “Tell them to keep their traps shut.  
I’m not going to have this sort of chatter.  Public chatter would be mutiny, or the threat of mutiny.  This is a 
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politician takes notice of the views of the military on these issues.’  Rebellion! (BBC Television, 1999), Part 
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contingency plans submitted by the DPS during 1964 and 1965 contained warnings that 
military intervention ‘would give rise to an almost intolerable strain on the loyalties and 
morale of British troops involved.’116  Officials in the Ministry of Defence also reinforced 
this message.  When Arthur Bottomley, the Commonwealth Secretary, enquired about the 
possibility of military intervention to protect Zambian copper production, the Defence 
Secretary was advised that ‘Action against Rhodesians of British origin would be a task 
deeply repugnant to our forces.’117  These opinions were supplemented by rumours that 
some commanding officers had consulted their officers to ask whether they would fight if 
ordered into Rhodesia.  The results were allegedly negative; many apparently cited the 
precedent of the Curragh ‘mutiny’ in 1914.118  Hew Strachan has observed: ‘The evidence 
for this is largely anecdotal.  Some officers serving in 1965 are categorical that they were 
consulted on these issues; some equally clearly state that they were not.’119  Nevertheless, 
                                                 
116 TNA: PRO, DEFE 32/17, DP 83/64 (Final), ‘Operations in Central Africa’, para. 34, 19 June 1964; DP 
17/65 (Final), ‘The Kariba Dam.  Note by the Directors of Defence Plans’, para. 49, 22 February 1965. 
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Royal Military College, Sandhurst (1973-75), 90 per cent of junior army officers said that they would be 
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although hard evidence of such consultation is lacking, the political significance of these 
rumours is that they ‘tended to serve as an alibi for inaction.’120 
 
Military intervention might have been distasteful to some senior British officers, 
particularly those who had close personal links with Rhodesia.  The Assistant Chief of the 
Air Staff (Policy and Plans), Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Fletcher, had been educated in 
Southern Rhodesia, trained in the Rhodesian Air Force, and during the Second World 
War served in the Rhodesian Air Training Group at Belvedere, Salisbury.121  Major-
General John Willoughby, British GOC Middle East Land Forces (who would probably 
have commanded any British military intervention), enjoyed a close relationship with 
Major-General Rodney Putterill, GOC Rhodesian Army.122  Such links tended to shape 
the perceptions of some on the Rhodesian side.  Brigadier Andrew Skeen, the Rhodesian 
High Commissioner in London, told his Government shortly before UDI that he had been 
assured by senior British officers that they would refuse to fight against Rhodesia.123  
However, the head of Rhodesian intelligence, Ken Flower, was not convinced: 
 
I doubted Skeen’s claim that most British Commanders would refuse to 
fight against Rhodesia; on the contrary, CIO knew for certain that some of 
the senior commanders would willingly use force against Rhodesia.  
                                                                                                                                                  
(Salisbury: Galaxie Press, 1979), p. 18.  Cited in Lowry, ‘Ulster resistance and loyalist rebellion in the 
Empire’, p. 212, n. 68. 
120 Adam Roberts, ‘The British Armed Forces and Politics: A Historical Perspective’, Armed Forces and 
Society Vol. 3, No. 4 (Summer 1977), p. 541. 
121 Obituary, The Independent, 6 January 1999. 
122 Flower, Serving Secretly, p. 57. 
123 Ibid., p. 50. 
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British military tradition – loyalty to the Sovereign and a high sense of 
military discipline and national pride – would override any other 
considerations.124 
 
The armed forces of both countries owed their loyalty to the Crown and were trained in 
the tradition that politics is not the concern of the military.  Lack of hard evidence makes 
it difficult to argue conclusively whether British forces would have fought, but it is 
certainly true that ‘the kith and kin factor was inflated to cover a general aversion to a 
military solution arising from other more compelling reasons.’125  It is therefore essential 
to consider the economic and political situation in order to understand why the Labour 
Government eschewed the use of force. 
 
Economic and political constraints on the use of force 
 
The decision not to use force in the event of a UDI departed from the established use of 
the military during Britain’s disengagement from Empire.  Peter Nailor has observed that 
‘The type of military involvement was, classically, to threaten the use of, or to use, 
military force to delay the pace of political change; or, more simply, to keep some sort of 
order while political change was being negotiated.’126  British troops were deployed in 
                                                 
124 Ibid. 
125 Good, UDI, p. 61. 
126 Peter Nailor, ‘The Ministry of Defence, 1959-70’, in Paul Smith (ed.) Government and the Armed 
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this capacity in Malaya, Cyprus and Kenya, for example.127  British forces were also 
deployed in East African states after they achieved independence; in early 1964 the 
Governments of Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya called upon Britain to suppress mutinies in 
their armed forces.128  Further, the extent of British military support for the Malaysian 
Federation in its confrontation with Indonesia demonstrated Britain’s continuing capacity 
to act on a global scale, which the Harold Wilson initially had no intention of changing.  
In his first major foreign policy speech Wilson declared ‘We are a world power, and a 
world influence, or we are nothing.’129  In December 1964, Wilson told the House of 
Commons that the Government would not preside over any dramatic scaling-down of 
Britain’s military commitments: 
 
I want to make it quite clear that whatever we may do in the field of cost 
effectiveness, value for money and a stringent review of expenditure, we 
cannot afford to relinquish our world role - our role which for shorthand 
purposes is sometimes called our ‘East of Suez’ role.130 
                                                 
127 Malaya became independent in 1957; Cyprus achieved its independence in 1959, but with a British 
military presence ‘in perpetuity’; Kenya became independent in 1963.  See Robert F. Holland, European 
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Behind this rhetoric, however, the foreign and defence policies of the Wilson Government 
were dictated by economic exigencies.  The massive balance of payments deficit of £800 
million, inherited from the Conservative Government, could probably have been dealt 
with most effectively by a devaluation of the pound, but this course of action was ruled 
out very quickly on political grounds.  The Labour Government struggled to engineer an 
economic recovery with a combination of tax increases and spending cuts, including a 
defence review.131  On 28 January 1965, Callaghan announced to the Cabinet his plans 
for reducing public expenditure by 1970.  He hoped to save some £500 million, of which 
£350 million would come from the defence budget, which in 1969-70 would be held at £2 
billion, at 1964 prices.  This move towards retrenchment in defence spending was given 
additional encouragement by George Brown and the Department for Economic Affairs.  
The National Plan, published in September 1965, argued that the defence sector was 
detrimental to the economy because it took up about 7 per cent of national output, 5 per 
cent of the labour force, and up to 40 per cent of British research and development.  
Defence consumed more resources than Britain’s total investment in industrial plant and 
machinery, more than Britain was spending on consumer goods, and 50 per cent more 
than education.132  To curb defence spending, Healey focused initially on equipment 
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projects, which resulted in the abandonment of several aircraft programmes in favour of 
cheaper American alternatives, and the cancellation of the CVA01 aircraft carrier.133   In 
these circumstances of economic retrenchment it became more unlikely that the Labour 
Government would have countenanced heavy expenditure on military intervention in 
Rhodesia.134  Further, these economic considerations eventually had a strategic impact, as 
the cuts in the defence budget militated against the capacity of the armed forces to 
discharge their traditional multiple roles.  In the Defence White Paper published in 
February 1966 the Government announced two major strategic principles that clearly 
conditioned its Rhodesia policy: 
 
First, Britain will not undertake major operations of war except in co-
operation with allies.  Secondly, we will not accept an obligation to 
provide another country with military assistance unless it is prepared to 
provide us with the facilities we need to make such assistance effective in 
time.135 
 
With regard to the first principle, although the British Government could have asked the 
United States to provide logistical support for British military operations in Rhodesia, any 
military co-operation beyond that would have been out of the question.  Similarly, there 
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was no prospect that any of Britain’s NATO allies or the ‘Old’ Commonwealth countries 
(Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) could have been prevailed upon to share the 
burden of military intervention in Rhodesia.  The implications of the second principle 
were also far-reaching because it meant that ‘seizing points of entry for an intervention 
force was to be avoided, as was any operation outside land-based air cover.’136  The 
strategic principles of the Defence White Paper therefore militated against the possibility 
of British military intervention in Rhodesia. 
 
There can be little doubt that the policy of the Wilson Government was also profoundly 
influenced by domestic political considerations.  Views within the three main parties and 
the perceived significance of public opinion acted as a powerful brake on the use of force 
against Rhodesia.  One former Labour MP, Dr David Kerr, has suggested ‘it was very 
apparent in the Parliamentary Labour Party that there was no instinct for the use of force 
at all’, which he thought reflected what was happening in Vietnam: 
 
Vietnam rather captured the left wing of the Labour Party, both inside and 
outside the House, and the events were not going in Vietnam in such a way 
as to persuade the left wing of the Labour Party that similar incursions into 
Rhodesia, however morally justified, was a practical proposition.137 
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In these circumstances the Labour Government felt constrained by its parliamentary 
majority, which by the time of UDI was down to just one seat.138  Ben Pimlott has 
observed: ‘A handful of Labour back-benchers could hold the precarious Government to 
ransom … there was the nightmare possibility of a war strategy collapsing because of 
lack of parliamentary support.’139  Labour MPs who may have defied the Party Whip 
included Woodrow Wyatt, Desmond Donnelly, Reginald Paget and Frederick 
Bellenger.140  On the other hand, Wilson could probably have counted on the votes of 
most of the Liberals, which would have offset the adverse effect of any minor backbench 
rebellion in his own party.141  The leader of the Liberal Party, Jo Grimond, spoke publicly 
about the possibility of Liberal parliamentary support in relation to those issues on which 
the Liberals felt most strongly committed, such as industrial co-ownership and Europe.142  
Although Grimond did not mention Rhodesia as a case in which Liberals would offer 
parliamentary support, it is reasonable to speculate that he and his colleagues would have 
supported military intervention.  Jeremy Thorpe, MP for North Devon and leader of the 
Liberal Party from 1967, later wrote that British troops should have been stationed in 
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Zambia and suggested that ‘the first shot to be fired at a British soldier would galvanise 
world opinion and give the British Government complete freedom to act.’143 
 
According to Barbara Castle, Minister for Overseas Development, ‘Harold Wilson was 
obsessed with the need to get a consensus with the Conservatives on Rhodesia if at all 
possible.’144  Wilson largely succeeded in maintaining a bipartisan approach, though it 
should not be imagined that Conservative Party views on Rhodesia were monolithic.  
There was a small, but vocal, Rhodesia Lobby, headed by Lord Salisbury and Patrick 
Wall, which expressed its views mainly through the right-wing Monday Club.  There was 
also a small faction of Progressives, whose views counterbalanced those of the Rhodesia 
Lobby.145  However, the vast majority of Conservative MPs were uncommitted on the 
Rhodesian issue, which reflected the fact that it was so controversial.146  The intention of 
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the Party leadership to steer a moderate course was evident at the party’s annual 
conference in October 1965.  The Rhodesia Lobby pushed for a motion to declare the 
Party’s total opposition to the use of military force or the imposition of economic 
sanctions, but the Party leadership defeated the proposed amendment and the official 
motion merely expressed hope that a UDI would not occur and that a settlement would be 
achieved through negotiation.147  Mark Stuart has noted that after UDI the new 
Conservative Leader, Edward Heath, faced a dilemma: ‘should [he] behave as the 
responsible leader of a government-in-waiting or take a more combative approach, which 
would appeal to his imperialist-minded right wing and the Conservative constituency 
associations, large numbers of whom were known to be sympathetic to Ian Smith?’148  If 
Heath had adopted a more adversarial approach over Rhodesia it would have been a 
political mistake because ‘Wilson could have claimed that the Opposition was being 
disloyal, endorsing an unconstitutional act, and racist in appearing to endorse a white 
regime.’149  It may be argued that if the Labour Government had decided to use force 
against Rhodesia the Conservative predicament would have been no different, which 
brings into question Wilson’s later claim that Heath ‘would have led a united party, and 
almost certainly won majority support in the country.’150  The reality of the situation in 
the Conservative Party became transparent in December 1965, with the three-way split 
over the policy of oil sanctions against Rhodesia.  William Whitelaw, the Conservative 
Chief Whip at the time, later recalled, ‘I always said that my biggest failure as Chief 
Whip, was that I had a party in three pieces.’151  It is hard to imagine that the very deep 
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rifts within the Conservative Party would have suddenly receded into the background if 
the Labour Government had decided to use force against Rhodesia.  It is more likely that 
British military intervention would have exacerbated rather than relieved Conservative 
discomfort. 
 
The Wilson Government was also sensitive to public opinion on the use of force against 
Rhodesia. Public opinion does not necessarily imply the detailed scrutiny of government 
policy, particularly foreign policy, in which the vast majority of the public has no real 
interest.152  However, according to Paul Dixon ‘British political and military elites have 
perceived public opinion and the impact of casualties to be a significant or important 
constraint in military interventions.’153  In the case of Rhodesia there was also potential 
linkage with domestic issues. The 1964 general election result had shown that black 
immigration was an emotive subject in Britain, which gave Wilson some political 
difficulties.154  Wilson’s Political Secretary, Marcia Williams, recalled in her memoirs: 
 
We realized that politically it was going to be very hard going indeed to 
convince the general public that Ian Smith was a right-wing reactionary 
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and that Black Africans had the right to have a say in their own 
government in Rhodesia, and to convince them that the actions which Ian 
Smith was advocating could not be tolerated or accepted by the United 
Kingdom.155 
 
No doubt there were many in Britain who sympathised with Rhodesian ‘kith and kin’ and 
saw them as upholding Christian values, bringing civilization to Africa, and resisting the 
spread of Communism.  However, this did not mean that the British public was entirely 
supportive of the white Rhodesian political agenda.  Soon after Ian Smith made a visit to 
London for talks with Wilson in October 1965, an opinion poll showed that the British 
public was divided almost equally three ways between sympathy for the Europeans in 
Rhodesia, Africans and ‘neither/both’.  An overwhelming majority believed that 
independence should not be granted unless the conditions were acceptable to Rhodesians 
as a whole.  However, there was almost no support for military intervention in the event 
of a UDI, with a majority in favour of referring the issue to the United Nations.156  During 
Smith’s visit, a Gallup Poll found that 41 per cent approved of the British Government’s 
handling of the problem, 24 per cent disapproved and 35 per cent were undecided.  After 
UDI, however, approval of British policy rose to 68 per cent and disapproval fell to 12 
per cent, with 22 per cent in favour of the use of military force.157   This evidence 
suggests that, with careful handling, the Labour Government could have engineered a 
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public consensus on the use of force, particularly as the public was poorly informed on 
the Rhodesian question.158  Wilson might, for example, have exploited the indignity that 
he felt when he saw Rhodesian maltreatment of African nationalists whilst he was in 
Rhodesia in late October 1965.159  This would have capitalised on the anti-imperialist and 
anti-racialist trend that had been developing in Britain since the Suez Crisis, which had 
been advanced by several crises and scandals such as the Nyasaland Emergency (March 
1959), the atrocities at Hola detention camp (July 1959), the Sharpeville massacre (March 
1960), and repression in Cyprus.  Nicholas Owen has argued that these incidents were: 
 
of crucial importance in enabling anti-colonialists to sustain the 
momentum of their campaign.  It gave them an opportunity to tap the 
sympathies of hitherto undecided audiences such as church groups and 
university students.  It enabled them to turn the tables on those opponents 
who had argued that the colonial framework was a guarantee of public 
order.  They could also point to a widening international consensus that the 
repression of colonial dissent had become illegitimate and as such 
damaging to Britain’s reputation at the United Nations and elsewhere.160 
 
Such arguments were articulated by the liberal and socialist press: The Observer, The 
Guardian, New Statesman, and Tribune, all of which urged the Labour Government not to 
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compromise with Ian Smith.161  Pressure groups such as the Fabian Society, the Africa 
Bureau and the Movement for Colonial Freedom also attempted to influence the 
Parliamentary Labour Party and the Government to take military action against 
Rhodesia.162  Even the Archbishop of Canterbury put forward a case for military 
intervention.  Shortly before UDI, Dr Michael Ramsay issued a message on behalf of the 
British Council of Churches, which assured the Government that many Christians would 
support the use of force if all other efforts to find a solution failed.  A group of 35 MPs 
sent a message to the Archbishop, congratulating the Council of Churches on its 
courageous stand.163 
 
Douglas Anglin has noted that ‘The individuals and groups in Britain prepared to support 
military measures were less numerous, vocal, and well connected and less well organized 
and financed than the powerful Rhodesia lobby.’164  Nevertheless, political and public 
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opinion on the Rhodesian issue was somewhat equivocal, rather than stacked hopelessly 
against military intervention.  Wilson could have marginalised the ‘kith and kin’ issue by 
appealing to the national conscience to justify British military intervention in Rhodesia, 
or alternatively he might have tapped into the potential jingoism of the British public, 
who ‘would not take kindly to being pushed around by colonials, even white ones, and 
the illegal seizure of power in a British colony was an affront to British sensibilities on 
the subject of being a second-rate power.’165  It is clear that the Labour Government 
failed totally in the ‘propaganda war’, which is an essential method of ‘sustaining the 
determination and morale of the domestic audience while attempting to break the 
opponent’s will to resist.’166 
 
A ‘classic strategic blunder’: the failure of deterrence and the British response to UDI 
 
In his biography of Wilson, Ben Pimlott commented that until Ian Smith’s visit to London 
in October 1965, ‘Wilson and his ministers had handled the Rhodesian adventurers with 
skill, displaying a mixture of consistency of purpose and patience,’ which is an 
impression that was shared by Healey.167   At this juncture, however, Wilson made a 
gross error that is difficult to understand: he allowed Smith to form the impression that 
the British Government did not consider the use of force against Rhodesia to be practical.  
According to Ken Flower, the Rhodesian Front had until this point been concerned about 
the likelihood of a British military response to a UDI, but when Smith returned from 
London the Rhodesian Security Council decided to declare independence at the earliest 
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opportunity.168  Wilson encouraged the Rhodesians further in his press conference of 30 
October and statement in the House of Commons on 1 November, in which he 
announced: ‘If there are those in this country who are thinking in terms of a thunderbolt, 
hurtling through the sky and destroying their enemy, a thunderbolt in the shape of the 
Royal Air Force, let me say that this thunderbolt will not be coming.’169 
 
It was one thing for the British Government privately to rule out the use of force against 
Rhodesia, but it was quite another for Wilson to make this decision known publicly.  
Healey thought that this was a ‘classic strategic blunder’, since it effectively gave the 
green light for a UDI.170  Yet Healey was hardly blameless.  In August 1965, when the 
press alleged that the Government was considering a plan for intervention in Rhodesia, 
Healey had condemned the report as ‘irresponsible speculation’, when he could simply 
have remained silent.171  The Government also failed to use its diplomatic channels, 
military liaison, and intelligence networks to create doubt in the minds of the Rhodesian 
Front about the likely nature of a British response to a UDI.172 
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Wilson’s private and public statements concerning the Government’s intentions were 
clearly at odds with the principles of deterrence.173  Although the Government made it 
clear that it would not grant independence to Rhodesia unless the conditions were 
acceptable to the population as a whole, it did not signal that it would take whatever 
action was necessary to defend this position, despite some pressure for Wilson to do so 
before negotiations reached crisis point.174  The Rhodesian Front therefore perceived that 
black majority rule in Rhodesia was not vital to British interests.  It is difficult to know 
whether the Rhodesian Government would have acted differently if Wilson had sent 
different signals, but the fact that he failed to leave the threat of force on the table requires 
some explanation.  A number of reasons can be suggested.  First, the Labour Government 
was perpetually concerned about the stability of sterling, as Robert Good has argued: 
‘When Wilson declared “no force in Rhodesia” he was talking as much to Britain’s 
financial creditors as to any other audience.’175  Second, Wilson was undoubtedly 
motivated by the desire to preserve cross-party support for his policy on Rhodesia.176  
Failure to make an explicit statement that military intervention was not being 
contemplated to settle the issue may have jeopardised the Government’s parliamentary 
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majority in the same way as the actual use of force.  Third, as Sir Oliver Wright has 
observed, ‘it helped to keep domestic opinion steady.’177  Wilson may have calculated 
that unless British military intervention was ruled out explicitly it could have caused 
public dissent.  On this theme Stephen Howe has commented: 
 
To governments eager to preempt possible crisis and confrontation at 
home as in the colonies themselves, there could never be any guarantee 
that the relative lack of popular protest over Malaya, Kenya, or Cyprus 
would continue to be replicated.  Suez was the great warning signal …178 
 
Fourth, Wilson was signalling to the African nationalists in Rhodesia that they should 
face up to the reality that the British Government was not going to intervene militarily 
and they must therefore modify their demands for immediate majority rule in Rhodesia.179  
Finally, Wilson believed in the utility of economic sanctions as a deterrent and, after the 
failure of deterrence, as an instrument of coercive diplomacy.180  This was a distinctly 
non-rational assumption, because it was quickly established in the Defence and Oversea 
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Policy Committee that South Africa would be likely to break an oil embargo, which 
therefore meant that no serious damage could be done to the Rhodesian economy for over 
a year.181 
 
Yet despite all his misgivings about the use of force or even the threat of force, it appears 
that by the end of 1965 Wilson had become more receptive to the idea of military 
intervention, which may have been related to his private scepticism about the ability of 
economic sanctions to bring the rebellion to a swift end.  Wilson requested Healey to 
produce: 
 
[A] choice of plans to fit quite a wide range of possible circumstances, 
extending from one extreme (at which no more than a token military 
intervention in Rhodesia would be required) to the other extreme (at which 
we might have to contemplate a virtual invasion of the country against 
both political and military opposition, followed by a period of what could 
be, in effect, military occupation and administration).182 
 
Wilson’s change of mind was also known in Washington, which tends to suggest that 
Wilson was indeed serious about military intervention.183  However, subsequent 
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correspondence between officials in the Ministry of Defence indicates that plans were 
designed to highlight the difficulties of intervention, so that the Prime Minister could 
argue at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lagos why force should 
not be used to end the Rhodesian rebellion.184  This may have reflected a bureaucratic 
reluctance to overturn an established line of policy. Officials had advised Healey in 
November 1964 that military intervention, which would be undertaken only at the request 
of the Governor and subject to the condition of unopposed entry, ‘would essentially be 
something that could only be undertaken in the very first days after a Unilateral 
Declaration while the Governor was still trying to form an alternative government.’  
Clearly, these circumstances did not exist in early 1966, so the possibility of military 
intervention in the official mind had long since passed, if it ever existed.185 
 
Conclusion 
 
Sir Anthony Parsons, a former British Ambassador to the United Nations, has 
commented: ‘By the late 1970s the problem of Southern Rhodesia was hanging like the 
Ancient Mariner’s albatross round the necks of British foreign policymakers, its weight 
increasing with the years.’186  This chapter has suggested that this burden might have 
been avoided if the British Government had either handed responsibility for Rhodesia to 
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the United Nations, or used force to impose a settlement in Rhodesia.  In the Foreign 
Office, which had to defend Britain’s policy to the international community, there was a 
feeling that the European minority in Rhodesia should not be allowed ‘to hold our whole 
international policy to ransom’.187  Handing the matter over to the United Nations would 
have rid Britain of this problem.  However, Foreign Office officials were concerned that 
if Britain conceded UN competence to deal with Rhodesia it would lead to an 
international campaign against South Africa, which would gravely prejudice British 
economic interests.  Foreign Office officials also acknowledged that ‘Logically the 
obvious course would be to use troops’, but noted that ministers had explicitly ruled this 
out.188  The Wilson Government was highly resistant to military intervention in Rhodesia 
for several reasons.  First, and perhaps most significant, Britain’s economic weakness 
generated a rolling defence review that was progressively undermining the capability of 
the British armed forces to execute their various roles, which constituted a powerful 
constraint on any deployment in southern Africa.  Second, parliamentary and electoral 
concerns made Wilson and the Cabinet reluctant to take what it perceived as unnecessary 
risks.  Against this background the Government received pessimistic advice from the 
Chiefs of Staff and officials in the Ministry of Defence, which was based on erroneous 
assessment of the respective attitudes and capabilities of the Rhodesian and British armed 
forces.  This advice, combined with the ‘kith and kin’ factor, became a convenient pretext 
to avoid the use of force.  All of this tends to support Sir Oliver Wright’s belief in the 
‘supremacy of the domestic over foreign’.189  Yet none of these factors taken in isolation 
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or, indeed, in combination, precluded the use of force as a viable option, particularly if 
military intervention had been politically well-orchestrated.  The failure to implement a 
successful deterrent was perhaps the most lamentable aspect of the Wilson Government’s 
policy on Rhodesia.  This profound error of judgement contributed to the ‘many 
uncomfortable moments’ with which successive British Governments were burdened 
unnecessarily for the next fifteen years.190 
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Chapter Three 
The Old Commonwealth: Racial Attitudes and the Rhodesian Crisis 
 
Introduction 
 
In 1958 the Australian historian Bruce Miller famously described the Commonwealth as a 
‘concert of convenience’, and suggested that although it did not go as far as to encompass 
‘a common set of values’ its members nevertheless considered it to be a convenient forum 
for consultation and cooperation.1  This underlying congeniality may explain why the 
Commonwealth was able to survive some significant disagreements during the post-War 
period, most notably during the Suez Crisis.  However, during the late 1950s and the early 
1960s the admission to the Commonwealth of newly independent African states 
transformed the nature of the association.2  African membership heightened sensitivities 
within the Commonwealth about issues of racial equality, which threatened to undermine 
the ‘concert’.  On the emotional questions of apartheid in South Africa and racial 
discrimination in Rhodesia, it is notable that Canada adopted a much more positive 
attitude towards African concerns than either Australia or New Zealand. This divergence 
in attitudes can be explained by three factors: an obvious contrast in their conceptions of 
the Commonwealth; their different diplomatic styles and political objectives; and, most 
significantly, a powerful undercurrent of racialism in Australia and New Zealand in the 
political, official, and public domains. 
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The Old Commonwealth and racial equality 
 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand conceptualised their membership of the 
Commonwealth in radically different terms.  For example, in 1966 British officials in 
Canberra characterised the Australian understanding of the Commonwealth as ‘an 
ANZAC relationship with Britain’, and observed that ‘for Australia, the only fully 
meaningful relationship within the Commonwealth is the trilateral one with Britain and 
New Zealand’; whereas British diplomats in Ottawa reported that ‘the concept of the new, 
multi-racial, Commonwealth plays a significant part in Canada’s external policies’.3  In 
terms of diplomatic style and political objectives, Canada tended to adopt a conciliatory 
posture towards African states because it emphasised the importance of the 
Commonwealth as one of several vehicles for increasing Canadian influence in Africa.4  
Australia and New Zealand, on the other hand, had little interest in Africa and tended to 
                                                 
3 The National Archives [hereafter TNA]: Public Records Office, Kew [hereafter PRO], DO 193/79, 
Eleanor J. Emery, Counsellor, British High Commission, Canada, to R. Walker, CRO, London, 1 December 
1966, para. 2; DO 193/79, O’Leary to Walker, 30 November 1966, para. 3; in S. R. Ashton and Wm. Roger 
Louis (eds.), British Documents on the End of Empire Project [hereafter BDEEP] Series A, Volume 5, East 
of Suez and the Commonwealth, Part II: Europe, Rhodesia, Commonwealth (London: The Stationery 
Office, 2004), pp. 348 and 354.  See also Lester B. Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. 
Pearson Volume 3: 1957-1968 (Toronoto: University of Toronto Press, 1975); Paul Martin, ‘Canada and 
the Commonwealth’ in Paul Martin Speaks for Canada: A Selection of Speeches on Foreign Policy 1964-
67 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967); and his autobiography, A Very Public Life Volume II: So 
Many Worlds (Toronto: Deneau Publishers, 1985).  In 1968 Pierre Trudeau replaced Lester Pearson and 
Canadian concern with the Commonwealth waned as its desire to establish a better relationship with 
francophone states waxed.  Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, p. 371. 
4 TNA: PRO, DO 193/79, Emery to Walker, 1 December 1966, para. 6, in Ashton and Louis (eds.), BDEEP 
Series A, Vol. 5, Part II, p. 356.  This feature of Canadian diplomacy is explored further in the next chapter. 
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concentrate more on their regional concerns in South East Asia.5  As one commentator on 
Australian foreign policy in the 1960s noted: 
 
In a broad sense Australian policy had to take account of the fact that the 
focal point of international tension had shifted from Europe to Asia.  
Despite the prominence of Africa and the undeniable importance of the 
racial controversies surrounding South Africa and Rhodesia, it seemed 
increasingly clear that the great international issues of the day were finding 
their strongest expression in Asia and South East Asia, and that this in the 
immediate future was the area in which they were most likely to be 
decided.6 
 
A significant reason why South Africa and Rhodesia were of ‘undeniable importance’ is 
that Commonwealth debate about these issues exposed the Old Commonwealth to 
scrutiny of their own domestic racial policies.  Canada, Australia and New Zealand were 
biracial societies, and their governments pursued policies of assimilation or integration of 
indigenous minorities.7  However, racial issues were not as pronounced in Canada as they 
                                                 
5 TNA: PRO, DO 193/79, O’Leary to Walker, 30 November 1966, paras. 6 and 7, in Ashton and Louis 
(eds.), BDEEP Series A, Vol. 5, Part II, pp. 349-50.   
6 Gordon Greenwood, ‘Australian Foreign Policy in Action’, in Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper 
(eds.), Australia in World Affairs, 1961-1965 (Vancouver: University of Columbia Press, 1968), p. 12.  
Similarly, New Zealand also remained firmly focused on its interests in Asia and the South Pacific.  See W. 
D. McIntyre, ‘From Dual Dependency to Nuclear Free’, in Geoffrey W. Rice (ed.), The Oxford History of 
New Zealand (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn. 1992), pp. 532-33. 
7 A policy of assimilation aims to extinguish native culture and compel acceptance of the white majority 
culture, whereas a policy of integration requires indigenous minorities to accommodate to white society but 
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were in Australia and New Zealand, so Canadians therefore felt less vulnerable to 
criticism from the newer, Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth and were more 
willing to engage them on the subjects that were of greatest concern to them, such as 
racial discrimination, aid and development. 
 
The prospect of British decolonisation in Africa generated a great deal of scepticism 
among some of the older, white members of the Commonwealth, as historian William 
McIntyre has observed: ‘when Kwame Nkrumah demanded Dominion Status for the Gold 
Coast in 1951 there were shudders, especially in Pretoria, at the prospect of a “Black 
Dominion”.’8  Conservative politicians in Britain flirted with the idea of a two-tier 
structure for the Commonwealth, which would preserve the ‘club-like’ atmosphere for the 
older members, whilst confining new members to an outer circle.9  However, these ideas 
did not get very far and in 1957 newly independent Ghana became a full member of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
encourages retention of some aspects of minority culture, e.g. production and sale of native clothing, tools, 
and instruments.  Segregation, as practiced in South Africa, used race and colour as a legitimate basis to 
differentiate in law and for the provision of services, and aimed at separate development.  Colin M. Tatz, 
Four kinds of dominion: comparative race politics in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa 
(Armindale: University of New England, 1972), pp. 5-6. 
8 W. D. McIntyre, ‘Commonwealth Legacy’, in Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), The Oxford 
History of the British Empire Volume IV: The Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
p. 697. 
9 John Holmes, ‘The Impact on the Commonwealth of the Emergence of Africa’, in Norman J. Padelford 
and Rupert Emerson (eds.), Africa and World Order (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 29; Ronald Hyam, 
‘Winds of Change: the Empire and Commonwealth’, in Wolfram Kaiser and Gillian Staerck (eds.), British 
Foreign Policy 1955-64: Contracting Options (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 203-04; McIntyre, 
‘Commonwealth Legacy’, in Brown and Louis (eds.), Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. IV, p. 698. 
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Commonwealth (and quickly became the leader of pan-African aspirations).10  In 
Australia the political establishment wondered aloud about the viability of the changing 
Commonwealth.  In 1956 Sir Eric Harrison, the Australian High Commissioner in 
London, opined that it really ought to be a British Commonwealth.11  In March 1957 
Alexander Downer, an Australian MP who subsequently entered the Menzies 
Government as Minister for Immigration (1958-63), commented that: 
 
In striving to accommodate many diverse policies, conflicting ambitions, 
irreconcilable philosophies, in maintaining that opponents are our friends, 
there is a danger that the whole thing will dissolve into thin air … more than 
anything else I believe in the Commonwealth, but it must be a co-operative 
Commonwealth in fact not just a historical fiction.12 
 
By the end of the 1960s there was in Australia ‘an attitude of near-contempt for the new 
Commonwealth structure which had arisen’.13  This reflected a number of developments 
that had accentuated problems of race relations since the beginning of the decade.  In 
                                                 
10 Wm. R. Louis, ‘The Dissolution of the British Empire’, in Brown and Louis (eds.), Oxford History of the 
British Empire, Vol. IV, pp. 347 and 349. 
11 J. D. B. Miller, ‘An Empire That Don’t Care What You Do’, in A. F. Madden and W. H. Morris-Jones, 
Australia and Britain: Studies in a Changing Relationship (London: Cass, for the Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, 1980), p. 97. 
12 Quoted in Sir Alan Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938-1965 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 287.  In August 1965 Sir Alexander Downer became Australian 
High Commissioner in London. 
13 Miller, ‘An Empire That Don’t Care What You Do’, in Madden and Morris-Jones, Australia and Britain, 
p. 98. 
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1960 the United Nations admitted seventeen new states and passed the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which recognised the right 
of all peoples to self-determination and the obligation of colonial powers to effect an 
immediate transfer of power to their dependent peoples.  In the same year the Sharpeville 
Massacre in the Transvaal and Harold Macmillan’s ‘Wind of Change’ speech shone a 
spotlight on apartheid in South Africa.14  This issue came to a head at the Commonwealth 
Prime Minister’s Conference in March 1961, when South Africa applied to retain her 
membership of the Commonwealth after becoming a republic.  Kwame Nkrumah of 
Ghana, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria, and Sirimavo Bandaranaike of Ceylon 
vociferously opposed continued South African membership.  Julius Nyerere also wrote a 
newspaper article stating that Tanganyika, which was scheduled to become independent 
in December 1961, could not join the Commonwealth if it included a state pursuing 
racialist policies.15 The Commonwealth avoided a disastrous split because the South 
African Prime Minister, Hendrick Verwoerd, withdrew his Government’s application and 
in doing so South Africa left the Commonwealth. Verwoerd claimed that his Government 
bowed to pressure not only in South Africa’s interests but also in the interests of ‘our 
friends in the Commonwealth, particularly the United Kingdom.  I could not place them 
                                                 
14 Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, pp. 140-42.  See Ch. 8, ‘The South African Problem’, pp. 126-
66, which discusses the South African problem between the late 1940s and the 1960s. 
15 Holmes, ‘The Impact on the Commonwealth of the Emergence of Africa’, in Padelford and Emerson 
(eds.), Africa and World Order, pp. 29-30; Hyam, ‘Winds of Change: the Empire and Commonwealth’, in 
Kaiser and Staerck (eds.), British Foreign Policy 1955-64, p. 204; Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, 
pp. 152-55. 
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in the invidious position of having to choose between South Africa and a group of Afro-
Asian states.’16   
 
The positions taken by Canada, Australia and New Zealand on the South African issue 
presaged their attitudes towards the matter of Rhodesian independence.  Until 1960 
Canada pursued a policy of ‘disinterested detachment’ towards southern Africa, but the 
changing international environment compelled a change of attitude in Ottawa.  The 
Canadian Government feared that the Soviet Union would exploit colonial issues at the 
United Nations to foster an anti-Western attitude among African states.  The Canadian 
Government therefore determined that it should become much more active on colonial 
and racial issues.17  By the time of the 1961 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference 
it was obvious to Canadians that apartheid was inconsistent with the multi-racial character 
of the Commonwealth, and the problem could no longer be ignored.18  Typically, 
Canadian politicians and diplomats worked quietly behind the scenes to produce 
compromise solutions to difficult problems, but on the issue of apartheid the Canadian 
Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker, ‘preferred to appear as one of the lead architects of 
change’, and took a very personal stand against continued South African membership of 
                                                 
16 Quoted in James Barber, ‘The Impact of the Rhodesian Crisis on the Commonwealth’, Journal of 
Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (July 1969), p. 87; also cited in Miller, Survey of 
Commonwealth Affairs, p. 156. 
17 Robert Matthews and Cranford Pratt, ‘Canadian Policy Towards Southern Africa’, in Douglas G. Anglin, 
T. Shaw, and C. Widstrand (eds.), Canada, Scandinavia and Southern Africa (Uppsala: Scandinavian 
Institute of African Studies, 1978), pp. 164-66. 
18 Ibid., p. 168. 
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the Commonwealth.19  Robert Menzies later wrote that Diefenbaker ‘came armed with a 
resolution of his Parliament and presented his views with immense emotion.  Not even 
some side-queries to him about the Red Indians and the Eskimos in Canada could deflect 
him from his course.’20  This comment indicates that even the Canadian Government was 
not immune from criticism on racial matters, partly because of federal laws defining the 
status of natives and partly as a result of provincial attempts to assimilate indigenous 
peoples.21  However, this did not deter Canadian politicians from emphasising the multi-
racial nature of the Commonwealth.  For example, in his address to the Royal 
Commonwealth Society in Montreal in May 1966, Lester Pearson, Diefenbaker’s 
successor as Prime Minister of Canada (1963-68), declared that ‘the greatest value of the 
new Commonwealth is [that it is] a multi-racial association at a time when the world is 
crying out for that kind of association.’  Similarly, in his memoirs Pearson described the 
Commonwealth as: 
 
                                                 
19 Andrew F. Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions (Scarborough, Ontario: 
Prentice-Hall, 1997), p. 40. 
20 Sir Robert Menzies, Afternoon Light: some memories of men and events (London: Cassell, 1967), p. 213. 
21 In Canada the Federal Government has a ‘fiduciary responsibility’ for native peoples such as the Innu, 
and as no other groups in Canadian society have such a direct relationship with the state, ‘These legalities 
constitute natives as a separate category of citizen.  By doing so, the law, itself imposed, exposes the 
colonial nature of the relationship between the state and native peoples.’  Colin Samson, ‘Rights as the 
reward for simulated cultural sameness: the Innu in the Canadian colonial context’, in Jane K. Cowan et al 
(eds.), Culture and Rights: Anthropological Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
pp. 227-28.  During the 1950s and 1960s the Provincial Government in Newfoundland pursued a vigorous 
sedentarisation policy towards the nomadic Innu, which resulted in the formation of two settlements in 
Labrador.  Through their acceptance of cultural sameness the Innu acquired rights to housing, healthcare, 
work, welfare and schooling.  Ibid., pp. 230-33. 
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a fellowship, the great value of which stems from the fact that it is an 
association of peoples of every race, freely joined together as equals in the 
hope that they have something to offer one another and can give the world 
an example of inter-racial as well as international friendship and co-
operation.22 
 
In Australia there were no such plaudits for the Commonwealth.  After the Sharpeville 
Massacre, Robert Menzies had expressed to the Australian House of Representatives his 
regret at the loss of life in South Africa but he refused to condemn apartheid.23  Menzies 
felt that apartheid was an issue on which Australia and the Commonwealth should not 
interfere and deplored the ‘busy-bodies’ who believed that they had the right to pass 
judgement on matters of domestic jurisdiction.24  The New Zealand position was 
somewhat different as it had, since 1957, accepted that the United Nations had some 
competence to discuss apartheid on the grounds that: ‘The human rights provisions of the 
Charter imposed a general obligation on all states to move towards rather than away from 
increasing respect for human rights.  Extreme and deliberate breaches of these provisions 
in effect forfeited the protection of Article 2 (7).’25 
 
                                                 
22 Pearson, Mike, Vol. 3, p. 312. 
23 A South African newspaper, the Transvaaler, carried a cartoon showing a young girl - representing South 
Africa  - shaking hands with Menzies and saying Dankie Oom Robert (‘Thank You, Uncle Robert’).  Alan 
W. Martin, Robert Menzies: A Life (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1999), Vol. 2, p. 413. 
24 Menzies, Afternoon Light, p. 193. 
25 H. C. Templeton, ‘New Zealand and Africa’, in New Zealand External Affairs Review, Vol. XVII, No. 1 
(January 1967), p. 9.  Templeton was First Secretary in the New Zealand Mission to the United Nations.  
Quoted in R. Kennaway, New Zealand Foreign Policy 1951-1971 (Wellington: Hicks Smith, 1972), p. 136. 
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At the 1961 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting Keith Holyoake, the Prime 
Minister of New Zealand (1960-72), cautioned against the withdrawal of South Africa 
from the Commonwealth because it would ‘lead to exclusion of some nine or ten million 
coloured people of South Africa.’26  Holyoake put a gloss on the outcome of the Meeting, 
as he later told the New Zealand House of Representatives: ‘I believe that by its 
determination to stand for the principle of racial equality the Commonwealth, far from 
beginning to disintegrate, has demonstrated its strength and its capacity to serve great and 
worthwhile ideals.’27  Yet Holyoake, like Menzies, had reason to lament the attention that 
racial issues were now receiving in the Commonwealth.  As one contemporary 
commentator observed: ‘There is a fear … that once the hypothesis that a member can be 
judged for offending against Commonwealth principles has been accepted, no member is 
immune from the hostility of a majority’.28  To understand the reasons behind such fears 
it is necessary to analyse the links between the domestic and foreign policies of Australia 
and New Zealand.   
 
A background factor that explains why the Australian Government was so concerned to 
preserve the right of domestic jurisdiction was the traditional legalistic emphasis in 
Australian constitutional politics, which was also reflected in the formulation and conduct 
                                                 
26 Holyoake to Marshall, 15 March 1961.  Holyoake blamed South Africa’s withdrawal on Verwoerd’s 
intransigence as much as Afro-Asian pressure.  Quoted in Malcolm McKinnon, Independence and Foreign 
Policy: New Zealand in the World Since 1935 (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993), p. 234. 
27 New Zealand Debates, House of Representatives, 4 July 1961, p. 220.  Quoted in Miller, Survey of 
Commonwealth Affairs, p. 156, n. 5. 
28 Holmes, ‘The Impact on the Commonwealth of the Emergence of Africa’, in Padelford and Emerson 
(eds.), Africa and World Order, p. 31. 
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of Australian foreign policy.29  Robert Menzies, who was a barrister by training, was 
particularly wedded to constitutional conventions.30  Yet Australian defence of domestic 
jurisdiction was far from a simple matter of legal principle.  Throughout the 1950s and 
1960s Australia was gripped by a debate about race relations that was both controversial 
and multi-faceted, involving the rights of Aborigines, discrimination in Papua New 
Guinea (which Australia administered on behalf of the United Nations Trusteeship 
Council), and prohibition of non-European immigration.31  These matters exposed the 
Australian Government to international criticism that it wished to avoid, and as one critic 
of Australian foreign policy suggested, ‘it was largely in her membership of the 
Commonwealth that Australia revealed the racialist prism through which she viewed 
international reality.’32   
 
In Australia, the socio-economic cleavage between whites and Aborigines was immense.  
Aboriginal living conditions were extremely poor: their ‘settlements’ were often adjacent 
to rubbish dumps and the shacks in which they lived lacked electricity and hygienic toilet 
                                                 
29 J. D. B. Miller, The Conduct of Australian Foreign Policy (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 
1969), p. 4.   
30 Paul Hasluck, Sir Robert Menzies: A Life (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1980), p. 24. 
31 Bruce Grant, The crisis of loyalty, a study of Australian foreign policy (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 
1972), p. 37.  For a detailed study of these various aspects of the race problem in Australia see Frank S. 
Stevens (ed.), Racism: The Australian Experience (New York: Taplinger, 3 Vols. 1971-1972).  Volume 1: 
Prejudice and Xenophobia, examines the experience of migrants and Australian attitudes towards them.  
Volume 2: Black Versus White, discusses Australian treatment of Aborigines.  Volume 3: Colonialism, 
analyses the effects of domestic prejudice and government policies on Australia’s external relations. 
32 Joseph A. Camilleri, An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy (Milton, Queensland: Jacaranda Press, 
2nd edn., 1975), p. 26. 
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facilities.33  Given these extremely basic living conditions it is not surprising that 
Aborigines suffered from high death and disease rates due to communicable diseases and 
Aboriginal infant mortality was far higher than among the white population.34  Few 
Aborigines received any education beyond primary schooling, which severely restricted 
their opportunities for social improvement.35  Paul Hasluck, who was a distinguished 
historian before he entered government service, professed his humanitarian concern for 
Aborigines.36  As Minister for Territories (1951-64) he achieved little for them.  The 
Aboriginals Ordinance deprived them of rights of citizenship and made them wards of the 
Federal Government, but in 1953 people of mixed blood were exempted from the 
Ordinance, unless they were living in the manner of Aborigines or were under the age of 
18 and subject to the Director of Native Affairs.  As one Australian historian commented: 
‘It is a measure of how strongly racist Australian society still was, as well as of Hasluck’s 
conservatism, that this measure at the time was considered a wonderful forward step by 
almost everybody’.37  Really beneficial changes in the status of Aborigines took a long 
time.  In 1962 Aborigines were enfranchised by the repeal of discriminatory provisions in 
                                                 
33 K. R. Howe, Race Relations: Australia and New Zealand, a comparative survey 1770s-1970s 
(Wellington: Methuen, 1977), pp. 62-63. 
34 See Peter M. Moodie, ‘The Health Disadvantages of Aborigines’, in Stevens (ed.), Racism, Vol. 2, pp. 
235-42. 
35 Howe, Race Relations, p. 64. 
36 In his account of his early years Hasluck recalled his interest in Aborigines from an anthropological 
perspective, which later developed into a political concern to achieve social justice for them.  Paul Hasluck, 
Mucking about: an autobiography (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1977), Ch. 17, 
‘Aborigines’, pp. 202-27, and Ch. 22, ‘Politics’, pp. 267-87. 
37 Russel Ward, The History of Australia: The Twentieth Century (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 
319. 
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the Federal Electoral Act.38  In 1967 a referendum approved a proposal to amend the 
Constitution so that Aborigines would be counted as Australian citizens (though the 
margin in favour was lowest in those States that contained the highest proportion of 
Aborigines).39  It was not until 1975 that an Anti-Discrimination Act was passed, which 
was followed in 1976 by the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act.40  
Between the 1950s and the 1970s, therefore, Aborigines experienced elements of 
continuity and change.  On the one hand there was still a great deal of racial prejudice in 
white communities towards Aborigines, and Aborigines experienced little socio-
economic improvement compared with rising standards of living among the population as 
a whole.  On the other hand Aborigines enjoyed a theoretical legal equality, were subject 
to more sympathetic and constructive government policies, and were no longer prepared 
to tolerate a subservient position in Australian society.41 
 
The status of Papua New Guinea also led to domestic and international criticism of the 
Australian Government.  Until the 1960s the Australian Government regarded Papua New 
Guinea not as a colony, but as a territory, which created considerable vagueness about its 
future as either a fully independent state or a state within the Australian Federation.42  
Paul Hasluck, the responsible Minister, came under increasing pressure from the United 
Nations to set a target date for independence but refused to be drawn into a specific 
                                                 
38 Donald Denoon et al, A History of Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), p. 
386, n. 10.  See also Colin M. Tatz, ‘Aborigines: Law and Political Development’, in Stevens (ed.), Racism, 
Vol. 2, pp. 97-109. 
39 Ward, The History of Australia, pp. 372-73. 
40 Denoon et al, A History of Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific, p. 370. 
41 Howe, Race Relations, p. 62. 
42 Denoon et al, A History of Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific, p. 399. 
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commitment.43  Hasluck presided over many improvements in the provision of health care 
and education, encouraged indigenous people out of subsistence farming into the slowly 
growing cash economy, and implemented a rapid growth in local government.44  
However, many discriminatory practices, some of which were justified in paternalistic 
terms, were slow to disappear.45  For example, the regulations that banned indigenous 
peoples from drinking alcohol were not repealed until 1962 (following recommendations 
from a UN committee).46  Even after the Discriminatory Practices Ordinance of 1963 
made many forms of discrimination illegal, there were still restrictions on natives of 
Papua New Guinea who wished to enter Australia.47  The big questions surrounding the 
future of Papua New Guinea were tackled in the second half of the 1960s, partly as a 
result of pressure from indigenous people and partly due to savage criticism of 
government policy by Edward Gough Whitlam, the Leader of the Opposition.  When a 
delegation of legislators from Papua New Guinea asked if they had a real option to join 
the Australian Federation, ‘the Australian Cabinet took fright at three million Melanesians 
crossing the Torres Strait to demand jobs, schools, pensions and other rights of citizens.  
                                                 
43 Denoon et al, A History of Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific, p. 347; Ward, The History of 
Australia, p. 319. 
44 Denoon et al, A History of Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific, p. 347; Ward, The History of 
Australia, p. 319.  
45 See Edward P. Wolfers, ‘Trusteeship Without Trust: A Short History of Interracial Relations and the Law 
in Papua and New Guinea’, in Stevens (ed.), Racism, Vol. 3, especially pp. 116-27, which deals with the 
period 1951-1969. 
46 Denoon et al, A History of Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific, p. 347; Wolfers, ‘Trusteeship Without 
Trust’, in Stevens (ed.), Racism, Vol. 3, p. 123. 
47 Denoon et al, A History of Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific, p. 347; Wolfers, ‘Trusteeship Without 
Trust’, in Stevens (ed.), Racism, Vol. 3, p. 125. 
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Instead they resolved that Papua New Guinea’s destiny was independence – eventually, 
after much economic development.’48 
 
The restrictions on non-European immigration were known informally as the White 
Australia Policy.49  Richard Casey, the Australian Minister for External Affairs (1951-
60), wrote that the Australian Government was determined to avoid ‘the formation of 
substantial minorities or pockets of people who do not fit into the pattern of the rest of the 
community.’50  According to Casey and Menzies, the purpose of such a policy was to 
avoid the racial conflicts like those that existed in South Africa, the United States and 
Britain.51  The Australian historian Russel Ward suggested that the Colombo Plan – 
which exposed Australia to significant numbers of Asian and African students – had only 
a marginal impact on the recipient countries of South-East Asia but a major impact on 
Australia because it helped ‘significantly to break down the racist sentiment which still 
sustained the White Australia Policy.’52  In 1960 the University of Melbourne produced a 
                                                 
48 Denoon et al, A History of Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific, pp. 399-400. 
49 For the origins and implementation of this policy see A. C. Palfreeman, ‘The White Australia Policy’, and 
A. T. Yarwood, ‘Attitudes Towards Non European Migrants’, in Stevens (ed.), Racism, Vol.1, pp. 136-44 
and 145-55.  For a conservative response to some of the arguments against restrictive immigration see John 
Ray, ‘In Defence of Australia’s Policy Towards Non-White Immigration’, in Stevens (ed.), Racism, Vol. 3, 
pp. 233-39. 
50 Richard Gardiner Casey, Friends and Neighbors (East Lansing: Michigan State College Press, 1955), p. 
123. 
51 Ibid., p. 125; and Menzies, Afternoon Light, pp. 201 and 225. 
52 Ward, The History of Australia, p. 317.  Ward suggests that greater tolerance was fostered by conditions 
of full employment in Australia and the fact that visiting foreign students returned to their countries of 
origin.  The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia emerged 
from a meeting of Commonwealth ministers in Ceylon in 1950. 
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study that indicated a majority of the Australian public (55 per cent) was in favour of 
replacing the White Australia Policy of total exclusion with controlled, selective 
immigration from Asian and African countries.53  Nevertheless, whilst public attitudes 
were beginning to change it is difficult to detect much sympathy in the Australian 
Government for a new direction in immigration policy.  Menzies and the Australian 
Government were troubled by the Commonwealth debates about South Africa and 
Southern Rhodesia because they feared that they could potentially lead to Commonwealth 
discussion of racial problems and policies in Australia.54  In his memoirs Menzies 
admitted: ‘My colleagues and I were not unconscious of the dangers to our immigration 
policy inherent in the proposition that a matter normally one of domestic jurisdiction can 
become one of international jurisdiction if it excites criticism and hostilities in other 
lands.’55 
 
In New Zealand there was also racial tension, between whites and Maoris.  The official 
position on race relations was that ‘Maoris have a natural and legal right to full equality 
with all other New Zealanders.’56  However, although Maoris were entitled to equal 
treatment they often fared badly compared with whites, as one commentator observed: 
‘Although Maoris do not face the same extremes of prejudice and poverty as Aborigines 
                                                 
53 Immigration Reform Group, Control or Colour Bar? (University of Melbourne, 1960).  Cited in Ward, 
The History of Australia, p. 318. 
54 T. B. Millar, Australia’s Foreign Policy (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1968), p. 152. 
55 Menzies, Afternoon Light, p. 193.  This was a point that Australian officials also appreciated: see 
discussion below, pp. 185-87. 
56 ‘Integration of Maori and Pakeha’, Department of Maori Affairs (Wellington, 1962), in W. D. McIntyre 
and W. J. Gardner, Speeches and Documents on New Zealand History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 
438-41. 
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they can still appear to occupy something of an equivalent position to white society.’57  
Their rates of child mortality were higher (though this was diminishing); they did not 
have the same access to high quality land that whites enjoyed; they attained lower 
standards of educational achievement (only 10 per cent of Maori boys gained a School 
Certificate, compared with 50 per cent of European males); they were poorly represented 
in the professions (just 8 per cent of Maoris compared with 40 per cent of the European 
workforce) and worked mainly as labourers (50 per cent of Maoris compared with 35 per 
cent of Europeans), which meant that they were more vulnerable in times of economic 
depression; and they were disproportionately likely to end up in prison (60 per cent of 
inmates were Maori, yet Maoris constituted just 8 per cent of the New Zealand 
population), which demonstrated Maori social dislocation.58  Beneath these social 
indicators was ‘a thick underlay of privately (and less commonly publicly) expressed 
prejudice’ towards Maoris.59 Unsurprisingly, Maori self-consciousness increased and they 
rejected the Government’s concept of integration, which was felt to be tantamount to 
assimilation.60  There was little open racial conflict in New Zealand, which may be 
explained by the fact that Maoris adopted non-traditional methods of protest: they 
demonstrated, distributed literature, and used the news media to publicise racial 
discrimination.61 From the late 1960s Maori pressure began to produce changes in official 
thinking about race relations.  The 1967 Education Institute Report on Maori Education, 
                                                 
57 Howe, Race Relations, p. 73. 
58 Ibid.; and Keith Sinclair, A History of New Zealand (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 271-
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for example, declared: ‘It must be remembered that the Maori is both a New Zealander 
and a Maori.  He has an inalienable right to be both.’62 
 
Faced with an increasingly effective protest movement at home, the Government of New 
Zealand did not welcome developments in its external relations that added an additional 
dimension to domestic problems in New Zealand.  In 1960 the issue of apartheid spilled 
over into a fundamental feature of New Zealand culture: sport.  When the New Zealand 
Rugby Football Union excluded Maori from the All Blacks team that toured South Africa, 
it produced ‘No Maori, No Tour’ protests.63  The New Zealand Government generally 
refused to take any action to discourage sporting contacts with South Africa but in 1965 
the South African Government made it clear that it would be unacceptable to include 
Maori players in an All Blacks tour planned for 1967, the New Zealand Government did 
intervene.  Keith Holyoake issued a statement declaring that the New Zealand 
Government regarded the principle of racial equality as basic to the New Zealand way of 
life and did not consider that New Zealand could ‘as a nation be truly represented in any 
sphere by a group chosen on social lines.’64  On that occasion the New Zealand Rugby 
Union cancelled the planned tour, which shows just how sensitive feelings were about 
race relations.65  Similarly, the subject of Rhodesian independence also exposed the 
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Government of New Zealand to scrutiny of its own handling of race relations issues, 
especially in the wake of UDI.66   
 
James Barber has observed that in the case of South Africa the Commonwealth had side-
stepped a racial clash, but there was no prospect that it could do so over Rhodesia.  
Although the members of the Commonwealth ultimately agreed on the desirability of 
African majority rule in Rhodesia, throughout the 1960s they remained divided over the 
timetable and means by which to achieve this.67  These divisions were evident not only in 
relations between the Old Commonwealth and the Afro-Asian members (which were 
articulated clearly during Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conferences), but also in 
routine diplomatic exchanges between the Old Commonwealth states.  In order to 
understand these divisions – which are explored in the next chapter – it is first necessary 
to examine Canadian, Australian and New Zealand attitudes towards Rhodesia more 
closely. 
 
The Old Commonwealth and Rhodesia 
 
Canadian politicians felt sympathetic towards the aspirations of Africans in Rhodesia and 
were anxious to support Britain in its search for a reasonable settlement, but they were 
also conscious of the need to avoid alienating the European settlers lest this provoke a 
UDI, which might then precipitate the disintegration of the Commonwealth.  Lester 
Pearson recalled in his memoirs that although the Canadian Government was entirely 
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behind the African members of the Commonwealth on the issue of racial equality, ‘it was 
quite impracticable to do some of the things they wanted, such as enforcing racial 
equality on Rhodesia by military action, if Rhodesian independence were declared 
unilaterally.’68  Similarly, Paul Martin, the Secretary for External Affairs (1963-68), 
wrote that in the autumn of 1963 he had opposed African attempts to have the United 
Nations assume a greater role in the issue, but when Jack Howman, the Rhodesian 
Minister of Internal Affairs, visited Ottawa, Martin ‘left him in no doubt that we were 
opposed to any plan that denied suffrage to Rhodesia’s black majority.’69  In a later 
meeting with a Rhodesian representative Martin also stressed the Commonwealth 
dimension in the Rhodesian problem, pointing out that: 
 
The future of the Commonwealth is a matter of increasing concern to 
Canada, because of the implications for future relations between the West 
and the Afro-Asian nations if we fail to strengthen and develop the more 
and more tenuous bonds which now exist between its members.70 
 
Arnold Smith, who served as Assistant Under-Secretary for External Affairs in Ottawa 
(1963-65) before he became the first Secretary-General of the Commonwealth 
Secretariat, was convinced that ‘for Britain to agree to the independence of any African 
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country on any other basis than actual majority rule was to invite conflict and disaster.’71  
The senior Canadian figures were therefore very much in accord when it came to dealing 
with the issue of Rhodesian independence. 
 
At the official level the Canadian approach to the problem was sophisticated and 
thoroughly pragmatic.  Officials in the Department of External Affairs distinguished 
subtle shades of opinion among Rhodesians, as one Canadian diplomat observed: ‘all 
white Rhodesians are not of one mind on the political situation, even though the 
“embattled minority” attitude is in all to a greater or lesser degree.’72  In conversations 
with Rhodesian Ministers Canadian officials took care to emphasise that Ottawa did not 
have a ‘doctrinaire approach’ to the problem of granting independence.73  They advised 
Canadian politicians that it was unrealistic to suppose that Rhodesia could proceed 
directly to majority rule, though they also recognised that it was ‘equally unthinkable that 
the Africans will wait for fifteen years for majority rule to evolve under the present 
constitution.’74  Canadian officials were careful not to alienate the Rhodesian 
Government because they feared the international implications of a UDI, particularly the 
prospect that UN sanctions might be extended to South Africa and the ramifications for 
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the Zambian economy.75  Above all else, they were anxious to provide assistance to 
Britain in its efforts to deter a UDI and, if this failed, to support economic sanctions.76  In 
this respect the attitude of Canadian officials was markedly different from that of 
Australian officials, who did not necessarily see the interests of Britain or the 
Commonwealth as coterminous with their own national interests.77 
 
During the 1950s and early 1960s, before Rhodesia’s UDI, there were few pluralist 
pressures on the Canadian foreign policy establishment.  Parliamentary discussion of 
foreign affairs was growing, but less than 20 per cent of members of the House of 
Commons had sufficient interest or expertise to contribute effectively to foreign policy 
debates, and there were very few instances where parliamentary opinion had any 
significant influence on the initiation, development and shaping of government policy.78  
Neither was the Canadian Government subject to any overwhelming pressures from the 
press, academic and professional experts, interest groups, or the general public in relation 
to foreign policy.79  Thus, as one academic study commented: ‘The hallmark of the 
Pearson era of Canadian foreign policy was a coherent but relatively closed approach to 
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policymaking.’80  Canadian public opinion counted for very little in the formulation of 
foreign policy, provided that the Canadian Government respected the parameters of 
acceptable policies.81  A strong public reaction would only have been seen on the 
Rhodesian issue in the event that the Canadian Government deployed military forces to 
assist African nationalists, or endorsed the policies of the Rhodesian Government, neither 
of which were likely.82 
 
In contrast to Canada, there was considerable sympathy in Australia for the European 
settlers in Rhodesia.  This was particularly evident in the Australian Government and civil 
service, and to a lesser extent among the Australian public.  In October 1965 Sir Robert 
Menzies told the Australian Parliament: 
 
[N]one of us would fail to understand something of the position of the 
European settlers, if I may so call them chiefly the British settlers, in 
Southern Rhodesia.  They have made an enormous contribution to the 
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country.  They have rights which everybody would want to protect.  So the 
matter is not utterly simple.83 
 
In his memoirs Menzies explained why the matter was not ‘utterly simple’.  He observed 
that although Africans consistently demanded ‘one man, one vote’, the emergence of one-
party government in many newly independent African states negated universal suffrage.  
Further, he argued that ‘The right to vote should be approximately related to the capacity 
to vote … The recent history of the Congo should be sufficient proof that a premature 
grant of self-government can lead to a great community disaster.’84  Menzies 
acknowledged that it was impossible to perpetuate white minority rule indefinitely but 
suggested that the 1961 Constitution in Southern Rhodesia offered the prospect of 
majority rule once the African majority attained a sufficient level of economic and 
educational attainment.85  Menzies’ interpretation of the situation was therefore very 
close to that of the Rhodesian Front, which maintained that the African majority was not 
barred from political advancement.  However, although Menzies showed strong sympathy 
for the Europeans in Rhodesia he consistently advised against a UDI.86  When they did 
take this step Menzies reluctantly announced that his Government had decided to apply 
sanctions, but explicitly ruled out Australian support for use of force.87  This drew a 
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stinging criticism from Edward Gough Whitlam, the Deputy Leader of the Opposition, 
who declared that it ‘completely undermines the use of sanctions if we say we will never 
resort to the ultimate sanction.’  Paul Hasluck, Minister for External Affairs (1964-66), 
condemned UDI as foolish but suggested that the Rhodesian Government had acted out of 
fear to preserve ‘something the Europeans thought precious to themselves’.  Hasluck 
appealed for restraint and understanding: ‘Let us try to appreciate as part of the situation, 
the fact that the Europeans in Rhodesia do face a great difficulty … For the time being 
and in the present situation we can see that the best hope is to support the Government of 
the United Kingdom.’88  One commentator later wrote that Hasluck’s statement was 
‘cautious, unemotional and utterly oblivious to the passions aroused by the issue.’89 
 
In the debates about UDI many prominent figures in the Australian House of 
Representatives went much further than Menzies and Hasluck in their expressions of 
support for Ian Smith’s regime, and questioned the wisdom of applying economic 
sanctions against Rhodesia.  Sir Wilfred Kent Hughes, Chairman of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, observed that Rhodesia was ‘not the only country in Africa that needs 
time to establish the principles of a more sophisticated democracy, as out of 35 or 36 new 
African nations only 5 allow any freedom of opposition to the ruler and his party … it is a 
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sad moment for this Parliament when the Government feels it has to take the actions 
outlined by the Prime Minister.’  Charles E. Barnes, the Minister for Territories (1963-
66), stated that ‘those of us who come from rural areas and who have rural associations, 
particularly, I think, must have a great deal of sympathy for those people in Rhodesia … 
The great measure of prosperity that Rhodesia enjoys has been brought about by the 
efforts of many generations from the British Isles.’90  Denis James Killen, the 
Government’s Deputy Whip in the House, was by far the most vociferous supporter of the 
Europeans in Rhodesia.  In May 1965 he tabled a parliamentary question asking Menzies 
to confirm that he would oppose efforts to debate the Rhodesian issue at the forthcoming 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference (which hardly seemed necessary given that 
Menzies had always maintained that it was not a matter for Commonwealth scrutiny).91  
In September 1965, just before Britain and Rhodesia were about to enter another round of 
negotiations, Killen enquired whether the Australian Government would be willing to 
send a parliamentary delegation and accredited journalists to Rhodesia, with a view to 
obtaining ‘a more particular understanding of Rhodesian difficulties’.92  Later, during the 
parliamentary debates after UDI, Killen made his position perfectly clear: he claimed that 
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the Labor Opposition had its facts wrong; drew attention to African violence in Malawi, 
Zambia, Tanzania and Rwanda; described the nationalist Patriotic Front as a terrorist 
organisation that did ‘not stop at murder’; and concluded that the Rhodesian cause was 
‘greatly misunderstood’.93  Killen later wrote that in Rhodesia ‘a mere handful of 
Europeans are valiantly striving to maintain standards against tremendous odds … The 
fact that Rhodesia’s efforts provide the only hope for a multi-racial society in the whole 
of the African continent is studiously ignored.’94  Killen was also associated with Eric 
Butler and the Australian League of Rights, which brought Killen into disrepute.  In 
November 1965 the Opposition alleged that Killen had passed information about Cabinet 
views to Butler, who had in turn written to the Rhodesian Government advising that ‘the 
Australian Cabinet was divided 50-50 on the wisdom of the Government’s sanctions 
against Rhodesia.’95  Whether or not the allegation was true, it nevertheless indicated a 
perception that there were some in the Liberal Government who were unhappy with 
Australian policy towards Rhodesia.  Over the course of the next few years a ‘Rhodesia 
Lobby’ was discernible in the House and the Senate, distinguished by its ‘White Anglo-
Saxon Protestant solidarity, a hankering for the lost Empire, a deep suspicion of black 
regimes who rejected the deserving whites and a feeling that communism lurks behind 
most critical thinking’.96 
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Officials in the Australian Department for External Affairs took a less emotional view of 
the Rhodesian problem than their political masters did, though this did not preclude them 
from expressing pro-Rhodesian views.  They recognised that the issue was multifaceted 
and could potentially hurt Australian interests in several ways.  First, it was a 
Commonwealth problem; if Rhodesia became independent in circumstances short of 
African majority rule it would not be recognised as a member of the Commonwealth and 
sanctions would be imposed, to which Australia would have to adhere.  Second, it was a 
United Nations problem; because Australia was a member of the Committee of Twenty-
Four (the UN’s Special Committee on Colonialism) it had become involved in the search 
for a solution in Rhodesia, and in the event of UN intervention Australia might have to 
bear some of the costs.  Third, it was a problem of decolonisation; Australian officials 
noted that ‘As an administering power in New Guinea, we wish to appear to African and 
Asian countries as enlightened and reasonably progressive.’  Fourth, it was an 
international problem; officials anticipated that failure to find a solution could lead to a 
general conflict in Southern Africa that would be exploited by the Communist bloc.  
Fifth, it was a problem of race relations; officials warned that: 
 
Failure in Southern Rhodesia would hasten the drift towards an irrevocable 
cleavage between black and white leading to race war in Africa.  As a 
country of European settlement practicing a discriminatory immigration 
policy, and desiring Asian goodwill, Australia has reason to fear any 
inflammation of the racial issue.97 
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Despite these concerns about the damage that a UDI could inflict on Australia’s 
international reputation, there was some sympathy for the Rhodesian settlers among 
Australian diplomats, and even apathy in some official quarters about the prospect of a 
UDI.  In October 1965 Sir Laurence McIntyre, a very senior official, argued that whilst it 
was desirable not to antagonise Afro-Asian opinion: ‘Our general policy should not be to 
victimise the Rhodesians.’98  J. C. G. Kevin, the Australian Ambassador to South Africa, 
also counselled the Department of External Affairs to take a cautious approach towards 
the Rhodesian problem.  Kevin argued that there was little that could be done to influence 
the Rhodesian Government, and suggested that the danger to the Commonwealth posed 
by a UDI had been much exaggerated.99  Kevin felt that in negotiations with Ian Smith, 
the British Government adopted a position that was too rigid, and after UDI he argued 
that there was a divergence between Australian interests and British policy.100  Kevin 
observed – with evident distaste for principles of racial equality – that ‘demographic 
forecasts being what they are and some Asian thinking being what it is, we in Australia 
may not be left alone in the future’ and lamented that if Rhodesia, the Portuguese 
territories and South Africa were ‘forced radically to dismantle and rebuild their social 
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and constitutional structure, we shall be the only survivor.’101  On the basis of such 
evidence it may be argued that official advice tended to compound the natural 
dispositions of Australian ministers on the issue of Rhodesian independence. 
 
For the most part, the Australian public did not exhibit much interest in the Rhodesian 
problem, at least until the 1970s when the debate about domestic racial discrimination 
became louder, which tended to accentuate foreign policy issues involving race.  The 
Australian press, which cared little about Africa in general, devoted no sustained attention 
to Rhodesia but generally condemned UDI.  The only consistent supporters of the Smith 
regime were regional newspapers such as the Burnie Advocate (Tasmania), the West 
Coast Sentinel (South Australia), and the South Burnett Times (Queensland).  The last 
two were in areas where there was strong support for the right-wing League of Rights.102  
The League was a small but vocal organisation that had expressed its unequivocal support 
for Europeans in Southern Rhodesia for many years, even before the break up of the 
Central African Federation.  In 1961 Eric D. Butler, an associate of Denis Killen and the 
National Director of the Australian League of Rights, described the Rhodesian settlers as 
‘an inspiring example of the dedicated few’.103  As creeping sanctions were introduced in 
the months after UDI, there were some indications of Australian public sympathy towards 
Rhodesia.  Rhodesian-Australian Associations were formed in Victoria, New South 
                                                 
101 NAA: A1838, 190/10/1, Part 7, Kevin, Pretoria, to DEA, Canberra, Savingram 65/65, 17 December 
1965, para. 5. 
102 Hall, ‘Australia and Rhodesia’, in Stevens (ed.), Racism, Vol. 3, p. 183.  The League advocated 
Christian principles, was fervently monarchist, and strongly anti-communist.  Some of its members were 
also white supremacists and anti-Semitic. 
103 Quoted in St. J. Barclay, ‘Friends in Salisbury’, p. 41.  The Australian League of Rights was formed in 
1960 from a number of regional associations. 
 188 
 
Wales, South Australia, Western Australia and Queensland, and in March 1966 the 
Australian League of Rights sponsored the sanctions-busting Petrol for Rhodesia Fund.  
There was some degree of overlap with Liberal Party membership, especially in New 
South Wales, but the Rhodesian-Australian Associations were not really successful in 
involving prominent national political figures in their activities.  The Associations 
consisted of three discernible groups: older Australians, who were nostalgic for the days 
of the British Empire; right-wing activists, who also belonged to the League of Rights; 
and émigré South Africans and Rhodesians. However, the extent of Australian public 
support for Rhodesia should not be overstated: the largest attendance reported at a 
meeting was 250 in Sydney and the membership of the Associations probably numbered 
only in the low thousands.104 
 
In New Zealand there was a similar pattern of political, official, and public opinion on the 
Rhodesian issue to that which existed in Australia.  Keith Holyoake privately 
sympathised with the European settlers in Rhodesia.  In July 1964 he told the Rhodesian 
Minister Clifford Dupont that ‘he wished to help the Europeans in Southern Rhodesia in 
whatever way he could’, and in October 1965 he wrote to Ian Smith expressing his 
admiration for the European settlers ‘who ha[d] by their own special skills and industry 
established a prosperous and highly developed society.’105  Publicly, however, Holyoake 
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was keen to minimise New Zealand’s involvement in the issue of Rhodesian 
independence.  In August 1964 Holyoake reported to the House of Representatives that at 
the recent Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting he had reaffirmed his Government’s 
support for the principle of majority rule in Rhodesia, but had recognised that the 
independence issue was a matter between the Governments of Britain and Rhodesia.106  
Indeed, this was the position that Holyoake maintained throughout the Rhodesian Crisis, 
up to and beyond UDI.107  This position partly reflected Holyoake’s style of leadership, 
‘the slowing down of every process which, if speedily dealt with, might have represented 
change and political harm.’108  More significantly, it also reflected the Government’s 
perception that little was at stake for New Zealand, as Malcolm McKinnon has 
commented: ‘Kinship was the only interest “aligning” New Zealand with Rhodesia.  Over 
Rhodesia a major crisis was avoided, because while New Zealand sentiment was 
involved, New Zealand interests were plainly less so.’109  Officials in the Department of 
External Affairs certainly recognised that New Zealand’s economic interests in Rhodesia 
were extremely limited.110 On the other hand, officials were also aware that the issue of 
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Rhodesian independence had ‘profound implications for race relations throughout the 
world and especially within the Commonwealth’, and they were ‘conscious of the need to 
avoid damaging the reputation which New Zealand has earned for having promoted 
harmonious race relations in its own community and for having brought Western Samoa 
to independence in a way which evoked international approbation.’  It was nevertheless 
observed that these concerns should not lead the New Zealand Government into a 
position where support for Afro-Asian proposals went beyond what was ‘prudent and 
expedient’, and it was suggested that the Rhodesian question should be considered ‘in an 
impartial way’, which meant that the New Zealand Government should avoid giving the 
impression that it was ‘merely acting in support of the British Government.’111  This 
evidence indicates that New Zealand officials had very similar concerns to their 
Australian counterparts. 
 
The New Zealand Government adopted, as far as possible, a ‘hands off’ policy on 
Rhodesia, but this did not necessarily accord with the attitudes of some among the wider 
political establishment and the public.  When the Rhodesian Government held its indaba 
in October 1964, a British newspaper reported: ‘Among the small audience, the only 
people who appeared to have been impressed with the proceedings were a small group of 
visiting New Zealand MPs, who said afterwards that this was the way they consulted the 
Maori chiefs in their own country.’112  The press in Rhodesia and New Zealand widely 
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Zealand Policy’, Brief for Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference, London, 8-15 July 1964, Annex 1, 
p. 1. 
112 ANZ: ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 10, Malcolm Templeton, Counsellor, High Commission, 
London, to DEA, Letter, 3 November 1964, enclosing a copy of an article by Ronald Legge, ‘The smoke 
signals were meaningless at the indaba’, Sunday Times, 1 November 1964. 
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reported the favourable comments of the New Zealand MPs, which prompted Arnold 
Nordemeyer, the Leader of the Opposition, to question whether their views were 
representative of the New Zealand Government’s position.113  Press comment in New 
Zealand certainly revealed a strong current of support for the Europeans in Rhodesia.  
The Daily News defended them as ‘loyal Britons who believe that Britain has stabbed 
them in the back.  Eighty years of effort will be dust and ashes if the African takes 
over.’114  The Dominion showed a similar concern, arguing that it was easy to lose sight 
of the ‘legitimate claims of the white Rhodesians and to ignore their plight’, and the 
Auckland Star, which was critical of Ian Smith, received letters expressing support for the 
Rhodesian Front leader.115  Pro-Rhodesian views were particularly strong in rural New 
Zealand, especially in areas where the Social Credit League was campaigning hard in the 
run up to the 1966 election, of which the New Zealand Government had to take 
account.116  Shortly before UDI the Mayor of Dargaville – who in early 1966 became 
Chairman of the New Zealand-Rhodesian Society – wrote to Holyoake that it would be a 
‘terrible thing for New Zealand to be a party to such inhuman treatment of white settlers 
by handing the country over to Communist inspired trouble makers.  Contrary to reports 
                                                 
113 ANZ: ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 10, Malcolm Templeton, Counsellor, High Commission, 
London, to DEA, Letter, 4 November 1964; and various documents passim. 
114 Daily News, Taranaki, 12 October 1965.  Quoted in McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy, p. 
236. 
115 The Dominion, 28 October 1965; Auckland Star, 13 October 1965.  Quoted in McKinnon, Independence 
and Foreign Policy, p. 236. 
116 Ibid.  The Social Credit League was created in 1953 out of the Social Credit Association, a pressure 
group, but did not win its first parliamentary seat until 1966.  Chapman, ‘From Labour to National’, in Rice 
(ed.), Oxford History of New Zealand, pp. 376-77. 
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the 4 million Africans are supporting Premier Smith and his Government.’117  As the 
Rhodesian crisis became more acute in the weeks after UDI, the Department of External 
Affairs advised its overseas posts that in New Zealand there was a ‘substantial body of 
opinion which supports the policies and objectives of the Smith regime’.118  Such 
evidence tends to suggest that in New Zealand public interest in the Rhodesian problem 
and sympathy for the European settlers was probably greater than in Australia. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The fact that Canada demonstrated a much more positive attitude towards the 
Commonwealth than either Australia or New Zealand can be explained partly by their 
different conceptions of the Commonwealth, partly by their different diplomatic styles 
and objectives in international politics, and most significantly by their different attitude to 
race relations.  Canada felt less vulnerable than Australia or New Zealand to charges of 
racialism, which dominated Commonwealth relations in the 1960s, and therefore found it 
easier to engage with Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth.  In Australia and New 
Zealand there was considerable sympathy for Rhodesian ‘kith and kin’, which permeated 
the government, the civil service, and the public, but such sympathy was not evident in 
Canada.  This explains why Australia and New Zealand were less willing than Canada to 
be drawn into the search for a solution to the problem of Rhodesian independence, which 
is explored in the next chapter. 
                                                 
117 S. Green to K. Holyoake, 12 October 1965.  Quoted in McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy, p. 
236. 
118 Quoted in ibid., p. 237. 
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Chapter Four 
The Old Commonwealth: Consultation and Cooperation 
During the Rhodesian Crisis 
 
Introduction 
 
The Old Commonwealth, like the United States, was concerned with two major 
dimensions of the Rhodesian problem: first, what assistance could be given to Britain to 
prevent a UDI; and second, what measures would have to be implemented in the event of 
a UDI.  This chapter will examine the attempts of Canada, Australia and New Zealand to 
prevent a UDI from both a positive perspective (through offers of aid and technical 
assistance, and proposals for constitutional development), and a negative perspective 
(warning Rhodesia of the consequences of unilateral action).  It will be argued that their 
attempts to influence Rhodesia were hindered by several factors.  First, both Winston 
Field and Ian Smith were unwilling to countenance any Commonwealth advice that could 
be construed as interference in Rhodesian constitutional affairs.  Second, the deterrent 
efforts of Canada, Australia and New Zealand were not coordinated and lacked 
credibility.  Third, Old Commonwealth influence was restricted by the fact that Canadian 
and Australian diplomatic representation in Salisbury was limited, and in the case of New 
Zealand it was non-existent.  In addition to their ‘carrot and stick’ diplomacy, the Old 
Commonwealth also recognised the need to formulate contingency plans to be 
implemented in the event of a UDI, which seemed increasingly likely with the failure of 
each round of negotiations between Britain and Rhodesia.  The Old Commonwealth 
intended to follow Britain’s lead after a UDI, but the slow pace of British contingency 
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planning inhibited preparations in the Old Commonwealth.  The Old Commonwealth, like 
the United States, therefore became irritated with the British during the Rhodesian Crisis. 
 
Winning friends and influencing people 
 
Aid and technical assistance 
 
In the preceding chapter it was noted that Canada adopted a much more positive attitude 
than Australia and New Zealand towards Commonwealth relations in general and the 
Rhodesian problem in particular.  The following discussion will explain why the 
Commonwealth was a significant element in Canadian foreign policy and examine the 
reasons for a massive increase in the level of Canadian foreign aid during the mid-1960s, 
which included greater levels of assistance for Commonwealth states in Africa.  Although 
Rhodesia was not an independent member of the Commonwealth, the Canadian 
Government nevertheless put forward practical proposals for aid and technical assistance 
programmes for Rhodesia, which were intended to improve the socio-economic status of 
Africans and prepare them for majority rule.  With greater enthusiasm on the part of 
Australia and New Zealand, these programmes might have encouraged greater 
cooperation between Africans and Europeans in Rhodesia, and could have changed 
attitudes towards the Commonwealth among European Rhodesians (though it must be 
admitted that it would have been difficult to overcome intransigence among many African 
nationalists and extremist Europeans). 
 
In a 1966 assessment, British officials recognised that although the Commonwealth was 
not the only or even the most important factor in Canadian foreign policy, ‘there can be 
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no doubt that the present Canadian Government attach a good deal of importance to it, in 
word and deed.’1  Canadian politicians emphasised the multi-racial nature of the 
Commonwealth, as noted in the preceding chapter, but the principle of racial equality was 
not the only reason why Canada valued the Commonwealth.  The Commonwealth was an 
association through which Canada could exert influence, a forum that suited the 
principles of Canadian foreign policy and character of Canadian diplomacy.  During the 
post-War period Canada obviously lacked the formidable capabilities of the great powers, 
but in the words of one historian it acquired a distinguished reputation as ‘the industrious 
tailor of the international system, stitching together workable compromises out of rather 
patternless and (often) threadbare material.’2  Canada conceived its role in the 
international system as a problem-solver, a system maintainer rather than a system 
reformer.  In other words, Canadian politicians and officials did not seek to make changes 
to the international system, but attempted to deal with the difficulties relating to the 
workings of the system as it stood.3  Canadian foreign policy was characterised by 
functionalist principles, particularly the idea that ‘responsibility in selected areas of 
international organization should be commensurate with specialized interests and task-
                                                 
1 The National Archives [hereafter TNA]: Public Records Office, Kew [hereafter PRO], DO 193/79, 
Eleanor J. Emery, Counsellor, British High Commission, Canada, to R. Walker, Commonwealth Relations 
Office [hereafter CRO], London, 1 December 1966, para. 2; in S. R. Ashton and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), 
British Documents on the End of Empire Project [hereafter BDEEP] Series A Volume 5, East of Suez and 
the Commonwealth, Part II: Europe, Rhodesia, Commonwealth (London: The Stationery Office, 2004), p. 
355. 
2 Andrew F. Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions (Scarborough, Ontario: 
Prentice-Hall, 1997), p. 36. 
3 Ibid.  For a discussion of national roles see K. J. Holsti, ‘National roles conceptions in the study of foreign 
policy’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3 (September 1970), pp. 233-309. 
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related experience.’4  Canada maintained its credibility by not over-extending itself, 
instead choosing to focus on specific issues that it felt competent to deal with.  This 
meant concentrating on trying to mediate intra-bloc tensions (such as those that occurred 
during the 1956 Suez Crisis) rather than inter-bloc tensions (that is to say, East-West 
relations during the Cold War).5  A notable attribute of Canadian diplomacy was its 
associational activity, through which a habit of consultation and collaboration were 
thoroughly inculcated in the Canadian diplomatic service.  Canada concentrated on 
working with others, as the Canadian diplomat and academic John Holmes put it: 
‘Diplomacy … is a game of skill in which countries without adequate weight to be 
decisive in world politics and economics play whatever hands they can muster.  To do so 
they need more friends than enemies.’6  The Commonwealth was (at least in theory) an 
association of friends, in which Canada enjoyed a prestigious position, as British officials 
observed: ‘Canada (unlike Britain) has no imperialist past to inhibit her relations with the 
new Commonwealth countries.  She sees herself, therefore, and the African countries in 
particular see her, as having a leading role to play in Commonwealth affairs.’7  A further 
                                                 
4 Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policy, p. 36.  For a discussion of functionalism see John W. Holmes, The 
Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 
Vol. 1, pp. 29-73. Holmes was President of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and had 
previously served in the Canadian Foreign Service. 
5 Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policy, pp. 37-39. 
6 John W. Holmes, ‘The changing role of the diplomatic function in the making of foreign policy’, 
Occasional Paper, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Department of Political Science, Dalhousie University 
(January 1975), p. 10.  Quoted in Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policy, p. 37. 
7 TNA: PRO, DO 193/79, Emery to Walker, 1 December 1966, para.6; in Ashton and Louis (eds.), BDEEP 
Series A, Vol. 5, Part II, p. 356.  Bruce Miller suggests that there was ‘something synthetic about Canada’s 
role in the 1950s and 1960s.’  Canada could and did capitalise on the fact that it had no imperialist 
association with Africa but ‘this was to a large extent an operation at the edges of national concern.’  It did 
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notable characteristic of Canadian diplomacy was its tenacity, which was evident in ‘both 
an entrepreneurial and technical dimension’.  In an entrepreneurial role Canadian 
diplomats were responsible for ‘triggering initiatives; the planning and convening of 
meetings, setting priorities, and drawing up and fleshing out proposals’, and on the 
technical side they were involved with ‘a wide range of more routine activity surrounding 
liaison efforts, shuttle diplomacy, the use of formal and informal forums, working the 
corridors, and other means to push a given process forward.’8  The United Nations 
General Assembly and Security Council were obviously important arenas for pursuing 
entrepreneurial initiatives and routine diplomatic work, but Canada valued the 
Commonwealth as a channel of communication because its meetings were held in camera 
and as they were less subject to scrutiny it encouraged greater candour.9  As this chapter 
will demonstrate, Canadian politicians and officials used different diplomatic techniques 
in their attempts to contribute to the management of the Rhodesian problem.  One 
initiative, which was routine but nevertheless potentially significant, was the Canadian 
attempt to mobilise the support of the Old Commonwealth for aid and technical assistance 
programmes in Rhodesia, which reflected growing Canadian expertise in and 
commitment to overseas aid. 
                                                                                                                                                  
not address the major questions of U.S. influence or national unity.  J. D. B. Miller, Survey of 
Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Expansion and Attrition 1953-1969 (London: Oxford University Press 
for The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1974), pp. 371-72. 
8 Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policy, p. 38. 
9 K. A. MacKirdy, ‘The Commonwealth: Does it Exist?’, in J. L. Granatstein (ed.), Canadian Foreign 
Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite? (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1970), p. 167.  However, many 
African Commonwealth states were inclined to use Prime Ministers’ Meetings as a forum for public 
diplomacy, which irritated the Prime Ministers of Britain and Australia.  See the next chapter for further 
discussion of this point. 
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In his March 1964 statement to the first United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), the Canadian Foreign Minister, Paul Martin, stated his 
Government’s view that the economic and social life of developing countries ‘is 
strengthened by the function which outside assistance performs and by the evidence 
which it brings of widespread interests, sympathy and support.’  Martin explained that 
was why the Canadian Government actively encouraged UN assistance programmes and 
had decided to increase its economic aid in the year ahead by more than 50 per cent, to 
between $180 and $190 million.10  Speaking to an audience in Quebec in February 1965, 
Martin explained the motives behind foreign aid, highlighting humanitarianism in 
particular: 
 
For my own part, I have no hesitation in saying that I regard humanitarian 
considerations to be foremost in the minds of those who have supported 
and sustained the principle of Canadian aid to the developing countries … 
In essence I would say [the humanitarian approach] rests upon the 
recognition that, as flagrant disparities in human wealth and human 
welfare are no longer morally acceptable within a single community, 
whether it be local or national, the same principle is applicable to the 
larger world community.11 
                                                 
10 Costas Melakopides, Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1995 (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 1998), p. 77.  UNCTAD set a target for developed countries to donate one per 
cent of their GNP to developing countries annually by 1972.  In 1966 Canadian aid was around 0.45 per 
cent of GNP. TNA: PRO, DO 193/79, Emery to Walker, 1 December 1966, paras. 5, 10 (f) and (g); in 
Ashton and Louis (eds.), BDEEP Series A, Vol. 5, Part II, pp. 356 and 358-59. 
11 Paul Martin, Paul Martin Speaks for Canada: A Selection of Speeches on Foreign Policy, 1964-1967 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967), p. 132.  Also quoted in Melakopides, Pragmatic Idealism, p. 77. 
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Of course, this moral dimension was not the only motive behind foreign aid.  Martin 
observed that Canada also benefited in several ways: first, Canadian economic growth 
was stimulated ‘by contributing to the level of production, exports and employment’; 
second, ‘Canadian producers, engineers and educators’ could ‘gain valuable experience’ 
whilst promoting Canadian products and skills; third, it enlarged Canadian horizons and 
Canada’s image abroad was ‘more clearly projected’; and fourth, the use of Canadian 
goods and services gave Canadians a stake in foreign aid, which ‘helped to enlist and 
maintain public support in Canada for an expanding aid programme.’12 
 
Between 1964 and 1967 the level of Canadian aid rose by 280 per cent, reaching a total of 
$307 million in 1966-67.13  Canadian aid was distributed in a variety of ways and to many 
different regions including South East Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean.  Bilateral aid 
accounted for over 70 per cent of Canada’s total effort, such as disbursements to 
Francophone states in Africa, which amounted to $11 million in 1966-67.14  However, 
Canada was keen to coordinate her aid with other donors, which was effected through 
several multilateral schemes, including the Inter-American Development Bank, the 
International Development Association, the UN Development Programme, the Colombo 
Plan, the Commonwealth Caribbean Aid Programme, and the Special Commonwealth 
                                                 
12 Martin, Paul Martin Speaks for Canada, pp. 134-35.  Also quoted in Melakopides, Pragmatic Idealism, 
p. 78. 
13 Department of External Affairs [hereafter DEA], External Aid Office, Annual Review 1966-67, p. 3.  
Figures cited in Melakopides, Pragmatic Idealism, pp. 78 and 80. 
14 DEA, External Aid Office, Annual Review 1966-67, p. 9.  Figures cited in Melakopides, Pragmatic 
Idealism, p. 78; and TNA: PRO, DO 193/79, Emery to Walker, 1 December 1966, paras. 10 (f) and (g); in 
Ashton and Louis (eds.), BDEEP Series A, Vol. 5, Part II, pp. 358-59. 
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African Assistance Plan (SCAAP).15  Canadian aid to Commonwealth states in Africa 
increased dramatically, from $3.5 million in 1961-62 to $11 million in 1964-65 and $18.5 
million in 1966-67, of which the major recipients were Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania and 
Uganda.16  Of course, these figures were a mere fraction of Britain’s aid efforts in 
Africa,17 but as an imperial power Britain’s commitments and responsibility in the region 
were far greater than those of Canada, whose role was seen as complementary to the part 
played by Britain.18  It may be argued that the level of Canadian aid in Africa was 
sufficient to demonstrate that Canada’s stated humanitarian concerns were not mere 
rhetoric.  Similarly, Canadian proposals for aid and technical assistance in Rhodesia, 
which were quietly pursued through regular diplomatic channels, indicated that Canada 
had a genuine concern about the situation there and a positive approach to tackling the 
problem. 
 
Rhodesia was not under-developed by comparison with most states in Africa, but its 
pattern of development had obviously favoured the European minority in terms of 
distribution of wealth, education, and professional training.  Consequently, the African 
majority lacked the level of education and skills that were necessary to assume 
responsibility for self-government.  Educated African Rhodesians were of course mindful 
                                                 
15 Melakopides, Pragmatic Idealism, pp. 78-80; and TNA: PRO, DO 193/79, Emery to Walker, 1 December 
1966, paras. 8 (f) and (g); in Ashton and Louis (eds.), BDEEP Series A, Vol. 5, Part II, pp. 358-59. 
16 External Aid Office, Ottawa, Annual Review 1966-67, pp. 7 and 24.  Figures cited in Melakopides, 
Pragmatic Idealism, p. 80. 
17 See Ashton and Louis (eds.), BDEEP Series A, Vol. 5, Part III: Dependent Territories, Africa, 
Economics, Race, Ch. 13, ‘Aid and Trade’, pp. 431-546. 
18 TNA: PRO, DO 193/79, Emery to Walker, 1 December 1966, para. 10 (a); in Ashton and Louis (eds.), 
BDEEP Series A, Vol. 5, Part II, p. 357. 
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of the problem and discussed it with the Canadian Government even before the break up 
of the Central African Federation.  Dr Bernard Chidzero, a Rhodesian who was head of 
the United Nations Office in Nairobi, told one Canadian diplomat of his fear that in the 
event of African majority rule in Rhodesia many Europeans would resign from the civil 
service, which would cause a crisis in government unless sufficient numbers of trained 
Africans were available.19  George Nyandoro, Secretary-General of the Zimbabwe 
African Peoples Union, also shared these concerns.  He observed that whereas British 
civil servants had administered most British colonies in Africa, by contrast European 
settlers had administered Rhodesia.  Nyandoro therefore anticipated that European settlers 
would deliberately intrigue against an African majority government, causing 
administrative collapse.20  At the same time that the Canadian Government was receiving 
reports of African concerns about the lack of education and training opportunities in 
Rhodesia, it was also pursuing the issue with the Rhodesian Government.  Canadian 
officials and ministers questioned whether the Rhodesian Government might do more to 
facilitate African educational advancement so that more Africans would then be 
enfranchised.  Jack Howman, the Rhodesian Minister of Internal Affairs, explained that 
the Rhodesian Government had so far concentrated on providing elementary education to 
the majority of African children, and having achieved its goal the Government intended to 
expand facilities for secondary education.  Faster progress to African majority rule would 
                                                 
19 National Archives of Canada, Ottawa [hereafter NAC]: RG 25, Vol. 10071, 20-1-2-SR, Part 1.1, N. F. H. 
Berlis, Canadian High Commissioner, Dar Es Salaam, to Director General, External Aid Office, Ottawa, 
Letter, 17 September 1963, para. 2. 
20 NAC: RG 25, Vol. 10071, 20-1-2-SR, Part 1.1, George B. Nyandoro, London, to George Ivan Smith, 
Head of United Nations Office, Dar Es Salaam, 12 September 1963.  Extract enclosed in Berlis to Director 
General, External Aid Office, Ottawa, Letter, 17 September 1963. 
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depend upon increased foreign investment in Rhodesia to provide the funds for the 
development of educational facilities.21 
 
Over the next few months, the Canadian Government considered what it might do to 
assist African development in Rhodesia.  In March 1964 Paul Martin met with Oliver 
Bennett, who emphasised that it was important for the United States, Britain, and the 
Commonwealth to provide educational and economic assistance to Rhodesia in order to 
accelerate African participation in government.  According to Bennett both forms of 
assistance were necessary otherwise an educational programme would produce an 
additional problem of unemployment among qualified Africans.  Martin told Bennett that 
the Canadian Government was prepared to offer technical assistance but questioned the 
necessity for large-scale financial aid, as ‘it was his impression that Southern Rhodesia, at 
least in African terms, had a relatively prosperous economy.’22  The following month the 
Canadian Government made a formal offer to provide three Canadian teachers for African 
schools in Rhodesia and two technical assistance advisers, and up to 25 places for 
Rhodesian Africans to train in Canada.  Thomas Carter, the Canadian official who 
conveyed the offer to Salisbury, reported that the Rhodesian Government was grateful for 
the technical assistance programme, which it considered ‘a useful way of demonstrating 
                                                 
21 NAC: RG 25, Vol. 10071, 20-1-2-SR, Part 1.1, ‘Meeting with Mr J. H. Howman, Minister of Internal 
Affairs for Southern Rhodesia’ [on 12 September 1963], Memorandum by R. G. Hatheway, African and 
Middle Eastern Division [hereafter AMED], DEA, 19 September 1963, paras. 8-10.  ‘Visit to Ottawa by Mr 
J. H. Howman, Minister of Internal Affairs, Local Government and African Education of Southern 
Rhodesia, Sept. 12-13 1963’, Memorandum by D. B. Hicks, AMED, DEA, Ottawa, 21 October 1963, para. 
15. 
22 NAC: RG 25, Vol. 10071, 20-1-2-SR, Part 1.1, ‘ Meeting of Mr Bennett (Southern Rhodesia) with 
Minister, March 17’, Memorandum by R. E. Collins, AMED, DEA, 18 March 1964, para. 2. 
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[Canadian] interest in Southern Rhodesia without implying any interference in their 
constitutional problems.’  Sensing an opportunity for progress, Carter recommended that 
the Canadian Government should consider extending its assistance through its new long-
term, low interest low programme.23  Yet within just a few days, developments in 
Rhodesia threatened to jeopardise the Canadian aid package.  Ian Smith ousted Winston 
Field as Prime Minister, which signalled a further shift to the right in the Rhodesian 
Government.  The Canadian External Aid Office called into question the rationale of 
providing assistance designed to facilitate African advancement in circumstances where 
the Rhodesian Government showed no commitment to that objective.  This was not an 
unreasonable assessment, but as one senior External Affairs official concluded, if the 
Canadian Government went back on its offer, it would have a negative effect on its 
relations with Rhodesia and could preclude Canada from playing any further part in 
working out a solution to the problem of independence.  Accordingly, it was 
recommended that the Canadian Government should follow through with its offer.24 
 
Even though the political situation in Rhodesia was not promising, Canadian officials did 
not abandon the hope that the Commonwealth might be able to influence future 
developments by focusing on Rhodesia’s economic requirements.  In a brief for the 1964 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting Canadian officials noted that the Rhodesian 
economy was in recession, and badly needed investment had dried up because of political 
uncertainty.  Like other African countries, Rhodesia would require high levels of 
                                                 
23 NAC: RG 25, Vol. 10071, 20-1-2-SR, Part 1.1, ‘Southern Rhodesia – Canadian role’, Thomas Carter, 
AMED, DEA, c/o Canadian Embassy, Cape Town, to Paul Martin, Ottawa, Despatch No. 142, 7 April 
1964, para. 7. 
24 NAC: RG 25, Vol. 10071, 20-1-2-SR, Part 1.1, Marcel Cadieux, Acting Under-Secretary of State for 
External Affairs, to Director General, External Aid Office, Letter, 30 April 1964. 
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government spending and private investment for development projects and expansion of 
educational facilities, but as long as the political situation remained unsettled the 
Rhodesian Government would not be able to attract sufficient investment.25  It was 
observed that financial aid could be offered to the Rhodesian Government as an 
inducement for a commitment to African political advancement, and it was suggested that 
the Prime Ministers’ Meeting: 
 
might aim at producing a statement on Southern Rhodesia which would 
not give grounds to the present Southern Rhodesian Government to claim 
that the Commonwealth was attempting to interfere in Southern 
Rhodesia’s internal affairs and which would at the same time give hope to 
the Africans and to liberal white Southern Rhodesians that the 
Commonwealth as a whole would be willing to give material support to 
help African educational and economic advancement.26 
 
As noted in Chapter One, in May 1964 the former Rhodesian Prime Minster, Garfield 
Todd, suggested that the British Government should be prepared to offer substantial 
assistance of £10 million per year for ten years in order to facilitate an agreement in 
Rhodesia.27  The Old Commonwealth was willing to contribute only limited funds in 
respect of aid and technical assistance to Rhodesia, though Canada was willing to go 
much further than either Australia or New Zealand.  Canadian officials advised ministers 
                                                 
25 NAC: MG 31-E47, Vol. 66, ‘Southern Rhodesia’, Confidential Brief, 26 June 1964, paras. 8, 9, and 11. 
26 Ibid., para. 15. 
27 Ibid., para 12; Archives New Zealand, Wellington/Te Rua Mahara o te Kāwanatanga [hereafter ANZ]: 
ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 9, Garfield Todd and Hardwicke Holderness to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 
Letter, 15 May 1964. 
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that there was scope for Canada to increase the scale of its technical assistance from the 
initial figure of $125,000 and to allocate grant aid funds and special development loans to 
Rhodesia, but this could not take a disproportionate share of the $10 million allocated for 
aid to all Commonwealth countries in Africa, nor be greater than that offered to other 
countries with an equal or larger population.28  The figure that the Canadians had in mind 
by the time of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting in July 1964 was around 
$1.5 million.29  This was a small figure in relation to Garfield Todd’s suggested total 
assistance package in the sum of £100 million, but it represented more than a tenfold 
increase in Canada’s initial technical assistance allocation for Rhodesia. 
 
The Australian Government was prepared to contribute very little financial assistance to 
Rhodesia, which reflected the limitations of its overall external aid budget and the 
priorities that dictated allocation of funds.  As one contemporary commentator noted: ‘In 
Australia overseas aid has a low rating as a subject of political interest.’30  Australia’s aid 
budget in 1965-66 was around $115 million, which was 0.6 per cent of GNP.  This was 
slightly higher than Canada’s external aid budget in relative terms (0.45 per cent of GNP) 
but not in absolute terms ($190 million).  The majority of Australian aid, some 76 per 
cent, was directed to Papua and New Guinea, leaving only $34 million for wider 
                                                 
28 NAC: MG31-E47, Vol. 66, ‘Southern Rhodesia’, Confidential Brief, 26 June 1964, paras. 13 and 14. 
29 ANZ: ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 9, J. S. Reid, New Zealand High Commissioner, Ottawa, to 
Secretary of External Affairs, Wellington, Letter, 15 June 1964. 
30 J. A. Camilleri, An introduction to Australian foreign policy (Milton: Jacaranda Press, 2nd edn. 1975), p. 
27; David Scott, ‘Some Aspects of Overseas Aid’, in M. Teichmann (ed.), New directions in Australian 
foreign policy, ally satellite or neutral? (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), p. 117. 
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distribution.31  Africa was not a priority, and in any case Australian officials were not 
particularly enthusiastic about facilitating change in Rhodesia.  In documents prepared 
before the 1964 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting Australian officials 
commented: ‘We, and perhaps others, would not wish to see Africanisation of the 
administration for its own sake … we doubt whether the idea would do much to help 
persuade the European community to accept an African-based government’, which 
demonstrates clearly that they did not share the optimism of their Canadian counterparts.  
Officials advised Ministers that it if they were pressed it would be possible to train around 
20 Rhodesian African administrators through the SCAAP, at an annual cost of £35,000.32  
At the conclusion of the Meeting there appeared to be a more optimistic tone in the 
Australian Department of External Affairs, which admitted that technical assistance to 
Rhodesia could have two useful results: first, it might help to diminish the validity of the 
argument put forward by Europeans that Africans were not suitably equipped to run the 
country; second, it could allay European fears that an African majority government would 
reduce standards to an unacceptable level.  However, the Australian Government had not 
received any request for financial assistance from the Rhodesian Government (and there 
was no mention of any offer).33  When the Zimbabwe African National Union solicited 
Australian scholarships for Rhodesian Africans it was told that the Australian 
                                                 
31 Scott, ‘Some Aspects of Overseas Aid’, in Teichmann (ed.), New directions in Australian foreign policy, 
p. 119. 
32 National Archives of Australia, Canberra [hereafter NAA]: A1838, 190/10/1, Parts 2 and 3a, two 
confidential papers on Southern Rhodesia for 1964 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting [n.d. but June 
1964]. 
33 NAA: A1838, 190/11/162, Part 1, DEA, Canberra, to Australian High Commission, London, Cable No. 
18191, 15 July 1964. 
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Government gave scholarships only to nominees of foreign governments.34  The 
Rhodesian Government was obviously not disposed to nominate members of African 
nationalist movements, so they were bound to be disappointed. 
 
The New Zealand external aid budget was smaller than that of Canada and Australia in 
both relative and absolute terms.  During the 1950s, under the Colombo Plan, New 
Zealand contributed a mere 0.14 per cent of GNP to overseas aid.  By 1972 (the 
UNCTAD target date for developed countries to donate one per cent of their GNP to 
developing countries annually), New Zealand’s Official Development Assistance had 
risen to just 0.22 per cent of GNP, or  $22,486,000.  This placed New Zealand towards 
the bottom of the international aid league table in absolute and relative terms.  As with 
Australia, the overwhelming proportion of the aid budget was directed towards Asia and 
the Pacific, and New Zealand donated only tiny sums to Africa (around $120,000 in 
1971-72).35  One analyst of New Zealand foreign policy, Richard Kennaway, observed 
that some New Zealanders felt that this was an entirely appropriate arrangement, because 
it reflected national interests and regional priorities.  However, Kennaway argued that 
‘New Zealand has few enough links with large areas of the world, such as the African 
continent, and those few channels of communication and interchange of ideas which do 
exist – for example, through SCAAP and Commonwealth Education schemes – are 
therefore especially valuable.’36  The idea that New Zealand should develop a greater 
interest in Africa did not, however, carry any weight in the Department of External 
                                                 
34 NAA: A1838, 190/10/1, Part 5, F. W. Truelove, First Secretary, Dar-Es-Salaam, to DEA, Canberra, 
Letter, 23 September 1965. 
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36 Ibid., p. 141. 
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Affairs, which took the view that ‘We ourselves have neither the resources nor the 
intention to extend our existing commitments in Africa.’37 
 
Another way in which the Old Commonwealth might have helped Rhodesia was through 
the offer of assisted immigration for European Rhodesians who did not wish to remain in 
Rhodesia under African majority rule.  The Australian Government did consider this 
matter but decided not to facilitate emigration from Rhodesia for two reasons.  First, the 
Federal Government in Salisbury had in 1959 asked Canberra not to extend the General 
Assisted Passage Scheme to Southern Rhodesia, presumably because the Federal 
Government wanted to stem the flow of European emigrants (which by 1964 had reached 
the rate of 1,000 per month) rather than encourage it since this would erode the European 
position in Rhodesia.  Second, Australia did not wish ‘to gain a reputation as a refuge for 
Europeans from Africa, unwilling to come to terms with African nationalism.’  Thus, 
when Ghana proposed that Australia and Canada might assist a solution in Rhodesia by 
taking white migrants, the Australian Government did not comment on the suggestion.38  
This was unfortunate, because a public commitment to assist migration would have 
provided an obvious alternative for those European Rhodesians who were convinced that 
African majority rule meant certain disaster. 
 
The Rhodesian Government was explicit on many occasions that the state of the 
Rhodesian economy was the main reason why it must gain independence.  Rhodesian 
                                                 
37 ANZ: ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 9, DEA, Wellington, to New Zealand High Commission, 
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ministers argued that independence would create conditions of certainty that would attract 
investment, which Rhodesia desperately needed.39  The economic situation in Rhodesia 
therefore presented an opportunity that Britain and the Old Commonwealth could have 
exploited to their advantage.  As the Rhodesian Government admitted, proposals for aid 
and technical assistance were a useful way of demonstrating Commonwealth interest in 
Rhodesia without implying any interference in Rhodesian constitutional affairs.40  Yet 
schemes for training African teachers and administrators, or the development of 
Rhodesia’s infrastructure, required a huge level of investment to be effective in terms of 
advancing the status of Africans and creating confidence among Europeans in Rhodesia.  
The British Government, let alone those of the Old Commonwealth, balked at this degree 
of commitment, especially since the Rhodesian Government gave at best conflicting 
signals about its commitment to the cause of African advancement.41  In such 
                                                 
39 NAC: RG 25, Vol. 10071, 20-1-2-SR, Part 1.1, ‘Visit to Ottawa by Mr J. H. Howman, Minister of 
Internal Affairs, Local Government and African Education of Southern Rhodesia, Sept. 12-13 1963’, 
Memorandum by D. B. Hicks, AMED, DEA, Ottawa, 21 October 1963, para.13; RG 25, Vol. 10071, 20-1-
2-SR, Part 1.1, Ralph Collins, Canadian Ambassador to South Africa, to DEA, Ottawa, Cable No. 85, 3 July 
1964.  TNA: PRO, PREM 13/534, ff 86-95, ‘Record of a meeting between Mr Wilson and Mr Smith’, by 
Derek J. Mitchell, Prime Minister’s Principal Private Secretary, 30 January 1965, para. 6; in Ashton and 
Louis (eds.), BDEEP Series A, Vol. 5,Part II, p. 185. 
40 NAC: RG 25, Vol. 10071, 20-1-2-SR, Part 1.1, ‘Southern Rhodesia – Canadian role’, Tom Carter, 
AMED, DEA, c/o Canadian Embassy, Cape Town, to Paul Martin, Ottawa, Despatch No. 142, 7 April 
1964, para. 7. 
41 In August 1964 Oliver Bennett told British officials his Government had calculated that under the 1961 
Constitution an African majority government could emerge in ‘significantly less than ten years.’  TNA: 
PRO, DO 183/317, John Wakely, British High Commission, Ottawa, to Godfrey Bass, Southern Rhodesia 
Department, CRO, Letter, 2 September 1964.  However, in January 1965 Ian Smith told Harold Wilson that 
the Rhodesian Government was looking at ways to prolong European control for ‘60 or 70 years, or perhaps 
 210 
circumstances it would have been politically difficult for Britain and the Old 
Commonwealth to justify an aid programme for Rhodesia that exceeded levels of 
assistance for all other African countries combined, particularly as those other countries 
were in a much worse economic state than Rhodesia.  Taxpayers at home would probably 
not have been sympathetic to a massive assistance programme for Rhodesia, whilst 
African Commonwealth states may have been critical of a policy that afforded special 
treatment to a white minority regime.  Nevertheless, Britain and the Old Commonwealth 
failed to explore sufficiently their opportunity to influence the Rhodesian Government 
through positive inducement, and Australia and New Zealand were notably unenthusiastic 
about participating in schemes to improve the position of Africans in Rhodesia.  If greater 
levels of aid and technical assistance had been offered it might have created a more 
favourable impression in Salisbury of the value of the Commonwealth.  Certainly it can 
be argued that this approach would have been easier than trying to persuade the 
Rhodesian Government to accept Commonwealth proposals for constitutional change or 
suggestions for Commonwealth political involvement in discussions about Rhodesian 
independence, as the following discussion demonstrates. 
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Commonwealth constitutional proposals and suggestions for Commonwealth 
participation 
 
Canadian interest in the Rhodesian problem was manifest in suggestions for a 
Commonwealth conference to discuss the issue, and in proposals for constitutional 
arrangements that would facilitate Rhodesian advancement towards independence.  These 
proposals, put forward mainly by Canadian officials between 1963 and 1965, foundered 
on two big rocks: a lack of enthusiasm among Canada’s Old Commonwealth partners 
(and sometimes even among Canadian politicians), which tended to undermine the force 
of the proposals; and outright opposition from the Rhodesian Government, which was 
impervious to any suggestion that the Commonwealth might have a role to play in finding 
a solution to the problem. 
 
The impending dissolution of the Central African Federation prompted greater 
Commonwealth scrutiny of the problems in its successor states.  In September 1963, 
Canada and Tanganyika jointly proposed to the British Government that there should be a 
Commonwealth meeting to discuss Southern Rhodesia.  On this occasion the British 
Government was less than enthusiastic, which caused frustration and bemusement among 
Canadian officials who had a progressive attitude to the Rhodesian problem. The 
Canadian High Commissioner in Tanganyika wrote: 
 
I find it somewhat difficult to reconcile the British view that little could 
come out of a Commonwealth meeting at this time … and Lord Home’s 
disenchantment ‘with behaviour in [the] UN of African members of [the] 
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Commonwealth who never seem to make the slightest effort to consult 
with [a] view to devising formulas that Britain could accept’.42 
 
The High Commissioner pointed out that an African member of the Commonwealth 
(Tanganyika) had just taken the initiative along with an older member of the 
Commonwealth (Canada) in an effort to facilitate an agreement on Rhodesia, but the 
British Government had indicated that it was not interested in such an initiative.  He 
continued: 
 
Nor can I reconcile this reluctance to plan for discussion at a meeting 
where moderate countries would take the initiative, with the British view 
that discussion of Southern Rhodesia by the Commonwealth group at the 
UN is probably unavoidable anyway!  One would have thought that, if 
Britain believes Southern Rhodesia is going to be discussed, it would be to 
her advantage to have the initiative in the hands of a group of moderate 
countries rather than leave it to Ghana to make the running.43 
 
Despite initial British reluctance the proposal for a conference resurfaced later in the year.  
In October 1963 Sir Alec Douglas-Home took over from Harold Macmillan as Prime 
Minister, and Duncan Sandys, who retained his position as Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations, succeeded R. A. Butler as the responsible minister for Central 
Africa.  In November Sandys reiterated to the House of Commons that the British 
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Government was concerned for the unity of the Commonwealth and he stressed the 
necessity for Commonwealth consultation on the Rhodesian problem.  Sandys set off 
alarm bells in Salisbury when he said that he was ‘wondering whether we might not go 
further than that.  Might it not perhaps be possible for other members of the 
Commonwealth to help in a more positive way in the task of finding a generally 
acceptable solution?’44  Winston Field wrote to Sandys asking for clarification of the role 
that he envisaged other members of the Commonwealth might play.  Field affirmed that 
the matter was one for determination between the British and Rhodesian Governments 
and indicated his apprehension of the effect that Sandys’ remarks might have at the 
United Nations, where the British Government had consistently maintained that the grant 
of independence to Rhodesia did not admit of outside interference.45 Sandys conveyed 
through Sir Roy Welensky an invitation to Field to attend a conference at which the 
Commonwealth Secretary and Rhodesian Prime Minister would discuss the problem of 
Rhodesian independence with Robert Menzies, Lester Pearson, and Julius Nyerere, but 
Field replied that he was not prepared to discuss Southern Rhodesia’s independence with 
any country other than Britain.46  Sandys tried to persuade Field that he was not asking 
the Commonwealth to ‘sit in judgment’ on Rhodesia and he was not thinking of a formal 
conference, but rather talks without any fixed agenda that were ‘entirely exploratory and 
consultative in character’, which ‘would not in any way affect the responsibilities of our 
two governments for the ultimate solution’.  Sandys encouraged Field to accept the 
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proposal because it would ‘tend to create a more sympathetic atmosphere and a better 
understanding in other Commonwealth countries of the nature of Southern Rhodesia’s 
problem and of the policy and attitude of your Government.’47  However, Field rejected 
the proposal for three reasons: first, it was ‘without precedent in British Colonial history’; 
second, it would be interpreted as a breach of ‘the principle of exclusive responsibility’ 
that Britain claimed at the United Nations; and third, the attitude of Commonwealth 
Governments was ‘likely to be conditioned either by doctrinaire considerations or by 
considerations of national interest which will have little or no bearing on the best interests 
of the people of Southern Rhodesia now or in the future.’  Field also indicated that he did 
not agree with Sandys’ view that willingness to enter into discussion with the 
Commonwealth would create greater sympathy and understanding of Rhodesia’s 
problems, since he saw no evidence of ‘of a willingness to view the political 
circumstances in Southern Rhodesia with a degree of objectivity and a sense of historical 
perspective.’48  Field’s emphatic rejection therefore contained some indication of the 
Rhodesian Government’s general attitude towards the Commonwealth (which is explored 
in more detail in the next chapter). 
 
There were also some concerns in Ottawa about the viability of a conference, which is 
somewhat surprising considering that the proposal was first mooted jointly by Canada and 
Tanganyika.  In March 1964 Paul Martin confessed to Oliver Bennett that although he 
had agreed with the proposal for a conference Sandys put it forward, ‘he had always been 
dubious about its efficacy and had been somewhat relieved when it was turned down by 
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 215 
Field.’49  This suggests either that Canadian officials were more progressive than 
Canadian ministers, or that Canadian ministers were more realistic than their officials.  
Both should certainly have had no illusions about Rhodesian attitudes towards 
Commonwealth involvement in the Rhodesian problem.  During his visit to Ottawa in 
September 1963, Jack Howman, the Rhodesian Minister of Internal Affairs, expressed 
doubts about whether ‘African Commonwealth countries would help to find any solution 
short of complete surrender to African demands which his Government was not prepared 
to make.’  Although Howman was interested to hear that Julius Nyerere was willing to 
consider a compromise solution in Rhodesia that would give Africans less than ‘one man 
one vote’, he suggested that ‘Radio Dar-Es-Salaam was one of his Government’s most 
troublesome enemies and Mr Nyerere might best do something to curb their 
propaganda.’50  Howman indicated that he did not think that the Commonwealth could 
play any special role in the Rhodesian problem and when the idea of a Commonwealth 
good offices mission was put to him he ‘clearly implied that his Government would 
regard [the] appointment of such a mission as unwarranted interference in their affairs.’51  
Similarly, when Tom Carter, a senior Canadian External Affairs official, visited Salisbury 
in April 1964 he found that Rhodesian ministers and officials ‘were very anxious to 
explain their points of view, but with only one or two exceptions, they did not envisage 
any role for Canada in the resolution of Southern Rhodesian constitutional difficulties.’  
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Carter advised: ‘We should not, of course, delude ourselves as to the role Canada might 
play … The Canadian role, at best, would be a marginal one.’52 
 
Nevertheless, Canadian officials were not wholly discouraged by Rhodesian 
intransigence.  Conscious of the need for new ideas in advance of the 1965 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting, the Canadian High Commissioner in Nigeria, 
Harrison Cleveland, launched a diplomatic initiative on the Rhodesian problem, which 
was apparently shot down by his own ministers and the Australian Government.  
Cleveland observed that in order to forestall the influence of more radical elements in 
Rhodesia, such as the Organisation of African Unity, and Russian- and Chinese-backed 
African nationalists, it might prove necessary to ‘associate the Commonwealth in some 
way with the transitional arrangements leading to independence’.53  Cleveland proposed 
setting up in Rhodesia a Commonwealth Commission of Government similar to that used 
in Newfoundland during the 1930s and 1940s.54  Cleveland recognised that the situation 
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in Rhodesia was ‘obviously not on all fours’ with the conditions that had prevailed in 
Newfoundland, but suggested that ‘a comparable constitutional basis might be sought.’  A 
Commission of Government for Rhodesia could include representatives of the United 
Kingdom, Rhodesia, one African and one non-African Commonwealth country.  
Cleveland suggested that: 
 
The Commission of Government would not need to exercise authority in 
matters which are being satisfactorily handled by existing ministries.  
However, it could have sufficient authority to ensure that the terms of any 
agreement reached between Britain and Rhodesia are implemented.  
Among its responsibilities the Commission of Government could 
recommend the date on which Rhodesia would have fulfilled the 
preconditions for independence.55 
 
Cleveland also suggested that this proposal might be easier for the British Government to 
accept if a Commonwealth Court was established to hear cases involving racial 
discrimination in Rhodesia.  The continuation of the Commonwealth Court after Rhodesia 
became independent on the basis of African majority rule would also provide some 
measure of protection for the European settlers.56  Cleveland advised that from his 
conversations with African Prime Ministers he believed Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and the 
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Gambia would support a coalition government in Rhodesia if Ian Smith included two or 
three Africans in his Cabinet.57 
 
It is uncertain how Cleveland’s proposal was received in Ottawa, but Australian officials 
formed the impression that whilst the idea of a Commission of Government was not likely 
to commend itself to Lester Pearson the proposal for a Commonwealth Court might hold 
some attraction.58  The fact that neither of these ideas were mentioned in Canadian briefs 
for the Prime Ministers’ Meeting and were not raised by Pearson in London suggests the 
Canadian Government thought that Cleveland’s proposals were not worth pursuing.59  
Even if the Canadian Government had decided to pursue them it would not have received 
any support from Australia.  When Paul Hasluck, the Australian Minister of External 
Affairs, heard about Cleveland’s proposals he exclaimed: ‘What a damn silly idea!  I will 
take a copy to London with me in case it comes to the surface.’60  Why Hasluck should 
have thought this is not clear.  Cleveland admitted that the circumstances in Rhodesia in 
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1965 were not exactly analogous to the situation in Newfoundland in the 1930s, but it 
may be argued that this did not automatically invalidate the proposal for a transitional 
arrangement based on a Commission of Government.  If the Commonwealth had accepted 
Cleveland’s ideas the biggest stumbling block would no doubt have been the attitude of 
the Rhodesian Government, which would have protested this form of Commonwealth 
interference perhaps even more vigorously than it resisted proposals for a Commonwealth 
conference. 
 
The idea of a special Commonwealth mission surfaced in October 1965, immediately 
after the breakdown of negotiations between the British and Rhodesian Governments in 
London.  Harold Wilson wrote to Ian Smith advising that Sir Robert Menzies had agreed 
to take part in ‘a small Commonwealth mission of respected senior statesmen which 
could go to Rhodesia and examine the whole situation.’  Wilson hoped that the Prime 
Ministers of Nigeria and Ceylon and one other Commonwealth state would accompany 
Menzies.61  Wilson also made a television broadcast announcing the proposal, which he 
ended with an appeal: ‘I know I speak for everyone in these islands, all parties, all our 
people, when I say to Mr Smith, “Prime Minister, think again.”’62  The seriousness of the 
situation commanded Old Commonwealth support.  Keith Holyoake, for example, 
immediately endorsed Wilson’s proposal by issuing a press statement that he was 
confident ‘a mission of Prime Ministers could give new perspective to the problem and 
clarify the implications of differing courses of action.’63  Yet despite the public support 
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given by Old Commonwealth leaders they must have privately felt that this proposal was 
a measure of the British Government’s desperation.  Wilson told his Cabinet that the 
Rhodesian Government would no doubt agree to a Commonwealth mission by Menzies, 
but it would be unacceptable to the British Government (and the Commonwealth) if the 
mission were confined only to Menzies and/or representatives from white Commonwealth 
countries.64  In fact, whilst the Rhodesian Government expressed its high regard for 
Menzies, and highlighted a standing invitation for him to visit Rhodesia, it was not 
prepared to accept any form of Commonwealth mission.  Smith replied to Wilson that 
those involved in such a mission would be ‘so far from the issues involved that … they 
could not better any contribution made by you and the Commonwealth Secretary’, and 
reiterated the fact that the Rhodesian Government had ‘always maintained that the 
Commonwealth has no jurisdiction as far as Rhodesia is concerned.’  Smith also pointed 
out that a Commonwealth mission would ‘have within its ranks people who have openly 
expressed themselves as enemies of the present Rhodesian Government and 
Constitution.’  He highlighted Tanzania’s pledge to withdraw from the Commonwealth if 
Britain granted independence to Rhodesia on the basis of anything less than African 
majority rule, and noted that Zambia and India had both raised objections to the proposal 
for a Commonwealth mission.65  ‘In other words’, as Smith later recalled in his memoirs, 
‘Wilson’s plan was floored before it started, so the whole thing turned out to be an utter 
farce.’66 
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Yet whilst the Rhodesian Government was disdainful of the Commonwealth and 
particularly its African members (which is discussed in the next chapter), it was not 
entirely unreceptive to the Old Commonwealth.  In July 1964 Ian Smith told the Canadian 
Ambassador to South Africa that the views of Canada, Australia and New Zealand were 
‘the only ones that count’.67  Moreover, in his memoirs Smith portrayed his personal 
relationship with Menzies and Holyoake as perfectly amiable.68  Perhaps, then, the Old 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers might have had a greater role to play after all.  Menzies 
and Pearson both had experience of crisis diplomacy and were respected Commonwealth 
statesmen who enjoyed considerable prestige.69  It is not inconceivable that had they been 
able to discuss the Rhodesian problem with the Rhodesian Government at an early stage, 
well before negotiations with Britain entered a critical phase, they might have been able 
to inspire sufficient confidence to arrive at a formula for a solution.  On the other hand, as 
one Australian diplomat noted in October 1965, for almost two years ‘British officials 
have cudgelled themselves numb in search for various alternative formulae which might 
be negotiable with Salisbury and which international opinion might be brought to 
tolerate.’70  It might therefore be presuming too much to suggest that Pearson or Menzies 
could have established a breakthrough, but the unwillingness of the Rhodesian 
Government to admit any form of Commonwealth interference ultimately renders such 
speculation idle.  However, in the absence of more determined attempts at constructive 
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engagement the British Government sought to involve the Old Commonwealth in its half-
hearted attempts to deter the Rhodesian Government from a UDI. 
 
The failure of deterrence 
 
The following discussion will firstly define deterrence and note the requirements for a 
successful deterrent strategy, and then explain why the Old Commonwealth’s efforts to 
support the British Government in this regard failed.  Deterrence has been defined as: ‘an 
effort by one actor to persuade an opponent not to take action of some kind against his 
interests by convincing the opponent that the costs and risks of doing so will outweigh 
what he hopes to gain thereby.’71  Successful deterrence depends upon a state conveying 
clearly to an opponent that the course of action it contemplates threatens the fundamental 
interests of the deterring state and that it is committed to defending its fundamental 
interests.  That commitment must be backed by threats that are both credible and 
sufficiently potent in the mind of the opponent to convince it that the deterring state has 
the motivation and the capability to defend its fundamental interests.72  Yet attempts by 
Britain and the Old Commonwealth to deter Rhodesia from a UDI between 1964 and 
1965 lacked the essential attributes that were required for success.  They were also 
dealing with an opponent that rationalised the situation in its own terms and considered 
that its own fundamental interests were at stake in its claim for independence.  It is clear 
that without a public commitment to use force (which was entirely unacceptable to the 
Old Commonwealth) the governments of Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand 
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could not have deterred Rhodesia from a UDI even if they had orchestrated their efforts 
with greater regard for the principles of deterrence. 
 
The first attempt by the Old Commonwealth to deter Rhodesia from a UDI was when 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand acted in support of the British Government’s 
warning statement of October 1964.73  Canadian officials suggested immediately that 
although the British Government had not approached the Canadian Government it should 
nevertheless do whatever it could to support British efforts at deterrence and to show 
solidarity with the African members of the Commonwealth.74  Canadian officials also 
urged their Australian and New Zealand counterparts to adopt a similar view and take 
supportive action.75  The New Zealand Government was swift to react, irrespective of 
Canadian pressure.  Holyoake released a statement, which observed that the terms of the 
British statement were in line with the discussions on Rhodesia at the 1964 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting, and confirmed his Government’s opposition 
to a UDI.76  Yet privately Holyoake told Wilson that although he supported the terms of 
the British statement: ‘I cannot hope, however, that publication at this stage will succeed 
in deterring the Rhodesians from going ahead irrespective of the consequences with all 
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their embarrassments for the Commonwealth especially within the United Nations.’77  
Australian officials demonstrated similar concerns; it was suggested that although it 
might be better for the British Government to be rid of the Rhodesian problem through a 
UDI, ‘from our point of view it was surely far better that the British should go on dealing 
with the problem than that Southern Rhodesia should break away when we would be 
faced with all sorts of awkward initiatives and choices in the United Nations.’78  The 
Australian Prime Minister was similarly anxious that Wilson’s warning statement should 
not foreclose constructive engagement with the Rhodesian Government.  Menzies wrote 
to Wilson: ‘You may be assured of our full support … for your latest statement … I have 
no doubt that you will do what you can to preserve some possibility of negotiation.’79  It 
is clear from the evidence that whereas the Canadian Government was concerned to 
support Britain on the Rhodesian issue order to preserve the integrity of the 
Commonwealth, the Australian and New Zealand Governments were motivated more by 
a desire to avoid the awkward issue of reprisals against Rhodesia in the event of a UDI. 
 
Whatever the motives of the Old Commonwealth, the action that they took in support of 
the British Government in October 1964 was certainly effective.  Ian Smith later wrote 
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O.27765, 29 October 1964. Other documents on this file indicate that Australian officials also prevailed 
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that Wilson’s ‘bull-headed tactics’ had no effect.80  Yet the deterrent action taken by 
Britain and the Old Commonwealth clearly postponed any illegal action by the Rhodesian 
Government.  Ian Smith admitted in a broadcast two days after the British statement that 
he had abandoned his hope of independence by Christmas.81  The state funeral of Winston 
Churchill in London in January 1965 presented the Prime Ministers of Britain and the Old 
Commonwealth with an opportunity to impress upon Smith in person their opposition to a 
UDI.  Smith’s behaviour was difficult and in discussions with Wilson he was bullish 
about Rhodesia’s prospects for independence.82  His mood was perhaps not unrelated to 
the frustration caused by the action that Britain and the Old Commonwealth had taken the 
previous October.  In his memoirs Smith recalled that he was invited to the Savoy Hotel 
for tea with Menzies and Holyoake on the morning after Churchill’s funeral.  He wrote: 
‘It was obvious to us that Wilson had asked them to try and twist my arm over the 
independence issue’, but suggested that their talk was all about sport, not politics.83  Yet 
Smith’s account is distorted, for Holyoake told Wilson that he had advised Smith that 
Rhodesia needed friends and ought to be cautious.84  Smith also made no mention in his 
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memoirs of another meeting that he had with Lester Pearson at the Dorchester Hotel, 
where the talk was definitely about politics.  The Canadian record of the meeting states: 
 
The general impression that Mr. Smith conveyed was of an almost 
fanatical determination to make no concession whatever from the position 
as now established in Rhodesia.  He clearly thinks there is no possibility of 
any negotiation or any adjustment, however, minor.  It is equally apparent 
that he personally, and presumably his government, is quite prepared to 
contemplate independence on a unilateral basis outside the Commonwealth 
– counting on the support of their immediate neighbouring countries to the 
South and the weakness of African states generally.85 
 
This confirms that Smith adopted the same posture in his meeting with Pearson as he had 
with Wilson that same day.  Oddly, Smith told Pearson, Menzies and Holyoake that he 
had not had a meeting with Wilson.  As Wilson later wrote, it was astounding that Smith 
thought he could get away with misleading the Commonwealth leaders like this, as they 
were bound to discuss matters with Wilson.86  It is perhaps unfortunate that no attempt 
was made to convene a meeting between all of the Old Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
and Smith so that they could warn him jointly, face-to-face, that a UDI would meet with 
Commonwealth reprisals.  On the other hand, the records of Smith’s meetings with 
Wilson and Pearson suggest that he really did not care what they thought or did and was 
willing to deal with the consequences of illegal action.  Thereafter, attempts to deter 
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86 Wilson, The Labour Government, pp. 74-75. 
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Rhodesia from a UDI became even more difficult because the Rhodesian Government 
had time to consider how it could circumvent some of the consequences that it knew 
would flow from any illegal action on its part.87 
 
Smith’s behaviour in London and his casual attitude towards the consequences of a UDI 
caused grave concern in the Canadian Government.  It was suggested at both the official 
and political levels that the British Government should be more specific about the 
consequences of a UDI, and should put forward proposals for constitutional reform.  Even 
if this provoked a UDI then Britain’s more positive approach to the Rhodesian problem 
would at least limit the damage to the Commonwealth.88  In a letter to Arthur Bottomley, 
Paul Martin reiterated the Canadian Government’s position: 
 
I believe that our two Governments agree closely in our approach to the 
Rhodesian problem, although your direct interest and responsibility is, of 
course, far greater than ours.  We are, however, deeply concerned about 
the situation in Rhodesia because of the strain which it continues to place 
on relations between old and new members of the Commonwealth and 
because of the damage which a unilateral declaration of independence 
might cause to the whole position of the West in Africa.89 
                                                 
87 On 26 April 1965, the Rhodesian Government published a White Paper entitled ‘Economic Aspects of a 
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reporting the views of Tom Carter, 11 February 1965; Paul Martin to Arthur Bottomley, Letter, 18 February 
1965 (also in FO 371/181876).  
89 Ibid. 
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Martin’s message arrived just before the Commonwealth Secretary was due to visit 
Rhodesia.  On his return Bottomley advised Martin that he had left Smith in no doubt 
about the likely consequences of a UDI.  Bottomley did not think that a more precise 
statement of British intentions would have any greater effect on Smith ‘because, in spite 
of the consequences, he is in the last resort prepared to face them if he cannot achieve a 
negotiated settlement.’90  Australian officials reacted in a similar way when they learned 
of Martin’s message to Bottomley.  They questioned Martin’s sense of urgency about the 
Rhodesian problem and doubted both the efficacy of using economic arguments to reason 
with Smith and the utility of economic sanctions in the event of a UDI.91  The Australian 
Ambassador to South Africa wrote: ‘I find it surprising that the Canadians should still 
regard Mr Smith as a sort of man who will be impressed by threats.  He is not that sort of 
man.  I should also judge that he is already very conscious of the kinds of punitive action 
which might follow a unilateral declaration.’92  The Ambassador dismissed Canadian 
concerns about the likely impact of a UDI on the Commonwealth, implied that Martin 
was ignorant of the political situation in Rhodesia, and observed that discussion of the 
Rhodesian problem at the forthcoming Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Meeting would 
not find favour with Robert Menzies.93  Clearly, then, there was no enthusiasm in Britain 
or Australia for Canadian proposals for a more forceful deterrent statement.94 
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The threat of economic sanctions in the event of a UDI certainly did not have much 
psychological effect on the Rhodesian Government, which knew very well that Rhodesian 
trade with the Old Commonwealth was limited and therefore dispensable.  For the same 
reason, the Old Commonwealth did not have faith in sanctions either as an instrument of 
deterrence or coercive diplomacy.  Doubts were even evident in Canada at both the 
official and political levels.  Trade between Canada and Rhodesia was worth around $3 
million annually, which gave the Canadian Government very little economic leverage.95  
The Canadian Government also knew that Ian Smith was unperturbed by the loss of 
Commonwealth preferences, since he thought that these would probably disappear within 
a few years anyway.96  Lester Pearson was therefore not optimistic that the threat of 
economic sanctions would have much effect in deterring Rhodesia from a UDI.97  
Australian trade with Rhodesia was on a similar scale to that of Canada.  Shortly after the 
dissolution of the Central African Federation Australian officials reported that in 1961-62 
Australian imports from the Federation amounted to just under £2 million and Australian 
exports were worth a little more than £3 million.98  In 1965-66 Australian exports to 
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Rhodesia were around $5 million (and remained at a similar level for the remainder of the 
decade despite the introduction of sanctions).99  It is therefore not surprising that 
Australian officials repeatedly advised that sanctions would have little effect.100  New 
Zealand was an even greater irrelevance to the Rhodesian Government in economic 
terms.  In 1963-64 New Zealand exports to the Central African Federation were worth 
only £169,792 and imports from the Federation amounted to just £293,330.101  Trade 
figures clearly demonstrate that the relationship between Rhodesia and the Old 
Commonwealth was a long way from being a vital economic interest for either side, and 
threats of economic sanctions could not, therefore, be expected to deter Rhodesia from a 
UDI. 
 
Shortly before the negotiations between Wilson and Smith in London in October 1965, 
Wilson requested Pearson, Menzies, and Holyoake to ‘approach Smith in whatever way 
you think best calculated to influence him and his colleagues against extreme action on 
their part … It seems to me, subject to the course of events in the next few days, that a 
message from you would be most effective if it were made immediately and publicly after 
it became clear that the current negotiation has foundered.’102  The Old Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers were at a loss to understand Wilson’s reasoning; they recognised that if 
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they delivered their messages to Smith after negotiations had failed it would have little 
effect.  Holyoake advised Wilson: ‘I prefer that a candid but friendly warning from New 
Zealand be delivered during your current negotiations and before any irrevocable step is 
taken.’103  Holyoake’s message was indeed forthright but balanced.  He warned that in the 
event of a UDI New Zealand would not recognise an illegal regime, and observed: 
‘Economic and trading preferences would have to be withdrawn and it would breach the 
present sympathetic relationship between our two governments.’  Holyoake affirmed New 
Zealand’s admiration for the European achievement in Rhodesia and suggested that their 
interests would be best served by a policy of reconciliation and acceptance of the 
principle of majority rule, with an appropriate period of transition.104  Menzies rejected 
the two extreme positions associated with the Rhodesian question – that there should 
either be immediate majority rule or indefinite minority rule – and asserted that the 
problem was one of timetable.  Menzies warned Smith that if a UDI took place ‘the 
results, not all of which are foreseeable, could be both painful and difficult.’  In particular 
Menzies pointed out that if the United Nations became involved it could lead to a 
situation that the Australian Government could neither ‘anticipate nor control.’  Menzies 
also praised Wilson’s handling of the Rhodesian question at the Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers’ Conference: ‘He was patient and understanding and avoided all suggestion of 
having fixed or intolerant views.’  Menzies concluded that there was therefore no reason 
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why the London negotiations should not be approached in a statesmanlike manner.105  
Pearson’s message was very similar in tone.  He advised Smith that he had no intention of 
expressing any detailed views on the negotiations, and emphasised the common heritage 
between Canada and Rhodesia.  Pearson reminded Smith that Canada had attempted to 
maintain ‘close and effective relations’ by providing aid to Rhodesia, and was trying to 
appreciate Rhodesia’s problems and the Rhodesian Government’s approach to them.  
Pearson asked Smith ‘to give very careful thought to all the consequences before taking 
any irrevocable step which could separate you from Britain, from Canada, and from other 
Commonwealth countries.’106  In his replies to the Old Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
Smith assured them that the London negotiations had been undertaken with goodwill and 
in the hope of reaching a settlement, but if an agreement could not be reached he would 
do what was in Rhodesia’s best interests.  Smith expressed his hope that in the event of a 
UDI it would still be possible to maintain friendly relations with the Old Commonwealth 
and asked for a deferred judgment to see how the Rhodesian Government discharged its 
responsibilities towards the Rhodesian people.107  When the London negotiations did 
break down, Pearson was quick to advise Wilson and Smith that in the event of a UDI it 
would not be possible for Canada to maintain normal relations of any kind with 
Rhodesia.108  Holyoake released a press statement expressing New Zealand’s 
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disappointment at the failure of negotiations and warning of the ‘incalculable’ 
consequences if this were to be followed by a UDI.109 
 
Smith clearly hoped that in the event of a UDI it would be possible to maintain a 
diplomatic relationship with the Old Commonwealth.  The private messages from and 
public statements by the Old Commonwealth Prime Ministers, though clearly warning 
Rhodesia of the consequences of a UDI, do not appear to have destroyed Smith’s 
illusions.  A better way to disabuse Smith of his misplaced hopes would perhaps have 
been to orchestrate a truly joint approach by Pearson, Menzies and Holyoake.  This would 
at least have given the impression of Old Commonwealth solidarity on the Rhodesian 
issue (even though this was not actually the case).  Yet the New Zealand Prime Minister 
took the opposite view, advising Wilson: ‘In the past, I recall, the Rhodesians have 
referred somewhat scathingly to what they regard as evidence of the Old Commonwealth 
acting in concert and it may perhaps have been that the joint approach has tended to 
lessen our influence.’110  Canadian officials also expressed their concern that the 
Rhodesian Government might interpret the separate but simultaneous approaches by 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand ‘as evidence of carefully planned collaboration.’111 
   
The final Old Commonwealth initiative that may have had a potential deterrent effect 
upon the Rhodesian Government (though it was not conceived in such terms) came 
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during the hiatus in the final stages of negotiations between the British and Rhodesian 
Governments.  Upon learning of Smith’s rejection of a proposed Royal Commission, 
Lester Pearson telephoned Harold Wilson to discuss the possibility of a Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers’ Meeting to consider action in the event of a UDI.  They agreed that a 
Commonwealth meeting would be useful to limit the damage to the Commonwealth and 
to prevent the matter from getting out of hand at the United Nations.112  British officials 
recognised that it would be advantageous in terms of demonstrating positive action in the 
context of the Commonwealth, which could head off proposals for more extreme courses 
of action.  On the other hand there were several disadvantages: Rhodesia was primarily a 
British responsibility; a meeting ‘would provide a splendid forum for the Africans’ to 
bring maximum pressure to bear on the British Government; an initiative could fail (as 
had the attempted mediation over Vietnam); if the matter were before the United Nations 
it could confuse the issue; and many Commonwealth Prime Ministers would be unwilling 
or unable to attend at short notice.113   Indeed, the New Zealand and Australian 
Governments objected for a number of reasons, some of which had already been 
anticipated by British officials: the Commonwealth had no legal standing in the matter; a 
meeting would be used by African Prime Ministers to urge extreme courses of action, 
including military intervention, which Australia and New Zealand would not 
countenance; and as the decision on action to be taken in the event of a UDI rested with 
Britain, each Commonwealth government would wish to consider its own actions in the 
light of measures adopted by Britain.114  These were logical arguments, especially since 
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the British Government was known to oppose the use of force but had not made clear 
what measures it would take in the event of a UDI.  Wilson was still considering the 
Canadian proposal when he made his decision to fly to Salisbury for one more round of 
negotiations.115  However, Wilson’s personal diplomacy, combined with the reluctance of 
Australia and New Zealand, pushed the Canadian proposal into the background.  Yet if 
Wilson had left instructions to prepare for a Prime Ministers’ Meeting in the event of a 
UDI, he could have used this to bolster his position while he was in Salisbury, which 
might have created a pause in which the Rhodesian Government could reconsider its 
intended course of action.  On the other hand the Rhodesian Government might well have 
accused the British Government of bad faith in its negotiations and pointed to 
arrangements for a Commonwealth conference as a justification for a UDI.  The fact that 
the Rhodesian Government had consistently demonstrated little regard for 
Commonwealth opinion suggests that the latter response was more probable.  
Nevertheless, a Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting held before or immediately 
after a UDI could still have had some value in terms of signalling British and 
Commonwealth determination to deal swiftly with a UDI.  It would also have avoided the 
situation that later transpired in which Wilson agreed only reluctantly to Sir Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa’s invitation to attend a Commonwealth meeting in Lagos.116 
 
The efforts of Britain and the Old Commonwealth to deter Rhodesia from a UDI failed 
for two major reasons.  First, the Rhodesian Government did not believe that if it declared 
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independence it would threaten the fundamental interests of Britain and the Old 
Commonwealth.  In terms of international security, Britain and, to a lesser extent, the Old 
Commonwealth, were concerned about the spread of Communism in Africa, but this did 
not threaten their immediate national security.  In any event the Rhodesian Government 
was convinced that the ‘White Redoubt’ (Rhodesia, South Africa and the Portuguese 
colonies) was an effective barrier to the spread of Communism in Sub-Saharan Africa.  In 
ideological terms, Britain and the Old Commonwealth professed that they were 
committed to democratic government and liberal freedoms, which the granting of 
independence was supposed to facilitate.  The Rhodesian Government, however, believed 
that African majority rule would result in one party government in Rhodesia and 
recognised that the Australian and New Zealand Governments were sympathetic to 
Rhodesian concerns in this regard.  In economic terms British interests in Rhodesia were 
well in excess of those of the Old Commonwealth.  The only collective element of 
concern was the potential impact of a UDI on Zambia, whose copper production was 
essential to western defence contractors, but only the Canadian Government was actively 
involved in contingency planning to safeguard the Zambian economy.  Overall, then, 
Britain and the Old Commonwealth struggled to persuade the Rhodesian Government that 
their fundamental interests – whether measured in terms of security, ideology, or 
economics – were at stake in the event of a UDI. 
 
The second reason why deterrence did not work is that Britain and the Old 
Commonwealth failed to develop threats that were credible or sufficiently potent to 
persuade the Rhodesian Government that they meant business.  Britain and the Old 
Commonwealth coordinated their diplomatic warnings to some degree, but they did not 
act jointly, partly because of divergence in their views and partly because they did not 
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want the Rhodesian Government to feel that the Old Commonwealth was conspiring 
against it.  This perhaps reduced the impact of the warnings delivered by Britain, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand individually.  Britain and the Old Commonwealth ruled out 
the use of force, which meant that they could only make (usually vague) pronouncements 
about the dire political and economic consequences that would follow a UDI.  Warnings 
were sent reluctantly, especially by Australia and New Zealand, and were received with 
regret by the Rhodesian Government, but they did not unduly concern Ian Smith and his 
ministers.  They felt that their exclusion from the Commonwealth would be nothing more 
than symbolic and calculated that economic sanctions would have little effect because 
Rhodesian trade with the Old Commonwealth was in any case limited.  The efforts of 
Britain and the Old Commonwealth to deter Rhodesia from a UDI therefore lacked much 
sense of credibility or potency. 
 
The dilemma of representation 
 
One of the major arguments advanced in this thesis is that structural problems 
complicated the management of the Rhodesian Crisis, and this is no less true of the 
Commonwealth aspects than it is of the British domestic policy-making process or 
Britain’s relations with the United States.117  The political and diplomatic channels of 
communication through which the Commonwealth aspects of the Rhodesian problem 
were managed were complex.  They involved periodic consultation between the British 
Prime Minister and the Prime Ministers of Canada, Australia and New Zealand; personal 
communication between the Old Commonwealth Prime Ministers and the Rhodesian 
Prime Minister; regular consultation between British officials and their Canadian, 
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Australian and New Zealand counterparts; meetings between Rhodesian representatives 
and Old Commonwealth officials; and multilateral contacts in the context of the 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meetings (which is discussed in the next chapter).  
Rhodesia’s constitutional status as a self-governing colony was somewhat ambivalent but 
it was definitely not an independent member of the Commonwealth.  As such, Rhodesian 
external affairs were the responsibility of the British Government and Salisbury had no 
constitutional right to enter into diplomatic relations with independent members of the 
Commonwealth or other sovereign states (though it did attempt to defy this convention).  
The Rhodesian High Commission in London and the British High Commission in 
Salisbury served as the main channels of communication between British and Rhodesian 
Governments and there were no equivalent forms of bilateral representation between 
Rhodesia and any other state.  As suggested above, this did not mean that there was a 
complete absence of diplomatic links between Rhodesia and other members of the 
Commonwealth.  For example, the Canadian High Commission in London liaised with 
the Rhodesian High Commission, Rhodesian representatives who were attached to the 
British Embassy in Washington made periodic visits to Ottawa, Canadian diplomats 
occasionally visited Rhodesia, and there was also a Canadian Trade Commission in 
Salisbury.  Similar arrangements pertained to Australia, though it did not place the same 
degree of emphasis on diplomatic links with Rhodesia that Canada did.  New Zealand had 
no form of representation in Salisbury at all and did not attempt to cultivate a regular 
diplomatic relationship with Rhodesia (which reflected the fact that New Zealand’s 
material interests in Africa were so limited that it did not justify the costs of 
representation), though it did receive information from the Rhodesian Government, which 
it sought to verify through other channels.118 
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All of this had different significance for the parties to the Rhodesian problem.  The 
Rhodesian Government argued that because Canada, Australia, and New Zealand lacked 
sufficient diplomatic representation in Salisbury, they did not have an accurate picture of 
local conditions and therefore could not formulate a valid opinion about Rhodesian claims 
to independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution.  The Canadian, Australian and 
New Zealand diplomatic establishments sometimes felt that they lacked first-hand 
information, but the main concern, in Ottawa especially, was that without sufficient 
representation in Salisbury they were unable to exert influence on a regular basis.  Britain 
and the Old Commonwealth were also conscious of the fact that the limited diplomatic 
links between Rhodesia and the Old Commonwealth could be interpreted by Salisbury as 
a lack of genuine concern with the Rhodesian problem.  Yet the Old Commonwealth was, 
of course, faced with an obvious dilemma.  If they had augmented the status of their 
representation in Salisbury it might have facilitated better relations with the Rhodesian 
Government, but at the same time it would have poisoned relations with the African 
members of the Commonwealth, who would have undoubtedly condemned the Old 
Commonwealth for colluding with the European minority in Rhodesia.  The dilemma of 
representation is therefore an excellent illustration of the difficulties associated with the 
management of the Rhodesian problem. 
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The ineffectual nature of Canadian representation in Salisbury acquired a farcical quality 
that did not sit well with the seriousness of the Rhodesian problem.  In July 1964 the 
British High Commissioner in Salisbury commented on the incongruity between 
Canadian interest in a satisfactory outcome to the Rhodesian problem and the lack of 
effective Canadian representation in Salisbury: 
 
Until earlier this year their only representative was a Trade Commissioner 
[Lester Glass] of the most useless kind of near-pensioner it is possible to 
imagine.  So far as I can ascertain he does no work to speak of, and 
certainly takes no part in local life whatsoever.  He is a semi-invalid, and 
his wife apparently a total invalid – at least she has never appeared in 
public and I have never met her.  I have seen him once this year (Canada 
Day), and twice last – the first at the Armistice Day ceremony, when he 
forgot his wreath, and the second when the diplomats took formal leave of 
Sir Roy Welensky, when he was a quarter of an hour late!119 
 
To be sure, the Canadian Department of External Affairs (DEA) was aware of the nature 
of this problem, which had been under review since the impending dissolution of the 
Central African Federation.  Lester Glass was due to be replaced by a younger official, 
Ian Smyth, who was scheduled to arrive in Salisbury by January 1964 in readiness to take 
over as Trade Commissioner by the summer.  Officials also recommended that a Foreign 
Service Officer (FSO) should be attached to the Canadian Trade Commission in Salisbury 
for a number of reasons.  First, it was important for Canada to establish a way of 
obtaining objective and reliable views on the Rhodesian problem.  This would ensure that 
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Canada was properly informed in the event that she was called upon to attend a 
Commonwealth conference on the Rhodesian question, or to make statements at the 
United Nations, where the issue had intensified since the independence of Kenya and 
Zanzibar.  Second, it would be a useful means by which to establish regular contact with 
African nationalists.  Third, because external aid to Rhodesia was likely to increase, it 
would be helpful to have a FSO in Salisbury to administer the programme.  Finally, as 
Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were both scheduled to attain independence in 1964, it 
would be useful to accredit Canadian representatives in Salisbury to the newly 
independent states.120 
 
The Canadian Government treated this recommendation with caution because it coincided 
with a request from the Rhodesian Government to exchange accredited diplomatic 
representatives.121  This was obviously an attempt by the Rhodesian Government to 
subvert the constitutional convention that the British Government had responsibility for 
the conduct of Rhodesian external affairs, but the Canadian DEA did not dismiss the idea 
out of hand.  In a meeting on 4 March 1964 it was suggested that there might be some 
advantage in securing the appointment of a Rhodesian High Commissioner in Ottawa, 
since this would allow the Canadian Government to exercise some influence on the 
Rhodesian Government to refrain from a UDI.  However, it was also recognised that it 
would have serious drawbacks in terms of Canada’s relations with African members of 
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the Commonwealth, ‘since they would undoubtedly look on it as an Old Commonwealth 
gesture of support for the present white government in Salisbury.’  The Canadian 
Government therefore declined the Rhodesian invitation to exchange diplomatic 
representatives on the basis that: ‘It is Canadian practice to use the title of High 
Commissioner only for representatives of independent members of the Commonwealth 
and that we do not think that the present circumstances would justify our making an 
exception in the case of Southern Rhodesia.’122  A similar desire to avoid gestures of 
encouragement to the Rhodesian Government was probably behind the Canadian 
Government’s decision not to attach a FSO to its Trade Commission in Salisbury.  
Instead, Ian Smyth took on the task of political reporting, and according to the British 
High Commissioner Smyth quickly ‘got into local confidence and the local picture 
extremely well.’123 
 
One incident that Smyth reported in June 1965 is worth recounting because it illustrates 
the nature of Canadian-Rhodesian diplomatic relations at the routine level.  Smyth 
advised his superiors that he had been called in to see M. B. Benoy, the Permanent 
Secretary of the Rhodesian Ministry of External Affairs, to answer questions about a 
recent visit to Salisbury by N. H. F. Berlis, the Canadian High Commissioner in 
Tanzania.  Benoy, who referred to a letter from the British South Africa Police, wanted to 
know why the High Commissioner had not presented himself officially to the Rhodesian 
Government, and why he had visited two well-known African nationalists.  Smyth 
explained that the visit was unofficial and personal but Benoy ‘virtually demanded to be 
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told what had been discussed at the meetings and suggested that perhaps Mr Berlis had 
been acting as a “courier”.’  Smyth gave a ‘short and sharp’ reply to the effect that he was 
not prepared to tolerate such a line of questioning and Benoy withdrew the accusation.  
Smyth reported that Benoy was in fact a close personal friend and had later told Smyth 
that ‘he had been “put up” to the interview by certain Ministers.’  Smyth commented that 
the episode showed that either Berlis or more likely the African nationalists had been 
under police surveillance, and referred to a previous report in which he had advised that 
‘our mail is still opened, our telephone tapped and, periodically, I am followed by various 
Rhodesian security personnel.’124  Smyth’s letter not only confirms that by mid-1965 
Rhodesia had become a police state, but also demonstrates that the Rhodesian 
Government treated Canadian diplomats with contempt.  This was at variance with the 
Rhodesian objective of establishing an enhanced diplomatic relationship with the Old 
Commonwealth, and appears even more incomprehensible given that Rhodesia was by 
this time in receipt of technical assistance from Canada. 
 
Australian diplomatic representation in Salisbury was even more limited than that of the 
Canadian Government.  Australia had maintained a Trade Commission in Salisbury since 
December 1954, but in 1963 the Department of Trade decided to reassign its Trade 
Commissioner to another post.  Administration of Australian trade interests was left in the 
hands of a locally recruited Englishman who was designated as a Marketing Officer.125  
In September 1963 Winston Field wrote to Sir Robert Menzies enquiring whether 
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Australia might open a diplomatic mission in Salisbury in order that Australia could be 
better informed on the Rhodesian problem (but it was also, no doubt, an attempt to obtain 
de facto recognition).  The Australian Government made no reply but official opinion 
suggested that sufficient information could be obtained from the Australian Ambassador 
in South Africa, Australian High Commissions in Africa, and material circulated by the 
British and Rhodesian Governments.126  A senior External Affairs official who visited 
Salisbury advised his Minister that Field had again raised the question of Australian 
representation.  In reviewing the situation the official recognised the same dilemma that 
faced the Canadian Government: on the one hand, it would probably be politically 
disadvantageous in terms of African opinion; but on the other hand, it would be useful to 
have better representation in Salisbury to handle technical assistance and immigration 
matters.  He concluded that ‘For these purposes, the maintenance of the Trade 
Commission, if properly staffed from Australia, would provide a suitable answer.’127  The 
Minister for External Affairs therefore requested the Department of Trade to appoint a 
suitably qualified officer to Salisbury.128  However, the Department of Trade did not feel 
that it could accommodate the request because Australian trade with Rhodesia was 
stagnant and its staffing resources for overseas posts were inadequate, so it shunted 
responsibility back to External Affairs.129  Against this background of bureaucratic 
unwillingness to accept responsibility, the Rhodesian Government once again asked if it 
would be possible to send a diplomatic representative to Salisbury.  The Australian 
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Ambassador to South Africa opined that this would probably not accomplish a great deal, 
‘although it might make the Southern Rhodesia authorities feel rather less isolated inside 
the old Commonwealth.’130  Yet this was precisely the point, and the Department of 
External Affairs ought to have apprehended the value of maintaining one of its officers in 
Salisbury not only for the purpose of gathering information, but also to signal a clear 
interest in the Rhodesian problem and to establish a clear line of communication with 
Salisbury.  However, External Affairs advised its Embassy in South Africa that it had 
decided to maintain the status quo, partly due to the impending Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers’ Meeting and partly because ‘Mr Smith’s emergence as Prime Minister has 
made the situation a little different’.131  One consequence of this decision was that in the 
absence of first-hand reports from Salisbury, the Department of External Affairs would 
have relied to a great extent on political reports from its Ambassador to South Africa 
who, as noted in the preceding chapter, was very sympathetic to the Europeans in 
Rhodesia.  It would perhaps be going too far to suggest that this shaped Australian policy 
on the Rhodesian issue, but it certainly reinforced it. 
 
Diplomatic representation has four major functions: achievement of statehood; contact 
and communication; promotion, explanation and defence of national interests; and 
acquisition of information.132  The Rhodesian Government undoubtedly aimed at the first 
and third functions in its exchanges with Canada and Australia, whereas the Canadians 
and Australians were concerned with the second and fourth functions.  Ottawa and 
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Canberra were attuned to the different emphasis that the Rhodesian Government was 
attempting to place on its diplomatic representation, which presented the Canadians and 
Australians with a delicate situation.  Ottawa was not prepared to exchange accredited 
representatives with Salisbury, nor even to augment the staffing of its Trade Commission, 
because this could easily be construed as showing approval of Rhodesian policies.  Only 
if the Rhodesian Government implemented progressive policies would Canada be 
disposed to review its policy.133  The Australian Government, which was aware of 
Canadian policy on representation, was also cognisant of the political disadvantages that 
would follow any decision to augment its representation in Salisbury.  However, 
Australian policy appears to have been guided less by concern for African opinion than 
consideration of staffing costs in the Departments of External Affairs and Trade.  The 
cautious approach adopted by Canada and Australia on the problem of representation was 
understandable, but it did not maximise their opportunities to exert influence in Salisbury 
and possibly signalled a lack of interest in the Rhodesian problem. 
 
Old Commonwealth contingency plans and initial responses to UDI 
 
Although the threat of a UDI was just below the surface on several occasions during 1964 
and 1965, the Old Commonwealth remained in the dark about the details of Britain’s 
likely response until just days before the Rhodesian Government issued its illegal 
declaration.  This was because British ministers had resolved to take firm decisions only 
in the light of the circumstances that prevailed at the time of a UDI, so British officials 
could not communicate much useful information to their Old Commonwealth 
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counterparts about British intentions in the event of a UDI.  This generated some friction 
between the British and Canadian Governments because the Canadians were anxious to 
be taken into British confidence.  By contrast the Australians and New Zealanders tended 
to take a more relaxed approach to contingency planning, which reflected their overall 
reluctance to impose economic sanctions against Rhodesia in the event of a UDI.  
 
Canada 
 
The Canadian Government gave urgent consideration to contingency planning against a 
UDI at three junctures during the Rhodesian crisis: in October 1964, when the British 
Government issued its warning statement against the consequences of a UDI; in the 
period February–May 1965, when it appeared to the Canadians that the effects of the 
warning statement had worn off and the Rhodesian Government was again preparing for a 
UDI; and between September and November 1965, when the fruitless Anglo-Rhodesian 
negotiations brought the prospect of a UDI much closer.  Unlike the Australian and New 
Zealand Governments, the Canadian Government was also involved in ongoing 
consultation with the British and Americans to safeguard Zambian copper production in 
the event of economic warfare between Rhodesia and Zambia.134 
 
During the first period of discussion, in October 1964, Canadian officials recognised that 
the Canadian Government would be obliged to take action against Rhodesia ‘especially in 
light of any British moves’, and would also need to take action ‘if the UN becomes seized 
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of the issue’.135  Suggested actions included: non-recognition of an illegal regime; 
withdrawal of Commonwealth preferences (though it was noted that this would have little 
economic effect on Rhodesia); and withdrawal of the Canadian Trade Commissioner 
(though it was felt that it might be valuable to retain some presence in Salisbury for 
consular purposes to assist Canadian citizens).136  Officials determined that if the 
Rhodesian question were brought before the UN Security Council and the Council 
decided to take action under Article 41 of the Charter, Canada would be committed to that 
decision.137  This immediate willingness to accede to a resolution in Chapter VII terms 
was characteristic of Canadian foreign policy and stood out in contrast to British, 
Australian, and New Zealand concerns about UN action.  Canadian officials were, 
however, concerned that the imposition of trade sanctions against Rhodesia could set a 
precedent for similar action against South Africa, and ‘would of course be contrary to the 
long-standing and moderate Canadian policy of non-interference with trade for political 
reasons.’  In the event of a UDI it would therefore be necessary to distinguish between 
South Africa and Rhodesia by stressing that the latter was ‘a rebellious and illegal 
government.’138 
 
As Canadian officials began to study the implications of action against Rhodesia, Paul 
Martin approached the British Government to request details of the measures that it 
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intended to implement in the event of a UDI.139  Arnold Smith also approached the 
British High Commission in Ottawa, but was told that no firm answers could be given on 
the points of detail that he raised.140  This was the beginning of a pattern of exchanges 
between the Canadian and British Governments.  The Canadian sense of urgency about 
consultation receded temporarily after it became clear that Ian Smith had backed away 
from a UDI.  The Canadian Government also felt more at ease because the British 
ministerial visit to Ottawa facilitated brief consideration of the Rhodesian issue, and the 
Commonwealth Relations Office instituted a practice of periodic consultation with the 
Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand High Commissioners in London.141  From 
February 1965, however, Canadian anxiety became heightened as a result of Ian Smith’s 
posturing.  Paul Martin wrote to Arthur Bottomley advising that because ‘a Rhodesian 
move might come very suddenly’ the Canadian Government was drawing up contingency 
plans for immediate action, including withdrawal of Commonwealth preferences: 
 
It would be helpful to our thinking if you could let us know whether you 
have drawn up plans of this nature.  Would you cut off preferences on 
Rhodesian tobacco and subject it to the general tariff?  Are you 
considering other measures, such as freezing Rhodesian sterling balances, 
treatment of Rhodesia as outside the sterling area and prevention of private 
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financial transactions with Rhodesia which have been mentioned in public 
discussion of the economic consequences of a unilateral declaration of 
independence?142 
 
Martin’s questions demonstrate that the British Government had not yet communicated 
anything specific to the Canadian Government.  Yet this was not surprising given that the 
Defence and Oversea Policy Committee had the matter under review at that precise 
moment, and had to address not only contingency measures against Rhodesia but also the 
Zambian aspects of the Rhodesian problem, the forthcoming visit of the Commonwealth 
Secretary to Rhodesia, and Rhodesian complaints about subversion fostered by 
neighbouring Commonwealth countries.143 Against this background Bottomley advised 
that he would arrange for an exchange of views with the Canadian Government once he 
had returned from Rhodesia.144  No substantive exchange took place until May, but even 
then British officials noted that: ‘In the absence of a decision by Ministers in advance of 
[a UDI] on the economic measures the British Government would take against Rhodesia 
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in that event, it will not be practicable for the Commonwealth Secretary to seek Canadian 
support for specific policies though we should be glad to know we can count on their 
general support.’145  Bottomley could only advise that the British Government was not 
prepared to impose economic sanctions as such, but would withdraw preferences, place 
an embargo on tobacco, and exclude Rhodesia from the London capital market.146  It 
cannot be coincidental that in a lengthy dispatch sent before the talks between Bottomley 
and Martin, the British High Commissioner in Ottawa noted that: ‘There are perhaps 
times when Canadian attitudes on international affairs seem tiresome to us: the perpetual 
demand to be consulted, the slightly “holier than thou” approach on thorny problems of 
which Canadian have little or no practical experience, a tendency to naivety and starry 
eyes in the approach to the newly independent nations.’147  The Commonwealth Relations 
Office was no doubt irritated by the ‘perpetual demand to be consulted’ on the Rhodesian 
problem, especially since it was not in a position to divulge greater details of British 
policy in the event of a UDI until a very late stage. 
 
In mid-September 1965 the Commonwealth Relations Office advised the Old 
Commonwealth High Commissioners in London that developments in the Rhodesian 
situation had taken a ‘serious down-turn’ and the British considered that the prospect of 
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negotiating an acceptable solution was slim.148  By the time of the London negotiations 
the Canadian Prime Minister had come to the conclusion that the Rhodesian Government 
was ‘under right wing domination and beyond influence.’149  In those circumstances the 
Canadian Government would no doubt have been anxious to finalise the measures that it 
would take in the event of a UDI, and would have been relieved when it at last received 
firmer details of British contingency plans.150  However, Canadian officials were still 
hesitant to recommend a trade embargo in the event of a UDI, not because of the costs to 
Canada but because of the principle of interfering with trade for political reasons.151  The 
Canadian Cabinet finally resolved the matter on 11 October, when it took decisions to 
withhold recognition of an illegal Rhodesian regime, withdraw its Acting Trade 
Commissioner from Salisbury, impose a complete arms embargo, suspend 
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Commonwealth preferences, and refuse all aid and finance agreements.152  According to 
one senior official, these decisions were taken to establish Canada in a position ‘from 
which it could give a relatively moderate lead to Commonwealth Africans, rather than 
merely argue against possibly extreme African initiatives.’153  It may therefore be 
observed that in its response to UDI the means of Canadian diplomacy were ultimately 
consistent with the objectives of Canadian foreign policy, despite some official 
reservations about the principles involved. 
 
Australia 
 
Canadian officials liaised extensively with their Australian counterparts throughout 1965, 
but they found little willingness in Canberra to discuss contingency plans.  As noted in 
the preceding chapter, key Australian officials were as averse as their political masters to 
the possibility that they might have to impose of sanctions against Rhodesia.  The 
Australian Government was also keen to avoid any involvement in contingency planning 
to protect Zambia against the effects of a UDI.154  However, the Australian Government’s 
response to Rhodesia’s UDI was eventually sufficiently robust to deflect any international 
criticism of Australian policy. 
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By late September 1965, Britain, Canada and New Zealand were beginning to consider 
their contingency plans in some detail, but this was not the case in Australia.  New 
Zealand officials in Canberra reported that it was ‘not thought likely that there will be 
much planning of Australian measures against the contingency of a UDI’, which reflected 
advice from the Attorney-General’s Department that the precise form of a UDI could not 
be predicted and without details of the British response Australian planning could not be 
taken very far.  The Australian Government therefore did not intend to resume inter-
departmental consultation ‘until UDI has ceased to be a contingency and has become a 
reality.’155  The day after Rhodesia declared itself independent New Zealand officials 
advised Wellington: ‘As you would expect there is more than a little sympathy in some 
influential quarters of the Cabinet for the position of the Rhodesian Europeans, and 
Ministers have hitherto shown a marked reluctance to consider in advance of the event 
what action Australia should take in response to a Rhodesian UDI.’  The Cabinet had 
begun to discuss the issue seriously, but it had concluded that the Australian Government 
should not rush into an announcement of punitive measures.156  In fact the only decision 
that the Australian Government made initially was to decline to finance or contribute 
physically to any use of force.157  As far as economic measures were concerned, the 
Cabinet observed that the British Government would hope to receive Commonwealth co-
operation, and the United Nations was bound to call for these as a minimum response.  
However, the Cabinet noted that economic measures were likely to have a greater impact 
on the African population in Rhodesia than the Rhodesian Government, and it was not 
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clear that they would succeed in re-establishing a legal administration.158  The Cabinet 
also recognised: ‘There is the further and important question of whether it is acceptable to 
the Australian people that there should be action by Australia against Rhodesia, especially 
in the light of our decisions not to place any measures on South Africa and our attitude to 
trade with Communist China.’159  The Cabinet therefore decided to defer any decisions 
pending further developments.160 
 
Developments in the UN Security Council, where African and Asian countries were 
demanding military intervention, overturned the Australian Government’s hesitant 
response to UDI.  ‘The Cabinet felt that the practical choice for all countries had now 
come down to a choice between supporting or acquiescing in military action and 
supporting economic measures.  This points, in Australia’s case, to a programme of 
economic measures.’161  If Australia did not act it would not only create embarrassment at 
the United Nations, ‘but would make Australia unacceptably conspicuous as the one 
country, apart perhaps from South Africa and Portugal, not to take action.’162  
Accordingly the Cabinet decided to ban the export of arms and military equipment to 
Rhodesia, to suspend tariff preferences, to ban the import of tobacco from Rhodesia (but 
with provision for the entry of shipments already in transit), to amend the Australian 
banking exchange regulations to exclude Rhodesia from the Sterling Area and to take 
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action to prevent evasion of exchange control measures, and to terminate the appointment 
of the Australian Trade Representative in Salisbury.163 
 
Menzies announced this programme of measures to the House of Representatives on the 
same day.164  As noted in the previous chapter, the Government’s policy was subjected to 
considerable debate, which revealed a substantial current of political opinion favourable 
to the Europeans in Rhodesia.  Yet despite the fact that the Australian Government had 
only reluctantly decided to impose economic sanctions, Australia’s international 
reputation was preserved by its robust response.  For example, the Ghanaian Government 
had ‘professed satisfaction with economic sanctions announced by Australia and said 
Ghana was lobbying in other non African states for a similar declaration.’165  By contrast, 
New Zealand’s response to UDI was subject to international criticism. 
 
New Zealand 
 
The New Zealand Government was apprised of British, Canadian, and Australian 
contingency planning (or lack of it) but did not itself address the implications of a UDI 
until the final stages of the Rhodesian Crisis.  New Zealand officials then took an 
intensely legalistic approach to the issue, which retarded New Zealand’s response to UDI.  
Britain and the wider Commonwealth interpreted New Zealand’s hesitant response as 
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political reluctance to impose measures against Rhodesia, and this interpretation was 
perhaps justified given the evidence presented in the preceding chapter. 
 
In late September 1965, a senior New Zealand official noted that the deterioration in 
relations between Britain and Rhodesia could prompt the latter to take some form of 
‘decisive action’, but anticipated that instead of an outright UDI, ‘it is more likely perhaps 
that Salisbury will attempt, through a series of unilateral acts, to assume independence 
gradually.’166  This assumption was based on the recent Rhodesian effort to have their 
representative in Lisbon formally accredited.167  It was argued that: ‘Although there are 
numerous imponderables, this is a subject to which we should now be giving some 
careful thought.’  In particular, the New Zealand Government would have to consider: the 
effects of a cessation of trade with Rhodesia; the amendment of legislation to permit 
                                                 
166 ANZ: ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 12, ‘Rhodesia: New Zealand Contingency Planning’, 
Memorandum by T. C. Larkin, 28 September 1965. 
167 Ibid.  On 13 September the British Defence and Overesea Policy Committee (DOPC) noted that a 
Rhodesian representative, Mr Harry Reedman, was due to arrive in Lisbon two days later and the 
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13 September 1965.  The Canadians were worried because they did not know how to treat Reedman.  ANZ: 
ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 12, New Zealand High Commission, Ottawa, to DEA, Wellington, Cable 
No. 534, 21 September 1965; and NAA: A1838, 190/9/1, Part 2, Australian High Commission, Ottawa, to 
DEA, Canberra, Cable No. 183, 21 September 1965.  In the House of Commons Michael Stewart asserted 
that Reedman’s appointment was not in the capacity of ‘accredited diplomatic representative’.  Hansard, 
House of Commons Debates, Vol. 718, Col. 116, 1 November 1965.  Cited in Windrich, Britain and the 
Politics of Rhodesian Independence, p. 41. 
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withdrawal of Commonwealth preferences; the effects of a UDI on Rhodesia’s 
membership of the Commonwealth, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), and UN specialised agencies; and the question of recognition of a government in 
exile.  A major concern was the possibility that the use of sanctions against Rhodesia 
could set a precedent for their use against South Africa.168 
 
Officials gave detailed consideration to the implications for New Zealand of a UDI and 
concluded that in some respects the position taken by the New Zealand Government 
would depend upon following British or international precedents.  For example, in terms 
of the constitutional status of Rhodesia after a UDI, ‘the choice for New Zealand will 
probably lie between regarding Rhodesia as a rebellious piece of Commonwealth territory 
or as an alien territory whose paternity is no longer acknowledged; and it is primarily for 
the British to say what is the situation.’169  As far as tariffs were concerned, the New 
Zealand Government could withdraw Commonwealth preferences by Order in Council, 
but the GATT was an inhibiting factor because it imposed a legal obligation to place 
Rhodesia on the Most Favoured Nation Tariff (as opposed to the General Tariff) unless 
this were set aside by UN Security Council directive.  Any embargo on trade would 
involve the same considerations.170  The withdrawal of South Africa from the 
Commonwealth had shown that matters relating to Commonwealth agreements, such as 
telecommunications and merchant shipping, could be dealt with at leisure.  When it came 
to membership of international organisations such as the GATT and UN specialised 
                                                 
168 ANZ: ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 12, ‘Rhodesia: New Zealand Contingency Planning’, 
Memorandum by T. C. Larkin, 28 September 1965. 
169 ANZ: ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 12, ‘Consequences for New Zealand of a Rhodesian UDI’, DEA 
Memorandum, 30 September 1965, para. 1. 
170 Ibid., para. 2. 
 259 
agencies, however, Rhodesia could only be excluded by collective international action.171 
On the political side, officials noted that in keeping with previous announcements New 
Zealand would not be able to recognise an illegal Rhodesian Government, but beyond this 
commitment: 
 
New Zealand is free to act as our conscience and interests dictate, although 
it is clear that in the broad context of our relations with Africa and with 
Asia we cannot fall too far behind in the sincerity and credibility of our 
response. In view of the very limited volume of New Zealand trade with 
Rhodesia, decisions of an essentially political character will be required to 
show our good faith.172 
 
Officials concluded that in addition to non-recognition of an illegal Rhodesian 
Government it would also be impractical to recognise a government in exile because that 
too would lack any constitutional basis.173  If the United Nations imposed mandatory 
sanctions then the New Zealand Government would be obliged to comply, but up to this 
point it would be in New Zealand’s interests to argue against their adoption because of 
the implications that this could have for relations with South Africa.174  The Department 
of External Affairs therefore determined that New Zealand’s response to a UDI ‘should 
be a graduated one which would take account of the intentions and actions of other 
Commonwealth countries and the pressures which may develop within the UN.’  Whilst 
                                                 
171 Ibid., paras 4 and 5. 
172 ANZ: ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 12, ‘Rhodesia: Political Implications for New Zealand of a 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence’, DEA Memorandum, 30 September 1965, p. 1. 
173 Ibid., p. 2. 
174 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
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New Zealand would support the British it had ‘no intention of undertaking more severe 
courses of action than they contemplate.’175  Australian officials reported the New 
Zealand attitude more bluntly: they did not want to be ‘out in front’ on the Rhodesian 
issue and felt that ‘any action against Rhodesia would be unwelcome though in the event 
of a UDI some would have to be taken (including of course, non-recognition).’176 
 
When Rhodesia declared its independence unilaterally Keith Holyoake issued a press 
statement that action by New Zealand would be ‘determined after consultation with other 
Commonwealth countries and in light of discussions in the United Nations.’  The 
Secretary of External Affairs advised the Prime Minister that New Zealand could 
implement a number of measures including (in ascending importance) ‘an embargo on he 
export of strategic goods, the withdrawal of Commonwealth preference, the prohibition of 
Rhodesian tobacco imports and a complete trade embargo on all Rhodesian exports to 
New Zealand.  The total severance of all trade between us would, of course, be a final 
step.’177  McIntosh commented that there would be no advantage in taking measures more 
extreme than those implemented by Britain and the Old Commonwealth but New 
Zealand’s response would be monitored by the Commonwealth and at the United Nations: 
‘Should we fall too far behind our fellow members of the Commonwealth we run a risk of 
provoking criticism and of impairing the concerted international efforts which are 
necessary to induce a change of heart in Rhodesia.’  McIntosh therefore recommended 
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516, 22 October 1965. 
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that the minimum response of New Zealand should be: an embargo on strategic goods, 
which would have no economic significance but ‘considerable presentational value’; and 
removal of the British Preferential Tariff, which again would have no economic 
ramifications because the Most Favoured Nation and General Tariff rates were the same 
on tobacco (the only significant import from Rhodesia).178  Only after Britain and 
Australia had announced more stringent economic measures did McIntosh recommend 
that the New Zealand Government should adopt a parallel response, including an 
embargo on Rhodesian tobacco.179  However, Holyoake’s public statement on the issue 
demonstrated an unwillingness to go this far and a lack of understanding of the symbolic 
importance of sanctions.  He questioned whether sanctions were effective, suggesting that 
they ‘are at any time an uncertain means of inducing any country to change its policies’, 
and observed that if sanctions were to have a chance of succeeding ‘they need to be 
widely supported and firmly sustained.’  Holyoake concluded that: 
 
New Zealand is not in a position to add substantially to the action taken by 
other Commonwealth governments.  Its trade with Rhodesia is small.  It 
has no diplomatic or trade representative in Salisbury.  Unlike Britain and 
Canada, it does not import Rhodesian sugar.  The only possible practical 
measure open to New Zealand relates to tobacco.  But since no more 
tobacco is likely to be bought until the sales next year an embargo by New 
Zealand at this stage has little real meaning.180 
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Holyoake’s position drew criticism from Britain and the Commonwealth.  At a meeting in 
London an official from the New Zealand High Commission was told that ‘the British 
were surprised and disappointed with [the] cautious attitude adopted by Wellington over 
[the] matter of economic sanctions.’181  Similarly, Alhaji Obisesan, a Nigerian 
parliamentarian, was reported as saying that at the Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Conference in December 1965 he would strongly criticise Holyoake’s ‘almost reluctant 
decision’ to impose sanctions.182   
 
New Zealand was, like Australia, very reluctant to consider the ramifications of a UDI.  
When New Zealand officials did finally examine the legal, political, and economic issues 
associated with the various measures that might be required, it was decided that an 
incremental approach to dealing with a UDI would be in New Zealand’s best interests.  
However, New Zealand’s gradualist response did not impress the British Government or 
the African Commonwealth.  It may therefore be argued that although the attitudes of 
officials and politicians in Wellington and Canberra towards the Rhodesian problem were 
very similar, the New Zealand response to UDI was not as effective as the Australian 
reaction. 
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182 NAA: A1838, 190/11/1, Part 5, ‘Holyoake to get ‘punch for timidity”’, Canberra Times, 27 November 
1965. 
 263 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has noted that the Old Commonwealth faced several obstacles in its attempts 
to influence the Rhodesian Government from either a positive or negative perspective.  
Perhaps foremost among these was the fact that the Rhodesian Government denied the 
competence of Commonwealth states to discuss Rhodesia’s internal affairs and to make 
suggestions for constitutional change in Rhodesia.  It is also evident that the Old 
Commonwealth lacked credibility in its efforts to deter the Rhodesian Government from a 
UDI, which was a result of both subjective and objective factors.  Sympathy in Australia 
and New Zealand for the Europeans in Rhodesia meant that they were not terribly 
enthusiastic about threatening the Rhodesian Government with reprisals in the event of a 
UDI, but such sympathy belied the truth that the Australian and New Zealand 
Governments would have little choice but to impose sanctions against Rhodesia in the 
event of a UDI.  In any event, the Old Commonwealth and Rhodesia knew perfectly well 
that the threat of sanctions carried little weight because trade between Rhodesia and the 
Old Commonwealth was so limited.  An additional factor that restricted the influence of 
the Old Commonwealth during the Rhodesian Crisis was its inadequate diplomatic 
representation in Salisbury.  In this respect, however, the Canadians and Australians were 
confronted by an awkward dilemma, because any increase in the status of their 
representation could be misconstrued in Salisbury and the Commonwealth as approval of 
Rhodesian Government policy. 
 
This chapter has also argued that opportunities to influence Rhodesia from a positive or a 
negative angle could have been pursued more vigorously.  For example, on the positive 
side the Old Commonwealth had the resources to improve the socio-economic status of 
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Africans in Rhodesia, and thereby prepare them for majority rule.  The British 
Government ought to have explored the possibility of greater collaboration with the Old 
Commonwealth in this regard and it stands out as a missed opportunity.  The Old 
Commonwealth might also have exploited feelings of ‘kith and kin’ to increase 
confidence among European Rhodesians that the Commonwealth was a worthwhile 
association, and to convince them that they were not alone in their defence of ‘standards’, 
or their resistance to Communism in Africa.  Further, the Old Commonwealth could have 
offered assisted passage schemes to Europeans who did not wish to remain in Rhodesia 
under African majority rule.  From a negative perspective the Old Commonwealth might 
have given more effective warnings of the consequences that would follow a UDI, 
perhaps even hinting that they would not condemn any British threat to use force, though 
this would of course have been possible only if the British Government had been willing 
to give a lead to such an approach. 
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Chapter Five 
The Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meetings 
and the Rhodesian Crisis  
 
Introduction 
 
The racial issues that were involved in the Rhodesian problem inevitably heightened the 
level of interest among the African and Asian Commonwealth states, which saw the 
Commonwealth as an important forum for discussion of the issue.  The Rhodesian 
Government, however, denied that the Commonwealth had any competence to discuss 
Rhodesia’s internal affairs, which reflected not only its insistence on the principle of 
domestic jurisdiction but also a general disdain for states north of the Zambesi.  This 
placed the British Government in a difficult situation because by convention it reported to 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meetings on the constitutional progress of colonies that 
were moving towards independence, ‘not as something for the meeting to decide but as 
something in which its members were closely interested.’1  The Rhodesian problem made 
the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meetings of 1964 and 1965 (and beyond) 
potentially explosive affairs.  In the period preceding the 1964 Meeting, Sir Alec 
Douglas-Home’s Conservative Government had to deal with the delicate question of 
whether the Rhodesian Prime Minister should attend, which required careful consultation 
with the Commonwealth to avoid wrecking the Meeting.  The Rhodesian question was a 
difficult feature of the 1964 Meeting, but the Commonwealth, though divided, remained 
intact.  In the period leading up to the 1965 Meeting, Harold Wilson’s Labour 
                                                 
1 J. D. B. Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Expansion and Attrition 1953-1969 
(London: Oxford University Press for The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1974), p. 187. 
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Government was acutely conscious that its inability to negotiate a settlement and the 
threat of a UDI would lead to African and Asian demands to use force to impose a 
solution in Rhodesia.  Once again, despite savage criticism of British policy and fears that 
the Commonwealth would disintegrate, it did not do so.  The fact that the Commonwealth 
survived these Meetings relatively unscathed requires some explanation.  First, it can be 
argued that Douglas-Home and Wilson presided over the Meetings with enough patience 
and skill to avert disaster.  Second, it is clear that the Canadian Prime Minister helped to 
moderate criticism of British policy towards Rhodesia, which made it possible to 
compromise on the final communiqués.  Third, and perhaps most significant, divisions 
among radical and moderate Commonwealth leaders – whose numbers increased between 
the 1964 and 1965 Meetings – meant that Douglas-Home and Wilson were not faced by 
an obdurate monolith of critical Commonwealth opposition. 
 
Rhodesian resistance to Commonwealth interference 
 
Between the break up of the Central African Federation and Rhodesia’s UDI, the 
Rhodesian Government consistently resisted any Commonwealth involvement in, or 
advice about, Rhodesian constitutional politics.  Yet whilst Rhodesian intransigence 
accorded with the formal constitutional position, it was at odds with the spirit of 
Commonwealth consultation and co-operation, as Bruce Miller has observed: 
 
In strict legal terms, the advancement of colonies was Britain’s business 
and no one else’s; in political terms it was desirable that other 
Commonwealth members should concur in, and if possible applaud, the 
progress which Britain was making.  If they could be associated in some 
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way in that progress – as India and Pakistan had been in preparing for the 
independence of the Sudan, and Australia, India, and Pakistan in that of 
Malaya – this was all to the good.2 
 
The Rhodesian Government’s unwillingness to countenance Commonwealth involvement 
in its affairs was motivated by attitudes towards the African Commonwealth that were 
similar to those of many Australian politicians and officials.  In February 1964 Winston 
Field spoke disparagingly in the Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly of the 
Commonwealth African states, which were characterised by ‘varying degrees of one-
party dictatorship; some just flirting with communism, some obviously in love with 
communism, if not already married to it.’  Field suggested that these states wanted to 
interfere in Rhodesian affairs to divert attention from their own poor administration and 
corruption.3  The following month Field made it clear to the British Government that for 
the Rhodesian Government the issue was ‘not the impact on the Commonwealth which 
the grant of independence is likely to have but the preservation of our Constitution, which 
is essential to our freedom, against the efforts of international and Commonwealth forces 
to circumvent, and even suppress it.’  Field went on to suggest that the 1961 Constitution 
was ‘the very basis for the orderly political advancement of Africans’ and for that reason 
Rhodesia’s enemies regarded the Constitution as an obstacle.  Field also observed ‘There 
is no doubt that African Nationalism in this country is directed and financed by 
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
3 Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates, 26 February 1964.  Quoted in Miller, Survey of 
Commonwealth Affairs, p. 190. 
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Communist countries.’4  Field’s public and private remarks reflected beliefs that were 
deeply embedded in the Rhodesian Front, which proved to be insurmountable obstacles to 
any possibility of Commonwealth engagement in the Rhodesian problem. 
 
Ian Smith’s views about the Commonwealth were certainly no different to those of his 
predecessor.  When Sir Alec Douglas-Home advised Smith that ‘the British Government, 
either alone or in conjunction with other Commonwealth Governments, will be glad to 
help in any way they can to bring about a generally acceptable solution’, Smith replied, ‘I 
must repeat, what my predecessor has already stated, that the issue of independence for 
Southern Rhodesia is a matter solely between the Southern Rhodesia Government and the 
British Government and that it is not the concern of any other Government in the 
Commonwealth or elsewhere.’5  Smith continued to profess that the Commonwealth had 
no jurisdiction; following the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting in June 1965 he 
informed Harold Wilson: ‘frankly, I am not interested in what the other members of the 
Commonwealth say about our affairs, and what they do say will not turn us from what we 
consider to be the right thing to do in the interests of our country.’6  During the 
negotiations in London in October 1965 Smith emphasised another familiar theme when 
he remarked that there was no such thing as democracy in the countries to the north of 
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Rhodesia, and referred to the situation in Tanzania by way of illustration.7  When Wilson 
put it to Smith in later negotiations that the Commonwealth was ‘a valuable buttress 
against the spread of Communist influence in Africa and that it would be gravely 
damaged by a UDI’, Smith replied that ‘he had heard military experts argue the contrary 
view, in the sense that the best means of avoiding trouble in Africa or an international war 
would be to maintain the European influence in Rhodesia, if necessary by a UDI.’8   
 
The Rhodesian Government never deviated from its views that the Commonwealth had 
no standing in the matter of Rhodesia’s claim to independence and that its African 
members were infected with Communism and were therefore enemies of Rhodesia.9  
Many Europeans in Rhodesia no doubt shared these views.  In September 1963 the 
Canadian High Commissioner in Tanganyika reported an editorial in the Rhodesian 
Herald that ‘talked about barbarism in some countries which are criticizing Southern 
Rhodesia.’  He remarked: ‘Livingstone is just across the border, but close enough to 
remind me of the saying about people who live in glass houses.’10  There was indeed 
much hypocrisy on both sides of the debate, and Bruce Miller has commented on the 
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African Commonwealth: ‘Their lack of political stability made their complaints against 
South Africa and Rhodesia less acceptable than if parliamentary democracy had survived 
in Africa to the same extent as in the Caribbean Commonwealth countries or in India and 
Ceylon.’11  Yet the obstinate refusal of the Rhodesian Government to admit that there was 
a genuine Commonwealth interest in the future of Rhodesia was a major obstacle to a 
more constructive approach to the problem of independence. 
 
The 1964 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting 
 
Although Rhodesian ministers consistently opposed any Commonwealth interference in 
the issue of Rhodesian independence – and in doing so lost no opportunity to disparage 
the African members of the Commonwealth – they also claimed that Rhodesia was a 
member of the Commonwealth because Rhodesian representatives had, since 1932, 
attended Commonwealth meetings.  Robert Menzies recalled in his memoirs that in June 
1963 he had a long conversation about this in London with Jack Howman, the Rhodesian 
Minister of Internal Affairs, Local Government, and African Education.  Menzies pointed 
out that it was a mistake to believe that Rhodesia was a member of the Commonwealth.  
Rhodesian representatives had never attended Commonwealth meetings as a matter of 
right and Rhodesia could not become a member of the Commonwealth without the 
approval of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting, which was unlikely so long as 
the Rhodesian franchise did not include the whole African population.  Menzies observed 
that Howman was ‘genuinely surprised’ by this assessment, and Howman apparently 
suggested that the only recourse for Rhodesia’s critics was to move for Rhodesia’s 
expulsion from the Commonwealth, which he thought was unlikely despite the South 
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African precedent.12  Accordingly, Menzies wrote to Winston Field in an attempt to clear 
up this misapprehension, citing the original basis upon which a Rhodesian representative 
had been invited to attend the Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa in 1932 ‘as an 
observer, with liberty by permission of the Conference, to speak at its full meetings and 
with a right to participate in the work of its Committees.’13  Yet despite Menzies’ verbal 
and written advice, the Rhodesian Government still continued to profess that it was 
already a member of the Commonwealth.14  In September 1963 Howman told Canadian 
officials and ministers ‘Southern Rhodesia is and always has been a member of the 
Commonwealth’ and ‘there could be no question of Southern Rhodesia applying for 
Commonwealth membership but, rather, a question of whether its membership would be 
denied it.’15  Howman suggested that ‘if other members of the Commonwealth made 
difficulties then it was time for the old members of the Commonwealth to stand up and 
support Southern Rhodesia’s right to full membership.’16 
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Thus, on the one hand Rhodesian ministers dismissed the relevance of the 
Commonwealth, but on the other hand they professed their membership of the 
Commonwealth and sought to enlist the support of the Old Commonwealth against 
Rhodesia’s African critics.  During the period between the dissolution of the Central 
African Federation at the end of 1963 and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting 
in July 1964, the African members of the Commonwealth became increasingly attentive 
to the issue of Rhodesian independence, particularly as a result of Ghanaian initiatives.  In 
July 1963 the Ghanaian Government sent a note to the British Government, which, inter 
alia urged Britain to suspend the 1961 Constitution and re-establish direct rule over 
Rhodesia (as Britain had done in Malta in 1936), and warned that Ghana intended to raise 
the issue of Rhodesian independence in the United Nations Security Council.  The 
Ghanaian Government breached convention by simultaneously sending copies of the note 
to other Commonwealth governments, which so angered the British Government that it 
did not reply.17  In August 1963 the Ghanaian Government did bring the question before 
the Security Council, in an effort to prevent the British Government from handing over 
the military assets of the Central African Federation to the Rhodesian Front Government.  
Although the Ghanaian initiative was unsuccessful it nevertheless publicised the issue of 
Rhodesian independence by ‘shedding light on the internal political, constitutional, social, 
and economic developments of the territory to an extent unknown in many world 
capitals.’18   It has also been argued that British attempts to drive a wedge between Ghana 
and the other African states enhanced Ghana’s prestige.19  Ghana was therefore 
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encouraged to maintain pressure on the British Government.  In February 1964, reports in 
the British press suggested that at least 100 Conservative MPs favoured an immediate 
grant of independence to the Rhodesian Government on the basis that the recent army 
mutinies in East Africa proved Africans were incapable of governing themselves.20  The 
Ghanaian High Commissioner in London, Kwesi Armah, wrote to Duncan Sandys 
admonishing that if there was any truth in these rumours it would be ‘a travesty of justice 
and morality of the highest order.’21  Ghana also engaged in a further public controversy 
that broke out just weeks before the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting, which 
concerned the right of the Rhodesian Government to be represented at the Meeting. 
 
In April 1964 Sir Alec-Douglas Home announced that the Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers’ Meeting would be held in London in July.  Shortly thereafter he was asked in 
the House of Commons whether the Rhodesian Prime Minister would be invited to the 
Meeting.  Douglas-Home replied that only Prime Ministers of fully independent 
Commonwealth countries had a right to attend, and any invitation to the Prime Minister 
of a country that was not independent could only be extended after consultation with 
other Commonwealth countries.  Accordingly, Douglas-Home had asked Smith if he 
wished the Commonwealth to be so consulted, but Smith had replied that he did not 
because he believed he was entitled to attend as of right.  Smith had been asked to 
reconsider his position.22  The Ghanaian High Commissioner had already stated that his 
                                                 
20 Aluko, ‘The Role of Ghana in the Rhodesian Question’, p. 311; and Miller, Survey of Commonwealth 
Affairs, p. 191, n. 1. 
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government was ‘astounded’ by the suggestion that Smith might attend, and warned that 
it would not participate in the Meeting if that were the case.23  The Indian Government 
had also indicated its opposition to Smith’s attendance.24 
 
Smith, however, did ask to be invited and the British Government therefore initiated 
consultation on this issue with the Old Commonwealth representatives in London and 
directly with their Prime Ministers.  Sir Saville Garner, the Permanent Undersecretary at 
the Commonwealth Relations Office, emphasised to the High Commissioners of 
Australia, New Zealand and Canada that an invitation to Rhodesia to attend the Prime 
Ministers’ Meeting would be conditional upon the prior endorsement by all 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers, and that there was no precedent by which the Prime 
Minister of Southern Rhodesia should be invited automatically.  They were told that the 
British Government was anxious to obtain the views of the Old Commonwealth before 
requesting the formal advice of the other Commonwealth Prime Ministers.25  Douglas-
Home wrote to Pearson, Menzies, and Holyoake, acknowledging that there were 
advantages and disadvantages associated with Rhodesian attendance at the Meeting.  On 
the one hand, if the Rhodesian problem was going to be discussed it would be fair if 
Smith was present, and if an invitation was not extended it could lead to resentment in 
Rhodesia.  On the other hand, there were procedural implications associated with Smith’s 
attendance, because colonies that were already scheduled for independence (such as 
Northern Rhodesia) or enjoyed self-government (such as Malta, British Guiana, and 
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Barbados) might ask to attend.  More significantly, there was likely to be strong 
opposition to Smith’s attendance: Ghana and India had already objected, and it was likely 
that other newly independent members of the Commonwealth would do the same.  Newer 
members of the Commonwealth who did not object would probably have the intention of 
putting Smith ‘in the dock’.  Douglas-Home feared that in such circumstances ‘the 
question of Southern Rhodesia would be so highlighted by the press that it would 
overshadow all else, and would thus present the world with an altogether distorted picture 
of our Prime Ministers’ Meetings.’  The British Prime Minister therefore concluded that it 
would be in the best interests of Rhodesia and the Commonwealth if Smith did not attend, 
but invited comments from Pearson, Menzies, and Holyoake.26 
 
Australian officials were concerned that if Menzies ‘places his weight on one side or the 
other at the present juncture, it might sharpen the controversy’ and therefore advised ‘the 
Prime Minister should not positively take sides on the substantive issue but should point 
to the need to continue the search for a compromise.’27  Menzies was apparently already 
thinking along these lines.28  In his reply to the British Prime Minister Menzies suggested 
that Smith should make himself available for informal discussions in London outside the 
Prime Ministers’ Meeting, which he thought ‘would be not only fair but also of 
considerable value.’29  The major concern of the New Zealand Government was that ‘the 
invitation question should not be allowed to divide Commonwealth members nor provide 
                                                 
26 NAA: A1838, 190/11/1, Part 1, ‘Southern Rhodesia and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting’, 
text of a message from Sir Alec Douglas-Home to Sir Robert Menzies, 5 May 1964. 
27 NAA: A1838, 190/11/1, Part 1, ‘Southern Rhodesia: Presence at Prime Ministers’ Conference’, 
Memorandum by M. R. Booker, First Assistant Secretary, Division IV, DEA, 6 May 1964. 
28 NAA: A1838, 190/11/1, Part 1, Foreign Minister’s hand written minute on Booker’s Memorandum. 
29 NAA: A1838, 190/11/1, Part 1, Sir Robert Menzies to Sir Alec-Douglas-Home, 7 May 1964. 
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any of them with an excuse for flamboyant gestures of disapproval.’  It thought that 
Smith’s attendance would not confer ‘any advantages which outweigh the risks of a 
serious dispute’ and sought to avoid making any public statement on the issue because it 
would ‘merely serve to bring Smith’s attendance even more within the realm of public 
controversy and give credence to the existence of a crisis within the Commonwealth.’30  
The attitude of the Canadian Government is less clear due to lack of documentary 
evidence.  Bruce Miller suggests that Canada was ‘strongly opposed’ to Rhodesian 
attendance,31 but it appears that opinion in Ottawa was actually divided.  Some officials 
were in favour of inviting Smith to the Meeting on the basis that failure to do so could be 
interpreted as a signal that the Commonwealth had no role to play in the Rhodesian 
question.32  Yet it was clear to Douglas-Home that there was no support among the Old 
Commonwealth for Smith to attend the Prime Ministers’ Meeting, and by the end of May 
Pakistan and Kenya had also made their opposition clear.33  In June the British Prime 
Minister told the House of Commons that the consensus of Commonwealth opinion was 
that because of the size of Commonwealth, only representatives of fully sovereign states 
should attend the Prime Ministers’ Meeting.34  Douglas-Home thus attempted to avoid 
                                                 
30 Archives New Zealand/Te Rua Mahara o te Kāwanatanga, Wellington Office [hereafter ANZ]: ABHS 
950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 9, DEA, Wellington, to New Zealand High Commission, London, Cable No. 
1074, 5 May 1964. 
31 Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, p. 192, n. 5. 
32 ANZ: ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 9, J. S. Reid, New Zealand High Commissioner, Ottawa, to 
DEA, Wellington, 15 June 1964. 
33 Daily Telegraph, 26 May 1964.  Cited in Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, p. 192. 
34 House of Commons Debates, 3 June 1964, cols. 239-240.  Cited in Miller, Survey of Commonwealth 
Affairs, p. 192. 
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antagonising Smith by justifying the outcome of the whole issue in strictly procedural 
terms.  Smith, however, did not see it that way, and declared: 
 
We are excluded now not because we are no longer loyal to the Crown or 
to the ideals on which the Commonwealth was founded.  Nor was our case 
judged on its merits.  We are excluded because the Commonwealth has 
outgrown itself and there is no longer room for us among the motley of 
small countries which have recently acceded to independence and been 
admitted to the Commonwealth without regard to their adherence to the 
ideals and concepts on which it was founded.35 
 
One commentator suggested that, ‘The snub to Smith cut the ground from under the feet 
of such men as Whitehead who were pleading for restraint and no UDI, and united the 
Rhodesians behind Smith’s Government.’36  This may be true, but the British 
Government had managed to defuse a potentially explosive problem that could have 
wrecked the Prime Ministers’ Meeting before it even began.  Miller also observes that it 
prevented a direct clash between Smith and the Commonwealth African Prime Ministers 
similar to the confrontation that had led to the withdrawal of South Africa from the 
Commonwealth in 1961.37  Yet the Meeting itself was still bound to be difficult, as the 
New Zealand Government advised its High Commission in London: ‘Whatever illusions 
the British may cherish, it seems to us that Southern Rhodesia will inescapably be the 
                                                 
35 The Times, 8 June 1964.  Quoted in Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, p. 192; and Kenneth 
Young, Rhodesia and Independence (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1967), p. 139. 
36 Young, Rhodesia and Independence, p. 139. 
37 Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, p. 192. 
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central and pressing preoccupation of the Afro-Asian members at the Conference.’38  
There were certainly signs that this would be the case.  Ghana surreptitiously attempted to 
convene a meeting of African Commonwealth Foreign Ministers in Lagos to discuss the 
Rhodesian issue in advance of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting.  When it 
was apparent that Nigerian support for this proposal was not forthcoming the Ghanaian 
Government sent out emissaries to propose a meeting in Accra.39  These initiatives were 
not successful but the African members of the Commonwealth did gather in London on 
the eve of the Prime Ministers’ Meeting to discuss Rhodesia.40  Ghana also published 
several hundred copies of a pamphlet entitled Britain’s Responsibility in Southern 
Rhodesia, the significance of which ‘lay in the fact that it represented a direct appeal by 
the Ghana Government over and above the British Government to the British public and 
the organizations shaping public opinion in Britain.’41 
 
The Old Commonwealth formulated similar contingency plans for dealing with the strain 
that the Rhodesian question was sure to impose on the Prime Ministers’ Meeting.  
Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand officials anticipated the demands that African 
Prime Ministers would most likely articulate.  They would call upon Britain to implement 
the provisions of United Nations resolutions requiring the release of political prisoners in 
Southern Rhodesia, suspension of the 1961 Constitution, and the convening of a 
constitutional conference representative of all political parties and races to draft a new 
                                                 
38 ANZ: ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 9, DEA, Wellington, to New Zealand High Commission, 
London, Cable No. 1074, 5 May 1964. 
39 NAA: A1838, 190/11/1, Part 1, B. G. Dexter, Australian High Commission, Accra, to DEA, Canberra, 
Cable No. 119, 6 May 1965. 
40 Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, p. 194. 
41 Aluko, ‘The Role of Ghana in the Rhodesian Question’, p. 312. 
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constitution based on ‘one man one vote’, which would lead to early independence.42  
Australian officials suggested that these objectives were not practical, and anticipated that 
African members of the Commonwealth would be realistic enough to recognise this.  It 
was therefore likely that the African Prime Ministers would at a minimum seek an 
endorsement of the principle of racial equality as the foundation of the Commonwealth, 
and a statement that independence would not be granted to Rhodesia until that principle 
was given effective constitutional expression.43  Old Commonwealth officials accepted 
that such minimum expectations should be met,44 but did not advance any common 
constitutional proposals for discussion at the Prime Ministers Meeting, which reflected 
their belief that this was a matter for negotiation between Britain and Rhodesia.45  There 
was also no consensus about the utility of aid and technical assistance as a means to 
facilitate African advancement in Rhodesia and induce a more co-operative attitude on 
the part of the Rhodesian Government.46 
 
                                                 
42 NAC: MG 31-E47, Vol. 66, ‘Southern Rhodesia’, Confidential Brief, 26 June 1964, para. 2; ANZ: ABHS 
950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 9, ‘Southern Rhodesia’, Confidential Brief, 29 June 1964 Section 2 (A); NAA: 
A1838, 190/10/1, Part 3a, ‘Southern Rhodesia’, Confidential Brief, [n.d. but June 1964], p. 3. 
43 NAA: A1838, 190/10/1, Part 2, ‘Southern Rhodesia’, Secret Brief [n.d. but June 1964], p. 2. 
44 NAC: MG 31-E47, Vol. 66, ‘Southern Rhodesia’, Confidential Brief, 26 June 1964, para. 15; ANZ: 
ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 9, ‘Southern Rhodesia’, Confidential Brief, 29 June 1964, Section 4; 
NAA: A1838, 190/10/1, Part 2, ‘Southern Rhodesia’, Secret Brief [n.d. but June 1964], p. 3; and A1838, 
190/10/1, Part 3a, ‘Southern Rhodesia’, Confidential Brief, [n.d. but June 1964], p. 1. 
45 Unusually, Australian officials did make some suggestions, specifically a Bill of Rights to guarantee the 
rights of Europeans and reservation of a number of seats in the legislature for members of non-African 
minority groups.  NAA: A1838, 190/10/1, Part 2, ‘Southern Rhodesia’, Secret Brief, [n.d. but June 1964], p. 
3. 
46 See above, Ch. 4, pp. 194 ff. 
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The Prime Ministers’ Meeting played out very much as the Old Commonwealth officials 
had anticipated in their briefing papers.47  The final communiqué recognised that it was 
not a function of the Commonwealth to act as an arbiter in disputes between member 
countries but the Prime Ministers agreed that, ‘Commonwealth countries could play a role 
of conciliation and, where possible, consider using their good offices to help towards the 
settlement of disputes between member nations provided the parties concerned accepted 
such mediation.’  The Prime Ministers welcomed the British announcement that 
sufficiently representative institutions were a precondition of Rhodesian independence 
and that a UDI would not be recognised.  Some Prime Ministers expressed the view that a 
constitutional conference should be convened, attended by leaders of all parties in 
Southern Rhodesia, in order ‘to seek agreement on the steps by which Southern Rhodesia 
might proceed to independence within the Commonwealth at the earliest practicable time 
on the basis of majority rule.’  The communiqué appealed for the release of all detained 
African leaders and called upon all leaders and their supporters to refrain from violence.  
The communiqué affirmed the Prime Ministers’ belief that the best interests of all parties 
lay in developing confidence and co-operation based on tolerance, mutual understanding 
and justice.  The communiqué recognised the necessity of giving confidence to the 
minority in Southern Rhodesia that their interests would be protected.  Finally, the 
communiqué recorded the fact that the British Prime Minister undertook to give 
                                                 
47 For a discussion of the proceedings see Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, pp. 194-95.  Even 
though the meetings were conducted in private the press was able to report the proceedings in great detail 
because – as Menzies noted – many speeches were passed to the media before they were delivered at the 
meetings.  NAA: A1838, 190/10/1, Part 3a, ‘Press, Radio and Television Conference given by the Prime 
Minister, The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Menzies, at Canberra on Sunday, 19th July 1964’, p. 4.   
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consideration to the views expressed but emphasised that the British Government was 
solely responsible for bringing Southern Rhodesia to independence.48 
 
According to Miller, ‘The final communiqué reflected the gap between Britain and the 
Africans’, but ‘Britain could be said to have come well out of the ordeal.’49  This is a fair 
assessment, but the outcome requires some explanation, particularly in light of the fact 
that there was such a notable build up of tension in the months preceding the Prime 
Ministers’ Meeting.  Some credit should certainly be given to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 
who presided over the meetings with considerable patience despite the hostile 
atmosphere.  Menzies commented that the British Prime Minister ‘was tactful; he 
enlivened the proceedings from time to time with a little humour if things threatened to 
become a little tense and he was, whenever firmness was required on the part of the 
United Kingdom, admirably firm.’50  Menzies, on the other hand, contributed to the 
tension for three reasons: firstly, he opposed discussion of the Rhodesian problem on the 
basis of the domestic jurisdiction principle; secondly, he made his concern for the rights 
of the Europeans in Rhodesia very clear, particularly the right of Ian Smith to defend 
himself against his accusers; and thirdly he pointed out that some African Prime Ministers 
who advocated ‘one-man-one-vote’ and the release of political prisoners in Rhodesia 
actually presided over one-party government and imprisoned their own political 
opponents.51  Thus, according to one reporter’s informant, Menzies demonstrated that he 
                                                 
48 NAC: MG 31-E47, Vol. 66, Cmnd 2441, Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting 1964: final 
communiqué (London: HMSO, 1964). 
49 Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, pp. 195 and 196. 
50 NAA: A1838, 190/10/1, Part 3a, ‘Press, Radio and Television Conference given by the Prime Minister, 
The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Menzies, at Canberra on Sunday, 19th July 1964’, p. 1. 
51 Ibid., pp. 2-4; and Menzies, Afternoon Light, pp. 190-91 and 219-20. 
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was ‘more British than the British’!52  However, Lester Pearson helped to offset the 
antagonism between Menzies and the African Prime Ministers.  The Canadian Prime 
Minister instigated the inclusion of a declaration on racial equality in the final 
communiqué and toned down the passages that dealt with Rhodesia.53  It may therefore be 
argued that a combination of Alec Douglas-Home’s patience and Lester Pearson’s 
creativity explain the reasonable outcome of the Prime Ministers’ Meeting.54 
 
A further point that is worth considering in connection with the outcome of the 1964 
Meeting is the significance of the proposal for a Commonwealth Secretariat.  The idea of 
a central organisation for coordinating the activities of the Empire-Commonwealth was 
by no means new, having come up as early as the 1907 Colonial Conference.55  In the 
months leading up to the 1964 Prime Ministers’ Meeting Douglas-Home had indicated 
that he wanted to see a more cohesive Commonwealth and had put forward a number of 
proposals for greater cooperation, especially in terms of economic development.  At the 
Meeting he suggested several schemes for functional cooperation, including a proposal 
for a Commonwealth Foundation to foster the development of professional links (this 
                                                 
52 The Guardian, 16 July 1964, report by Patrick Keatley.  Quoted in Miller, Survey of Commonwealth 
Affairs, p. 195. 
53 Aluko, ‘The Role of Ghana in the Rhodesian Question’, p. 312; Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, 
pp. 195 and 196; and Young, Rhodesia and Independence, p. 143. 
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came into existence in 1966).  However, Douglas-Home’s suggestions were overtaken by 
proposals from Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Milton Obote of Uganda, and Eric Williams 
of Trinidad, for a central organisation capable of facilitating conciliation, cooperation and 
coordination.56  According to one British newspaper the members of the Old 
Commonwealth were surprised by this development, as the newer members had rejected 
previous similar proposals from the Old Commonwealth as ‘neo-colonial’.57  The 1964 
Meeting endorsed the proposal for a Commonwealth Secretariat but did not decide what 
structure or functions the Secretariat should have, leaving these issues to be worked out 
by a committee of senior officials chaired by Sir Burke Trend, the British Cabinet 
Secretary.58  Over the next eighteen months politicians and officials in Britain and 
Australia became increasingly concerned about the ‘proper’ role of the Secretariat, 
especially in the context of Rhodesia’s UDI.59  Nevertheless, in July 1964 the Old 
Commonwealth responded favourably enough; even Robert Menzies commented publicly 
that the decision to establish a permanent Secretariat was ‘quite a remarkable 
achievement and a very powerful answer to the pessimists.’60  By accepting the proposal 
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for a Secretariat the Old Commonwealth had perhaps done enough to demonstrate that 
they were sensitive to the concerns and interests of the Afro-Asian members.  This may 
well have persuaded some of the newer members of the Commonwealth to give Britain 
the benefit of the doubt over its Rhodesian policy, at least for the time being. 
 
Finally, a key reason why the 1964 Prime Ministers’ Meeting did not dissolve into bitter 
acrimony was the fact that there were divisions among the African Prime Ministers about 
how hard a line to take.  The Ghanaian proposal for a meeting of African Foreign 
Ministers in advance of the Prime Ministers’ Meeting had received a cool response from 
Sierra Leone and from Nigeria, who had argued that African Commonwealth states 
should not adopt a separate position on a matter that concerned the Commonwealth as a 
whole.61  Between the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meetings of 1964 and 1965 
expressions of indignation on the Rhodesian question grew even louder.  It is surely 
significant that the number of Commonwealth Prime Ministers increased during the same 
period, which further multiplied rivalries and divisions (especially among African 
leaders), allowing the British Government and the Commonwealth to survive relatively 
unscathed once again. 
 
The 1965 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting 
 
In February 1965 Harold Wilson announced that a Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ 
Meeting would be held in London in June.62  There was little point in re-opening the 
                                                 
61 NAA: A1838, 190/10/1, Part 2, ‘Southern Rhodesia’, Secret Brief, [n.d. but June 1964], p. 1. 
62 House of Commons Debates, 4 February 1965, cols. 1280-1283.  Cited in Miller, Survey of 
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question of Smith’s attendance, though Smith issued a statement deploring the fact that he 
was once again excluded.63  However, the period leading up to the Meeting was not 
without controversy, both public and private.  The 1965 Meeting was the first attended by 
Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia.  It is noted elsewhere in this thesis that Zambia 
presented the British Government with an awkward dilemma in the management of the 
Rhodesian Crisis.64  Whilst the British Government was engaged in negotiations with 
Rhodesia, it hoped that Zambia would do nothing to provoke Rhodesia.  The British 
Government was therefore dismayed to learn that the Rhodesian Government had ‘made 
representations to the Government of Zambia concerning the training of saboteurs and the 
harbouring of terrorists in that country for use against Rhodesia.’65  Wilson questioned 
Kaunda about these allegations whilst he was in London for Winston Churchill’s funeral.  
Kaunda denied everything, which, as one Foreign Office official wrote, ‘is awkward as 
we know Kaunda was not telling the truth.’66  Wilson advised Smith that Kaunda had 
                                                 
63 Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, p. 199. 
64 Britain was heavily involved in, and dependent upon, Zambian copper production, which would be 
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given a ‘firm personal rebuttal’ and suggested that the Rhodesian Government should 
discuss the matter directly with Zambia, and perhaps agree that a third party should 
investigate the situation.67  Fortunately, this delicate situation – which could have caused 
a great deal more trouble for the British Government in advance of the Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers’ Meeting – did not come to anything.  By March, Kaunda was seeking to 
moderate the position of other African governments, which reflected Kaunda’s 
recognition of the damage that was likely to be inflicted on the Zambian economy in the 
event of a UDI.68 
 
Since the Wilson Government came into office it had been trying to establish a 
meaningful dialogue with the Rhodesian Government.  In January 1965 Wilson persuaded 
Smith to accept a visit by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the 
Lord Chancellor and the Rhodesian Cabinet agreed that this would take place the 
following month.69  Arthur Bottomley and Lord Gardiner did not achieve anything 
dramatic, but in fairness they were not seeking to do so, as Jack Johnston, the British 
High Commissioner in Rhodesia, acknowledged: ‘The political situation imposed limited 
but important objectives – to re-establish a dialogue with the Government; to correct false 
ideas of British policies; to combat the move to a unilateral declaration of independence 
                                                 
67 TNA: PRO, FO 371/181876, Harold Wilson to Ian Smith, CRO Cable No. 239, 18 February 1965, p. 2. 
68 TNA: PRO, CAB 148/18, Minutes of OPD (65) 13th Meeting, 5 March 1965, p. 4.  Presumably, Kaunda’s 
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(u.d.i.); and to assess public opinion.’70  The Bottomley-Gardiner mission may be said to 
have succeeded within its limited objectives,71 but it did not satisfy Commonwealth 
opinion, especially as there were some unwelcome developments in Rhodesian domestic 
politics. 
 
At the end of March Ian Smith announced that a general election would be held on 7 
May.  Kenneth Young suggested that although a general election was not due, there was 
nothing sinister about the dissolution of the Rhodesian Legislative Assembly: 
 
Smith believed that it was important that the electorate, which had not 
voted since the time of Federation, should have an opportunity to give or 
refuse to give the Government a fresh mandate.  In particular he wished to 
have a two-thirds majority in the [Assembly] because this would 
strengthen his hand in negotiations between him and the British 
Government.  He said that it was his intention to place before the 
electorate a considered analysis of all the reports received from various 
bodies consulted on the question of a UDI.  But he could assure the public 
that such a step was not contemplated while negotiations continued.72 
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Unsurprisingly, some members of the Commonwealth did not feel reassured about the 
intentions of the Rhodesian Government.  For example, a few days after the dissolution 
proclamation, the Indian chargé d’affaires sent a message to Governor Humphrey Gibbs 
that the Indian Government considered this to be a prelude to a UDI and was therefore 
terminating its diplomatic representation in Salisbury.73  The Nigerian Government also 
regarded the announcement of elections in Rhodesia as a precursor to a UDI and 
suggested to the British Government that it should call a constitutional conference, even if 
the Rhodesian Government resisted the proposal.74  There was further cause for alarm on 
26 April, when the Rhodesian Government issued a White Paper entitled ‘Economic 
Aspects of a Declaration of Independence’.  This sought to reassure the Rhodesian 
electorate that the benefits of a UDI would outweigh its potential costs, and that British 
threats to impose economic sanctions were not serious or practical.  Although powerful 
economic interest groups in Rhodesia publicly countered this optimistic assessment, and 
despite the fact that Harold Wilson made a parliamentary statement warning Rhodesia 
against a UDI, the Rhodesian Front nevertheless won a landslide election victory.75  It has 
been suggested that because the Soviet Union failed to obtain support for a UN Security 
Council resolution demanding that Britain revoke the Rhodesian elections, ‘The signs, it 
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seemed, were set fair for the 1965 Prime Ministers’ Meeting.’76  However, it is difficult to 
agree with this assessment given that Kwame Nkrumah – the most outspoken 
Commonwealth critic of Britain’s policy towards Rhodesia – accused Britain of failing to 
discharge its obligations to the African population of Rhodesia.77  The actions and 
statements of Commonwealth members during April and May were bound to heighten 
tension within the Commonwealth, and the British Government had to consider what it 
could do to persuade its Commonwealth partners that it had the situation under control.  
Wilson first looked at whether he might obtain Commonwealth support for the British 
Government’s negotiating strategy based on the Five Principles,78 but when it became 
clear that this did not have the utility that Wilson hoped for, he came up with a tactic 
designed to deflect criticism on the Rhodesian issue: a proposal for a Commonwealth 
initiative to end the Vietnam War. 
 
Harold Wilson believed that the Five Principles were not only a means by which to 
progress negotiations with the Rhodesian Government, but would also have 
presentational value at the forthcoming Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting.  In 
May he suggested to the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee (DOPC) that he should 
try to obtain the agreement of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers on the Five Principles 
but avoid any detailed discussion of how they should be implemented.79  In fact, Wilson 
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78 See above, Ch. 1, pp. 51-53. 
79 TNA: PRO, CAB 148/18, Minutes of OPD (65) 26th Meeting, 19 May 1965, p. 4. 
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had already corresponded with the Old Commonwealth Prime Ministers on this subject.80  
Menzies and Pearson thought that the Five Principles provided a good basis on which to 
proceed with negotiations, but Pearson was not optimistic that the Five Principles would 
gain much support at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting because they did not 
raise the possibility of convening a constitutional conference, which had been mentioned 
in the 1964 final communiqué.81  A few days before the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ 
Meeting the DOPC acknowledged this same point.  It was suggested that one possible 
method of reducing pressure on Britain over the Rhodesian issue might be to set up a 
Commonwealth Consultative Committee for the whole of Southern Africa, including 
South Africa and the Portuguese territories.  On the other hand, it was acknowledged that 
this could alienate the Portuguese Government, whose assistance would be needed to 
alleviate Zambia’s difficulties in the event of economic conflict with Rhodesia.82  Thus, 
Wilson faced the unwelcome prospect of attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ 
Meeting armed with little to combat criticism of British policy on Rhodesia.  It was at this 
juncture that Wilson ‘decided to turn the situation to his own advantage by conceiving the 
idea of a Commonwealth peace mission’ to Vietnam.83 
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4-5. 
82 TNA: PRO, CAB 148/18, Minutes of OPD (65) 29th Meeting, 16 June 1965, p. 6. 
83 John W. Young, ‘The Wilson government and the Davies peace mission to North Vietnam, July 1965’, 
Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1998), p. 549. 
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In his diaries Richard Crossman recorded that by mid-1965 he had become so worried by 
the Vietnam situation that he decided to raise the issue in Cabinet: ‘But it fell flat.  This 
was mainly because, with the Commonwealth Conference just starting, Harold was able 
to say that a big initiative was now on the way – and he didn’t want to say anything about 
it for obvious reasons.’84  Wilson consulted Derek Mitchell (his Principal Private 
Secretary) and Oliver Wright (his Foreign Office Private Secretary) before asking the 
Foreign Office to work out the details of the scheme.85  When the Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers’ Meeting opened on 17 June, Wilson convened a restricted meeting to discuss 
his proposal, and was successful in obtaining general approval.86  Crossman suggested 
that he only came to know the details of Wilson’s scheme when he saw Robert Menzies 
congratulating Wilson on television, just two days after Crossman had raised his concerns 
about Vietnam in Cabinet.  Crossman was unimpressed by the ‘political matiness and 
gimmickry of the proceedings’.87  He was also worried that Wilson would be absent for 
up to a month as a result of the ‘stunt’ and was therefore relieved when it failed as a result 
of Communist opposition.  After the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting Crossman 
discussed with Wilson the failure of the peace initiative.  Wilson apparently told 
                                                 
84 R. H. S. Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister Volume 1: Minister of Housing 1964-66 (London: 
Hamilton and Cape, 1975), p. 250, entry for Tuesday 15 June. 
85 A multi-member Commonwealth delegation would visit Hanoi, Peking, Saigon and Washington, and 
would talk with the International Control Commission (Canada, India and Poland), which had been set up to 
oversee the implementation of the 1954 Geneva agreements.  Young, ‘The Wilson government and the 
Davies peace mission to North Vietnam, July 1965’, p. 549; and Harold Wilson, The Labour Governments 
1964-1970: A Personal Record (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, and Michael Joseph), pp. 108-09. 
86 Young, ‘The Wilson government and the Davies peace mission to North Vietnam, July 1965’, p. 550; and 
Wilson, The Labour Governments 1964-1970, pp. 109-10. 
87 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p. 253, entry for Thursday 17 June. 
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Crossman, ‘I think we have got most of the value we can out of it already’, which led 
Crossman to conclude that the main purpose of the proposal had been to prevent the 
Prime Ministers’ Meeting from breaking up on the first day as a result of a row over 
Rhodesia.  In that sense, Crossman wrote, ‘I have no doubt the stunt was brilliantly 
successful.’88  Similarly, one historian has commented that: ‘Wilson was nothing if not 
manipulative and there were many critics who came to doubt the seriousness of such a 
peace attempt, which could be seen as a publicity exercise to divert attention from his 
problems within the Labour Party and the Commonwealth.’89 
 
Wilson survived the opening day of the Prime Ministers’ Meeting by using his guile, but 
he obviously could not escape the Rhodesian problem altogether.  When discussion of 
Rhodesia took place on 21 June, the African Commonwealth Prime Ministers subjected 
Bottomley and Wilson to a very rough ride indeed.90  The barrage of criticism that 
Bottomley and Wilson had to endure was no doubt a most disagreeable experience, but 
their tolerance did much to preserve the goodwill of the African members of the 
Commonwealth in particular.  One British High Commissioner observed that ‘African 
leaders and their principal followers sometimes display political adolescence in their 
                                                 
88 Ibid., p. 255, entry for Sunday 27 June. 
89 Young, ‘The Wilson government and the Davies peace mission to North Vietnam, July 1965’, p. 549.  
For a more thorough discussion of the Commonwealth proposal see Miller, Survey of Commonwealth 
Affairs, pp. 71-82. 
90 See Wilson, The Labour Governments 1964-1970, pp. 114-19.  cf. NAC: MG 31-E47, Vol. 66, Minutes 
of PMM (65) 8th Meeting, Item 5, ‘Rhodesia’, pp. 75-87; and NAA: A1838, 190/11/1, Part 2, Australian 
High Commission, London, to DEA, Canberra, Cable Nos. 5211 and 5212, 21 June 1965. 
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conduct, almost like wilful children.’91  He explained that African leaders ‘often 
deliberately indulge in exaggeration of their private thoughts when they make public 
speeches’ especially on racial matters, which helped to bolster their domestic authority.92  
Their tendency to ‘indulge in excessively long-winded statements’ was a product of their 
cultural environment. ‘Their opinion springs from a traditional method of government in 
many African tribes.  According to their custom, free, democratic and often very lengthy 
discussions hold a vital place in the settlement of public affairs.’93  By allowing the 
African leaders an opportunity to express their views fully it ‘made them feel that the 
Commonwealth can be a valuable as well as congenial body’.94  Wilson’s willingness to 
endure such lengthy discussion was an extension of his successful Cabinet management 
strategy.95  It was no doubt helpful in preserving the unity of the Commonwealth in 1965 
and beyond. 
 
Lester Pearson helped to moderate the outcome of the 1965 Meeting, just as he had done 
the year before.  Robert Menzies had once again increased tension by deriding African 
insistence on ‘one-man-one-vote’, and with his remark that he ‘found it puzzling to be 
                                                 
91 TNA: PRO, FCO/211, No. 1, ‘An impression of the Commonwealth conference’, Despatch from M. 
MacDonald, British High Commissioner, Nairobi, to Mr Bowden, CRO, 9 December 1966, para. 7, in 
Ashton and Louis (eds.), BDEEP Series A, Volume 5, East of Suez and the Commonwealth. Part II: Europe, 
Rhodesia, Commonwealth (London: The Stationery Office, 2004), p. 366.  MacDonald’s comments on the 
attitudes and conduct of African members at the September 1966 Meeting may be applied equally to their 
conduct at the special conference convened in Lagos in January 1966, the 1965 Meeting, or even the 1964 
Meeting. 
92 Ibid, para. 9, in Ashton and Louis (eds.), BDEEP Series A, Vol. 5, Part II, p. 367. 
93 Ibid., para. 10, in Ashton and Louis (eds.), BDEEP Series A, Vol. 5, Part II, p. 368. 
94 Ibid., in Ashton and Louis (eds.), BDEEP Series A, Vol. 5, Part II, p. 367. 
95 See above, Ch. 1, pp. 82-86. 
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reminded of Magna Carta and its principles and at the same time to hear the Prime 
Minister of Rhodesia referred to contemptuously and have his name coupled with 
allegations of corruption and bribery’ when Smith was not there to defend himself.96  
With several speakers criticising British inaction and demanding that Wilson convene a 
constitutional conference, and some calling for Britain to use force against Rhodesia, 
Pearson sought to steer the meeting away from extreme views.  He began by stressing that 
‘Everybody agreed on the principles that peace needed freedom, and that freedom implied 
self-government, which in turn implied majority rule as a basis of universal suffrage, and 
above all the absence of discrimination.  The principles had all been agreed last year and 
this: the application was the difficulty.’97  This was an astute opening statement because it 
emphasised the points of agreement and helped to diminish the focus on the contentious 
issues of implementation.  Pearson praised the efforts of the British Government to put 
the agreed principles into practice and hailed Wilson’s public statement on the 
consequences of a UDI as ‘an outstanding example of political courage.’98  Pearson 
rejected indefinite delays as unsafe, but also suggested that coercive economic and 
political measures or the use of military force would result in ‘nothing but chaos’.99  
Although Pearson recognised that the British Government was solely responsible for 
deciding what to do, he said that it was the duty of other Commonwealth members to give 
their views on the decision.  Pearson said that a constitutional conference should be 
convened soon (though he gave no specific time frame), African nationalists should be 
released from detention to participate, and there should be early progress in repealing 
                                                 
96 NAC: MG 31-E47, Vol. 66, Minutes of PMM (65) 8th Meeting, Item 5, ‘Rhodesia’, pp. 78-79. 
97 Ibid., p. 81. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
 295 
repressive and discriminatory laws.  Pearson referred to the 1964 communiqué – which 
had acknowledged that a constitutional conference should be convened with a view to 
establishing an independent Rhodesia ‘within the Commonwealth at the earliest 
practicable time on the basis of majority rule’ – and suggested that it would be necessary 
for the 1965 communiqué to go beyond this.100  Wilson noted that although those words 
had been included in the 1964 communiqué they were not an agreed statement, and 
clarified that the British Government had reserved its position.101  In his memoirs Wilson 
wrote that ‘Lester Pearson certainly did not go all the way with the Africans, particularly 
on military intervention, but he felt that we should be doing more.’102  This is a somewhat 
opaque representation of Pearson’s position, since he was evidently sympathetic to the 
idea of a constitutional conference and therefore closely aligned with the views of the 
majority of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers.  The Canadian Prime Minister’s 
activism was certainly no surprise to the British Government.103  Nevertheless it did cause 
irritation: in the wake of the Meeting one senior official suggested that the British 
Government ought to develop ‘a particularly close connection with Australia and New 
Zealand and a slightly less close connection with Canada’.104  Yet whatever the British 
may have thought of Canadian policy, it can certainly be argued that Pearson played a 
                                                 
100 Ibid., p. 82. 
101 Ibid., pp. 82 and 84. 
102 Wilson, The Labour Governments 1964-1970, p. 116. 
103 Arnold Smith had put the British on notice that Pearson intended to take an active role.  TNA: PRO, DO 
183/674, Sir Harry Lintott, British High Commissioner, Ottawa, to Sir Saville Garner, Commonwealth 
Relations Office, 17 May 1965. 
104 TNA: PRO, DO 193/81, Minute by P. Rogers, Deputy Secretary, Cabinet, 1 July 1965, para. 4, in 
Ashton and Louis (eds.), BDEEP Series A, Vol. 5, Part II, pp. 342-43. 
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valuable role by helping to diffuse some of the tension at the Meeting engendered by the 
Rhodesian issue. 
 
There were evident degrees of separation in the positions adopted by the African and 
Asian Prime Ministers, which is perhaps the most significant reason why the 1965 
Meeting did not disintegrate over discussion of the Rhodesian problem.  The most radical 
African leaders at the 1965 Meeting were Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia), Sir Alfred Margai 
(Sierra Leone), Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), and Milton Obote 
(Uganda).  Bruce Miller observed: 
 
With variations, their position was that, having either experienced the use 
of force by British administrations in their own countries or seen it 
deployed in such other colonies as Aden, British Guiana, and Cyprus, they 
saw no reason why Britain should not use it against the Smith regime in 
Rhodesia.105 
 
Nkrumah initially took the lead on the Rhodesian issue.  He was highly critical of several 
Labour Ministers who had bitterly denounced the 1961 Constitution yet now accepted it 
as the basis of progress towards independence in Rhodesia.  He reproached the British 
Government for its failure to call a constitutional conference and called for it to do so 
without further delay.  He rejected the argument that a constitutional conference was 
impractical because the Rhodesian Government was unwilling to attend and urged Britain 
                                                 
105 Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, p. 205.  Eric Williams (Trinidad) also adopted a similar 
position.  NAC: MG 31-E47, Vol. 66, Minutes of PMM (65) 8th Meeting, Item 5, ‘Rhodesia’, pp. 82-83. 
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to use troops if necessary to impose direct rule.106  Nkrumah’s demands set the tone for 
the meeting.  Kaunda emphasised that white minority regimes posed a threat to peace in 
southern Africa and warned that without a swift solution in Rhodesia it would become 
more like South Africa and the Portuguese colonies.  He therefore supported the call for 
an immediate constitutional conference.107  Wilson recalled in his memoirs that Nyerere, 
‘With his brilliant forensic powers … put us in the dock on charge after charge.’108  He 
dismissed Britain’s attempts to negotiate with the Rhodesian Government and argued that 
there were no insurmountable obstacles to British military intervention, as Wilson put it: 
‘for him history and geography could not overcome an issue of principle.’109  Margai and 
Obote both spoke in similar terms, criticising Bottomley for his apparent willingness to 
compromise with the Smith regime, and insisting that any settlement in Rhodesia must be 
based on ‘one-man-one-vote’.110  Curiously, Nkrumah played a more moderate role after 
making his initial statement, refraining from supporting Nyerere and even ‘telling Albert 
Margai to shut up’, which astonished the British High Commissioner to Accra.111  It has 
been argued that significant differences between Nkrumah and Nyerere on other political 
issues affected their behaviour at the 1964 and 1965 Meetings.112  They had, for example, 
                                                 
106 NAA: A1838, 190/11/1, Part 2, Australian High Commission, London, to DEA, Canberra, Cable No. 
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110 NAC: MG 31-E47, Vol. 66, Minutes of PMM (65) 8th Meeting, Item 5, ‘Rhodesia’, pp. 75-78. 
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disagreed vehemently in 1963 about the proposed East African Federation.113  Such 
division must caution against any suggestion that the more extreme African leaders 
constituted a monolithic bloc, and this may have helped Wilson and Bottomley to weather 
the storm of criticism. 
 
Wilson and Bottomley also received some degree of support from moderate African 
leaders, especially Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (Nigeria), who was more sympathetic to 
the difficulties that the British Government faced and critical of obduracy on both sides in 
Rhodesia.  He said that African majority rule in Rhodesia could not be achieved overnight 
because Rhodesian Africans had no experience of administration.  He therefore suggested 
that it was essential to build confidence and co-operation between blacks and whites in 
Rhodesia.114  The Asian representatives were not uncritical of some of Abubakar’s 
comments.  Lal Bahadur Shastri (India) rejected the argument that there were no Africans 
capable of governing Rhodesia; he said that such arguments had been used in relation to 
all colonial territories.  Shastri did, however, agree with Abubakar’s emphasis on 
confidence-building measures and accepted that the timing of a constitutional conference 
must rest with the British Government.115  Agha Hilaly (Pakistan) went further, 
                                                 
113 Whereas Nkrumah believed that movements for regional unification militated against broader Pan-
African visions of continental solidarity, Nyerere dismissed ‘the curious argument that the continued 
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condemning minority government as indefensible and expressing his support for an 
immediate constitutional conference.116  Yet the Asian delegates were by no means 
sympathetic to the extreme African leaders who called for the use of force against 
Rhodesia, and one British official subsequently commented on the ‘obvious distaste of 
the Asian members at some of the African interventions’.117  The same official also 
observed that Tunku Abdul Rahman (Malaysia) and Donald Sangster (Jamaica) were ‘fast 
asleep during the plea of Africans on the dangers to world peace in Africa’ and concluded 
that the 1965 Prime Ministers’ Meeting had shown that the Commonwealth in ‘its 
original concept as a cohesive body with common interests’ was dead.118 
 
The drafting of the 1965 final communiqué took eleven hours, most of which was taken 
up by ‘long and unpleasant debates’ about the wording in the passage dealing with 
Rhodesia.119  The communiqué went a little further than the preceding year’s, stating that 
‘in the process of seeking to reach agreement on Rhodesia’s advance to independence a 
constitutional conference would, at the appropriate time, be a natural step.’  If 
negotiations did not produce satisfactory results the British Government ‘would be ready 
to consider promoting such a conference in order to ensure Rhodesia’s progress to 
independence on a basis acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.’  The 
communiqué also stated that the Commonwealth Prime Ministers ‘welcome the statement 
of the British Government that the principle of “one-man-one-vote” was regarded as the 
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very basis of democracy and this should be applied to Rhodesia.’120  This was enough to 
satisfy all the delegates except Nyerere, who dissociated Tanzania from the communiqué.  
He explained: ‘I am not concerned about timetables.  I know that this is a tough, difficult 
business and that it cannot be done in a hurry.  But this does not matter so much as long 
as the objectives of achieving independence on the basis of majority rule were established 
in advance.  But it was the adamant refusal of Mr Wilson to commit the British 
Government to these six words that caused all the trouble.’121  Nyerere was concerned 
that the wording of the communiqué allowed the British Government to negotiate with 
the Rhodesian regime on the basis that majority rule could be deferred until after 
independence was granted.122  Wilson said privately that if he went any further it would 
raise the possibility of ‘dangerous reactions’ in Rhodesia, and he threatened to revoke all 
the concessions that he had made on the wording of the communiqué if the African Prime 
Ministers insisted on trying to bind him to an explicit commitment to independence based 
African majority rule.123  Menzies not unreasonably paid tribute to Wilson when he said 
that ‘Mr Wilson and his Government went as far as any government could go on this 
matter’.124  This was certainly born out by the reaction of Ian Smith.  On 1 July he made a 
statement in the Rhodesian Legislative Assembly in which he expressed strong criticism 
of the Prime Ministers’ Meeting. He warned that any attempt to convene a constitutional 
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conference would be interpreted as interference in Rhodesia’s internal affairs and 
declared, ominously, ‘I hope no-one has any false illusions as to what that would mean.’  
Yet, for the moment, he remained committed to further negotiations.125 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Rhodesian problem was central to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meetings of 
1964 and 1965.  The circumstances leading up to the 1965 Meeting – consolidation of the 
Rhodesian Front’s domestic political support, its increasingly open talk about the 
possibility of a UDI, its evident contempt for the African members of the 
Commonwealth, and seething Afro-Asian indignation at Britain’s professed inability to 
end racial discrimination in Rhodesia – gave Wilson ample reason to believe that the 
Meeting could end in disaster.  Yet, as Bruce Miller commented, ‘Wilson had weathered 
the Prime Ministers’ Meeting with nothing to tie his hands except the promise to consider 
a constitutional conference in loosely defined circumstances.’126  The outcome of the 
Meeting can be explained by three main factors.  First, Wilson managed the Meeting very 
effectively: initially, he deflected attention from the Rhodesian problem by proposing a 
Commonwealth peace mission to Vietnam; then he demonstrated considerable patience in 
the face of withering African criticism; finally, he set a clear limit on the extent to which 
he was prepared to compromise on the wording of the final communiqué.  Second, 
Wilson was fortunate that Lester Pearson took a similar position to those adopted by some 
African and Asian representatives.  Although the British found the Canadian Prime 
                                                 
125 ANZ: ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 12, ‘Southern Rhodesia’, United Nations Brief, DEA, 
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Minister’s ‘holier than thou’ attitude somewhat irritating, it nevertheless helped to offset 
the damage that the Australian Prime Minister inflicted upon African confidence in the 
Commonwealth.  The third, and probably most significant reason why Wilson secured a 
favourable outcome, is that there were divisions among radical and moderate 
Commonwealth leaders, which allowed him some scope for manoeuvre, especially on the 
timing of a constitutional conference for Rhodesia.  Yet although the Meeting ended on 
terms favourable to the British Government, the unpleasant experience of being ‘in the 
dock’ did begin a process in Whitehall of questioning the concept and utility of the 
Commonwealth.127 
                                                 
127 See documents in Ashton and Louis (eds.), BDEEP Series A, Vol. 5, Part II, pp. 340 ff. 
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Chapter Six 
Anglo-American Relations and the Rhodesian Crisis 
 
Introduction 
 
Part Two of the thesis has demonstrated that Wilson and his ministers looked to the Old 
Commonwealth for assistance in coping with the Rhodesian Crisis, and that to a certain 
extent the Old Commonwealth obliged.  Part Three of the thesis shows that the British 
Government had similar – if not greater – expectations of the United States, but observes 
that the United States was not as forthcoming as the British Government hoped it would 
be.  This chapter briefly notes the attitudes of the U.S. Government towards the Central 
African Federation, explaining why the United States was interested in the politics of the 
region.  The chapter then explores in detail the nature of Anglo-American consultation 
between 1964 and 1965, during which time Britain and the United States were involved 
in joint consideration of two sensitive and complicated issues.  First, what help the United 
States could give to support the Zambian economy in the event of economic warfare with 
Rhodesia following a UDI.  Second, what measures the United States could take to give 
effect to British efforts to deter Rhodesia from declaring its independence unilaterally.  
The chapter argues that on both issues Anglo-American relations were subject to 
considerable strain, and explains the misunderstandings and frustrations in Anglo-
American relations by reference to alliance theory. 
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The United States, Britain, and the Central African Federation 
 
Thomas J. Noer has commented: ‘Rhodesia was Lyndon Johnson’s “crisis”, even though 
it had been a “problem” for American diplomats for nearly five years.’1  During those 
five years American policy makers considered the Rhodesian problem to be of secondary 
importance compared to the difficulties presented by the Congo, Angola and South 
Africa.  Nevertheless, Washington could not ignore the situation in the Central African 
Federation and two broad policy options were available to the U.S. Government.  It could 
disclaim any involvement on the basis that it was an internal matter for the British 
Government.  However, the United States rejected this policy because it would have done 
nothing to counter the possibility of violent action by African nationalists or an attempt to 
impose majority rule through the United Nations.  The alternative was to support British 
efforts to retain control of the situation, which committed the United States to oppose any 
efforts by the white minority to seize independence unilaterally.2  Larry Butler has 
observed that from 1959 until the demise of the Federation, the United States gave 
consistent support to British policy.  Although the Americans offered encouragement and 
advice during this period, there is little evidence of direct American influence on British 
policy formulation.3  There are several reasons for this.  First, British and American 
                                                 
1 Thomas J. Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation. The United States and White Africa, 1948-1968 
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objectives in Central Africa were much the same, with both seeking a swift end to empire 
and the establishment of independent states friendly to the West.  Second, decolonisation 
had strong domestic political implications in Britain and the United States.  Third, Cold 
War considerations were of only marginal relevance; there was no significant Communist 
activity in any of the Federation territories and African nationalists actively sought 
American support, which meant that the U.S. Government could afford to be relatively 
relaxed about British policy.  Fourth, ‘there was no perceived threat to British or 
American business interests, which may account for the surprising absence of the 
economic dimension in Anglo-American discussions during this period.’  Fifth, and in 
Butler’s view most significant, Britain and the United States shared an abhorrence of the 
prospect of racial conflict in Central Africa and tended to view settler attitudes as being a 
greater problem than African nationalism.  These factors, taken together, help to explain 
the ‘helpful but silent’ approach adopted by Washington during the last years of the 
Federation.4 
 
Anglo-American consultation, 1964-65 
 
During 1964 and 1965 the basic pattern of U.S. policy on the issue of Rhodesia’s 
independence remained the same as it had been during the final years of the Federation.  
The Johnson administration continued to encourage the British and Rhodesian 
                                                                                                                                                  
African Federation, 1959–63’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3 
(September 2000), pp. 131 and 147. 
4 Butler, ‘Britain, the United States, and the Demise of the Central African Federation, 1959–63’, p. 147.  
For the growing significance of racial considerations on U.S. policy towards the Federation see also 
Andrew DeRoche, ‘Establishing the Centrality of Race: Relations Between the U.S. and the Rhodesian 
Federation, 1953–1963’, Zambezia, Vol. XXV, No. 2 (1998), pp. 209-30. 
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Governments in their search for a constitutional settlement, but some of the underlying 
factors that had shaped U.S. policy in the earlier period began to shift.  For example, as 
the discrimination against Africans in Rhodesia showed no sign of abatement and Britain 
continued to profess its inability to intervene, opportunities for Communist infiltration 
increased, which tended to alarm some sections of the U.S. bureaucracy.  Also, whereas 
in the final years of the Federation there had been no threat to British and American 
economic interests, the prospect of a UDI by Rhodesia suggested the possibility of 
economic warfare against Zambia, which Britain and the United States could not ignore 
because they were heavily involved in and dependent upon Zambian copper production.  
These shifting circumstances prompted the United States to become more vocal in the 
period following the dissolution of the Central African Federation.  As the likelihood of a 
UDI increased, Anglo-American relations became subject to greater strain, as Noer has 
commented: ‘The problems of UDI forced America and Great Britain into even closer 
policy coordination than usual, but the crisis also showed the tension, jealousy and rivalry 
within the “special relationship.”  America was unaccustomed to following any nation.  It 
was often frustrated and impatient in its role as supporting actor to Great Britain’s lead.’5  
Yet this was not the only cause of friction in Anglo-American discussions.  Despite the 
fact that some U.S. officials urged the British Government to take a firmer approach to 
the Rhodesian problem, British ministers formed the impression that the highest echelons 
of the Johnson administration wanted to wash their hands of the Rhodesian problem.  It is 
now necessary to document the development of this ‘tension, jealousy and rivalry’ before 
proceeding to analyse the causes of it. 
 
                                                 
5 Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation, p. 186. 
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American frustration and impatience became apparent in early 1964 shortly after the 
dissolution of the Central African Federation.  The British Government denied a request 
from the Rhodesian Government for independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution, 
which, as noted above, resulted in the downfall of Winston Field and his replacement by 
Ian Smith.  The State Department viewed these developments with mounting concern.  
Undersecretary of State George Ball noted that Smith’s ousting of Field had increased the 
danger of UDI because it wiped out moderation in the Rhodesian cabinet and decreased 
the slim possibility of successful negotiations with Britain or agreement with the African 
nationalists.  Ball observed that the U.S. had virtually no leverage for directly influencing 
developments and should remain in the background, leaving the British Government as 
the responsible party to deal with the situation.6  Ball played a key role in the 
development of U.S. policy towards Rhodesia and his posture contributed to significant 
tension between the American and British governments during the course of the next 
eighteen months. 
 
The State Department moved swiftly to obtain British assessment of the situation.  At a 
meeting of officials the Permanent Under Secretary at the Commonwealth Relations 
Office (CRO), Sir Saville Garner, told the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for African 
                                                 
6 Ball to U.S. embassies in Africa, Circular Cable No. 1924, 15 April 1964, Declassified Documents 
Reference System – Index and Abstracts (Woodbridge, CT: Gale/Primary Source Media, 1998).  Ball 
invited local assessments of the developments in Rhodesia and these were not optimistic.  In June 1964, 
Ambassador Satterthwaite in Pretoria concurred with Ball’s assessment that UDI was an increasingly likely 
possibility, and warned that South Africa would be almost certain to give strong economic support to 
Salisbury.  In September 1964, Consul General McClelland in Salisbury predicted that UDI would occur 
within a year unless the British Government abandoned its conditions for independence.  Noer, Cold War 
and Black Liberation, pp. 190-91. 
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Affairs, Wayne Fredericks, that Field was extremely bitter towards Smith and there was a 
strong possibility that he could move into opposition, taking with him sufficient 
Rhodesian Front support to bring down the Government.  The British Government 
anticipated that the former Prime Minister of the Central African Federation, Sir Roy 
Welensky, might once again become influential.  Although the British were not 
enthusiastic about this (relations with Welensky had been somewhat prickly) it was 
thought that Welensky would at least be willing to discuss reasonably the possible 
formulas for a constitutional settlement.7  A few days later, at a higher-level meeting, 
Foreign Secretary R. A. Butler told Secretary of State Dean Rusk that Ian Smith ‘seemed 
to be moving away from a unilateral declaration of independence.’8  British officials and 
ministers were therefore sanguine about the situation, despite the recent developments in 
Rhodesian politics that had given greater cause for concern in the State Department.  As 
detailed below, these discussions saw the early development of a pattern in Anglo-
American consultation on the Rhodesian problem.  The British failed consistently to 
reassure the Americans that a UDI could be prevented, or that adequate contingency plans 
existed to deal effectively with a UDI.  Senior members of the U.S. Government therefore 
became increasingly concerned that the British were trying to entrap them in the 
management of the Rhodesian problem to a degree that was well beyond an acceptable 
level of U.S. commitment. 
 
                                                 
7 Archives New Zealand/Te Rua Mahara o te Kāwanatanga, Head Office, Wellington [hereafter ANZ]: 
ABHS 950, W4627, 245/4/1, J. H. Weir, Counsellor, New Zealand Embassy, Washington, to Secretary of 
External Affairs, Wellington, 23 April 1964. 
8 Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas [hereafter, LBJL]: National Security File [hereafter, NSF], 
UK Country File, Box 212, ‘UK Vol. XV 12/63–9/65’, Memorandum of Conversation, 27 April 1964. 
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American officials were right to be concerned, since a corollary of the Micawber-like 
attitude of the British Government was that little, if any, thought had been given to 
contingency planning to deal with a UDI.  U.S. officials became starkly aware of this 
during the meetings with their British counterparts in April 1964.  The exchange between 
Sir Saville Garner and Wayne Fredericks is worth recounting because it demonstrates the 
casual British attitude towards the Rhodesian problem.  Whilst discussing the African 
nationalist movements,9 Garner reported inter alia that Joshua Nkomo had been seeking 
money to finance the training of guerillas in Zanzibar and that one of his deputies, George 
Silundika, was presently in Peking soliciting funds.  When Fredericks asked what the 
British Government would do in the event of widespread violence in Rhodesia, Garner 
replied that the Rhodesian Government was likely to be able to contain violence on any 
foreseeable scale.  Fredericks asked if the British Government would intervene if there 
were a Sharpville-type scenario.  Garner told him that a decision would be taken in the 
light of the circumstances that prevailed at the time, but he was inclined to doubt whether 
a mass African movement – which had been a precondition of Sharpville – was likely to 
develop in Rhodesia.  Fredericks then questioned what would happen if freedom fighters 
were infiltrated into Rhodesia, but Garner also thought that this was unlikely.  Although 
Tanzania had provided facilities to train guerillas from Mozambique, Garner thought that 
it would not allow freedom fighters to be infiltrated into another Commonwealth country.  
Fredericks also asked how the British Government would react if the African nationalists 
established a government-in-exile.  Garner agreed that this was a possibility and indicated 
that it would be considered if and when it occurred.  When asked what would happen if 
Commonwealth governments recognised a government-in-exile, Garner commented that 
                                                 
9 For brief details see above, Ch. 1, p. 36, n. 33.   
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many doubtless would but it would make no difference to the British Government.10  
Garner therefore gave a clear signal that the British Government had not addressed 
several contingencies relating to the Rhodesian problem.  In its report of the discussions 
the New Zealand Embassy commented: 
 
Though Garner’s casual remarks were probably not intended to be taken 
literally, the State Department certainly seems to have taken them at their face 
value.  Perhaps as much as anything else the State Department’s tendency to 
be unimpressed by British efforts in Southern Rhodesia reflects United States 
frustration at seldom being consulted on this question except where their 
support is required in the United Nations.11 
 
Equally, however, the British occasionally found that the United States frustrated ideas 
that they did have for advancing towards a solution in Rhodesia.  For example, the British 
Government was hopeful that an extensive education program would enfranchise 
Africans under the 1961 Constitution, eventually bringing about majority rule.  Garner 
was therefore dismayed to learn that the United States was tapering off its aid to Rhodesia 
and would be unable to make any significant contribution to the education project.12  The 
records of these early exchanges between British and American officials show clearly that 
Anglo-American consultation and cooperation on the Rhodesian problem was very poor. 
 
                                                 
10 ANZ: ABHS 950, W4627, 245/4/1, Weir to Secretary of External Affairs, Wellington, 23 April 1964. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid.  This reflected the sharp drop in funds allocated to the U.S. Agency for International Development.  
In 1962 these stood at $312, but declined to $261 million in 1963 and $202 million in 1964.  Figures cited 
in DeRoche, Black, White and Chrome, p. 97. 
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The radicalisation of Rhodesian politics, and the apparent nonchalance of the British 
Government, prompted the State Department to maintain a careful watch on 
developments throughout 1964.  For several months U.S. officials were convinced that 
the best hope for a solution to the problem lay with Welensky, who was known to have 
discussed the possibility of an electoral coalition with Whitehead, and a prospective 
timetable for African majority rule with the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole.  Even so, the 
State Department felt that the immediate outlook in Rhodesia was bleak, as several 
members of the Rhodesian Front were pressing for an early UDI and the Government was 
intensifying its repression against African nationalists and European critics alike.13  The 
Rhodesian Government’s announcement that it would hold an indaba of African chiefs 
and a referendum among white voters to determine the acceptability of independence 
under the 1961 Constitution heightened tensions even further.  In discussions with 
African nationalists the U.S. chargé d’affaires in Lusaka, Robert Foulon, was told that the 
Africans wanted a non-violent settlement but if a UDI occurred they would have no 
alternative but to escalate their program of sabotage and violence.  Foulon was warned 
that African bitterness ran so deep that in any confrontation the safety of even the most 
progressive European Rhodesians could not be guaranteed.14  This was obviously at 
variance with the assessments that British officials had provided to the U.S. Government 
earlier in the year.  The State Department therefore directed enquiries to British officials 
in Lusaka, Salisbury, Washington and London in an anxious attempt to ascertain what the 
British Government would do in the event of a UDI.  British Embassy staff in 
                                                 
13 ANZ: ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 9, Weir to Secretary of External Affairs, Wellington, 20 May 
1964. 
14 ANZ: ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 9, Weir to Secretary of External Affairs, Wellington, 30 
September 1964.  Weir reported that Foulon had met with James Chikerema, acting leader of ZAPU. 
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Washington confessed that they were ‘quite relieved at not being informed of whatever 
contingency plans may exist, since they would probably be such that we could not pass 
them on to the Americans anyhow, and we can also plead ignorance in reply to the 
questions of our Southern Rhodesian colleagues.’15  American officials could glean no 
significant information outside Washington either, as the New Zealand Embassy reported: 
 
Though they had found odd evidence of contingency planning, American 
representatives in London had been able to discover little that would suggest 
the matter was being considered seriously; certainly, but not unexpectedly, 
Ministers were not at this time interested in the subject.16  
 
British ministers gave little attention to the Rhodesian problem at this time because of an 
impending general election.  American officials realised that they could expect to make 
little headway on the Rhodesian issue during the election campaign, but stepped up their 
efforts to determine the British position once the new Labour Government had been 
elected.17  The Labour Government put a high premium on its relations with Washington 
                                                 
15 The National Archives [hereafter TNA]: Public Records Office, Kew [hereafter PRO], DO 183/314, John 
Killick, British Embassy, Washington, to Guy Millard, West and Central Africa Department [hereafter 
WCAD], Foreign Office, 28 August 1964. 
16 ANZ: ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 9, Weir to Secretary of External Affairs, Wellington, 30 
September 1964. 
17 The U.S. Consul General in Salisbury, Roswell McClelland, reported that he had spoken with the British 
High Commissioner, J. B. Johnston, about the Rhodesian policy of the new Government.  McClelland 
informed Washington that Johnston had no precise instructions from London regarding the position that the 
new Government would take in the event of a UDI.  Johnston did not know, for example, whether he would 
be instructed to remain in Salisbury.  Clearly concerned by the vagueness of the British position, 
McClelland urged the U.S. Government to give urgent consideration to the nature of the American response 
 314 
 
 
and acted quickly to seize the initiative on tricky issues, especially the Multilateral Force, 
which ‘became the barometer for Anglo-American relations.’18  Wilson was also keen to 
ascertain American thoughts on the Rhodesian problem and African policy more 
generally, and instructed his Foreign Secretary, Patrick Gordon Walker, to explore these 
issues during his visit to Washington in October 1964.  The British Government feared 
that the recent indaba of African chiefs and impending referendum of Europeans in 
Rhodesia could be a preliminary move towards a UDI.  The British Government had 
therefore prepared a warning statement that it intended to issue if the Rhodesian 
Government failed to give a categorical assurance that it was not contemplating such a 
measure.19  Walker discussed the warning statement with Rusk, who assured the Foreign 
Secretary that the U.S. Government supported Britain’s policy and would follow its 
lead.20  There was also some discussion of the action that the British Government would 
be likely to take against Rhodesia in the event of a UDI.  Ball enquired whether economic 
sanctions could create a problem in terms of setting a precedent that the British 
                                                                                                                                                  
to a UDI if it occurred concomitant with Zambian independence on 24 October.  LBJL: NSF, Rhodesia 
Country File, Box 97, ‘Cables, 12/63–1/66’, McClelland to State Department, 23 October 1964. 
18 Saki Dockrill, ‘Forging the Anglo-American Global Defence Partnership: Harold Wilson, Lyndon 
Johnson and the Washington Summit, December 1964’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 23, No. 4 
(December 2000), p. 114. 
19 For details of the statement, see above, Ch. 1, pp. 37-39. 
20 LBJL: NSF, UK Country File, Box 212, ‘Walker Visit Briefing Book’, Memorandum of Conversation, 
26 October 1964; and Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-68, Vol. XXIV, Africa [hereafter FRUS], 
(Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office for the Department of State, 1999), pp. 788-
89.  On 28 October the U.S. Government released a statement declaring: ‘We have been encouraged by the 
forthright position taken by the British Government in insisting that it would not sanction independence for 
Rhodesia until satisfied that the people have been allowed the full exercise of self-determination.’ Quoted in 
G. Mennen Williams, Africa for the Africans (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1969), p. 112. 
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Government would then have to follow against South Africa.21  This was a significant 
indication of one of the major concerns of the U.S. Government about the Rhodesian 
issue: that it should not be treated in isolation lest it prejudice American regional policy 
as a whole.22  No doubt with this mind the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 
Averell Harriman, had further talks with Walker ‘primarily to cover the African situation 
… to indicate that we were prepared to work closely with the British on all matters of 
mutual interest from South Africa, Portuguese territory and the Congo, etc.’23  These talks 
demonstrate the continuing importance that London and Washington attached to Anglo-
American consultation and cooperation, which contradicts the view that there was nothing 
left of the special relationship by the time that Wilson came into office.24 
 
Walker’s visit enabled the State Department to develop some preliminary ideas about 
how to respond to a UDI.  The U.S. Government would not recognise an illegal 
Rhodesian regime but it would continue to maintain its Consulate in Salisbury.  Although 
the U.S. Government would not recognise a government-in-exile, it was anxious that only 
one such government should be formed – by ZAPU – and was prepared to put pressure on 
                                                 
21 Memorandum of Conversation, 26 October 1964, FRUS, pp. 788-89. 
22 For a discussion of how U.S. economic and strategic interests conditioned attitudes within the 
bureaucracy see Anthony Lake, The ‘Tar Baby’ Option: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1976), Ch. 3; and Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation, Ch. 8.  Andrew 
DeRoche takes issue with some of Lake’s interpretations of attitudes within the State Department, Black, 
White, and Chrome, Chs. 3 and 4.  The concept of bureaucratic politics is applied explicitly in the final 
chapter of this thesis. 
23 LBJL: NSF, UK Country File, Box 212, ‘Walker Visit Briefing Book’, Memorandum, Harriman to 
Bundy, 27 October 1964. 
24 See above, Introduction, p. 20, n. 52. 
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Hastings Banda if it became clear that he was willing to allow ZANU to set up a rival 
government in Malawi.  As far as economic sanctions were concerned, the State 
Department acknowledged that as American investment in Rhodesia was so insignificant 
there was little that the U.S. Government could do, and in any event it would take no 
action except in concert with the British Government.25  American contingency planning 
at this stage was somewhat patchy and Washington was therefore slow to communicate 
its ideas to its diplomatic posts overseas.26  Yet this is hardly surprising given that the 
U.S. Government intended to follow the British lead in the event of a UDI and the British 
Government had thus far demonstrated very little idea of what it intended to do should it 
occur.  Anglo-American relations became subject to greater strain as the two governments 
moved to discuss the implications of the Rhodesian problem in more detail, especially 
contingency plans relating to the protection of the Zambian economy. 
 
The Zambian contingency 
 
From late 1964 the U.S. Government began to give detailed consideration to the potential 
impact that a UDI could have upon Zambia.  There can be no doubt that Zambian copper 
production was a key issue for the Johnson administration, which acknowledged 
explicitly that it was a matter of particular economic and strategic importance for the 
United States: 
                                                 
25 ANZ: ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 10, Totara, Washington, to Secretary of External Affairs, 
Wellington, 2 November 1964.  In 1964 Rhodesian exports to the U.S. were worth $10 million, and imports 
from the U.S. totalled $20 million.  Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation, p. 202. 
26 According to British officials, the U.S. Consulate in Salisbury was unaware of State Department thinking.  
TNA: PRO, DO 184/614, Neville French, British High Commission, Salisbury, to Mrs M. B. Chitty, 
Commonwealth Relations Office [hereafter CRO], 20 November 1964. 
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Zambia is one of the few black African countries where there is a 
significant U.S. economic interest.  Zambia produces about 15% of free 
world copper ($360 million last year compared to $700 million U.S. 
domestic production).  Over $100 million of Zambian production is U.S. 
owned … Zambia and Congo copper together (they are all one field) 
produce over 20% of free world copper; Zambia has the world’s largest 
known reserves.  With copper production reasonably tight, and Communist 
supplies very limited, the Zambia-Congo copper would be a rich prize for 
the Chinese (who already buy some of it).27 
 
There were concerns in Lusaka, London, and Washington that if Zambia applied 
sanctions against Rhodesia in the event of a UDI, the Rhodesian Government would 
retaliate by cutting off coal and electricity supplies to the Zambian copper mines, and 
depriving Zambia of railroad facilities for the shipment of copper.  This would ruin the 
Zambian copper industry and drive up the price of copper on the world market.  
Accordingly, this problem was discussed at both the official and political levels in 
London and Washington from late 1964 throughout 1965.  State Department officials 
initially came up with the idea of inserting a small number of troops on the Zambian 
border (though it was not specified if these were to be British or American) to protect the 
Kariba Dam and Wankie colliery.28  This proposal quickly faded from view, no doubt to 
                                                 
27 LBJL: NSF, Zambia Country File, Box 102, ‘Memos and Misc. 8/64–9/68’, ‘A note on copper, Zambia 
and the U.S.’, undated but prepared by Bill Brubeck as an addendum to the ‘talking points’ paper of 1 
December 1964 written for the visit of Kenneth Kaunda.  For the uses of copper in U.S. industries see 
DeRoche, Black, White and Chrome, p. 117. 
28 TNA: PRO, DO 183/619, N. C. C. Trench, British Embassy, Washington, to Martin Le Quesne, WCAD, 
Foreign Office, 5 February 1965.  Trench reported a conversation with Edward Mulcahy, Deputy Director 
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the relief of the British Government, which had taken a decision not to use force in 
Rhodesia.  If troops had been deployed as suggested by the State Department it could 
have produced even greater pressure from African nationalists and African members of 
the Commonwealth to send troops into Rhodesia itself in order to impose a new 
constitution and facilitate the transition to African majority rule.29  The first serious focus 
of Anglo-American discussions was the proposal to construct a railroad that would bypass 
Rhodesia and re-route Zambian trade through Tanzania.30  However, following talks 
between officials in March 1965 some problems in policy co-ordination emerged as a 
result of a breakdown in channels of communication.  The British Embassy in 
Washington complained that the Commonwealth Relations Office had failed to keep it 
informed about developments, particularly concerning Zambian contingency planning, 
which militated against effective co-ordination with the U.S. Government.31  Meanwhile, 
in Whitehall there was also growing concern that the existing arrangements for 
consultation in London were inadequate.  One Foreign Office official observed: 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
for Eastern and Central African Affairs, who suggested that Wayne Fredericks had requested the State 
Department and Department of Defense to draw up suitable military plans. 
29 For a discussion of the problems associated with the use of force see above, Ch. 2. 
30 LBJL: NSF, UK Country File, Box 207, ‘Memos Vol. III 2/65–4/65’, Memorandum of Conversation, 23 
March 1965, Part V, ‘Southern Rhodesia and Zambia’; and TNA: PRO, DO 183/691, ‘Record of Anglo-
American talks held on Tuesday 23 March’.  The efficacy of the proposal generated considerable 
bureaucratic conflict in the Johnson administration.  See below, Ch. 7, pp. 365 ff. 
31 TNA: PRO, FO 371/181877 and DO 183/691, A. H. Walker, British Embassy, Washington, to Mrs. M. 
B. Chitty, CRO, 28 April 1965.  Walker pointed out that: ‘unless we have full background we are always in 
some danger of crossing wires or putting a foot wrong.’ 
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The Cabinet Office are somewhat concerned about the state of our 
consultation with the Americans ... Following the Anglo-American talks last 
month there has been consultation between the CRO and Mr. Coote, but it is 
clear already that this is nothing like enough, and that these complicated 
questions cannot be handled through this channel.32 
 
The Foreign Office therefore encouraged the Government to expedite the arrangements 
for joint contingency planning: ‘We hope that Ministers will agree that we should discuss 
these problems at a high level with the Americans.  In our view it is important that we 
should do so soon – the CRO are taking rather too leisurely an attitude to this and it can 
only be done effectively in Washington.’33  Ministers agreed that the Foreign Office 
should arrange for further talks to take place between officials and then at a more senior 
level.34  Talks duly took place in Washington during May, which proved helpful in 
clarifying the degree of assistance that could be offered to Zambia in the event that the 
copper industry was compromised following a UDI.  British and American officials 
concluded that by using surface transportation only it would be possible to enable Zambia 
to continue exporting 200,000 tons of copper per year and, if an airlift were to be 
implemented, around 350,000 tons (Zambia’s usual annual production was 700,000 tons).  
Nevertheless, it was recognised that the fall in production would have serious 
                                                 
32 TNA: PRO, FO 371/181877, Minute by John Wilson, WCAD, Foreign Office, 29 April 1965. 
33 TNA: PRO, FO 371/181877, Martin Le Quesne, WCAD, Foreign Office, to George Thomson, Minister 
of State, 4 May 1965.  Le Quesne’s comments reiterated the recommendation of the Defence and Oversea 
Policy (Official) Committee.  See TNA: PRO, CAB 148/21, OPD (65) 81, ‘Preparation for action in the 
event of a UDI: Note by the Chairman of the DOPC (Official) Committee’, 30 April 1965, para. 16. 
34 TNA: PRO, CAB 148/18, Minutes of OPD (65) 24th Meeting, 5 May 1965; and TNA: PRO, FO 
371/181893. 
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repercussions for Britain, since its industry would be affected and sterling would be under 
pressure.  It was also acknowledged that a decline in Zambian output would impact upon 
the world market and to prevent prices from rising other measures would have to be 
considered, including the release of copper from the U.S. strategic stockpile.35  At this 
point, therefore, British and American officials were tackling the salient issues with some 
effect, though matters became more difficult as UDI loomed larger. 
 
In September a higher level British delegation visited Washington for talks with Rusk.  
The Secretary of State was told that the British Government believed only an airlift would 
be sufficient to keep the Zambian economy afloat, and he was given notice that an 
approach would shortly be made to set up an Anglo-American group of experts to visit 
Tanzania and Zambia to assess the requirements for an airlift.36  Rusk was concerned to 
ensure that British and American approaches to the Zambian problem were properly co-
ordinated and he wanted to know if the British Government felt that the U.S. Government 
was ‘in line’ with regard to the Rhodesian problem.  The British delegation was confident 
that this was the case but suggested that they would have to give increasing thought to 
keeping ‘in line’ if a UDI did occur, particularly in handling the issue at the United 
Nations.37  Yet shortly after this meeting Britain and the United States began to fall 
seriously out of line with one another in relation to the Zambian contingency.  Using 
British, American and New Zealand sources it is possible to examine in detail how 
                                                 
35 ANZ: ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 12, M. J. C. Templeton, Counsellor, New Zealand High 
Commission, London, to Secretary of External Affairs, Wellington, 2 June 1965. 
36 LBJL: NSF, UK Country File, Box 209, ‘Memos Vol. VII 10/65–1/66’, Memorandum of Conversation, 
20 September 1965, ‘Current Scene in Eastern and Southern Africa: Talks with CRO Officials’; and FRUS, 
p. 804. 
37 FRUS, p. 805. 
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regular channels of communication between London and Washington became confused, 
leading to misunderstandings and suspicion on both sides. 
 
At the end of September George Ball instructed the U.S. Embassy in London to make it 
clear to the British Government that American support for the British position on UDI 
was ‘not without qualification.’  The U.S. Government could not undertake, for instance, 
to make up any balance of payments losses that Britain suffered as a result of sanctions 
imposed in the event of a UDI.  Ball warned that that the question of U.S. sanctions 
against Rhodesia required further study and was contingent upon a clear statement from 
the British Government of what it intended to do.  Ball instructed the U.S. Embassy to 
avoid making it possible for the British Government: 
 
to seize upon our yet-to-be-determined ability or inability to follow the UK 
fully or partially on sanctions or our unwillingness to offset balance of 
payments losses as excusing them from taking action or permitting them to 
place blame for lack of action at our door particularly in justifying themselves 
to other Commonwealth countries.38 
 
The American Embassy executed its instructions, making it clear that whilst the U.S. 
Government supported the British position there was a question regarding how far the 
United States could go in terms of economic sanctions.39  This might have been accepted 
at face value but for a telegram from Sir Patrick Dean, the British Ambassador in 
                                                 
38 Ball to Kaiser, Cable No. 1669, 29 September 1965, FRUS, pp. 809-10. 
39 LBJL: NSF, UK Country File, Box 209, ‘Cables Vol. VII 10/65–1/66’, Kaiser to State Department, Cable 
No. 1418, 1 October 1965. 
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Washington, who reported that an informant in the New Zealand Embassy had advised 
him: ‘there is a growing suspicion of United Kingdom motives at a very high level in the 
State Department.’  Dean reported that according to his source, the State Department had 
formed an impression from Wendell Coote in the U.S. Embassy in London that the U.S. 
Government would be expected to shoulder £50 million of the cost of economic sanctions 
against Rhodesia, and £200 million as a result of the cessation of copper supplies from 
Zambia.  According to Dean’s informant, the State Department also believed that ‘a 
refusal by the United States to lighten this load for the United Kingdom would be used 
publicly by Her Majesty’s Government as grounds for taking no action against the 
Rhodesians.’  Dean observed that according to his source, the U.S. Government had no 
intention of offering the United Kingdom any financial assistance in the event of a UDI 
and resented this attempt to blackmail them.  Dean suggested that if there were suspicions 
in the State Department as a result of Coote’s ‘tendentious reporting,’ the CRO should 
consider taking ‘appropriate corrective action’.40 
 
Not surprisingly, the Foreign Office viewed this report with such alarm that it went 
straight before the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee (DOPC).  From the minutes of 
the DOPC meeting it appears that Ministers took the view that American assistance ought 
to be forthcoming: ‘It should be made clear to them that we regarded their help in the 
present situation as an essential part of our co-operation in world affairs, in which we 
maintained certain world responsibilities not directly related to our immediate economic 
interests.’41  This indicates the level of expectation that the Labour Government attached 
to the special relationship, but rather than press this point British officials wisely sought 
                                                 
40 TNA: PRO, FO 371/181893, Dean to Foreign Office, Cable No. 2496, 2 October 1965. 
41 TNA: PRO, CAB 148/18, Minutes of OPD (65) 42nd Meeting, 2 October 1965. 
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to disabuse the State Department and U.S. Embassy in London of any suspicion that the 
British Government was scheming to entrap the U.S. Government into extensive financial 
commitments.42 
 
The U.S. chargé d’affaires in London, Philip Kaiser, was at loss to understand Dean’s 
report except, perhaps, as a ‘badly garbled leak’ of Ball’s instructions.  Kaiser found it 
difficult to see how there could be any British misunderstanding of the American position 
in view of his recent meeting with Sir Saville Garner.43  However, Kaiser’s vision 
obviously did not extend to diplomatic circles in Washington, and he was therefore 
unaware of the information that Dean had received from the New Zealand Embassy, 
which had more than a fair idea of the reasons for the misunderstanding between Britain 
and the United States: 
 
We have the impression that American mistrust of British motives and 
intentions results from some breakdown in communications between the two 
countries.  This extends to and seems in some degree to derive from 
                                                 
42 TNA: PRO, FO 371/181893, Le Quesne to Dean, Cable No. 7662, 2 October 1965; and minute of 
conversation between Le Quesne and Brubeck, U.S. Embassy, 2 October 1965.  From Washington Dean 
reported that Wayne Fredericks had expressed surprise about the whole affair and undertook to speak with 
Rusk and any other senior officials who had been misinformed.  Dean advised that regardless of what Coote 
or junior officials may have said the senior figures in the State Department were ‘perfectly sound’. TNA: 
PRO, FO 371/181893, Dean to Foreign Office, Cable No. 2507, 3 October 1965. 
43 LBJL: NSF, UK Country File, Box 209, ‘Cables Vol. VII 10/65–1/66’, Kaiser to State Department, Cable 
No. 1450, 2 October 1965. 
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differences (which may well be more apparent than real) in thinking on [the] 
Zambia rescue operation.44 
 
According to the New Zealand Embassy, the U.S. Government believed that Rhodesia 
would have to be greatly provoked before it cut off electricity and coal supplies to 
Zambia.  The Americans therefore felt that it was important that Britain should put 
greater pressure on Zambia not to cut its ties with Rhodesia.  The Americans argued that 
emphasis in planning for a response to any interruption of Zambian copper production 
should not be on a short-term expensive airlift but on developing surface routes through 
Congo and Angola.  Accordingly, the Americans informed the British that their 
commitments in Vietnam and elsewhere meant that there were no military aircraft or 
pilots available for an airlift, and canvassing of American commercial airlines had 
suggested that as a result of an increase in airfreight operations it would be unlikely that 
suitable aircraft could be chartered.  Even if aircraft were available, the Americans 
doubted whether East African airfields could handle the volume of freight necessary for a 
successful rescue operation.45  The U.S. Government was also doubtful that it would be in 
a position to assist by releasing copper from its own stockpile because withdrawals for 
new coinage meant that its stockpile had been depleted to the legal minimum and it was 
therefore unlikely that Congress would approve an emergency release.  According to the 
New Zealand Embassy, the Americans had ‘not spoken in anything like this detail’ to the 
British Embassy in Washington, whose position was further undermined as a result of 
                                                 
44 ANZ: ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 13, Totara, Washington, to Secretary of External Affairs, 
Wellington, Saving 9, 1 October 1965. 
45 Ibid. 
 325 
 
 
lack of information from the CRO and unreliable reporting of British views from the U.S. 
Embassy in London.46 
 
The British Government attempted to establish some clarity about the Zambian situation 
at a high level meeting in Washington in October 1965.47  The Foreign Secretary, 
Michael Stewart, observed that the economic measures the British Government intended 
to take in the event of a UDI could have serious repercussions on the economies of 
Zambia and Britain.  This would undo some of the efforts that had been made to support 
sterling, and he hoped that the U.S. Government would be able to offer further help in 
these circumstances.  George Ball said that he assumed most damage to the British 
balance of payments would occur as a result of economic warfare between Rhodesia and 
Zambia, as the curtailment of copper supplies to Britain could involve the loss of £200 
million in the first year.  However, he could give no assurance concerning the ability of 
the United States to give additional support for sterling in these circumstances, and Dean 
Rusk confirmed that he did not have the authority to give any commitment in this regard.  
Ball also suggested that the U.S. Government could take only limited practical economic 
measures without Congressional authorisation.  The U.S. Government could apply export 
controls against Rhodesia but was doubtful that this would be very effective because there 
were alternative sources of supply for the commodities that were involved.  Imports, 
however, could not be restricted because the Trading with the Enemy Act was inoperable 
in the absence of war or the declaration of a state of emergency.  Ball said that the only 
                                                 
46 Ibid. 
47 What follows is based on TNA: PRO, FO 371/181893, ‘Record of discussion between the Secretary of 
State and Mr. Rusk at the State Department on the morning of Monday 11 October 1965’; and 
Memorandum of Conversation, FRUS, pp. 822-24. 
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possibility the administration could see would be action pursuant to a resolution by the 
United Nations Security Council under Article 41 of the Charter.  As far as the Zambian 
contingency plans were concerned, Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense 
McNamara expressed a preference for maximising use of railway routes rather than airlift 
supplies in and copper out of Zambia, but if an airlift became necessary, civil rather than 
military aircraft should be used.48  Stewart’s report of the outcome of the Washington 
talks was therefore pessimistic.49  It also did not go unnoticed in London that some of the 
information the British delegation had provided to the Americans regarding British 
contingency plans was incorrect.50  It is significant that even when discussions were 
conducted at a high level, the Americans left the talks without accurate information about 
British contingency plans and the British failed to obtain any assurance that the United 
States intended to assist in the implementation of those plans.  The British Government’s 
                                                 
48 In December 1965 the British Government imposed an oil embargo on Rhodesia and the Rhodesian 
Government terminated supplies to Zambia.  Britain and the United States arranged an airlift that enabled 
the Zambian copper industry to continue functioning.  The U.S. Government contracted the Lockheed 
Corporation to fly copper out of the country, whilst TransWorld Airlines and Pan-American Airlines were 
contracted to deliver oil and petroleum products.  Between January and April 1966 they delivered 68,921 
barrels containing 3.6 million gallons of oil.  In 1968 a pipeline was completed between Dar Es Salaam and 
the copperbelt, which ended the Zambian dilemma.  Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation, 204-05; and 
DeRoche, Black, White and Chrome, pp. 127-28. 
49 TNA: PRO, DO 183/619, Dean to Foreign Office, Cable No. 2585, 11 October 1965.  Stewart advised: ‘I 
am bound to say that the American response was not very reassuring.  Mr Rusk and Mr Ball were unable to 
give me any general assurance (which is understandable in that they will no doubt have to consult the 
President).’ 
50 TNA: PRO, DO 183/619, Sir Arthur Snelling, CRO, to Private Secretary, Foreign Office, 13 October 
1965.  Snelling pointed out that the British Government had not decided to ‘cut off all trade’ with Rhodesia 
in the event of a UDI. 
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confidence in the Johnson administration was also shaken by Washington’s apparent 
reluctance to support Britain’s efforts to prevent a UDI.  
 
U.S. diplomatic support for Britain 
 
Throughout 1965 the U.S. Government kept a watchful eye on developments in Rhodesia, 
and on negotiations between Harold Wilson and Ian Smith.  In its bilateral relations with 
the Rhodesian Government the U.S. Government made a number of efforts to dissuade 
Smith from moving towards a UDI, though the Rhodesian Front struggled to understand 
why the United States supported the British position and resented U.S. interference in 
Rhodesia’s affairs.  As the negotiations between the British and Rhodesian governments 
entered a critical phase, Wilson hoped that American pressure would exert a restraining 
influence on Rhodesia, but he discerned a degree of reticence in the U.S. Government that 
he felt was not in keeping with the special relationship.  Wilson failed to appreciate, 
however, that the U.S. Government was not terribly well placed to discharge the deterrent 
role that the he assigned to it.   
 
In April 1965 the U.S. Representative on the United Nations Human Rights Commission, 
Marietta P. Tree, made an unequivocal statement on Rhodesia, in which she castigated the 
Rhodesian Government for its oppressive practices and refusal to move away from 
minority rule.  She expressed support for British policy and emphasised the responsibility 
of the British Government for bringing Rhodesia to independence.  She made clear the 
American view that ‘the answer to the painful problems in Southern Rhodesia is not 
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immediate independence.’51  This statement was prompted by Rhodesian failure to 
comprehend that the Americans were squarely behind the British.  The State Department 
thought that the Rhodesian Government ought to have been convinced of this when the 
U.S. Government refused a Rhodesian request to purchase some military aircraft.52  
However, Salisbury protested the U.S. refusal in ‘exaggerated and derogatory terms.’53  
The State Department was incensed by the ‘insulting, offensive’ protest, and told the 
British Embassy that the U.S. Government was reluctant to receive the new Rhodesian 
Minister in Washington, Air Vice Marshal Bentley.54  The poor state of bilateral relations 
between the United States and Rhodesia was exacerbated by a speech given by G. 
Mennen Williams, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, in which he stated 
unequivocally the position of the United States: 
 
Let me make our position crystal clear, so there will be no 
misunderstanding.  The United States will support the British Government 
to the fullest extent, if asked to do so, in its efforts to reach a solution of 
the Southern Rhodesian problem.  We would also support the British 
                                                 
51 LBJL: NSF, Files of Edward K. Hamilton, Box 3, ‘Statement of Ambassador Marietta P. Tree to the 
United Nations Committee of Twenty Four’, 14 April 1965. 
52 ANZ: ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 11, G. R. Laking, New Zealand Ambassador, Washington, to 
Secretary of External Affairs, Wellington, 13 May 1965. 
53 LBJL: NSF, Files of Edward K. Hamilton, Box 3, McClelland to State Department, 16 April 1965. 
54 LBJL: NSF, UK Country File, Box 207, ‘Cables Vol. III 2/65–4/65’, Rusk to Kaiser, Cable No. 6875, 28 
April 1965. 
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Government to the fullest extent, in case of a unilateral declaration of 
independence in Southern Rhodesia.55 
 
British officials reported that the speech had little impact in Salisbury.56  It did, however, 
make relations difficult between Bentley and Williams.  At their first meeting Williams 
‘launched out on a sharp … and rather heavy footed denunciation of the Rhodesian 
Government and all its works’ and annoyed Bentley by his reference to African 
politicians being ‘in prison’ instead of ‘under restriction’.  Williams urged the Rhodesian 
Government to show some willingness to start a dialogue with the African leaders, to 
which Bentley replied that his Government was ready but the Africans were not willing to 
conduct such a dialogue on any reasonable terms.  Bentley also suggested that the United 
States might practice what it preached vis-à-vis Hanoi.  The British Embassy observed: 
‘On this elevated note they seem to have parted the worst of friends’ and advised it was 
unlikely that this particular dialogue could be pursued ‘at all fruitfully in the foreseeable 
future.’57 
 
It was therefore evident by mid-1965 that the relationship between the Johnson 
administration and the Rhodesian Government had deteriorated way beyond the point 
where most Americans could exert any friendly influence, which meant that the United 
States could play almost no positive role in encouraging Rhodesia to adopt a more 
                                                 
55 Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan: G. Mennen Williams Papers, State Department Files, 
Microfilm Edition, Series I, ‘Correspondence’, Reel 5, ‘Speech to the Chicago Chapter of the American 
Federal Bar Association’, 15 June 1965. 
56 TNA: PRO, DO 183/691, ‘American Attitude to a UDI’ (Extract), Salisbury F.S. No. 13 (65), Part II, 23 
June 1965. 
57 TNA: PRO, FO 371/181873, Killick to Le Quesne, WCAD, Foreign Office, 1 July 1965. 
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flexible position in its negotiations with Britain.58  Nevertheless, the National Security 
Council (NSC) remained hopeful that the U.S. Government might ‘be able to help at least 
marginally to forestall UDI.’59  Prior to Ian Smith’s departure for talks in London, the 
State Department instructed its Consul General in Salisbury to deliver an oral statement 
advising the Rhodesian Prime Minister that ‘it would be a grievous error to assume that 
the United States could in any way condone an attempt of the Government of S[outhern] 
Rhodesia by unilateral action to deal with such important issues as are involved in the 
discussions which concern the future of your country.’60  However, Sir Saville Garner 
blocked this message because he thought that it would antagonise Smith.  Garner argued 
that since the ostensible purpose of Smith’s visit to London was to reach agreement with 
the British Government, it would be a mistake to deliver a message that assumed he 
would fail to do so.  The State Department yielded to Garner’s advice and Consul General 
McClelland was instructed to tone down his message to simply indicate American 
concern and express hope that a solution would be found.61  This is significant, because it 
                                                 
58 Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson was ‘Smith’s most famous champion in the United States’.  
After UDI he opposed the Johnson administration’s policy of sanctions against Rhodesia and supported 
Rhodesia’s claim for independence until his death in 1971.  DeRoche, Black, White and Chrome, pp. 147 
and 151.  See also Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American race relations in the 
global arena (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 197.  The position that Acheson took 
after UDI suggests that he would not have been an ideal emissary before UDI because he was pro-
Rhodesian. 
59 Memorandum, Komer to the President, 29 September 1965, FRUS, p. 807. 
60 Ball to McClelland, 29 September 1965, FRUS, p. 808. 
61 FRUS, p. 808, note 3.  Smith responded that he considered it ‘ironic’ that the British Government was 
appealing to the U.S. Government for assistance, alluding to the fact that it had itself established its 
independence by rebellion against the Crown.  He asserted that the Rhodesian Government did not intend to 
do anything ‘rash or irresponsible’, but it was his duty to prevent Rhodesia from becoming infiltrated by 
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indicates that the State Department was willing to adopt a firmer deterrent line towards 
Rhodesia than CRO officials were prepared to countenance. 
 
Further evidence of divergent thinking in London and Washington emerged shortly 
before Smith arrived in London.  Wilson wrote to Johnson indicating his pessimism about 
the forthcoming talks and suggesting that once they broke down the President could 
‘approach Smith in whatever way you think best calculated to bring home to him the 
gravity of the step which he is apparently contemplating.’62  Ulric Haynes, a junior 
member of staff on the NSC, argued that Wilson’s request for a presidential message to 
Smith after the breakdown of negotiations was a bad strategy: ‘From the point of view of 
U.S. interests, our deterrent efforts should be aimed at encouraging a UK-Rhodesian 
accommodation before the break-down.  The minute the break-down occurs, the UDI ball 
bounces out of the UK court where assorted players like the Afro-Asians and 
Communists are waiting to take a swing at it.’63  However, George Ball was extremely 
resistant to the idea of presidential involvement in the Rhodesian Crisis.  He told National 
Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy that the U.S. position should be to follow the British 
lead, so that if there was a ‘blowup’ the British would not be able to turn on the U.S. 
Government.  Although Bundy was also opposed to presidential involvement, he felt that 
‘For Smith to go to London with the idea that the Americans don’t give a damn is a 
mistake’”. Bundy and Ball therefore agreed that an approach should be made, but this 
                                                                                                                                                  
Communists.  To that end the Rhodesian Government would if necessary take extreme measures and Smith 
hoped that the U.S. Government would refrain from interfering in the situation.  He also warned that if 
sanctions were imposed on Rhodesia then the effects would be felt in Zambia and Malawi.  McClelland to 
State Department, Cable No. 163, 2 October 1965, FRUS, p. 811. 
62 Ball to Rusk, New York, Cable No. 53, 2 October 1965, FRUS, p. 814. 
63 LBJL: NSF, Files of Ulric Haynes, Box 1, Memorandum, Haynes to Bundy, 2 October 1965. 
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should not be presented as coming directly from the President.64  Accordingly, Ball 
instructed the U.S. Embassy in London to advise Ian Smith that: ‘The United States 
Government does not intend to deviate from its course of strong support for Her 
Majesty’s Government’s position now and – if it occurs – after a unilateral declaration of 
independence.’65  The U.S. Government was therefore steering a middle course, trying to 
meet British expectations of support without becoming too deeply involved in the 
Rhodesian Crisis. 
 
The London talks broke down as Wilson had predicted, but he planned to fly to Salisbury 
in late October in a last effort to avert a UDI.  At this juncture some officials within the 
State Department felt that the British Government should stiffen its resolve to take drastic 
retaliatory action against Rhodesia if a UDI did occur, including ‘a total embargo, 
supported by the Commonwealth, and the props knocked out from under the Rhodesian 
pound,’ which was somewhat at variance with the earlier emphasis on a cautious 
approach so as not to endanger the Zambian economy.66  Ironically, the British 
                                                 
64 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, 5 October 1965, FRUS, p. 816. 
65 Ball to Kaiser, Cable No. 1790, 6 October 1965, FRUS, 819-20.  Smith replied that the Rhodesian 
Government was approaching the negotiations ‘in a spirit of goodwill and conciliation’ but asserted that it 
had the support of both Europeans and Africans for independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution.  He 
went on to state: ‘The Rhodesian Government would be failing in their duty not only to themselves but to 
the ordinary people of the country and to the cause of Western civilisation on the continent of Africa’ if 
they conceded to immediate majority rule.  Kaiser to State Department, Cable No. 1569, 9 October 1965, 
FRUS, p. 821. 
66 ANZ, Wellington: ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 13, Box 4170, Totara, Washington, to Secretary of 
External Affairs, Wellington, Cable No. 648, 2 October 1965.  Totara reported that Edward Mulcahy, 
Deputy Director, Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs, had expressed these views to the staff of 
the New Zealand Embassy.   
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Government was doubtful that the U.S. Government would take sufficient economic 
measures against Rhodesia in the event of a UDI.  A few days after the Washington talks 
involving Stewart and Rusk, the State Department received a worrying report that Wilson 
had formed an impression that the United States was ‘rather reserved on the whole 
subject’ and that if a UDI did occur and sanctions were imposed ‘he was not at all sure 
that [the] U.S. was as close to [the] British line as he would have hoped and still hoped 
we would be.’67  The NSC was alarmed by this report, which arrived in the middle of a 
bureaucratic battle concerning the degree of support that the United States should give to 
Britain.  George Ball took the view that a UDI was inevitable and argued that the United 
States should disengage from the situation, but the NSC contended that the U.S. 
Government should try to deter Rhodesia by issuing a statement that it intended to 
support economic sanctions in the event of a UDI.68  The matter was referred to Rusk, 
who instructed the U.S. Embassy in London to advise Wilson: ‘Our considered judgment 
is that any further public statement at this eleventh hour would run the risk of driving the 
Smith government further into a corner and stiffening their desperate resolve.’  However, 
Rusk assured Wilson that he had the support of the President Johnson, who had no 
objection if Wilson wished to convey that fact to Smith during his negotiations.69  At this 
                                                 
67 LBJL: NSF, UK Country File, Box 209, ‘Memos Vol. VII 10/65–1/66’, Harlan Cleveland, Paris, to State 
Department, POLTO 549, 20 October 1965.  Cleveland was U.S. Ambassador to NATO and former 
Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. 
68 LBJL: NSF, Rhodesia Country File, Box 97, ‘Memos and Misc., 12/63–1/66’, Memorandum, Haynes to 
Komer, 19 October 1965; and Memorandum, Haynes to Bundy, 20 October 1965. 
69 TNA: PRO, FO 371/181893, Rusk to Bruce, Cable No. 2129, 22 October 1965; FRUS, p. 828.  The 
British Ambassador in Washington also advised that State Department officials had stressed that George 
Ball’s legalistic emphasis should not be interpreted as ‘illustrative of a general dragging of feet by the 
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stage, therefore, senior figures in the U.S. Government were still trying to avoid direct 
presidential involvement in the Rhodesian Crisis, which fell short of British expectations. 
 
Wilson flew to Salisbury on 24 October for talks with the Rhodesian Government, 
African Nationalist leaders, church leaders, and the business community.  Wilson found 
that the Rhodesian Government was ‘impervious to argument … collectively like a 
suicide on a windowsill waiting to jump.’  However, Wilson also found some doubt in 
Salisbury about the attitude of the United States towards a UDI and therefore requested 
that Johnson send an unequivocal personal message to Smith, delivered through the U.S. 
Consul General in Salisbury, which might act as a deterrent.70  Bundy advised the 
President that Ball had agreed that they could not reject Wilson’s request.71  Johnson 
therefore sent Smith a vague warning that in the event of a UDI the United States did not 
intend to change its ‘course of firm support for the British Government,’ and that ‘in 
addition to all its other consequences, [UDI] would inevitably break the strong ties of 
friendship and understanding which have bound our countries together in war and 
peace.’72  In his reply Smith thanked Johnson for his interest and assured him 
(disingenuously) that ‘it is the firm intention of [the] Rhodesian Government to seek 
solution of its problems with [the] British Government through patient negotiations and 
                                                                                                                                                  
Americans in regard to the question of a possible UDI.’  TNA: PRO, DO 183/619, Dean to Foreign Office, 
Cable No. 2714, 21 October 1965. 
70 TNA: PRO, FO 371/181893, Wilson to Johnson, Cable No. 1494, UK High Commission, Salisbury, to 
UK Embassy, Washington, 29 October 1965; FRUS, pp. 829-30. 
71 Bundy to the President, 29 October 1965, FRUS, p. 829. 
72 Johnson to Smith, Cable No. 342, Washington to U.S. Consul General, Salisbury, 29 October 1965, 
FRUS, p. 830. 
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discussion.’73  Smith had already decided upon a UDI, so Johnson’s warning had no 
impact.74  State Department officials obviously did not know quite how ineffectual 
American representations were, but they were concerned that the media in Salisbury was 
playing down the significance of U.S. approaches to the Rhodesian Government.75  
Wilson’s pressure for presidential involvement in the Rhodesian Crisis ultimately had no 
positive effect, but it did generate considerable bureaucratic conflict in the Johnson 
administration and placed a strain on Anglo-American relations. 
 
Noer has commented: ‘The American position on the eve of UDI thus remained as it had 
been for nearly four years: dedicated to support of Great Britain yet unclear on any 
precise policies.’76  It was not surprising that intense frustration and even hostility 
towards Britain permeated parts of the U.S. bureaucracy.  George Ball might well have 
agreed with the assessment of one U.S. diplomat who thought that the Labour 
Government had made ‘a traditional British mess’ of its dealings with Rhodesia.77  When 
the Rhodesian Government finally declared itself independent on 11 November 1965 it 
caught the U.S. Government unprepared.  The President and his senior advisers were at 
                                                 
73 Smith to Johnson, Cable No. 281, U.S. Consul General, Salisbury, to Washington, 1 November 1965, 
FRUS, p. 832.   
74 According to the Rhodesian Intelligence Chief, Ken Flower, the Rhodesian Security Council decided on 
19 October 1965 to proceed with a UDI.  Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record.  Rhodesia into 
Zimbabwe 1964-1981 (London: John Murray, 1987), p. 47. 
75 TNA: PRO, DO 183/691, Dean to Foreign Office, Cable No. 2607, 13 October 1965. 
76 Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation, p. 196. 
77 TNA: PRO, FO 371/181881, Ronald Burroughs, British Embassy, Lisbon, to Derek Dodson, Central 
Department, Foreign Office, 22 October 1965.  Burroughs reported the views of Admiral George Anderson, 
U.S. Ambassador to Lisbon. 
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his ranch in Austin, conducting a major review of Vietnam policy and the only decision 
that Dean Rusk could announce to the press was that the U.S. Government would recall 
its Consul General from Salisbury.78  Further measures were announced at the United 
Nations the following day but it took until 19 November for the State Department to 
produce a detailed analysis of the Rhodesian Crisis and the range of available options.79  
However, continuing British prevarication encumbered the American response, as 
Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen Williams complained: ‘The U.S. is anxious to 
support [the British] but we do not understand the general outlines of their program or 
what their over-all thinking is.’80  One month after UDI, ‘American policy remained a 
mixture of public support of Wilson and private grumblings about his tentativeness and 
imprecision.’81  This illustrates just how frustrated and confused Anglo-American 
relations became during the period leading up to Rhodesia’s UDI and beyond.  To explain 
how and why these strains occurred within the special relationship, theories of alliance 
politics can be applied to the Rhodesian Crisis. 
 
Explaining the frustration in Anglo-American relations 
 
International relations theory addresses the general propositions that may be advanced 
about the political relations between states.  A key component of the literature on 
international relations is alliance theory, which examines the reasons why alliances are 
formed, how they are maintained, and why they collapse.  The Anglo-American special 
                                                 
78 Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation, p. 198; DeRoche, Black, White and Chrome, p. 113. 
79 Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation, p. 200. 
80 Williams to Ball, 24 November 1965, Williams Papers, Box 5, National Archives, Washington.  Quoted 
in Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation, p. 202. 
81 Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation, p. 203. 
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relationship is an obvious case study for testing such theories.82  Writing in 1970 about 
the Suez and Skybolt crises, Richard Neustadt discerned a pattern of crisis behavior in 
Anglo-American relations that consisted of muddled perceptions, stifled communications, 
disappointed expectations, and paranoid reactions.83  He argued that whilst the first three 
elements were common enough in the international states system, the fourth tends to be 
found only in intimate relationships such as those that exist between London and 
Washington: ‘paranoid reactions are associated with relations bearing something like the 
burden of an unrequited love.’84  Although the Rhodesian Crisis was obviously not as 
serious as either Suez or Skybolt, Neustadt’s approach is nevertheless useful for analysing 
Anglo-American relations during the Rhodesian Crisis. 
 
Neustadt observed that a number of factors contribute to misperception between allies, 
including clash of personalities, divergence in policy, and different orders of priority.85  
There is little to suggest that poor personal relations inhibited Anglo-American 
understanding during the Rhodesian Crisis.  Prominent members of the Johnson 
administration were well aware that Wilson and other senior members of the Labour 
Government attached considerable significance to their relations with the U.S. 
administration and were conscious of their personal standing in Washington.86  Johnson 
                                                 
82 John Baylis, ‘The Anglo-American Relationship and Alliance Theory’, International Relations, Vol. 8 
(November 1985), p. 368. 
83 Richard Neustadt, Alliance Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 56. 
84 Ibid., p. 72. 
85 Ibid., pp. 57-58. 
86 Shortly before the Washington talks in December 1964, Bundy advised Johnson: ‘It is extremely clear on 
all the evidence that Wilson has staked a great deal on having a “successful” visit with you.’  LBJL: NSF, 
UK Country File, Box 214, ‘UK Prime Minister Wilson Visit’, Memorandum, Bundy to the President, 5 
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was not by nature an enthusiastic Anglophile and indeed Wilson was well aware of this, 
which is why he worked hard to gain Johnson’s trust.87  Noer observes that prior to their 
meeting in December 1965 – at which UDI was discussed extensively – relations between 
Wilson and Johnson ‘had been rather cool,’ but on this occasion Wilson ‘greatly 
impressed’ the President.88  Wilson was obviously concerned to establish a good working 
relationship with Johnson and in this he largely succeeded, though he was perhaps 
inclined to exaggerate its intimacy.89  However, the degree of friendship between Wilson 
                                                                                                                                                  
December 1964.  There is, of course, a distinction to be drawn between Labour revisionists and those on the 
left of the Party regarding their attitudes towards the United States.  See Peter Jones, America and the 
British Labour Party (New York, I.B. Tauris, 1997), p. 124; and Steven Fielding, ‘Labour revisionists and 
the imagining of America’, in Jonathan Hollowell (ed.), Twentieth Century Anglo-American Relations 
(New York: Palgrave, 2001), Ch.5. 
87 Wilson met Johnson during a visit to Washington earlier in 1964, whilst Wilson was still Leader of the 
Opposition.  Wilson recalled in his memoirs that on that occasion Johnson had told him he did not trust 
British Prime Ministers because it seemed to him that their visits to Washington were mainly about 
cultivating British domestic opinion.  Johnson repeated this view to Wilson in December 1964 and, in an 
attempt to put Johnson at ease, Wilson assured him that his public statements on Anglo-American relations 
would correspond entirely with what he said to the President.  Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 
1964-1970 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, and Michael Joseph), pp. 46-47. 
88 Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation, p. 204. 
89 Dick Crossman was amused by the hyperbole in Wilson’s account of the warmth and significance of his 
relationship with LBJ.  See R. H. S. Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister. Volume 1, Minister of 
Housing 1964–1966 (London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, 1975), p. 94, entry for 11 December 
1964.  On the other hand, the U.S. Ambassador to London, David Bruce, suggested that Wilson and 
Johnson found considerable common ground, enjoying private talks about their respective domestic 
political situations.  LBJL: Oral Histories, Transcript of Interview, 9 December 1971, pp. 10-11.  Historians 
have advanced several interpretations of the nature of the relationship between Wilson and Johnson.  For a 
brief summary of these views see John W. Young, The Labour Governments 1964–70. Volume 2, 
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and Johnson does not really shed much light on the reasons for misperception during the 
Rhodesian Crisis, since relations can become strained irrespective of the degree of 
cordiality between principals.90 
 
There is also little evidence of divergence in policy between the United States and the 
United Kingdom with regard to the Rhodesian issue.  One contemporary commentator, 
Waldemar Nielsen, observed: ‘In the past, the U.S. has perhaps taken too dutiful and 
passive a stance in its dealings with Great Britain on the Rhodesian question.’  Nielsen 
suggested that if the U.S. Government deemed British policy too weak then ‘the only 
sensible course for the U.S. would be to separate itself from its ally and seek an 
independent line of action.’91  Yet this was never on the cards before UDI, since 
American interests (domestic and foreign) were best served by a pro-African and pro-
British policy.  This also remained true for a few years after UDI, but when Rhodesia 
declared itself a republic in 1969 – and it became apparent that the British Government 
had all but abandoned any pretence of being able to influence developments – the United 
States did indeed begin to pursue a separate policy.  As a result of Henry Kissinger’s 
                                                                                                                                                  
International Policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), pp. 20-22.  For a more detailed 
discussion see Sylvia Ellis, ‘Lyndon B. Johnson, Harold Wilson and the Vietnam war: a not so special 
relationship?’, in Hollowell (ed.), Twentieth Century Anglo-American Relations, pp. 180-204; Jonathan 
Colman, ‘Harold Wilson, Lyndon Johnson and Anglo-American “Summit Diplomacy”, 1964–68’, Journal 
of Transatlantic Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2003), pp. 131-151; and idem, A ‘Special Relationship’? Harold 
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Manchester University Press, 2005). 
90 Neustadt, Alliance Politics, p. 57. 
91 W. A. Nielsen, African Battle Line: American Policy Choices in Southern Africa (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1965), p. 56. 
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influence American policy became more favorable towards the white Rhodesians, which 
was consistent with a forward anti-Communist foreign policy.  According to one 
commentator, the results of this shift were illegal, since it involved breaking UN 
mandatory sanctions; and immoral, because it abandoned the principle of democracy in 
Rhodesia.92 
 
Certainly, it can be argued that different orders of priority were evident in London and 
Washington during the Rhodesian Crisis.  Interestingly, Wilson’s Foreign Office Private 
Secretary Sir Oliver Wright thought that although Rhodesia took up a lot of time, it was a 
‘problem of the second order’ when compared with East-West relations.93  Nevertheless, 
it was a problem that commanded far more attention at a higher level in London than in 
Washington.  This is not surprising as much of Johnson’s time was (quite naturally) 
absorbed by the escalation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.94  The other major concern 
for the Johnson administration during 1965 was the Dominican Republic, where some 
33,000 troops were deployed to crush a rebellion.95  Terence Lyons has noted that Africa 
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was a very low priority on Johnson’s foreign policy agenda.96  Andrew DeRoche agrees, 
but has argued that Johnson demonstrated a ‘personal interest in the Southern Rhodesian 
conflict’.97  However, there is clear evidence to the contrary, which suggests that the 
President was in fact keen to deflect the issue.  Shortly after UDI the staff on the NSC 
learned from the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs that senior figures in the 
administration were being ‘kept under wraps on Rhodesia by the President’s strong desire 
not to be bothered with another major problem at this time.’98  Similarly, although Dean 
Rusk was involved in several high-level meetings with British ministers in which the 
Rhodesian problem was discussed, he had little time for, or interest in, African matters.  
Rusk later observed that during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations the United 
States was a ‘junior partner’ in Africa, which was reflected in the fact that 75 per cent of 
African aid came from Western Europe and only 25 per cent from the U.S.  Rusk thought 
that was an appropriate arrangement because Europe had relatively little involvement in 
other regions such as Latin America and Asia.99  Rusk’s indifference meant that 
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management of the Rhodesian problem consequently devolved upon George Ball, whose 
approach was cautious to say the least.  Although Ball was keen not to prejudice relations 
with the United Kingdom he felt that on the Rhodesian issue the British were ‘playing a 
game of trying to push us out in front’.100  Ball did not believe that the United States 
could shape societies and events in the Third World and he saw the Rhodesian problem as 
a secondary issue on which American action was neither possible nor desirable.101  With 
the most senior policy-makers in the Johnson administration trying to marginalise the 
Rhodesian problem it might be argued that there was an increased likelihood of 
misperception between London and Washington.  However, as Neustadt acknowledged, 
different orders of priority are commonplace and this does not produce a state of 
continual crisis in relations.102  It may be argued, then, that the interaction of 
personalities, degree of policy divergence, and differences in orders of priority, do not 
provide a convincing explanation of the frustration in Anglo-American relations during 
the Rhodesian Crisis. 
 
In his analysis of the Suez and Skybolt crises, Neustadt suggested that communications 
were stifled by concerns that ‘any word to friends across the ocean may come back to 
other ears at home.  As well, a word to friends at home may skip across the water.’103  
Neustadt also recognised that in addition to reticence, communications were often 
inhibited by complicated embassy arrangements and failure to make effective use of 
established channels of communication.   He observed that the embassies in London and 
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Washington consisted of many different departments that tended to deal only with their 
official counterparts, which failed to yield a coherent view of ministerial motives.  
Further, as the ambassadors only acted on instructions – which did not contain the pointed 
questions necessary to obtain clarity – crucial details remained missing.  Neustadt 
therefore implied that, as a matter of routine, ambassadors must be permitted to use their 
own initiative to ask the questions that may give an insight into ministerial motives.104 
 
During the Rhodesian Crisis there was some evidence of reticence on the American side, 
which perhaps reflected Ball’s unwillingness to be ‘pushed out in front’ on the Rhodesian 
problem.  It is remarkable that the New Zealand Embassy was often better informed about 
concerns in Washington than the British Embassy, especially as the latter has been 
perceived as such a crucial element in the effective functioning of the special 
relationship.105  Perhaps more significant than reticence, however, were the regular 
difficulties created by breakdowns in communication, which emanated from the structural 
problems in Anglo-American relations at this time.  In late 1963, following a suggestion 
that U.S. and British regional policy could be effectively co-ordinated through the British 
Embassy in Washington, the U.S. Government considered the removal of its regional 
specialists in the Political Section of the U.S. Embassy in London.  The U.S. Ambassador 
to London, David Bruce, argued a strong case for retention of the regional specialists.  
Bruce observed that the structure of British policy making militated against the co-
ordination of policy through the British Embassy in Washington.  Bruce noted that 
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responsibility for British relations with Africa, Asia and Latin America was divided 
between the Foreign Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office, and the Colonial 
Office.  Some of the ‘hottest’ foreign policy problems (which by the following year 
included Rhodesia) therefore fell outside the remit of the Foreign Office.  Although the 
Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office were represented on the staff of 
the British Embassy in Washington they tended to regard the Embassy as ‘the arm of 
“another government agency,” without “primary” interest and responsibility for the areas 
which come within the purview of these two ministries.’  The recommendations of the 
British Embassy in Washington therefore carried more weight with the Foreign Office 
than with the other two ministries.106  Bruce argued that the State Department required its 
own channel of communication on regional matters with each of the British ministries 
and suggested that greater emphasis should be placed on the links provided by the 
regional specialists: 
 
Not infrequently, when we have a ‘regional’ position to sell the British, we 
initiate the matter with the British Embassy in Washington.  Our position 
does not ‘sell’ in London, and at that point the State Department calls on 
one of the Embassy regional specialists in London to straighten the matter 
out. Our regional specialist often finds that the British position has too far 
jelled, personal prestige has become too involved, to salvage as much for 
the American position as might be desired.107 
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Bruce concluded that the regional specialists should therefore be entrusted with ‘the 
initial sales effort,’ since they had the advantage of being able to conduct face-to-face 
talks with British policy-makers, ‘to feel out the ground and to proceed accordingly.’108  
One year later, Averell Harriman echoed the concerns expressed by Bruce regarding the 
structure of British policy-making, but this time American concerns were addressed 
directly to the British Government.  He told Patrick Gordon Walker that the U.S. 
Government experienced difficulties in dealing with the Commonwealth Relations Office, 
which was regarded as ‘a second Foreign Office in the important parts of the world.’  
Walker responded to these concerns by assuring Harriman that the Commonwealth 
Secretary, Arthur Bottomley, would give his full co-operation in matters of Anglo-
American interest.109  Yet despite this assurance it is clear from the documentary 
evidence that the division of responsibility within the British Government for Rhodesian 
matters militated against effective communication and co-ordination with the U.S. 
Government.  In May 1965, one Foreign Office official wrote:  
 
I am afraid it is clear that the CRO have not done any thinking on this 
question.  It is one of the great faults of the Sub-Committee on Rhodesia 
that although many papers have been prepared on detailed aspects of a 
unilateral declaration of independence nothing has been written about the 
reactions of Afro-Asian Governments, the [Organisation for African 
Unity] and the United Nations, and the effect on our international position 
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if [Her Majesty’s Government] did nothing to put an effective end to the 
rebellion.110   
 
As long as such major questions remained unanswered it was impossible for the British 
Government to give a clear indication of its policy to the U.S. Government, which 
explains why American policy-makers such as Ball felt such intense frustration 
throughout the period leading up to UDI and beyond.  The problem of poor 
communication was exacerbated by the fact that the American Embassy in London had its 
own institutional weaknesses.  Bruce had a ‘hands off’ style of management, which meant 
that his staff enjoyed considerable leeway and Bruce often did not see much of the 
correspondence that went out of the embassy, or get around as much as senior British 
officials would have liked.111  This lack of supervision and contact may help to explain 
the origins of American misinformation, such as the ‘tendentious’ reports by Wendell 
Coote on the Rhodesian problem. 
 
Neustadt observed that since Britain and the United States are such close allies, both sides 
‘habitually expect accommodation for themselves.’112  Consequently, expectations were 
disappointed on several occasions in London and Washington during the Rhodesian 
Crisis.  Harold Wilson, for example, over-estimated the significance of the United States 
as an actor in the Crisis.  As the prospect of a UDI drew closer, he clung desperately to 
the idea that the United States might be able to help avert it by expressing its unequivocal 
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support for Britain and warning the Rhodesians of the dire consequences of unilateral 
action.  Yet this vague hope was unrealistic, as the state of relations between the United 
States and Rhodesia was not much better than the relationship between Britain and 
Rhodesia. Moreover, U.S. trade with Rhodesia was relatively insignificant, so the 
Rhodesian Government was not greatly influenced by the prospect of American 
sanctions.  A further cause of disappointment in London was that the British Government 
hoped (despite its protestations to the contrary) that the U.S. Government would offset 
some of the financial burden that Britain faced as a result of economic sanctions against 
Rhodesia and the Zambia rescue operation.  This misconception probably originated as a 
result of the massive assistance provided by the U.S. Government to defend sterling 
shortly after Wilson came to power.113  Thus, British policy-makers ‘perceived what they 
projected’ and in doing so ‘they set the stage for their own disappointment and its 
aftermath in paranoid reactions.’114  Yet the same is true of policy-makers in Washington, 
who failed to perceive accurately the reasons for British prevarication on the Rhodesian 
issue and became frustrated by their indecision.  Wilson managed the Rhodesian problem 
in Cabinet sub-committees to avoid dissent in the full Cabinet, which is an important 
reason why so few authoritative decisions were taken before UDI.115  The division of 
responsibility between the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Relations Office also 
compounded British procrastination, though the U.S. administration was more aware of 
                                                 
113 The U.S. Government provided a $3 billion currency package to end speculation against the pound.  
LBJL: NSF, UK Country File, Box 213, ‘Off-the-Record Meeting of the President With Prime Minister 
Wilson’, Memorandum of Conversation, 7 December 1964.  The sensitivity of the meeting is clear from the 
minutes, which record: ‘It was agreed to begin with that this was a meeting which never occurred.’ 
114 Neustadt, Alliance Politics, p. 69. 
115 Crossman wrote: ‘quite elaborate contingency plans for action existed but nobody wanted to reveal what 
they were’.  Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p. 344, entry for 8 October 1965. 
 348 
 
 
the problems that this created in respect of Rhodesian policy.  However, there is clearly 
some validity in Neustadt’s contention that disappointed expectations can be explained by 
the failure to appreciate the differing political contexts that exist in London and 
Washington.116 
 
In his analysis of the Suez and Skybolt crises Neustadt contended that Anglo-American 
friendship contributed to unquestioned expectations of mutual support, and when such 
expectations were disappointed it resulted in paranoid reactions on both sides.  This 
contention is also supported by an examination of the Rhodesian Crisis, in which fears 
about abandonment and entrapment permeated governments in London and Washington.  
In this analysis, the concept of ‘the secondary alliance dilemma’ is extremely useful.117  
Glenn Snyder has observed that the alliance security dilemma has two phases.  In the 
primary phase the dilemma is whether or not to form an alliance in order to achieve 
greater security, but in the secondary phase the dilemma involves the extent of support to 
be given to an ally in a conflict situation.  In the secondary phase the fear of being 
abandoned by one’s ally is always present and abandonment may take a variety of forms: 
diplomatic realignment, abrogation of the alliance contract, failure to make good on 
explicit commitments, or failure to provide support in contingencies where support is 
expected.118  In the Rhodesian Crisis, the British Government obviously feared the last 
scenario, as evidenced by Harold Wilson’s pessimism over U.S. commitment to economic 
sanctions in October 1965.  Also characteristic of the secondary phase of the alliance 
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security dilemma is fear of entrapment, which means ‘being dragged into a conflict over 
an ally’s interests that one does not share, or shares only partially.’119  Clearly, this was 
what concerned the U.S. Government throughout 1965, as indicated by George Ball’s 
anxiousness not to be ‘pushed out in front’ on the Rhodesian issue.120 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has focused upon a relatively neglected area of historical research, 
demonstrating that attempts to co-ordinate policy on the Rhodesian issue were a 
significant feature of Anglo-American relations in the Wilson-Johnson era.  To be sure, 
British and American interests were asymmetrical; Britain had far more to lose as a result 
of a UDI than the United States.  Nevertheless, the U.S. Government considered it 
essential to support the British throughout the period of their negotiations with the 
Rhodesians, but without becoming too deeply involved in the Crisis.  As Anthony Lake 
has commented, ‘Their approach was to find and follow the course of least resistance.’121  
The United States established a policy very early on of following the British lead, which 
constituted an unusual departure from the normal pattern of relations between the two 
states.  However, this depended upon effective consultation and co-ordinated action, 
which was sorely lacking primarily as a result of structural weaknesses and bureaucratic 
conflict on both sides.  The Rhodesian Crisis therefore gave rise to mutual fears of 
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entrapment and abandonment, which exacerbated problems in the special relationship 
posed by thornier issues such as Vietnam.  This chapter has also sought to demonstrate 
the principle that ‘history must be regarded as the proving ground for theory; it provides 
the acid test against which general propositions about political behaviour can be either 
verified or falsified.’122  The chapter has argued that although Neustadt’s analytical 
framework is now well over thirty years old it still retains considerable utility for 
comprehending the misunderstandings and frustrations within the special relationship 
during the Wilson-Johnson period, at least in relation to the Rhodesian Crisis.  However, 
one case study does not of course prove the general utility of a theory, and other scholars 
might therefore wish to consider Neustadt’s paradigm in relation to other aspects of 
Anglo-American relations during the Wilson-Johnson era. 
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Chapter Seven 
U.S. Domestic Politics and the Rhodesian Crisis 
 
Introduction 
 
As the previous chapter has demonstrated, the Rhodesian Crisis was a significant focus of 
Anglo-American relations during 1964 and 1965.  It also suggested that bureaucratic 
conflict in the U.S. Government contributed to the problems involved in Anglo-American 
consultation and cooperation.  This chapter develops that theme in detail, by briefly 
outlining the bureaucratic politics model and then examining the battles fought within the 
Johnson administration over its Rhodesia policy.  Particular attention is paid to the role of 
G. Mennen Williams, a former Governor of the State of Michigan with a strong record on 
civil rights, who was Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs between 1961 and 
1966.1  This chapter focuses on the same policy issues discussed in the previous chapter – 
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also Thomas J. Noer, Soapy: A Biography of G. Mennen Williams (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Press, 2005). 
 352  
maintenance of the Zambian economy, and U.S. diplomatic support for Britain – but this 
time seeks to demonstrate how and why Williams failed to overturn the U.S. 
Government’s cautious approach to, and limited involvement in, these aspects of the 
Rhodesian Crisis.  The chapter then goes on to briefly outline the pluralist perspective of 
U.S. foreign policy formulation and analyses the reasons why interest groups – 
particularly African-American interest groups that naturally sought to exert influence in 
foreign policy matters involving questions of race – made little impact on the U.S. 
Government’s Rhodesia policy. 
 
The bureaucratic politics model and divisions over Rhodesia in the U.S. Government 
 
The bureaucratic politics approach to foreign policy analysis was inaugurated over thirty 
years ago with the publication of Graham T. Allison’s Essence of Decision.  Building on 
the work of political scientists and organisational theorists, Allison examined U.S. 
policymaking during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  He refuted the ‘rational actor’ model, 
which posits the idea that governments are unified actors who make purposeful choices 
between alternative courses of action in order to best serve the national interest.  Rather, 
Allison argued, the actions of the Kennedy administration during October 1962 were 
better understood not as rational choices but as resultants that emerged from 
‘compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal 
influence.’2  According to this view, policymaking should be seen as an outcome of 
                                                 
2 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 
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conflict between competing bureaucratic factions within the government, each of which 
seeks to advance its own interests and interpretation of the national interest.  The 
bureaucratic politics model tends to work well when it is applied to studies of U.S. policy 
because of the number of departments and executive agencies involved in the 
policymaking process, and their willingness to use the public arena, as Philip Darby has 
observed: 
 
Within the executive branch, under the President, the responsibility for 
foreign affairs is shared between the State Department, various other 
departments and agencies such as the Departments of Defense and 
Commerce, and the White House Office advisers.  Perhaps inevitably, 
there has been a tendency for these bodies to speak publicly with different 
voices.  It is thus of the nature of the American system that there is a fuller 
airing of different points of view and that positions are more often 
exaggerated or disguised for the purposes of bargaining than is true of 
most Western countries.3 
 
The bureaucratic politics model lends itself very well to understanding the divisions 
within the U.S. Government on Rhodesia, and the making of U.S. Rhodesia policy during 
the mid-1960s.  Anthony Lake (who served in the State Department from 1962) identified 
three groups in the Johnson administration with differing views on the Rhodesian 
problem.  First, anti-Smith advocates of relatively strong American action.  Second, 
advocates of any policy that would preserve American economic and military interests in 
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Africa, especially white southern Africa.  And third, senior figures who had no interest in 
the Rhodesian problem and wished to marginalise discussion by the advocates of more 
active policies.4  The last of these groups will be analysed first because its response to the 
Rhodesian problem conditioned the conflict over the issue within the American 
bureaucracy. 
 
Within the U.S. executive branch the President is expected to give strong leadership in the 
field of foreign affairs.  However, Lyndon Johnson began to prepare for the 1964 election 
almost immediately after being sworn in as President and his involvement in foreign 
policy during his first year in office was therefore muted.5  As noted in the previous 
chapter, once the President was able to focus on foreign affairs much of his attention was 
taken up with Vietnam. African problems generally, and the Rhodesian Crisis in 
particular, were not a priority for Johnson.6  In the absence of firm presidential leadership 
on Rhodesian policy, several government departments and executive agencies battled to 
articulate their interests.  The State Department was of course central to the discussion 
and development of U.S. policy on Rhodesia, but its views were by no means monolithic.  
Secretary of State Dean Rusk was involved in discussions with British ministers about 
Rhodesia, but he left the issue largely in the hands of Undersecretary of State George 
Ball.  Ball was not terribly sympathetic to the special relationship with Britain because he 
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felt that it tended to complicate U.S. relations with Europe.7  As discussed in the previous 
chapter, he felt that Rhodesia was a British problem and wanted to limit U.S. 
involvement.8  Ball enjoyed the loyalty of an extensive cadre of policymakers in several 
bureaus of the State Department, Johnson and Rusk trusted his judgment, and he was at 
the heart of policymaking on several key foreign policy issues (though he eventually 
resigned because he disagreed with Vietnam policy).9  Ball’s pervasive influence was 
therefore a serious obstacle to those who wished to implement a more active U.S. policy 
on Rhodesia. 
 
The attitudes of the two most senior figures within the State Department clashed with 
those of several subordinates.  The most vocal proponents of a more active U.S. policy 
were found in the Bureau of African Affairs.  G. Mennen Williams had been appointed 
Assistant Secretary of State by President Kennedy as a demonstration of the President’s 
interest in African affairs, and it did not take Williams long to draw public attention to the 
administration’s position.  During a visit to East Africa in February 1961, a reporter in 
Nairobi asked Williams about U.S. policy towards Africa.  Williams said: ‘What we want 
                                                 
7 I am grateful to Dr. Andrew Priest, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, for this analysis.  In his memoirs, 
Ball wrote: ‘so long as the peoples of Europe remained emotionally and politically locked up within tight 
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The Past has another Pattern: Memoirs (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1982), p. 82.  It has been 
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observed: ‘Ball was neither strictly a Third Worlder nor a Europeanist.  Although his experience would 
seem to have placed him in the Europeanist camp, some analysts considered him a Third 
Worlder/Africanist.’  George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U. S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1997), p. 140. 
8 See above, Ch. 6, passim. 
9 Bill, George Ball, pp. 68-75. 
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for Africa is what Africans want for themselves.’  The resulting headline – ‘Soapy Says 
Africa for the Africans’ – raised eyebrows in the United States and the United 
Kingdom.10  Williams and his deputy, J. Wayne Fredericks, were both deeply committed 
to the principle of majority rule in Rhodesia, and it has been suggested that this damaged 
their credibility within the bureaucracy.11  However, their position was based on more 
than principle.  In his statement to the House Appropriations Committee on the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1965, Williams observed that: 
 
A major objective of U.S. foreign policy and a concern of our AID 
[Agency for International Development] program is to help African 
countries become politically stable and economically viable, so they can 
maintain their own independence and resist Communist efforts at 
subversion.12 
 
                                                 
10 Kennedy defended Williams, saying that it ‘does not seem to me to be a very unreasonable statement … I 
do not know who else Africa should be for.’  Williams explained that in his view the term ‘African’ was 
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(Grand Rapids: Williams B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1969), p. 159.  See also Noer, Soapy, Chapter VI, 
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12 Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, [hereafter, BHL]: G. Mennen 
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Materials 1961-1966, ‘Congressional Hearings 1961-1965’, Box 7-N, ‘Statement of the Honorable G. 
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The Bureau of African Affairs repeated this strategic concern many times, but Johnson, 
Rusk, and Ball thought that it was exaggerated, and tended to be dismissive of warnings 
about Communist activities in Africa.  The Bureau of African Affairs, however, was by 
no means isolated in its policy stance on Africa in general or the Rhodesian issue in 
particular.  The United States Mission to the United Nations supported a tough line 
against Rhodesia because it was responsible for defending America’s international 
position in an arena where African votes and rhetoric could not be ignored.  The Bureau 
of International Organization Affairs shared these concerns about the image of the United 
States, and the Bureau of African Affairs also drew support from elements within the 
Office of the Legal Adviser and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.13  By far the 
most important allies of the Bureau of African Affairs, however, were the staff on the 
National Security Council (NSC).  Reporting to the National Security Adviser McGeorge 
Bundy was Deputy Assistant Robert Komer, a former CIA analyst who was, inter alia, in 
charge of African affairs.  Komer was sympathetic to Williams and Fredericks because he 
‘had long held the view that independence throughout Africa was inevitable and that the 
United States should do what it could to identify itself with anticolonialism.’14  Although 
Komer did not always agree with the tactics that the Bureau of African Affairs used to 
advance its views, or with its emphasis on aid as an instrument of U.S. policy, he often 
counselled against what he regarded as the excessively cautious approach of George Ball 
to U.S. policy on Rhodesia.15  However, there were limits to what Komer could achieve.  
                                                 
13 Lake, The ‘Tar Baby’ Option, pp. 66-7. 
14 Ibid., p. 67. 
15 Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas [hereafter, LBJL]: National Security File [hereafter, 
NSF], Rhodesia Country File, Box 97, ‘Memos and Misc., 12/63-1/66’, Komer to Bundy, 2 November 
1965, for Komer’s reaction to a suspected leak from the Bureau of African Affairs to the media.  LBJL: 
NSF, Name File, Box 6, ‘Komer Memos’, Vol. II (1), Komer to the President, 19 June 1965, for Komer’s 
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Lake notes that during the early phase of the Rhodesian problem, Komer sometimes acted 
on proposals from the Bureau of African Affairs without obtaining higher authority from 
Rusk or one of the Under Secretaries, but President Johnson curbed this tendency towards 
unilateral action in early 1964.16   
 
In between the advocates of a forthright approach to the Rhodesian problem and those 
who sought to marginalise them, were the Department of Commerce, the Treasury, and 
the Department of Defense.  The Department of Commerce took the view that U.S. 
investment in, and trade with, southern Africa was important in terms of the balance of 
payments and should not, therefore, be jeopardised.  There was no threat from African 
nations to boycott trade if the United States did not take stronger measures against the 
white regimes in southern Africa and it was argued that the only immediate threat to U.S. 
business interests was from the white regimes if the U.S. Government intervened against 
them too actively.  The Treasury concurred with this analysis and also wanted to prevent 
any policy that might damage relations with South Africa and disrupt its role in the 
supply of gold to the international monetary system.17  The Defense Department wanted 
to protect advantages that the U.S. military enjoyed in South Africa, and to maintain good 
relations with Portugal to avoid jeopardising its use of the strategically significant Azores 
base.  NASA also opposed any policy that might threaten its tracking station in South 
Africa.  Lake observes that: 
                                                                                                                                                  
views on aid policy.  For Komer’s advocacy of a more interventionist policy to prevent UDI, see Komer to 
Johnson, 29 September 1965, Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-68, Vol. XXIV, Africa [hereafter 
FRUS], (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office for the Department of State, 1999), p. 
807. 
16 Lake, The ‘Tar Baby’ Option, p. 67. 
17 Ibid., p. 68. 
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These agencies had a far less important stake in Rhodesia, however, than 
they did in South Africa.  While they therefore often found themselves at 
loggerheads with the State Department’s African bureau over American 
policy toward the latter, they did not weigh in so heavily on the American 
response to UDI.18 
 
Nevertheless, with so many different departments and agencies protecting or advancing 
their interests, the chances that Williams and the Bureau of African Affairs would prevail 
in the contest to shape U.S. policy on Rhodesia were much diminished.  A major 
consequence of the bureaucratic conflict was that U.S. policy was slow to emerge.  
Williams explained this not in terms of delays resulting from ‘vertical clearance’ (the 
need for approval from higher authority) but rather as a problem of ‘horizontal clearance’; 
i.e., delays resulting from co-ordination of policy within the State Department and 
between the State Department and other government departments.19  This can be 
demonstrated by an examination of the issues involved in U.S. policy and contingency 
planning prior to Rhodesia’s UDI. 
 
Bureaucratic conflict and the making of U.S. Rhodesia policy, 1964-65 
 
During 1964 and 1965 the Johnson administration gave consideration to two related 
issues, both of which caused considerable conflict within the bureaucracy.  The first was 
what kind of support the United States could give to Britain’s efforts to deter Rhodesia 
from a UDI; the second was what action the United States could take to protect Zambian 
                                                 
18 Ibid., pp. 68-69. 
19 Williams, Africa for the Africans, pp. 164-65. 
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copper production in the event of economic warfare between Rhodesia and Zambia after a 
UDI occurred.  The bureaucratic conflict intensified in the wake of UDI, but the influence 
of G. Mennen Williams and the Bureau of African Affairs diminished rapidly after 
George Ball took steps to gain control of the policy process. 
 
The question of support for Britain 
 
Throughout 1965 the State Department and the National Security Council kept a watchful 
eye on developments in Rhodesia, and its negotiations with Britain.  The NSC and Bureau 
of African Affairs argued that the U.S. Government could have strengthened its support 
of the British Government by exerting greater diplomatic pressure on Rhodesia.  There is 
evidence, however, that their efforts were weakened by a failure to coordinate their 
recommendations.  This allowed George Ball, who was critical and suspicious of 
Britain’s handling of the Rhodesian crisis, to avoid greater U.S. involvement. 
 
By April 1965, NSC staffers were becoming increasingly concerned about developments 
in Rhodesia, and were trying to develop an interventionist strategy.  A junior analyst on 
the NSC staff, Rick Haynes, pointed out to Robert Komer that there had been no ‘direct, 
high level’ U.S. approach to the Rhodesian Government.  Haynes suggested that Averell 
Harriman was ideally suited to such a mission because he was ‘awfully good at scolding 
wayward Chiefs of State as a result of his acknowledged, world-wide reputation as an 
elder statesman.’  Haynes also observed, ‘such a trip could be attributed to the President’s 
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desire to strengthen the peace-keeping aspect of US foreign policy.’20  Komer took up the 
proposal with Williams: 
 
‘Soapy’, its becoming more and more apparent that our position on the 
Rhodesian problem is (a) gaining us no friends in independent Africa and 
(b) doing nothing to discourage or delay UDI.  Granted, the U.S. has little 
leverage in this situation.  However, it seems to me we’re not using what 
leverage we do have to best advantage.21 
 
Komer suggested that if Harriman visited Salisbury after the Rhodesian elections on May 
7, 1965 it could gain the United States ‘brownie points’ with the Africans and might 
dampen the enthusiasm of the Rhodesian Government for a UDI.22  It is not clear from 
the archives what happened to the NSC proposal for a troubleshooting visit, but the 
Bureau of African Affairs may have sidelined the initiative during its preparations for the 
African Chiefs of Mission Conference convened to consider a ‘New Policy For Africa.’23  
The NSC staff were also concerned that the Bureau of African Affairs was suffering from 
                                                 
20 LBJL: NSF, Files of Edward K. Hamilton, Box 3, Memorandum, Haynes to Komer, 19 April 1965.  
Emphasis in the original. 
21 LBJL: NSF, Files of Edward K. Hamilton, Box 3, Memorandum, Komer to Williams, 28 April 1965. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Williams carried out the review at Johnson’s request.  BHL: Williams Papers, State Department Files, 
Microfilm Edition, Series I, ‘Correspondence’, Reel 4, Henry Tasca, Acting Assistant Secretary for African 
Affairs, to Senator Long, 27 May 1965.  Haynes considered the review a qualified success.  He noted that it 
provided a feel for the political and economic climate in African states and broke down the parochialism of 
many U.S. Ambassadors who tended to see U.S. foreign policy only in terms of their countries of 
assignment. However, the conferences did not generate significant new ideas.  LBJL: NSF, Files of Ulric 
Haynes, Box 1, Memorandum, Haynes to Bundy, 5 June 1965. 
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inertia as a result of Williams’ recent extended absences to make speeches.  In June, 
Haynes advised Bundy that he had met with one of the President’s special assistants, Bill 
Moyers, to obtain Johnson’s thinking on African affairs.  Haynes reported that: 
 
Bill urged that we light the fires under AF [Bureau of African Affairs] to 
get them to move forward with more preventive diplomacy to avert crises.  
He advised that where State seems to be falling short in protecting and 
advancing the President’s interests in Africa, the NSC staff should not be 
reluctant to take the initiative.24 
 
However, the criticism levelled at Williams was unfair, as he was at this time extremely 
active on African policy and Rhodesia.  In June 1965 Williams put forward a very 
convincing rationale for a presidential visit to Africa.  He argued that such a visit would 
counter African (and African-American) perceptions that the United States accorded a 
low priority to African affairs, and establish a level of trust that could allow the State 
Department to develop understanding and support for specific policies.  Since the 
President bore ultimate responsibility for foreign affairs, he could, Williams suggested, be 
very persuasive in explaining and obtaining support for U.S. foreign policy.  Williams 
also observed, ‘The image of this administration, as distinct from its predecessor, is still 
unclear in Africa.’  A presidential visit would demonstrate to Africans Johnson’s personal 
impact on domestic policy in the U.S., especially his dynamic projection of the ‘Great 
Society’ and his struggle for civil rights.  It would also reciprocate the many visits of 
                                                 
24 LBJL: NSF, Files of Ulric Haynes, Box 1, Memorandum, Haynes to Bundy, 15 June 1965. 
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African heads of state to Washington, and undermine Communist claims that only they 
were really interested in Africa.25 
 
Williams was also central to the exposition of U.S. policy on the Rhodesian problem.  On 
the same day that Haynes wrote to Bundy about inertia in the Bureau of African Affairs, 
Williams gave a speech entitled ‘Southern Rhodesia Today,’ in which he stated 
unequivocally the U.S. position: 
 
Let me make our position crystal clear, so there will be no 
misunderstanding.  The United States will support the British Government 
to the fullest extent, if asked to do so, in its efforts to reach a solution of 
the Southern Rhodesian problem.  We would also support the British 
Government to the fullest extent, in case of a unilateral declaration of 
independence in Southern Rhodesia.26 
 
Williams was therefore working just as hard as the NSC to convince senior government 
figures that the United States should be playing a more active role in African affairs, 
though his approach was not coordinated with the NSC.  As the Rhodesian Crisis became 
more acute, the NSC became disillusioned with the tactics that it thought the Bureau of 
African Affairs was using to advance its position. 
 
                                                 
25 BHL: Williams Papers, State Department Files, Microfilm Edition, Series I, ‘Correspondence’, Reel 4, 
Memorandum, ‘Presidential Visit to Africa’, 11 June 1965. 
26 BHL: Williams Papers, State Department Files, Microfilm Edition, Series I, ‘Correspondence’, Reel 5, 
‘Speech to the Chicago Chapter of the American Federal Bar Association’, 15 June 1965, p. 6. 
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By October 1965, the NSC and the Bureau of African Affairs were clearly convinced that 
the British Government should adopt an effective deterrent strategy in its negotiations 
with the Rhodesian Government.  They struggled, however, to convince George Ball that 
the U.S. Government should apply diplomatic pressure both privately and publicly in 
support of that strategy.  Ball was resistant to deeper involvement in the crisis and told 
Bundy that the U.S. position should be to follow the British lead, so that if there was a 
‘blowup’ the British would not be able to blame the U.S. Government.27  Ball told 
Fredericks and other officials that a UDI was inevitable and suggested that the United 
States had ‘nothing to worry about.’  Both the NSC and the Bureau of African Affairs 
were alarmed by this complacency.  They wanted the public release of a private statement 
that the U.S. Government had sent to the Rhodesian Government warning against a UDI, 
and exerted pressure on Ball to refer the matter to Rusk.28  The Secretary of State refused 
to clear the statement, but this was by no means the end of the matter.  The next day, the 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch ran an article on Rhodesia reporting the ‘deep division of 
sentiment within the Johnson Administration’ and that Ball had blocked expressions of 
U.S. support for the British position and for economic sanctions.  The NSC staff thought 
that the leak came from the Bureau of African Affairs.  Komer sent a copy of the article 
to Bundy with a note, ‘This is lousy and will do no one any good!  I suspect some AF 
[Bureau of African Affairs] hands!’29  Komer’s suspicions about the origin of the leak are 
logical enough, since it suggested a straightforward attempt by the Bureau of African 
                                                 
27 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, 5 October 1965, FRUS, p. 816. 
28 LBJL: NSF, Rhodesia Country File, Box 97, ‘Memos and Misc., 12/63-1/66’, Memorandum, Haynes to 
Komer, 19 October 1965; also FRUS, p. 827. 
29 LBJL: NSF, Rhodesia Country File, Box 97, ‘Memos and Misc., 12/63-1/66’, Memorandum, Haynes to 
Komer, and Komer to Bundy, 2 November 1965.  This incident is also cited in Noer, Cold War and Black 
Liberation, p. 195. 
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Affairs to undermine the position of its opponents, which is ‘a standard bureaucratic 
maneuver.’30  However, press leaks can be used very subtly and it is worth considering 
what George Reedy has described as the ‘reverse-thrust technique.’31  In this case, as the 
story undermined rather than enhanced the position of the Bureau of African Affairs, it is 
possible that the leak came from Williams’ opponents.  Ultimately, however, the leak’s 
origin is not as significant as the fact that it demonstrates the methods used by factions 
within the bureaucracy to advance their policy positions. 
 
The question of support for Zambia 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, Zambian copper production was a key interest for the 
United States.32  Once the proposal to construct a railroad that would bypass Rhodesia 
and reroute Zambian trade through Tanzania began to work its way round the U.S. 
Government, the usual clash of interests rapidly emerged.  In a brief to Thomas Mann, the 
Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, Williams explained that the Bureau of 
African Affairs regarded Zambia as the keystone in a ‘Zone of Peace’ along the frontiers 
of the ‘white redoubt’ in southern Africa, which could be imperilled by Rhodesian 
economic warfare against Zambia in the event of a UDI.33  Williams acknowledged that 
the proposed Tanzania-Zambia rail link could not be completed in less than five years and 
                                                 
30 Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 
1974), p. 173. 
31 G. Reedy, The Twilight of the Presidency (New York: World Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 90-91.  
Quoted in Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, p. 179. 
32 See above, Ch. 6, pp. 316-17. 
33 BHL: Wiliams Papers, State Department Files, Microfilm Edition, Series I, ‘Correspondence’, Reel 4, 
Memorandum, Williams to Mann, 6 May 1965. 
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therefore could not provide a solution to the Zambian transportation problem during a 
period of confrontation with Rhodesia.34  However, Williams was still in favour of the 
project on the basis that: 
 
[It] may still be regarded as a psychological safety valve by which to 
moderate Zambian reactions to a Rhodesian UDI … Zambia could more 
rationally withhold any action against Rhodesia if morally and emotionally 
sustained by the belief that the action could be taken more effectively in a 
number of years when the link was completed.  Thus the maintenance of a 
receptive and helpful position by the United States toward the complicated 
rail link … is regarded as an important part of whatever temporizing 
influence we can exert on the situation.35 
 
The debate about the value of the Tanzania-Zambia rail link became complicated when 
Kenneth Kaunda, the Zambian President, informed Williams that the Chinese 
Government was going to offer to build it.  Ball, Rusk, and Johnson, dismissed this as 
nonsense.36  They were probably influenced by the most recent National Intelligence 
Estimate on sub-Saharan Africa, which had concluded that although Communists would 
be presented with new opportunities to expand their influence in sub-Saharan Africa, 
‘even the militant radicals prize their freedom of movement, and we consider it unlikely 
that any African country will become a full-fledged Communist state, or will reject all 
                                                 
34 The rail link (which was built with Chinese, not Anglo-American aid) actually took eight years to build.  
The UDI period lasted until 1980, but it is doubtful that this could have been foreseen by anyone in 1965. 
35 BHL: Wiliams Papers, State Department Files, Microfilm Edition, Series I, ‘Correspondence’, Reel 4, 
Memorandum, Williams to Mann, 6 May 1965, p. 2. 
36 Memorandum, Komer to Bundy, 28 May 1965, FRUS, pp. 798-99. 
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ties with the West.’37  However, the Bureau of African Affairs sharply rejected this 
complacency at the apex of U.S. policymaking.  Williams went head-to-head with Ball, 
arguing that potential Chinese involvement in the Tanzania-Zambia rail link ‘represents 
the most serious and dangerous Chinese thrust into Africa to date.’38  Williams pointed 
out that acceptance of the Chinese offer to build half the link would give the Chinese a 
bridgehead in Africa that would greatly facilitate support of the Congo rebels.  Also, 
failure to offer Western assistance would undercut President Kenneth Kaunda’s strategy 
of combating radical pressure on Zambia and Tanzania to take hostile action against the 
‘white redoubt.’  That could increase the likelihood of a racial war in southern Africa, 
‘heavily stacked in favor of the Chinese Communists and permitting full exploitation of 
their racial and violent revolutionary themes.’39  Williams acknowledged that the rail link 
would be expensive (estimates varied between $400 and $500 million) but argued that 
inaction could be even more costly in the longer term.  The potential financial and 
military risks for the United States included combating a reinvigorated rebel movement in 
the Congo, helping to offset the United Kingdom’s losses as a result of the cessation of 
Zambian copper production, and dealing with an increasingly violent racial confrontation 
in southern Africa that would be exploited by the Communists.40 Accordingly, Williams 
suggested that in order to avoid these risks the U.S. Government should offer to finance a 
survey of the rail link and form an international consortium for its construction.41 
                                                 
37 LBJL: NSF, National Intelligence Estimates, Box 8, ‘Problems and Prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa’, 
NIE Number 60/70-65, 22 April 1965. 
38 BHL: Williams Papers, State Department Files, Microfilm Edition, Series I, ‘Correspondence’, Reel 4, 
Memorandum, Williams to Ball, 8 June 1965, p. 1. 
39 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
40 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
41 Ibid., p. 3. 
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Elsewhere in the bureaucracy there was some limited recognition of the Chinese threat, 
but no commitment to the Tanzania-Zambia railroad project.  In July 1965, the NSC staff 
advised the President that the Chinese had indeed offered to survey the rail link and 
possibly build the Tanzanian segment.  They noted that although the cost of building a 
railroad might have been exaggerated, a highway project would still be a better option for 
a number of reasons.  First, construction of a railroad would take many years, by which 
time the Rhodesian threat might have receded and the railroad would therefore be a multi-
million dollar ‘white elephant.’  Second, the fact that Zambia and Southern Rhodesia 
jointly owned the existing rail route discouraged them ‘from taking precipitous vindictive 
action against the other.’42  And third, it was not clear that the Chinese possessed the 
financial resources for a large-scale construction effort.  Nevertheless, the President was 
advised ‘this whole problem bears close watching, since a major Chicom bridgehead in 
East Africa could be highly painful.’43  It is evident that for the NSC, the idea that the 
Chinese might become involved could not be dismissed as easily as Ball, Rusk, and 
Johnson had suggested.  The debate over the Tanzania-Zambia railroad project illustrates 
the relative priority attached to African policy by the different elements within the U.S. 
bureaucracy.  It gives a clear indication of the strategic thought within the Bureau of 
African Affairs and the NSC, which differed to varying degrees with the sanguine 
assessment of senior policymakers.  Ball, Rusk, and Johnson saw little direct threat to 
U.S. interests, and they demonstrated a clear preference for limited liability in funding 
support of U.S. policy objectives. 
 
                                                 
42 Memorandum, Komer and Haynes to the President, 12 July 1965, FRUS, pp. 800-01. 
43 Ibid. 
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After UDI 
 
Once the Rhodesian government declared its independence unilaterally, it pushed to the 
foreground questions about what economic sanctions the United States intended to 
impose upon the illegal regime, and what support would be given to Zambia.  These 
issues threatened to spill over into other aspects of U.S. policy in southern Africa, as 
Thomas J. Noer has observed: ‘Ball quickly recognized that the African Bureau and its 
supporters planned to try to use the Rhodesian crisis to implement all of the rejected 
options they had pushed for in the other areas of white rule.’44  In order to prevent this 
Ball sought to gain control of the decision-making process by appointing someone to take 
responsibility for U.S. policy on Rhodesia.  Ball’s first choice was U. Alexis Johnson, 
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, but he declined.  He then approached 
Roswell Gilpatric, who had been Assistant Secretary of State for Defense under Kennedy.  
This time, however, the President vetoed the appointment because of possible 
Congressional objections, and perhaps also for personal reasons.45  Ball and Bundy next 
turned to William D. Rogers, a former Attorney General, whom they both knew and 
whom the President approved.  According to Anthony Lake, Rogers was left in no doubt 
that the Bureau of African Affairs and its supporters ‘were trying to push a harder policy 
than Ball wanted’ and that it would be his job to act as ‘Ball’s lid on the rest of the 
                                                 
44 Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation, p. 198. 
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bureaucracy.’46  In a recent work, however, Andrew DeRoche rejects this ‘conspiratorial’ 
interpretation of Ball’s actions and suggests that Ball was not plotting to advance his 
‘Europeanist’ agenda at the expense of the more progressive ‘Africanists’ in the 
administration.47  DeRoche argues that: 
 
The implication of Lake’s account is that Ball was a racist who did not 
care about the plight of blacks in Southern Rhodesia.  The reality, 
however, was that Ball focused almost exclusively on the economic 
ramifications of UDI, particularly regarding Zambian copper.48 
 
DeRoche contends that Ball was concerned about the best interests of the black majorities 
in Zambia and Southern Africa, that he did listen to the views of African-Americans, and 
that G. Mennen Williams himself did not pigeonhole Ball as a ‘Europeanist.’49  One need 
not engage the question of whether Ball was a racist, although ‘the personal experiences, 
intellectual baggage, and psychological needs’ of policymakers may be significant 
determinants of the positions they take on any given issue.50  Rather, the significant fact is 
that Ball and Williams had different views of the best way to protect the national interest.  
Whereas Ball advocated limited liability, Williams was more inclined towards a fuller 
economic and political commitment in Africa. 
 
                                                 
46 Lake, The ‘Tar Baby’ Option, p. 82. 
47 DeRoche, Black, White and Chrome, p. 122. 
48 Ibid., p. 123. 
49 John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Oral History Interview Transcript, G. Mennen Williams, pp. 56-57.  
Cited in DeRoche, Black, White and Chrome, p. 123. 
50 Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, p. 16. 
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Neither welcome nor effective: explaining the limited influence of G. Mennen 
Williams and the Bureau of African Affairs 
 
There are several reasons – objective and subjective – why Williams was on the losing 
side of the bureaucratic battle over policy towards Rhodesia.  In his memoirs, Dean Rusk 
commented: 
 
Soapy Williams was one of the best Assistant Secretaries for African 
Affairs this country ever had.  He was hardworking, knowledgeable, loyal, 
and always considerate, but we disagreed on the role the United States 
should play in Africa.  Naturally he wanted us to put our best foot forward 
in Africa and send more foreign aid.  But we were pinched for funds, and 
his position did not prevail.51 
 
Rusk’s emphasis on the limited availability of funds to support a more active U.S. policy 
in Africa partly explains why the views of Williams and the Bureau of African Affairs did 
not prevail.  In 1962, Agency for International Development funds stood at $312 million, 
but declined to $261 million in 1963 and $202 million in 1964.52  Against this 
background it is not surprising that Williams failed to secure American involvement in 
building the Tanzania-Zambia railroad.  However, it is necessary to go beyond objective 
factors such as finance.  As J. Garry Clifford has commented: ‘In its emphasis on 
individual values and tugging and hauling by key players, bureaucratic politics makes 
                                                 
51 D. Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1990), p. 274. 
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personality and cognitive processes crucial to understanding who wins and why.’53  A 
variety of factors determine the degree of influence exerted by policymakers, including: 
temperament; bureaucratic skill; ability to mobilise outside support; and, most 
importantly, relations with the President.54 
 
When asked by a former colleague in the State Department to identify the quality that was 
essential in an effective Secretary of State, Dean Acheson is said to have replied without 
hesitation: ‘The killer instinct.’55  Acheson was referring not to the Secretary of State’s 
dealings with foreign governments, but to his relationship with other officials.  Waldemar 
Nielsen has commented that Williams was not temperamentally suited to the bureaucratic 
policy process, which consequently diminished his influence: ‘Assistant Secretary 
Williams, who swung an effective broadsword in the area of general salesmanship and 
political speech-making, had neither the taste not the talent for the fine épée work 
required in day-to-day internal staff debate.’56  According to Anthony Lake, although 
Wayne Fredericks exhibited greater persistence than Williams, his effectiveness was 
undermined by the fact that he had ‘gained a reputation for committing one of the most 
terrible bureaucratic gaffes: He made no secret of his beliefs, and treated foreign policy 
problems as something more than technical issues.’57  Perhaps, therefore, the overt policy 
emphasis in the Bureau of African Affairs on principles of racial equality and democracy 
tended to run against the culture of the State Department. 
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54 Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, pp. 219-32. 
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Influence is also determined by the range of skills wielded by the bureaucrat, which 
includes the ability to write concise, persuasive briefs.  Williams was adept at making his 
case on paper, as shown by his contribution to the debate over U.S. involvement in the 
Tanzania-Zambia railroad project, and his forceful advocacy of a presidential visit to 
Africa.  In other respects, however, Williams was less effective.  A crucial skill that 
Williams lacked or neglected is ‘knowing whom to call in a particular agency, because 
that individual is likely to favor what one wants done and can exert the necessary 
influence.’58   The documentary evidence suggests that Williams failed to coordinate his 
policy initiatives sufficiently closely with the staff on the NSC and other sections of the 
bureaucracy sympathetic to the position of the Bureau of African Affairs.  Indeed, NSC 
staff formed the impression that Williams was inactive, even though he was in fact 
consistently engaged with major issues such as the Rhodesian problem. 
 
Morton Halperin, a prominent bureaucratic politics theorist, has noted: ‘A major form of 
influence within the bureaucracy is the ability to mobilize the support of influential 
groups outside the executive branch.’59  Among the most significant groups are leading 
congressmen and senators and interest groups whose support the President needs.  
Nielsen has commented that Williams ‘became the target of a sustained barrage of 
criticism by Republicans in Congress, much of the press, and certain influential 
Democrats outside the Administration.’60  This was no doubt due to the sensitive 
correlation between U.S. policy towards southern Africa and the domestic civil rights 
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issue in the 1960s.  The Bureau of African Affairs was conscious of and sympathetic to 
the activities of pressure groups such as the American Negro Leadership Conference on 
Africa (ANLCA).  In June 1963, Williams encouraged Rusk to address an ANLCA-
sponsored dinner in New York, arguing that it would ‘lend renewed dignity to the efforts 
of both white and black groups to focus on national issues on which all can cooperate.’61  
However, Williams’ advocacy on behalf of the ANLCA brought him no additional 
influence within the administration because the President and senior advisers were hostile 
towards the development of a distinct African-American voice in U.S. foreign policy.62  
Similarly, the fact that Williams cultivated close links with Senator Robert Kennedy was 
unhelpful to Williams because of the open antipathy between Kennedy and Johnson.63 
 
Halperin has acknowledged: ‘The single most important determinant of the influence of 
any senior official is his relationship with the President.’64  Williams acknowledged this 
fact when he recalled: ‘We had to go to the top many times … Some of them we won, 
some of them we lost.’65  The most significant reasons for the limited influence of the 
Bureau of African Affairs is that other factions in the bureaucracy exacerbated and 
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exploited the weak personal relationship between Williams and Johnson, which had been 
clouded as a result of events at the 1960 Democratic Convention in Los Angeles.  
Williams and the liberal wing of the Democratic Party were not sympathetic to Johnson 
running with John F. Kennedy because they felt (mistakenly, as it turned out) that 
Johnson was weak on civil rights.  Robert Kennedy told Johnson that JFK wanted him on 
the ticket but warned him ‘Mennen Williams will raise hell,’ to which Johnson 
responded: ‘Piss on Mennen Williams!’66  Johnson was well known for his tendency to 
lash out when he felt injured, so the sentiment behind such language was probably not 
reserved for Williams.  On the other hand, Williams’s outspoken opposition to Johnson in 
1960 was a significant matter in Democratic Party politics.  Helen Berthelot, Williams’s 
campaign manager, has suggested it probably had a lasting impact: 
 
A picture which was to cloud Mennen’s political future for many years 
was on the front pages of the Detroit papers and appeared in many 
magazine reports of the convention.  It showed Mennen standing 6-feet-4 
with his mouth wide open yelling ‘No!’67 
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Many in Washington assumed that when Johnson became President he would push 
Williams out of office, but surprisingly he did not do so.  Williams recalled that soon after 
he was sworn in, the new President called Williams in and told him: ‘Now, Mennen, I 
want you to know that you’re going to be as welcome and as effective in the White House 
as you had been with Kennedy.’68  Johnson reassured Williams: ‘We’ve pulled down the 
curtain on Los Angeles that night.  We’re a team.’69  However, other members of the 
administration quickly demolished the bridges that Johnson had built, publicly 
undermining Williams’s position.  When Averell Harriman was appointed ambassador at 
large in April 1964, with special responsibility for Africa, he gave the press the 
impression that Williams had been demoted.  Johnson was outraged by Harriman’s 
comments and ordered Press Secretary George Reedy to counter the humiliation that had 
been inflicted on Williams.  Johnson also ordered Rusk to tell Harriman to put the press 
straight and apologise to Williams.  However, as Thomas J. Noer has commented: 
‘Despite Johnson’s public relations efforts, the damage had been done.  The Harriman 
appointment began a gradual erosion of Williams’ direct influence on diplomacy and 
foiled his attempts to make Africa a major priority in U.S. foreign policy.’70 
 
Perceptions in Washington of the personal relationship between Williams and Johnson 
offer a convincing reason why Williams’s influence diminished once Johnson became 
President.  This was compounded by the President’s lack of interest in African affairs, 
which was publicly known. When an article about this appeared in the Washington Post 
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on April 4, 1965 Haynes wrote to Komer: ‘As for “Soapy”, it only serves to compound 
his already precarious position.’71  Against this background, and with a following in 
Michigan impatient for his return to state politics, it is not surprising that Williams 
resigned from the Johnson administration in March 1966.72  Ironically, two months later 
Johnson made his only presidential speech on African affairs.  On May 26, 1966 he told 
the ambassadors of the Organisation of African Unity that the United States was with 
them ‘heart and soul’ as they struggled to establish racial equality, and he criticised the 
racial policies of the illegal Rhodesian regime.  Johnson made the speech partly to gain 
favour with African states and civil rights groups in the United States, but it chiefly 
reflected his concern to deflect attention from Robert Kennedy’s forthcoming visit to 
Africa.73  Johnson’s short-term politicking contrasted sharply with the strategic and 
principled thinking that Williams had demonstrated whilst he was in office and which he 
highlighted in his memoirs.   Reflecting on his time in office, he wrote that the national 
interest was a reasonable basis on which to formulate foreign policy but it sometimes 
obscured ‘the equally honest motivation of a desire to help fellow human beings who 
need help, and to make a better world.’74  In the case of Rhodesia, however, the weight of 
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the U.S. bureaucracy did not agree with his judgment that ‘what is morally right proves to 
be diplomatically right as well.’75  Unfortunately for Williams, the notion of what was 
morally and diplomatically right for Rhodesia was also very vague in the minds of the 
U.S. public, even among those who took most interest in U.S. foreign policy and African 
affairs. 
 
Pluralist influences and U.S. Rhodesian policy 
 
According to the pluralist perspective, political power in liberal democracies like Britain 
and the United States is widely dispersed between large numbers of individuals and 
groups, both inside and outside government.  Consequently, pluralists argue that there is 
no dominant class or group in society (which separates them from Marxists and elite 
theorists).  Rather, they suggest that groups compete to advance their sectional interests, 
and new groups emerge to advance new interests if such interests cannot be articulated 
through existing groups.76  ‘Thus a context is set for foreign policy making in which the 
executive is constantly aware of and responding to a range of interests and views.’77  It 
has been suggested that in the United States the executive is particularly subject to 
pluralist pressures in foreign affairs, as Melvin Small has commented: ‘In few countries 
has public opinion played such a significant role in the development of diplomatic and 
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military strategies as it has in the United States.’78  However, the term ‘public opinion’ is 
by no means straightforward: it certainly does not imply all members of the public.79  
Public opinion might be conceived as a pyramid: at the apex is a small elite, consisting of 
respected national political figures and journalists, who often create public opinion; below 
that small segment of society is the attentive public, well-educated, well-informed, and 
potentially active in influencing the government and the wider public; finally, the vast 
majority of the public is often badly-informed and usually takes no interest in foreign 
affairs, unless there is a national crisis.80  Small has observed that among the attentive 
public in the United States: ‘organized ethnic groups have exerted a major influence in 
national foreign policy debates.  Ethnic political activism has been a unique problem for 
diplomats representing the multicultural United States.’81  In recent years a number of 
historians have examined the linkage between the domestic civil rights campaign and 
United States foreign policy towards southern Africa during the Cold War.82  As Mary 
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Dudziak has noted, the problem of racism in the United States caused anxiety among 
Americans who asked themselves: ‘How could American democracy be a beacon during 
the Cold War, and a model for those struggling against Soviet oppression, if the United 
States itself practiced brutal discrimination against minorities within its own borders?’83  
Yet although U.S. domestic and foreign policies were often linked in the minds of 
policymakers and those who sought to influence them, the extent of American public 
interest in southern Africa during the 1960s should not be overstated for two major 
reasons.  First, white liberals in the United States quickly became disillusioned with 
Africa as a result of the endemic corruption and one-party rule in many newly 
independent states on the continent.  This also coincided with rising militancy in the 
domestic civil rights movement, which further alienated liberal white opinion.84  It may 
be argued that the lack of congressional interest in the Rhodesian Crisis before UDI was 
symptomatic of the disillusion among white liberals, and after UDI the handful of 
legislators who did express an interest were mostly pro-Rhodesian.85  Second, African-
Americans considered racism in the United States and the struggle for civil rights to be 
more important than foreign affairs, and when domestic racism was linked to foreign 
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affairs it was usually in the context of the Vietnam War.86  It may also be argued that 
when interest groups did emerge to campaign on southern African issues they suffered 
from a number of specific weaknesses that inhibited their ability to influence U.S. policy 
towards the region, as the following discussion demonstrates. 
 
In 1953 civil rights leaders, churchmen, and liberal Democrat politicians formed the 
American Committee on Africa (ACOA), which by 1965 had around 16,000 members.87   
According to its Executive Secretary, the white liberal George Houser, the ACOA was 
founded ‘to give active, tangible support to the liberation of Africa from colonialism, 
racism, and other social and political diseases of the same nature’.88  The ACOA sought 
to discourage all cooperation – especially in the economic sphere – between the United 
States and the minority regimes in southern Africa, but particularly South Africa.  It 
provided assistance to, and publicity for, African nationalists visiting the United States 
and United Nations to make speeches, and provided funds for the legal defence and 
welfare of political prisoners and their families.89  The ACOA cooperated with civil rights 
groups, such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP).  In December 1957 they organised a ‘Day of Protest’ – led by Eleanor 
Roosevelt and Martin Luther King – to commemorate the United Nations Declaration of 
Human Rights and to draw attention to the fact that the South African Government had 
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refused to sign it.90  In late 1961 the ACOA, together with other groups such as the 
NAACP, Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the Urban League, and the National 
Conference of Negro Women, formed the American Negro Leadership Conference on 
Africa (ANLCA), which aimed to represent the various strands in African-American 
thinking about U.S. policy towards Africa.91  In the announcement for its first conference 
in November 1962, the founders of the ANLCA explicitly linked the domestic civil rights 
campaign with African issues: 
 
We believe the 19 million American Negro citizens must assume a greater 
responsibility for the formation of United States policy in sub-Sahara 
Africa.  Negroes are of necessity deeply concerned with developments in 
Africa because of the moral issues involved and because the struggle here 
at home to achieve in our time equality without respect to race or color is 
made easier to the extent that equality and freedom are achieved 
everywhere.92 
 
It was a measure of their initial success that the leaders of the ANLCA were able to meet 
with President Kennedy in late 1962, which was the first time African-Americans had 
gained access to the White House to discuss U.S. foreign policy.93  In September 1964 
Dean Rusk delivered a speech to the second meeting of the ANLCA in Washington.  
British officials in Washington advised the Foreign Office: ‘Mr. Rusk rarely delivers 
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speeches about Africa and it is a measure of the importance of his audience that he did so 
on this occasion.’94  The Washington embassy was particularly conscious of the need to 
monitor the activities of the ANLCA at this time because Rhodesia was on the agenda 
and it featured in the resolutions of the meeting.  First, the ANLCA urged the U.S. 
Government to affirm in the United Nations its opposition to Rhodesian independence 
until the African majority enjoyed full political participation on the basis of ‘one man, 
one vote’.  Second, it expressed regret that the U.S. representative had abstained from the 
vote at the United Nations on the resolution calling upon the British Government to hold 
a constitutional conference.  Third, it urged the U.S. Government to ‘lend its full weight 
to obtaining the release of political prisoners in Southern Rhodesia’.  Finally, it 
condemned Ian Smith’s attempt to coerce the tribal chiefs into supporting his demand for 
immediate independence.95  However, the resolution on Rhodesia – like the others passed 
by the second conference of the ANLCA – had little impact on U.S. policy, as DeRoche 
has commented: ‘While the ANLCA’s resolutions manifested the desire of African-
American leaders that racial justice be extended to southern Africa, they basically failed 
to influence U.S. policy towards Southern Rhodesia in the fall of 1964.’96  DeRoche does 
not explain why this was the case, but there are a number of sources that do provide 
answers to this question. 
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The failure of interest groups such as the ACOA and the ANLCA to influence U.S. policy 
on southern African issues can be explained partly by their organisational and tactical 
weaknesses, and partly by attitudes towards African-Americans and African issues within 
the Johnson administration.  With regard to tactics, Anthony Lake has observed that the 
ACOA had only a limited effect on American policy towards southern Africa ‘because it 
focused, at least until the late 1960s, on New York and the United Nations rather than on 
Washington and the American government.’97  Further, when the ACOA did campaign in 
Washington it targeted the Bureau of African Affairs, which was already sympathetic to 
its aims, rather than the sections of the Johnson administration that constrained the 
Africanists.  Consequently, the ACOA ‘irritated the Bureau by pestering it to push for 
actions which could not possibly be sold to the rest of the bureaucracy.’98  Similarly, 
officials in the Bureau of African Affairs suggested that the ANLCA was ‘a long way 
from being an effective organ for bringing pressure to bear on the U.S. Government’, not 
least because its members had demonstrated a great deal of ignorance on African 
matters.99  This evidence tends to support the conclusions of contemporary academic 
studies, which pointed to the socio-economic factors that militated against African-
American knowledge about African affairs.100  However, it may be argued that ignorance 
about the Rhodesian Crisis was not limited to African-Americans, as DeRoche has 
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acknowledged: ‘In general, Southern Rhodesia did not capture the attention of the 
American public before UDI.’101  One student group at Princeton University found that 
there was so little news about Rhodesia in the United States – even though UDI was 
imminent – that it had to solicit information from a prominent British interest group.102  
In addition to lack of information, the effectiveness of the ANLCA was further 
undermined by the fact that it had no permanent office, which resulted in administrative 
weakness, such as the failure to publish its conference resolutions.103  Finally, as British 
officials noted, although African-American leaders had the ear of the White House on 
domestic civil rights issues, it was by no means clear that they enjoyed similar leverage 
on U.S. policy towards Africa.104  The last point is probably the most significant, since 
there is considerable evidence that President Johnson, and many in his administration, 
were determined to prevent the development of a distinct African-American voice in U.S. 
foreign policy. 
 
In December 1964 the ANLCA pressed the White House for a meeting with Johnson to 
discuss African policy.  According to an NSC memorandum, Johnson made it clear: ‘He 
doesn’t think it at all a good idea to encourage a separate Negro view of foreign policy. 
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We don’t want an integrated domestic policy and a segregated foreign policy.’105  The 
NSC suggested that as Rusk had a ‘particularly high standing’ with the ANLCA leaders 
he should try to deter them from pursuing a distinct African-American agenda on African 
affairs.106  Rusk met with the ANLCA in March 1965.  He did not state the 
administration’s position as baldly as Johnson had privately, but rather stressed the 
problems associated with U.S. policy, such as its strategic interest in the Azores base, 
which made its dealings with Portugal on African matters somewhat delicate.107  
However, this more subtle approach did not have its intended effect.  The NSC 
discovered shortly afterwards that the ANLCA intended to hold a meeting in order to 
create a permanent organisation for influencing U.S. foreign policy towards Africa, which 
Haynes saw as ‘an attempt to organize an “ethnic lobby” out of a heretofore relatively 
ineffective and loosely constituted interest group.’108  In order to remove the raison d’etre 
of such an ethnic lobby, Haynes urged a high-level U.S. ‘friendship tour’ of African 
states, which would combat the impression that U.S. interest in Africa was only triggered 
during times of crisis.109  Clifford Alexander, one of Johnson’s special assistants, had 
similar concerns about the ANLCA, and suggested that the Bureau of African Affairs 
should ‘not give as much time and attention to representatives of the Conference as they 
                                                 
105 LBJL: NSF, Africa Country File, Box 76, Vol. II (7/64-6/65), ‘Africa – General, Memos and Misc.’ [1 
of 2], Komer to Bundy, 6 January 1965.  Quoted in Krenn, Black Diplomacy, p. 134; and Lyons, ‘Keeping 
Africa off the Agenda’, p. 272. 
106 LBJL: NSF, Africa Country File, Box 76, Vol. II (7/64-6/65), ‘Africa – General, Memos and Misc.’ [1 
of 2], Bundy to Rusk, 7 January 1965.  Quoted in Krenn, Black Diplomacy, p. 134. 
107 LBJL: NSF, Files of Ulric Haynes, Box 1, Memorandum, Haynes to Bundy, 4 March 1965. 
108 LBJL: NSF, Files of Ulric Haynes, Box 1, Memorandum, Haynes to Komer, 25 March 1965. 
109 Ibid. 
 387  
have in the past’.110  Yet Haynes remained relatively relaxed about the ANLCA because 
he recognised that it lacked the organisational capabilities and financial resources to be 
effective.  He also noted that other interest groups such as the ACOA and American 
Society for African Culture were ‘anxious to sabotage the creation of an all-Negro lobby 
which might diminish their respective importance.’111  Haynes concluded at the end of 
August 1965 that that the ANLCA ‘has proven itself to be a loose conglomeration of 
disparate organizations which lacks the expertise and background to be of any real help to 
us in formulating African policy.’112  Haynes suggested that Lee White, a civil rights 
adviser, should emphasise to the ANLCA leadership the importance of consulting with 
the State Department before taking public positions critical of U.S. policy, and should 
express the administration’s hope that the ANLCA would be helpful on African 
matters.113  It may be argued that this clear desire within the Johnson administration to 
constrain the ANLCA during 1964 and 1965 was the most significant reason for its 
failure to influence U.S. policy towards southern Africa, which was compounded by 
organisational weaknesses in the ANLCA.  Anthony Lake has commented: ‘It was an 
important failure, for this was the only anti-apartheid group with a natural interest in 
Africa’.114 
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Conclusion 
 
The Johnson administration’s policy on Rhodesia can be seen as the result of compromise 
and conflict between different sections of the bureaucracy that competed to advance 
interpretations of how best to serve the national interest.  There were sharp differences of 
opinion between policymakers on the degree of support to give Britain and Zambia as a 
consequence of Rhodesia’s UDI, but ultimately the advocates of a minimalist strategy 
prevailed.  Several factors explain why the views of the Bureau of African Affairs were 
marginalised, but most significant among these was the inability of G. Mennen Williams 
to exert sufficient leverage with President Johnson, partly as a result of a clouded 
personal history and partly because Johnson had little interest in African affairs.  U.S. 
policy was also unaffected by interest groups concerned with southern Africa in general 
and Rhodesia in particular.  Once again, the prevailing attitudes within the Johnson 
administration are crucial to understanding why pluralist influences were so limited.  The 
bureaucratic politics and pluralist perspectives not only help to explain the process of 
policymaking in the Johnson administration, but also provide essential background for 
comprehending bilateral relations between the United States and Britain, which were 
explored in the preceding chapter. 
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Conclusion 
The Rhodesian Crisis in British and International Politics 
 
Reflections on the Rhodesian Crisis 
 
It is fashionable for historians to claim that their research is relevant to current events, not 
least because the chances of securing funding may be much improved by an emphasis on 
the relationship between past and present.  This thesis does not stress such claims, but it is 
reasonable to agree with Lord Owen’s recent comment that the horrendous situation in 
Zimbabwe today cannot be understood without reference to its history.1  It is also 
pertinent to wonder how the history of Zimbabwe would have turned out had there been 
no UDI, and to ask whether there was a realistic prospect that a UDI might have been 
averted.  Owen suggested that if the Conservative Party had been returned to power in 
October 1964 a UDI would not have occurred because the Commonwealth Secretary, 
Duncan Sandys, was ‘a very tough man’.  Owen also observed that the Conservatives 
would have enjoyed the benefit of authority derived from continuity in office, which the 
Labour Government lacked.2  On the other hand, it has been argued that relations between 
the Rhodesian Front and Labour were actually better than had been the case with the 
Conservatives, whom the Rhodesians perceived as too patrician.3  Another point that 
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militates against Owen’s counterfactual proposition is the continuity in policy between 
the Conservative and Labour Governments.  The historian Anthony Low has suggested in 
relation to decolonisation that Harold Wilson was a prisoner of Harold Macmillan’s 
determination in the early 1960s to placate African opinion.4  Indeed, as Chapter One of 
this thesis has pointed out, whilst Wilson was Leader of the Opposition he entered into a 
number of explicit commitments to bring about African majority rule in Rhodesia, which 
certainly tends to justify Low’s argument.  Oliver Wright, who served as Wilson’s 
Foreign Office Private Secretary, has also remarked specifically on the continuity in 
Rhodesian policy: 
 
What was encouraging about it was that while Lord Home was trying to 
deal with the problem of Ian Smith at 10 Downing Street he was very 
concerned to keep the Labour Party on board so that it would be a national 
policy toward Rhodesia and not merely a Conservative one.  Harold 
Wilson, when he took over at Number 10, continued this very much and 
tried to run Rhodesia keeping the Conservative Party on board.5 
 
This ‘national policy’ had profound political consequences in the wake of UDI because it 
splintered the Conservative Party and contributed to the decisive Labour victory in the 
1966 general election.  Aside from these obvious political advantages a number of other 
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factors may also explain the continuity in policy between the Conservatives and Labour.  
First, the resources available to consecutive governments do not differ significantly.  
When the Labour Government was elected in October 1964 it found that the balance of 
payments crisis limited its freedom of manoeuvre in foreign as well as domestic policy.  
Second, interest groups continually seek to influence government policy.  During the 
Rhodesian Crisis there were groups on the left and right of the political spectrum that 
watched carefully to ensure that the British Government did not take action prejudicial to 
the interests of either the African nationalists or the Europeans in Rhodesia.  Third, 
governments often inherit problems with certain options irrevocably ruled out.  The 
Chiefs of Staff had consistently ruled out the use of force against Rhodesia since the early 
1960s, which was a powerful constraint on government policy.  Finally, the Civil Service 
is a permanent source of policy advice, which probably reinforced the continuity in 
Rhodesian policy between the Conservatives and Labour in 1964.6  As one Fabian 
Society tract acknowledged: ‘There is the traditional suspicion widespread in the Labour 
party that it is the Foreign Office which diverts a Labour Government from pursuing a 
radical course in foreign policy.’7  From a slightly different perspective Lord Norton, a 
                                                 
6 This comment should be qualified with the observation that an incoming Labour administration is not 
permitted to have access to the political files of an outgoing Conservative administration, and vice versa.  I 
am grateful to Dr N. J. Crowson for this information. 
7 Rodney Fielding, The Making of Labour’s Foreign Policy (London: Fabian Society, 1975) p. 5.  This is 
known as the ‘power-bloc’ model of ministerial-civil servant relations.  Sir Nicholas Henderson has also 
commented that: ‘The Labour Government that came to power in 1964 were very (I think I may have 
reflected on this) very suspicious, not to say contemptuous, of officials.  They thought officials were trying 
to oppose what they were doing.’  CAC: DOHP, GBR/0014/DOHP 32, Sir Nicholas Henderson, Private 
Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1963-65, Transcript of Interview, 24 September 
1998, pp. 4-5. 
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respected academic, commented: ‘Insofar as they [civil servants] consciously exert 
influence over ministerial decisions, they do so not in pursuit of a particular party bias but 
rather in furtherance of what they perceive to be some “national interest”, seeking to steer 
ministers toward what one permanent secretary referred to as “the common ground”.’8  
Yet whatever reason best explains the continuity between the Conservatives and Labour, 
it does not mean that the Labour Government’s Rhodesian policy was the right approach, 
or that it was the only policy that it could have pursued. 
 
Continuity is only one of the remarkable features of the Labour Government’s Rhodesian 
policy.  Another is the extent to which the Prime Minister dominated the formulation and 
execution of that policy.  Philip Ziegler, Wilson’s official biographer, has observed that it 
is common for British Prime Ministers to take an interventionist role in foreign affairs and 
suggests that from the beginning of his time in office Wilson never intended to take a 
back seat in dealing with international problems.  In Ziegler’s opinion: 
 
It can fairly be said that Wilson devoted a disproportionate part of his time 
and energies to a problem like Vietnam, in which the British interest was 
no more than peripheral.  It is harder to criticise the time he devoted to 
Rhodesia, which was pre-eminently a British responsibility.9 
 
                                                 
8 Philip Norton, The British Polity  (London: Longman, 2nd edn., 1990), p. 221. 
9 Philip Ziegler, Wilson: The Authorised Life of Lord Wilson of Rievaulx (London: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 
219. 
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A month after UDI Richard Crossman estimated that half of Wilson’s time was spent 
dealing with the Rhodesian Crisis.10  It is probable that Wilson devoted a similarly high 
proportion of his time to Rhodesia in the months preceding UDI.  Was this, as Ziegler 
suggests, a justifiable preoccupation?  Several factors may be adduced in support of his 
assessment.  First, Wilson was the chief of a largely inexperienced Cabinet, and it might 
be argued that this compelled him to take a leading role in all manner of executive 
problems, including Rhodesia, which was multi-faceted and therefore could not be left 
entirely in the hands of the Commonwealth Relations Office.  Second, during the early 
months of the Labour Government the position of Wilson’s first Foreign Secretary, 
Patrick Gordon Walker, was compromised by the fact that he did not have a seat in the 
House of Commons, which immediately enhanced Wilson’s role in foreign affairs.  Third, 
Wilson’s academic background (as an economist at Oxford) meant that he was 
theoretically well suited to comprehending the economic dimensions of the Rhodesian 
Crisis.  On the other hand, it can equally be argued that Wilson’s dominance had 
deleterious effects.  First, it undermined the notion of collective Cabinet responsibility for 
Rhodesian policy, which other complications in the Government’s affairs tended to 
reinforce.  Marcia Williams, Wilson’s political secretary, wrote in her memoirs that 
Rhodesia simply did not get the attention that it deserved before UDI because the 
Government was preoccupied with the economic crisis in Britain.11  A second, and related 
point is that because there was little sense of collegiality, the direction of the 
                                                 
10 R. H. S. Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister. Volume 1: Minister of Housing, 1964-66 (London: 
Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, 1975), p. 407, entry for Thursday 9 December 1965.  Crossman was 
also ‘disconcerted’ to find out that James Callaghan was spending around a third of his time dealing with 
Rhodesia (though it really should have been no surprise that the Chancellor of the Exchequer was so 
engaged with matters relating to economic sanctions). 
11 Marcia Williams, Inside Number 10 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), p. 34. 
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Government’s Rhodesian policy was not subject to proper scrutiny by the Cabinet.  The 
result, in the words of Robert Good, the U.S. Ambassador to Zambia at the time of UDI, 
was a policy that ‘placed Rhodesia’s neighbour, Zambia, in mortal danger, came within 
an ace of destroying the multiracial Commonwealth, and promoted an unprecedented 
involvement of the United Nations in programmes of dubious effectiveness and therefore 
of questionable wisdom.’12 
 
Good commented that after UDI, ‘Wilson’s reactions to his several “constituencies” 
produced a policy constantly working at cross-purposes’,13 but this is equally true of the 
period preceding UDI, which can be demonstrated by analysing the effects of Wilson’s 
decision to rule out the use of force.  Wilson calculated that by excluding military action 
– not only in private but also in public – he would satisfy the first of his constituencies: 
British public opinion and the Conservative Party.  However, this was either partially or 
entirely at cross-purposes with the other constituencies of which Wilson had to take 
account.  In Rhodesia, Wilson hoped that his rejection of force would encourage the 
African nationalists to adopt a more realistic aim than immediate majority rule, but it is 
clear that he only succeeded in giving the Rhodesian Front the green light to proceed with 
a UDI.  In the Commonwealth, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and a handful of African 
                                                 
12 Robert C. Good, UDI: The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion (London: Faber, 1973), p. 
292. 
13 Ibid., p. 295.  In an academic study written shortly after the publication of Good’s book, Martin Mason 
also highlighted the contradictions in British policy.  Britain’s explicit aims of maintaining authority over 
Rhodesia, and discharging its responsibility to the African majority before relinquishing authority, were 
incompatible with the implicit aims of maintaining Britain’s international prestige, and preserving its 
general economic interests.  Responsibility Without Power: Britain and Rhodesia Since 1965 (Ottawa, 
Carleton University, 1975), pp. 6-8. 
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moderates were relieved that the British Government did not intend to use troops to 
impose a solution in Rhodesia, but the majority of the Afro-Asian members suspected the 
British of connivance with their ‘kith and kin’.  Denis Greenhill, who went on to become 
Permanent Under Secretary in the Foreign Office within a few years of UDI, has 
suggested that Wilson ‘was far too sensitive ... to the feelings of other Commonwealth 
countries and that made it very difficult to get a settlement really’.14  Yet this ignores the 
fact that Wilson not only felt a deep personal sense of attachment to the Commonwealth 
but also ‘believed that it represented the surest way by which his country could remain 
among the foremost powers’.15  In the United Nations the Afro-Asians and the Soviet 
bloc also condemned Britain for its unwillingness to use force, pointing out that it was 
morally wrong to leave the African majority in Rhodesia under white oppression.  
However, arguments were also put forward suggesting that this created a situation in 
Rhodesia that constituted a regional threat to international peace and security within the 
meaning of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  The Labour Government found it necessary 
to go along with a programme of mandatory sanctions, which was entirely inconsistent 
with its concerns about creating a precedent that could be applied against South Africa.  
The fact that sanctions failed to work also exposed Britain to continuing criticism at the 
United Nations, as Lord Caradon, Britain’s diplomatic representative in New York 
commented: ‘the credit we had achieved and the merit we had achieved in the general 
membership was much reduced by our failure to cope with Rhodesia.’16  It is therefore a 
central contention of this thesis that although the Labour Government’s decision not to 
                                                 
14 CAC: DOHP, GBR/0014/DOHP 3, Baron Greenhill of Harrow, Assistant Under Secretary of State, 1964-
66, Transcript of Interview, 14 February 1996, p. 10. 
15 Ziegler, Wilson, p. 219. 
16 Rhodes House Library, Oxford: Oxford Colonial Records Project, MSS Brit. Emp. s395, Lord Caradon, 
Transcript of Interview, 23 April 1971, p. 29. 
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use force to impose a constitutional settlement in Rhodesia was politically safe in 
domestic terms, it represented a grave error of judgment in relation to Britain’s 
international standing. 
 
This thesis has also argued that the Labour Government’s handling of the Rhodesian 
Crisis created difficulties in Britain’s relations with its Old Commonwealth partners and 
the United States.  It is clear from the evidence in The National Archives that the 
Government’s contingency planning to deal with a UDI was compromised by a lack of 
momentum. This was a result of the tendency in the Defence and Oversea Policy 
Committee to defer crucial decisions pending an assessment of the circumstances that 
prevailed at the time of a UDI.  The Old Commonwealth and the United States – who 
were resolved to do no more than follow Britain’s lead in the event of a UDI – therefore 
could not formulate their own contingency plans, which left them feeling frustrated with, 
and even suspicious of, the British Government.  Bureaucratic conflict between the 
Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), which revealed much 
confusion about the aims of the Government’s Rhodesian policy, exacerbated this 
lamentable state of affairs.  The CRO was chiefly responsible for the Government’s 
contingency planning to deal with a UDI, but according to Denis Greenhill it was a 
‘superfluous Ministry’ and a ‘useless department’.17  Greenhill was of course a Foreign 
Office mandarin, so it is not surprising that he criticised the CRO in such unequivocal 
terms, but he was not the only one to do so.  According to the Confederation of British 
Industry, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Arthur Bottomley, was ‘of 
no quality whatsoever’ and was ‘hopelessly out of his depth’, and his Permanent Under 
                                                 
17 CAC: DOHP, GBR/0014/DOHP 3, Baron Greenhill, Transcript of Interview, 14 February 1996, p. 9. 
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Secretary, Sir Saville Garner, was ‘a dead bloody loss’.18  Garner’s own memoirs 
acknowledge ‘a mood of disillusionment’ in the CRO, which reflected concerns about the 
future of the Department, and ‘a constant undercurrent of criticism’ in Parliament, the 
press, and other government departments.19  Low morale may have contributed to the 
CRO’s poor performance during Rhodesian Crisis, which was especially evident in its 
liaison role with the Old Commonwealth and the United States.  In conclusion, it is clear 
that the weaknesses in the Labour Government’s administrative machinery compounded 
the confusion in its Rhodesian policy, which resulted not only in vociferous criticism of 
Britain by Afro-Asian states in the Commonwealth and the United Nations, but also in a 
loss of Britain’s prestige among its closest international partners. 
 
Some thoughts on future research 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that the Rhodesian Crisis was multi-faceted and enormously 
complex by analysing only its British, Commonwealth and American contexts.  Further 
work is necessary on certain points associated with these contexts, and on other aspects of 
the Rhodesian Crisis that this thesis has not addressed (for reasons of space).  As far as 
the British domestic context is concerned, more research is necessary on attitudes within 
the Parliamentary Labour Party and Labour constituencies.  It would be helpful, for 
example, to evaluate Dr David Kerr’s claim that ‘Vietnam rather captured the left wing of 
the Labour Party, both inside and outside the House’, to the extent that it overshadowed 
                                                 
18 Peterhouse School Archives, Marondera, Zimbabwe: Papers of Sir Humphrey Gibbs, ‘Report on CBI 
Mission to Rhodesia, October 1965’, p. 13.  Transcript of a recording by Eric Faulkner (who was a member 
of the mission).  Quoted in Richard Coggins, ‘Rhodesian UDI and the search for a settlement, 1964-8: 
failure of decolonization’, Oxford D.Phil (2002), p. 75. 
19 Joe Garner, The Commonwealth Office 1925-1968 (London: Heinemann, 1978), pp. 365-69. 
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Rhodesia.20  Yet there are some obstacles to this line of enquiry.  First, the records in the 
National Museum of Labour History in Manchester are very patchy, at least in relation to 
the period before UDI.21  Second, it may be the case that the records of Labour 
constituencies do not provide much information about Rhodesia, either because the 
minutes of constituency meetings only briefly record decisions rather than full discussion, 
or because records have simply been lost or destroyed.  Kees Maxey, a member of the 
Billericay Constituency Labour Party, which was very active during the Rhodesian 
Crisis,22 has suggested that the majority of constituencies with which he had any contact 
did not share the careful approach to record keeping practiced by the Billericay 
Constituency.23  Similarly, very little is known about attitudes among Liberal MPs and 
Liberal constituencies towards the Labour Government’s Rhodesian policy,24 which may 
                                                 
20 Dr David Kerr, MP for Wandsworth and Parliamentary Private Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, 1967-69, in ‘Rhodesian UDI’, ICBH Witness Seminar, 6 September 2000, Session One Transcript, 
p. 26.  http://www.icbh.ac.uk/icbh/witness/rhodesia 
21 National Museum of Labour History, Manchester: Commonwealth Papers: Southern Rhodesia 
Correspondence (1961-1969) and Southern Rhodesia Documents (1963-1966). 
22 The Billericay Constituency formed a Rhodesia study group, which wrote Rhodesia: The background to 
the present conflict, and policy for the British Government (Essex: Billericay Constituency Labour Party, 
September 1968).  A copy is in the School of Oriental and African Studies: Archives of the Movement for 
Colonial Freedom, Box 60, COU 122 (b) Southern Rhodesia 1963-1972. 
23 Conversation with the author, Dr Michael Kandiah, and Dr Richard Coggins, London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 5 January 2006.  Maxey is the author of From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe 
(London: Fabian Society, 1972); and The Fight For Zimbabwe. The Armed Conflict in Southern Rhodesia 
since UDI (London: Rex Collins, 1975).  His papers are deposited in Rhodes House Library, Oxford. 
24 There is some material dealing with Jo Grimond’s views in the British Library of Political and Economic 
Science: Papers of Alastair Hetherington, Hetherington/10. 
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be considered a significant factor in relation to Labour’s slim parliamentary majority 
between 1964 and 1966. 
 
The international dimensions of the Rhodesian Crisis are the most neglected.  This thesis 
has redressed the balance to some extent by exploring the Commonwealth context, 
especially the consultation and co-operation between Britain and its Old Commonwealth 
partners, which has been acknowledged as a new and important avenue of inquiry.25  
Relatively little attention has been paid to the United Nations dimension of the Rhodesian 
Crisis.  Some studies have focused on Rhodesia’s complicated status in international 
law,26 and there was a steady stream of literature dealing with sanctions imposed after 
UDI.27  This thesis has touched briefly upon British attitudes towards UN involvement in 
the Rhodesian Crisis, but it is also important to look at how the British Government 
managed the issue at the UN in the period before UDI.  Britain relied heavily on its Old 
Commonwealth partners and the United States to prevent the Rhodesian Crisis from 
slipping out of its control in the General Assembly and the Security Council, but this gave 
                                                 
25 Introductory comments by Professor Arne Westad, Chair, Panel Four, ‘Rhodesian UDI: The International 
Context’, Rhodesian UDI: 40 Years On Conference, London School of Economics and Political Science, 6 
January 2006. 
26 For example, Claire Palley, The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1966); J. Nkala, The United Nations, international law and the Rhodesian independence 
crisis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985); and V. Gowland-Debbas, Collective responses to illegal acts in 
international law: United Nations action in the question of Southern Rhodesia (London: Nijoff, 1990). 
27 See, for example: T. Curtin and D. Murray Economic Sanctions and Rhodesia (London: Institute of 
Economic Affairs, 1967); R. B. Sutcliff, Sanctions Against Rhodesia (London: Africa Bureau, 1968); L. T. 
Kapungu The U.N. and economic sanctions against Rhodesia (Lexington: D. C. Heath, 1973); H. R. Strack, 
Sanctions: the Case of Rhodesia (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1978); and M. Bailey, Oilgate: The 
Sanctions Scandal (London: Coronet Books, 1979). 
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rise to certain anomalies about which little has been written.  For example, Canada and 
New Zealand saw the UN as a cornerstone of their external relations, but they were 
placed in the invidious position of supporting the British claim that Rhodesia did not fall 
within the UN’s competence.  The United States also found itself – not for the first or the 
last time – supporting British colonial policy despite its supposedly anti-imperial heritage.  
There is a great deal of material in British, Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, and 
American archives that will illuminate how the Rhodesian Crisis was managed in its UN 
context, and the consequences of this. 
 
In terms of methodology, an interdisciplinary approach – which has so far been totally 
lacking – may lead to greater understanding of many aspects of the Rhodesian Crisis.  
Historians sometimes make excellent use of theory to frame their empirical research, but 
their efforts in this regard are usually limited to one or two theoretical paradigms.  To 
give two examples: in his book Dilemmas of Appeasement, Gaines Post Jr. observed the 
consequences of bureaucratic politics in British foreign policy formulation during the 
1930s and acknowledged the utility of deterrence theory for analytical purposes; and 
Louise Richardson’s When Allies Differ examined Anglo-American relations during the 
Suez Crisis and Falklands War from the perspective of alliance theory.28  However, the 
Rhodesian Crisis provides a single case study that can be analysed from multiple 
theoretical perspectives in political science and international relations.  At the domestic 
level these include intra-executive relations, bureaucratic politics, executive-legislative 
relations, and a variety of pluralist perspectives dealing with the media, pressure groups 
                                                 
28 Gaines Post Jr., Dilemmas of Appeasement: British Deterrence and Defense, 1934-1937 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1993).  Louise Richardson, When Allies Differ: Anglo-American Relations During the 
Suez and Falklands Crises (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996). 
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and public opinion.  At the international level there are many useful analytical 
perspectives and models for this study, such as the concept of crisis, theory and practice 
of negotiation, alliance theory, multilateral diplomacy, deterrence, and coercive 
diplomacy.  Future research on the Rhodesian Crisis carried out from these theoretical 
perspectives would therefore be useful not only for scholars of British decolonisation and 
international history, but also political scientists interested in domestic aspects of foreign 
policy formulation, and international relations theorists concerned with the operation of 
the international states system. 
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Appendix 
 
The Rhodesian Franchise1 
 
 
The franchise is for voters of all races registered on one of the two rolls and extends to all 
citizens aged 21 years or over, resident in the country for more than two years, subject to 
certain property, income or educational qualifications.  The following are the 
qualifications required for each role. 
 
‘A’ Roll 
 
(a) Income of £792 or ownership of property of value of £1,650, or 
(b) Income of £528 or ownership of property of value of £1,100 and completion of a 
course of primary education, or 
(c) Income of £330 or ownership of property of value of £550 and four years 
secondary education, or 
(d) Appointment to the office of Chief or Headman. 
 
‘B’ Roll 
 
(a) Income of £264 or ownership of property of value of £495, or 
(b) Income of £132 or ownership of property of value of £275 and two years 
secondary education, or 
                                                 
1 Source: London School of Economics: British Library of Political and Economic Science, Papers of 
Arthur George Bottomley, Bottomley 26, Box 3, Fact Sheets on the Commonwealth: Rhodesia (London: 
HMSO, August 1965), p. 4, ‘Franchise’. 
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(c) Over 30 years of age and income of £132 or ownership of property of value of 
£275 and primary education, or 
(d) Over 30 years of age and income of £198 or ownership of property of value of 
£385, or 
(e) Kraal heads with a following of 20 or more heads of families, or 
(f) Ministers of religion. 
 
Provision is made for a person paying for property by instalments to qualify for the ‘B’ 
Roll.  A married woman is deemed to have the same qualifications as her husband (one 
wife only) if she does not qualify in her own right.  No limit is set to the number of 
persons who can register as voters but in elections in ‘A’ Roll constituencies ‘B’ Roll 
voters do not count for more than 25 per cent of ‘A’ Roll votes cast; in ‘B’ Roll electoral 
districts ‘A’ Roll votes do not count for more than 25 per cent of ‘B’ Roll votes cast. 
 
Registered voters on 30th April 1963 were as follows: 
 
‘A’ Roll ‘B’ Roll 
Africans 2, 251  10,214 
Europeans 88,256  570 
Asians 1,193  107 
Coloureds 1,275  166 
TOTAL 92,975  11,057 
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